

*OUROBOROS*: IDENTITY WAR AS A REACTION TO THE TRANSFORMATIVE MISSION OF  
LIBERALISM

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII AT MĀNOA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

AUGUST 2017

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Keywords: identity, future conflicts, great powers, military philosophy, Liberalism, preemption,  
philosophy

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This dissertation is much more than a long answer to academic questions. It is the accumulation of years of working in the national security field. It has been a long journey, beginning in 1997 as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army. This dissertation reflects in many ways, the thoughts and ideas of all of the wonderful men and women I've had the privilege to serve with across the United States and in many countries. It was their hard work and courage that allowed me to move beyond the military to address the questions in these pages.

My deepest gratitude goes to Jairus Grove, who took a chance on me as a student, and then my proposal, answering all my questions with patience and cheer. I would like to thank my other committee members for their support of my very non-traditional academic plan: Richard Chadwick, Kate Zhou, Nicole Grove, and particularly Pete Hoffenberg, all of whose guidance and care has been priceless. I would like to thank the faculty at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School with whom I've continued correspondence and who always took the time to translate my clumsy ideas into new research paths: Doowan Lee, John Arquilla, Gordon McCormick, Leo Blanken, Douglas Borer, and especially David Tucker, now of Ashland University, whose wonderful works informed my own rather poor attempt. Joe Coolman, who did my job so I could write; Eun Jung Kim who provided critical reading advice that did much to shape the final product; Bryan Cecrle and the trivia nights that kept me sane; Sam Metzger and his wise counsel; Neal Davis, and his unquestioning trust.

Of course my family for their love and support. Leah, for putting up with me and for being patient and cheerful over these many years; my wonderful son Josh, who inspires me every day to be a better person. My own parents Barb and Larry Reynolds whose endless sacrifices gave me a chance. My in-laws Bob and Sharon Mihelbergel who, sadly, passed just as I began this last leg of the journey. It has been a pleasure of my life to give something of their enthusiasm back. Finally, this is for everyone who never left the battlefield.

## **ABSTRACT**

Liberalism has a global transformative mission which requires an ideologically democratic core, and an illiberal periphery. The Liberal west, absent the stable framework provided by the Cold War, increasingly intervenes in that periphery, ostensibly to set up democratic, security centered adjuncts. At the same time as Liberalism arose, states collectivized violence through their war machines, mass production of military power and Clausewitzian war was developed to support them.

Clausewitzian war was a credible deterrent and an effective tool for incubating emerging Liberal states. Twice in the twentieth century, during World Wars One and Two, collectivized violence was used to defeat illiberal, totalitarian regimes that threatened the stability, i.e., growth of the Liberal states. In the neo-liberal period, leading states developed international economic institutions that interlaced national economies to such an extent as to make the costs of structural wars, like those of the twentieth century, far outweigh possible benefits. Accordingly, state versus state war declined while internal and internationalized internal war remained high. The liberal system became balanced between a developed, rich, democratic internal, and a power poor, resource rich external, a system-within-a-system.

Systemic insurgents do not labor under a trinity of passion, government, and military. Instead, all three are centered in the individual and produce an unlimited enmity because Liberalism requires a change in life modality- an existential threat. This is a change in the nature of conflict. The objective is no longer to separate the trinity and force defeat. Within the singularity, only destruction can achieve transformation from coexistence into consensus. This kind of partisan war is political war, and in late Liberalism, political war is revolutionary war. Once identified as an existential threat, the partisan must be destroyed; the failure of the war machine leads to highly technical applications of the strategy of preemption. Preemption, increasingly centered on the individual then becomes the strategy of a future of securitized life.

Liberal states, particularly the West, began to view conflict as a way to ensure the stability that maximized their benefits, i.e., a method of social control. Not surprisingly, the periphery generated resistance groups that increasingly rejected neoliberalism. These groups, bound together by identity, convert their knowledge of self into an advantage that translates into winning strategies that nullify the Clausewitzian advantages in the distribution of military power. Still, Liberal states are increasingly drawn into identity conflicts for which they are ill-prepared in an attempt to maintain, and even extend, the international system to maximize their own benefits.

My thesis is that the production of resistance that is the basis for Liberalism's continuing counter-insurgent wars are a reaction to Liberalism's attempt to transform the system. There are several supporting hypotheses which must be explored to get to this end: That the irregularity of partisan war is a product of the emphasis on regular war in the normative distribution of power; that Clausewitzian war is weaker than the knowledge that generates identity; and, that powerful states choose to destroy individuals in an attempt to circumvent the knowledge advantage through preemption. Accordingly, I am examining the nature of the security apparatus and the use of military interventions to pacify the periphery as the primary tool of expansion.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANZUS – Australia, New Zealand & United States

ARVN – Army of the Republic of Vietnam

AQ – Al Qaida

AQIZ – Zargawi Al Qaida in Iraq

COSVN - Central Office for South Vietnam

CRUA - Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA)

DMZ – Demilitarized Zone

ENA – Etoile Nord Africaine (North African Star)

FAE – Fundamental Attribution Error

FIS - Islamic Salvation Front

FLN - *Front de Libération Nationale*

GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GVN – Government of Vietnam

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

ICP – Indochina Communist Party

ISI - Pakistani Intelligence Service

ISIS – Islamic State in Syria

IR – International Relations

MAAGV - Military Advisory and Assistance Group-Vietnam

MACV – Military Assistance Command Vietnam

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NORAD – North American Aerospace Defense Command

NLF - National Liberation Front

OAS - Organisation *de l'armée secrète* (Organization of the Secret Army or OAS)

PPA – Parti Populaire Algerien (Algerian Peoples Party)

RPG -Rocket Propelled Grenade

SEATO – Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SPETSNEZ - Soviet/Russian Special Forces

UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program

WTO – World Trade Organization

## CHAPTER ONE: WAR WRIT LARGE

*"The condition of man... is a condition of war of everyone against everyone."*  
Thomas Hobbes

### 1.1. 9/11 Vignette

The security crisis of late Liberalism began on a Tuesday morning. It was September and the weather was fine for flying. At 846am American flight 11, bound for Los Angeles, crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, in New York. At 903am, United Flight 175 flew into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. At 937am, American 77 crashed into the Pentagon. At 1002am, United 93, turned over on its back, and at 580 miles an hour crashed into a field at Shanksville, PA.<sup>1</sup> The morning of September 11th acts as a simulacrum of the change in conflict. As tactic, it was genius, and while later reports would make clear that the United States did have plans for shooting down hijacked airliners, the plans were rusty and difficult to execute across the vast American government bureaucracies. A relatively unknown resistance group calling itself Al Qaida had mobilized a group of men to kill themselves in an asymmetry that, would for a while, achieve tactical reciprocity with the world's superpower. The attack on 9/11 itself was the product of a fatwa issued in 1996 calling for the violent ejection of the 'infidels' from Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden wrote:

"The King has violated the prophet's command by allowing the crusaders to be in the Arab Peninsula. The Prophet said on his deathbed: "Expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula." He also said "If it should please God Almighty that I live, I will expel the Jews and the Christians from the Arabian Peninsula." It is out of date and no longer acceptable to claim that the presence of the crusaders is a necessity and only a temporary measure to protect the land of the two holiest sites..."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> 9/11 Commission Report. "Inside the Four Flights." Pp. 1-14.

<sup>2</sup> Osama bin Laden's Declaration of War, Counter Terrorism Center, West Point, NY. Found online at [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Osama\\_bin\\_Laden%27s\\_Declaration\\_of\\_War](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Osama_bin_Laden%27s_Declaration_of_War)

In the 1996 fatwa, Bin Laden acknowledged the difficulty of competing with the Americans on purely military terms. The need to strike in such a way against a materially superior opponent that allows for limited tactical superiority, i.e., the engagement, in a way that allows the weaker adversary to continue towards strategic victory is a problem that resistance groups have struggled with since the advent of firearms. By February 1998, the leading light of Al Qaida had developed an answer: Targeting civilians. Ayman al Zawahiri, an original Muslim Brotherhood member and fugitive from Egypt, had joined Bin Laden in Afghanistan. Providing a list of transgressions against Muslims by the United States-Israel alliance, al Zawahiri called for the murder of any American, anywhere on earth, as the "individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."<sup>3</sup> Zawahiri's proclamation was followed by two attacks. In August of 1998, the group pulled off the spectacular twin bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, killing over 200 people. The United States responded with *Operation Infinite Reach*, a limited missile strike against Al Qaida camps in Sudan and Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup> In October of 2000, two al Qaida suicide bombers in a small inflatable boat, pulled up to the port side of the USS Cole, a U.S. Navy destroyer in the port of Aden for refueling. Some five hundred pounds of explosive ripped a forty-foot hole in the hull, killing seventeen sailors.<sup>5</sup>

The al Qaida attacks achieved a perception of success incommensurate with their material costs, while there is evidence that the U.S. response pushed disparate elements

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<sup>3</sup> 9/11 Commission Report. "Text of World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders." Al Quds al Arabi, Feb. 23, 1998 (trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service), which was published for a large Arab world audience and signed by Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al Zawahiri.

<sup>4</sup> PBS Frontline. "Bombings of the Embassies of the USA at Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, August 7, 1998." Found online at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/summary.html>

<sup>5</sup> Lamothe, Dan. "The USS Cole Was Bombed 15 Years Ago." Washington Post, 12 October 2015. Found online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/10/12/the-uss-cole-was-bombed-15-years-ago-now-its-a-floating-memorial-to-those-lost/>

of Islamic extremist closer together.<sup>6</sup> Al Qaida's initial successes notwithstanding, reciprocity demands attention from the adversary, and few people outside the intelligence communities of western states were paying much attention. Bin Laden decided the way to get that attention was to kill *more* civilians. "It is far better for anyone to kill a single American soldier than to squander his efforts on other activities," he said. Asked whether he approved of terrorism and of attacks on civilians, he replied:

"We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind. We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets."<sup>7</sup>

Citing the Soviet loss in Afghanistan, Bin Laden was prepared for another long struggle against a superpower. Dedicated mujahedeen could overcome a materially superior opponent, saying "We are certain that we shall-with the grace of Allah-prevail over the Americans." He went on to warn that "If the present injustice continues . . . it will inevitably move the battle to American soil."<sup>8</sup>

Bin Laden's war against the West was oversimplified in the late 1990s. The world had experienced terrorism throughout the 1970s, and Bin Laden seemed to be resurrecting that totem. In many of his speeches and interviews, he linked his own jihad to the Palestinian issue. There was a simplicity there- stop oppressing Palestine, and he would call it even. And the West responded. The number of initiatives meant to create peace were infinite, with the belief

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<sup>6</sup> Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Vintage, 2007. Print. "1998 Missile Strikes on Bin Laden May Have Backfired," National Security Archive, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 253, 20 August 2008; Naftali, Timothy (2006). *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*. New York: Basic Books

<sup>7</sup> PBS Frontline "Hunting Bin Laden," May 1998. Found online at [www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html)).

<sup>8</sup> PBS Frontline "Hunting Bin Laden," May 1998. Found online at [www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html)).

that if a viable Palestinian state was created, Bin Laden would choose peace. What was missed was Bin Laden's apocalyptic vision for re-ordering the globe along lines suitable for his goals. In a remarkable letter published in 2002, Bin Laden laid out why he was fighting, and in doing so, replaced the Palestinian question with one of Islamic oppression. He cited Somalia, Chechnya, Kashmir and Lebanon, and even the southern Philippines; the oppression being the unwillingness on the part of various governments to allow the establishment of Islamic Sharia. Al Qaeda's global war aim was nothing less than the removal of those obstructionist governments. He specifically called on America to convert to Islam, but most tellingly he writes "do not interfere in our... method of education."<sup>9</sup> There are two aspects of the letter that bear on this research: One, Bin Laden successfully demonstrated that many disparate issues could be linked by the threat of a global Liberal order, which he often referred to as the Crusader-Zionist alliance, or more generally, the West. Two, he made that feeling of threat very personal, by angling it into a threat against identity. Often, in his writings he makes light of physical death, but over and over, his strongest words are meant to evoke the difference between the identities of the adversaries. Bin Laden was able to globalize his own movement by creating the perception of existential threat against his chosen identity group, the *umma*. This mobilization based on threat was not unlike the Cold War, climate change, the Nazis, Napoleon, the Gauls or the Persians. As a propagandist, Bin Laden was *par excellence*.

The Bin Laden jihad was a reaction to the global transformative effect that Liberalism spreads around the world. At its fore edge, there occurs a creative destruction as the old norms and values built on patriarchy and despotism are replaced by new shibboleths- equality, democracy and capitalism. By the time the buildings in Manhattan fell, the world had changed. The ante-bellum security provided by state-sponsored Liberalism would find itself competing

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<sup>9</sup> "Full Text: bin Laden's 'Letter to America'" The Guardian, 24 November 2002, found online at <https://web.archive.org/web/20130826184301/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver>

with the asymmetrical advantage provided by identity, belief and knowledge of non-state groups, who rejected the promise of Liberalism and democracy. The western response to 9/11 would prove disastrous as state centric warfare was deployed to defeat growing insurgencies, the injection of Clausewitzian war machines into the periphery generating even more resistance.



## **1.2. Thesis and Significance**

*“The fortunes of war are always doubtful.”*  
Seneca

My thesis is that the production of resistance that is the basis for Liberalism’s continuing counter-insurgent wars is a reaction to Liberalism’s attempt to transform the system. There are several supporting hypotheses which must be explored to get to this end: That the irregularity of partisan war is a product of the emphasis on regular war in the normative distribution of power; that Clausewitzian war is weaker than the knowledge that generates identity; and, that powerful states are pursuing preemption as a strategy in order to overcome that weakness. These partisan wars are political wars, and in late Liberalism\*, political war is revolutionary war which seeks to change Liberalism’s advancing status quo. Once identified as an existential threat, the partisan must be destroyed; the failure of the war machine leads to highly technical applications of the strategy of preemption. Accordingly, this study is about the nature and form of war as a tool of securitization, particularly in the kind of wars to which states are increasingly drawn in late Liberalism. These conflicts have been called small wars but employ vast material means on the state side.<sup>10</sup> France deployed half a million men to Algeria, and the U.S. the same in Vietnam. Even with lower troop numbers, the ability to deliver devastating fire power has soared in the twenty-first century. In Iraq and the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, precision weapons, delivery and targeting meant that lethality increased by orders of magnitude. The word *small* is a euphemism for the nature of the conflict. This also means that material capabilities are not predictors of success so some process must explain these outcomes. The

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\* The term late liberalism is used in much of the literature to describe the collapse of the welfare state, but in this dissertation it was inspired by Elizabeth Povinelli and is used to describe a security epoch beginning in the 1990s and extending into the future.

<sup>10</sup> An initial look at the small wars phenomena begins with Burleigh, Michael. *Small Wars, Far Away Places*. Viking: New York, 2013. For a broad survey, read Boot, Max. *Invisible Armies*. New York: Norton, 2013. For a good look at the complex interplay of small wars, read Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

asymmetry of the conflicts is part of the answer, but where does it come from? What causes states to adopt particular methods of war? How do small, unorganized groups resist, fight and why do they fight? Why do great powers get involved in others' internal wars if they are increasingly losing? I propose that the Western powers fundamentally believe that they can 'solve' the war riddle, but they are limited by the philosophical underpinning of their society and its cosmopolitan commitment to universal values and principles. The current literature refers to this as the "crisis of Liberalism" and it takes many forms, most founded in the excesses of neoliberalist capitalism. Stripped of the emotion-laden domestic political rhetoric about inequality, the argument becomes one of consensus versus identity based coexistence. The Liberal hegemonic consensus would see the world transformed. Propelled by liberal states, it uses interventionist policies to transform the world into a stable, wealth producing organism, one in which there is little space for the *other*. The cost of such a utopian world is that there can be no differentiation, no movement based on individual value or personal desire. There are those who resist such a clarion image of democratic equality and have their own vision for the way things ought to be. For them, they seek a violent co-existence, even while they subscribe to their own apocalyptic visions of global transformation. For several reasons, the Liberal West resents this rejection of its eternal, irreproachable organization of life. There is a paradox here, one which will require a long chapter to describe: Liberalism requires this rejection in order to define and justify itself, a sort of overwhelmingly Trumpian "We're so good, and they're so bad." At the same time Liberalism requires the 'other' to contrast its qualities, it also attacks. In the past, these wars did transform countries- the American Civil War and World War Two are sterling examples of remaking the world into a more utopian modality. But since World War Two, liberal states, possessing unlimited force, have failed to impose their writ, used in the name of all that might be called human rights, on the recalcitrant. Why this happens, is a large part of this research. The answer lies in the symmetry of war, and how states come to view conflict. In the post Napoleonic world which saw all strategy as asymmetric, states developed

extraordinarily similar weapons and tactics, which surprisingly, increasingly fails to secure their populations. The *métier* of Clausewitzian war developed around Napoleon's conception of absolute war and provided the translation of the Hobbesian theory of the state into power production and the projection of force, but has reached its explanatory limits.

The Clausewitzian way of war, which I argue is the *regular* form of war, developed in step with liberal states. Through the arc of the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, states had




Figure 1. Showing the balanced trinity developed by Clausewitz to describe war and the state in post-Napoleonic warfare.

been the principle threat to each other. Consequently, states focused their military power on ways to defeat other states, notwithstanding that for several of those early centuries, wars were limited in objective and force. Napoleon was the *genèse* of a fundamentally new war, in which unlimited force would be used in wars for unlimited objectives. The components of this kind of war are the people, who equal passion, harnessed so aptly by Napoleon, their government and the military force. This became the famous “trinity” of which Carl von Clausewitz would describe the state versus state warfare that is meant to separate the components of the state from each

other, thus collapsing resistance. Force was the simplest way to achieve this. At some point, people would be unwilling to suffer during conflicts and would withdraw their support for the policy. This Clausewitzian trinity succinctly describes the collectivization of war and reflects the rise of nationalism in the early nineteenth century. Personal enmity, multiplied by millions, was redirected into state policy with military power seen as key way to transform adversarial states through war and defeat. This mass production of military violence by states coalesced perfectly into a phantasmagoric needle point of force that could be directed at any enemy, eventually becoming so refined in the twenty-first century that it could be directed anywhere around the globe.

As history advanced into late Liberalism, the intricate network of international institutions created after World War Two pumped resources from the external, illiberal world to the internal. Liberal states began to view conflict as a method of social control, i.e., a way to ensure the stability of the system. Not surprisingly, some resisted. What has been surprising, well past the end of the history, is the rise of the sub state group. These groups, bound together by identity, convert their knowledge of self into an advantage that translates into winning strategies, strategies that nullify states' advantages in the distribution of military power. The diffusion of technology and its decreasing costs, harnessed by individuals motivated by identity, has individualized threat in late Liberalism. This requires the destruction of individuals.

Therein lies the fairly straightforward significance of this research. *Conflicts of identity* between Liberal states and the external are occurring more frequently. From the RPG attacks that brought down advanced helicopters in Mogadishu, to the 9/11 attacks, to homemade explosive devices in Iraq, weak actors are achieving instances of tactical superiority that lead to strategic success. The environment is rich with example and potential. Since 1945, there have been only 51 interstate wars and 418 internal conflicts. The militarily weak actors in these ethnic conflicts have steadily increased their ability to achieve their political objectives primarily

through the production of asymmetry. The trend continues: In 2015, there was only *one* state-on-state conflict and forty-nine intrastate or internationalized, largely ethnic conflicts.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, in 2015, there were some 87 organized, non-state groups causing at least twenty-five deaths a year.<sup>12</sup> Even so, great power states have eagerly returned to the predictable world of state-on-state conflict. Identity attacks in Europe, the ethnic cleansing in Syria, and the seeming indomitable attraction of radical ideologies comes at a time when North Korea, China and Russia are all engaging in power politics. With some relief, the United States is moving carrier groups to the Pacific, THAAD to South Korea, and armored brigades to the Baltics. This should be no surprise- Policy makers, both uniformed and civilian, prefer the clean fight-to-the-finish of Clausewitzian war against easily identifiable actors- governments- spending billions of dollars on massive digital wargames and field maneuvers that duplicate discrete wars. Political and military leaders are given the confidence needed to a grateful nation the results needed to justify trillion-dollar defense budgets. One should worry that the broad consensus is that states prefer the politically expedient over the hard truth of real challenges. Indeed, there have been no wars between great powers since 1945. Most likely the fights western states will find themselves in will look like Iraq and Afghanistan, conflicts in which Clausewitzian war was a crude tool. The United States, for example, has had only had six years of state war in the past fifty, and well over twenty years of involvement in small, identity wars of this research.

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<sup>11</sup> The latest year complete data is available. See Appendix One.

<sup>12</sup> Using the v2.5 2015 Nonstate Conflict Data set by Sundberg, Ralph, Kristine Eck, and Joakim Kreutz. "Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 49.2 (2012): 351–262. Print. See Appendix Two.



Figure 2. Deaths from internal, internationalized-internal, and one-sided violence in 2015; from Uppsala Conflict Data Program found at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/#/exploratory>

In fact, it is the failure of Liberalism's transformative mission that now drives these conflicts. Liberal states focused on other states, ignorant of each other's intentions and sensitive to threats. Neighboring states unhappy with structure of the system could, and often did choose war to rearrange the system- in fact, there have been a series of systemic wars since 1500. It was only with the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945 that the implied costs of these system changing wars grew too high and a relative stasis emerged between the most powerful states. The by-product of the global institutions meant to make great wars impossible was that states began to value stability more than the change of its original promise.

However, the transition into late Liberalism has seen the rise of weak actors and resistance groups unhappy with that status quo. The nexus between increasing levels of weaponization of technology, its decreasing costs, and will to power drives the increase in identity wars- the introduction of outmoded state military power into areas of self-knowledge.\*

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\* Carl Schmitt annotates the changing methods of war towards the end of his Partisan essay, in which he writes about the implications of technical-industrial development. His point is that things change, and the partisan changes too. The principle remains the same. For a higher level analysis, I recommend Horowitz, Michael. The Diffusion of Military Power, Princeton University Press, 2010.

The knowledge advantage collapses the state-centered Clausewitzian trinity into a singularity. These systemic insurgents do not labor under a trinity of passion, government, and military. Instead, all three are centered in the individual and produce an unlimited enmity.<sup>13</sup> These individuals, stateless and unpredictable, whose allegiance is to identity, the person who has been left behind by Liberalism. The three cannot be separated. And this makes people very dangerous to states which crave lemming like stability, harnessing their ethnicity into political power that ripples across the status quo, creating instabilities like collapsing waves reaching the shore.

States have responded to these instabilities through invasions and occupations and have increasingly spent vast sums of national treasure and blood only to be defeated. Deterrence against other states worked well when leaders feared the costs of war. In the past, people expected the state to secure them from organized threats; the liberal state system arose to deter state invasions, and with these, we are familiar: Napoleon, Prussia, Germany, Japan, and Russia. In late Liberalism, the expectations of security have changed. People now expect to be secured from individualized threats, threats against their person. Twenty thousand dead may have been the threshold for action in the past, but now, the number is in the tens. The murder of one person, which a hundred years ago would have been considered a cost of living, now demands a security response. This is changing the nature of war. In the past, the threat was from insecure and unhappy states which collectivized offensive violence. States fought states and tens of thousands died. Individuals didn't matter. States went to war when whole slices of territory were gobbled up, when thousands and even millions of people were at risk. Fast forward to the age of the individual and individual security is expected. No longer is one or two or a hundred deaths just the cost of living. One or two deaths demands action and

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<sup>13</sup> Schmitt, Carl. *The Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*. Trans. G.L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press, 2007. Print.

dominates state policy. Groups unhappy with the transformative mission of Liberalism and unwilling to lose their special identities reflect their own emphasis on individualism into violence against individuals. This targeting of individuals- called terrorism and executed in Paris, New York and San Bernardino- has triggered a new state strategy, in turn, focused on the individual, and called preemption.

States now exist in an age when every individual has the potential to drive policy—AQ, ISIS, or immigrants. Liberalism expends a lot of energy creating the proto-problem—the grand unification of all insecurities tied together. The genius is transferring the idea of the threat to the




Figure 3. The transition away from the state to new security configurations portend a change in the relationship between the state and the role of violence and force.

vast indeterminate: global warming, capitalism, and religion. The operationalization of preemption only requires a threat because successful preemption, after the fact, requires the determination that the threat was already an enemy. Insecurity derived from threats is existential to the individual. Liberal perceptions of causality has created ultra-threatened individuals, and in order to pacify the domestic, the state has responded with strategies of



*preemption*, foregoing the trial of transformation in an effort to stabilize their benefits through the only philosophy left. But preemption disturbs equilibriums; it creates reactions that cannot be predicted. This uncertainty is a vague, uneasy threat, one which continually renews the demands for offensive action. In the age of the individual who operates under the singularity, states' use of power has changed. Reaction is no longer acceptable; states must 'act', ergo, their preemptive power.

Michel Foucault described this process in his 1978 lectures, *Security, Population and Territory*. He described power through the transitions of sovereignty from the control of territory, to the disciplinary regimes exercised over the physical body, and finally, as a security blanket over the whole population.<sup>14</sup> The relationship between power and security are very close, reinforcing each other. Security provides, in a very real way, protection for the growth of economic modes of control, which increase wealth, the basis of power. Power then seeks to extend security, creating "forms of normalization" that are insinuated into the lives of people.<sup>15</sup> Much more than just police, Foucault called these *dispositifs*. The security dispositif is in the simplest terms a bureaucracy that tries to plan life processes in such a way that the illusion of *laissez-faire* is retained, but the danger of irrevocable disaster is retained. This cause and effect is described by Foucault through the famines and epidemics of late Bourbon France. Grain, to process into food, is a concrete good, yet security transforms its scarcity from a threat into another good, one which can be transformed into power.

Under Liberalism, the normativity of scarcity and security is translated into a perception of freedom. Foucault perceived that the change from the government of the sovereign to a government of the people resided in the change from a regime of discipline to a regime of security. In the former, freedom was delineated by saying no, ensuring that each individual

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<sup>14</sup> Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population (STP): Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978*. Ed. Michel Senellart. Trans. Graham Burchell and Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2009. Print. Pg. 25.

<sup>15</sup> Foucault, Michel. *STP*. Pg. 25.

stayed in his or her square. In the latter, the freedom became equated with the desire to say yes, to allow the most life, which the specter of scarcity proved. In this way, it behooved liberal governments to allow life to live as normally as possible. Government became, as Foucault would say, a “right disposition of things leading to a suitable end.”<sup>16</sup>

Foucault's case studies are somewhat dated, based on France and England, and tied up in his earlier research on sovereignty in the form of kings and princes. Drawing back a bit, away from his case studies, one can say that sovereignty had consisted of arranging territory and people in order to create and sustain wealth. To this end, the state had a necessary reason to manage famine and epidemics. In the age of late Liberalism, sovereignty is exercised through security. The state changed from imposing the law to disposing of things, managing the conjunction of interactions from events. Ultimate power, became the ability to identify the interaction before it become realized. Brian Massumi in *Ontopower*, calls this “power to the edge.”<sup>17</sup> The dreadful implications of the moral failure through the power to preempt the rewriting of history through the actions of the present, and the confirmation of what could have been into what was. In the hands of neo-liberal market principles, late Liberalism militarizes the environment in order to create new markets for the creative destructionism needed to drive opportunity and profit. States now shape the expectation of perception in order to create threats that demand action from the civic body. The passion of the people has been answered by the rationality of the republic, which offers death as an end of action in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Violence was used, so the threat was violent? Preemption targets individuals because there is no way to separate the policy from the enmity, as there was with Clausewitzian war. The collapse of the trinity that will be described in chapter five, the rise Age of the Individual with its unlimited enmity, has individualized conflict, back from the collective wars of the eighteenth and

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<sup>16</sup> Foucault, Michel. STP. Pg. 134, after Guillaume de La Perriere.

<sup>17</sup> Massumi, Brian. *Ontopower*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015.

nineteenth centuries. The tragedy is that the leviathan has finally found itself a threat that will provide it with an unlimited power.

Problems abound in the new security paradigm of late liberalism. The benefits of current offensive doctrines powered by massive formations with expensive weapons systems, of simple speed and mass must be parsed as the security environment becomes more complex. Identity wars and wars of individuals simply cannot be modelled by massive digital wargames the way Clausewitzian war can. The effectiveness of sub-state groups in achieving their goals has dramatically increased. In the past two hundred years, states have gone from winning some eighty percent of internal conflicts to less than half that by the end of the twentieth century.<sup>18</sup> Identity drives these conflicts. The rise of the sovereign state and its privileged position as the primary unit of the international system has failed to stem these conflicts as new space is created to facilitate the integration of marginalized groups. Policy makers try to fill in the gap with normative international theoretical formulations to which the securitization of threats in late Liberalism are unresponsive. The proliferation of threat drives massive expenditures of wealth which demand proof of the efficacy that expenditure. The management of the dispositif of security revolves around the instruments of government, the whole bureaucracy. To that end, this dissertation will study the use of armed conflict as a form of securitization.

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<sup>18</sup> Lyall, Jason, and Isaiah Wilson III. "Rage against The Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars." *International Organization*. 63(2009): 67–106. Print.

### 1.3. Scope

*"Fortune favors the brave."*  
Terence

In undertaking this work, the first issue confronting the research has been the vast literature on the subject of conflict. Inside political science, topics as diverse as peace studies, gender studies, global migration, and the north-south divide all touch on the subject of conflict. In a very real sense, conflict has been the great engine of civilization so perhaps there is little to which it cannot be connected. However, this dissertation is about the nature of war and its practicing states in late Liberalism, and the increasing failure of those states in these identity conflicts.\* Constraining the scope of the research is a necessity. Additionally, the Arquilla Square below demonstrates the four inputs, ontology, epistemology, effects, and causes, which




Figure 4. Arquilla quadrant which shows the level of analyses and range applicability to future research. This dissertation 'Ouroboros' is mostly ontological in nature, and could have vast applicability. John Arquilla lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011.

were used to rough out this research and determine the significance of the study. In this case, I

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\* I have chosen the term *identity war* to describe these conflicts rather than *irregular* or *guerrilla* war. The latter tends to describe method and even states have specialists who perform tasks in war of that nature. Identity better captures the connection to partisanship and political war. In this dissertation, I also use the term *partisan war* as a synonym.

am placing the study in the ontological quadrant because I have sought to study and understand the nature of the subject. In order to get at that nature, I look at how the West, broadly defined, fights its recent wars mostly through a prism of its philosophy and understanding of regular war. This requires some conceptual discovery, particularly when translating the philosophies of war into the mechanics of war. It uses history for the case studies to demonstrate general trends in order to construct of model of what the future might be. Still, this work is predominantly philosophical in nature, even while it uses all four quadrants to build its argument.

I have chosen to begin this dissertation with western and military philosophy, from the Enlightenment to the present. In that period, military philosophy underwent a shift from its production by and for military officers to the post World War II environment which saw civilian academics address the issue.<sup>19</sup> It was exactly during this period that contemporary liberal theorists and their military peers diverged. During the Cold War, strategic thought derived from a broad philosophical basis shriveled in professional military education due to the stalemated strategic situation of the Cold War which greatly simplified thinking.<sup>20</sup> Militaries focused on procedures and tactics and in the United States, this focus on tactics became a fetish after the Vietnam War. After the Cold War, interest in linking the tactical use of force to strategic purpose waxed, fueled by the search for purpose and the increase in non-state wars.<sup>21</sup> Universities, the uniformed services, and think tanks rapidly produced volumes meant to explain and forecast changes and challenges of contemporary conflicts and the coming revolution in military affairs. I have divided this literature into four categories: thematic texts, general military history,

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<sup>19</sup> Freedman, Lawrence "Strategic Studies," in Steve Smith, ed. *International Relations: British and American Perspectives*. Oxford: Blackwells, 1985. Pp. 29-44; Betts, Richard "Should Strategic Studies Survive," *World Politics*, 50(1) (1997): 7-33. Print

<sup>20</sup> Kelly, Justin, and Mike Brennan. *Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009. Print.

<sup>21</sup> Themner, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen (2011) "Armed Conflict, 1946-2010," *Journal of Peace Research*, 48.4 (2011): 525-536. Print.

biographical works, and context-specific military science texts.<sup>22</sup> Thematic texts deal with various forms of conflict, such as nuclear war, conventional war, or most recently, guerrilla war.<sup>23</sup> These texts are often excellent, but only narrowly focus on the subject and rarely place themselves in the broader context of the philosophy or the purpose and nature of war. In this group, I would place the political science literature, some of which is excellent, and of which this dissertation is related, but not directly.

The second and third categories are used in this work. General military history is better at capturing the wider view of conflict and its role in society by focusing on the context in which various military thinkers developed their ideas. These texts are somewhat narrow in that they are structured as historical accounts of ideas where critical analysis, when provided, does not begin conceptually but relies on other theorists covered in the same work. For example, Azar Gat's excellent work *A History of Military Thought* carefully traces the production of strategic thought from theorists to theorist across some five hundred years of history.<sup>24</sup> This process contains the risk that errors could be amplified through successive generations of writers, a risk Gat himself points out several times. Still some recent works provide excellent understanding of the Western way of war. The third category is one in which the theorist himself (or her) is the subject, and are closely autobiographical.<sup>25</sup> These are similar to works of history and provide an understanding of the theorists' intellectual development. In some cases, careful tracing of the development of ideas allows a deep understanding of the specific issues confronting the texts'

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<sup>22</sup> Angstrom, Jan, and J.J. Widen. *Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War*. New York: Routledge, 2015. Print.

<sup>23</sup> Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition*. London: Brassey's, 2013, and Boot, Max. *Invisible Armies*. New York: Norton, 2013. Print.

<sup>24</sup> Gat, Azar. *A History of Modern Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Print. Van Crevald, Martin. *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*. London: Cassel; 2000; Heuser, Beatrice. *The Evolution of Strategy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

<sup>25</sup> Paret, Peter. *The Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986; Baylis John and John Garnett, eds. *Makers of Nuclear Strategy*. London: Printer; Heuser, 1991; Beatrice Hueser. *Reading Clausewitz*. London: Vintage, 2002.

subjects. Again, these can become narrow in relationship to the field of military philosophy and very deep in their specialization. The subject becomes the focus of the work.

The final category is works which problematize the issues confronting the application of military force across time and space and are often related to problems of doctrine, training, resourcing and the tactical employment of units on the battlefield.<sup>26</sup> These texts are the least important to this dissertation as they rarely engage theory, much less the philosophies undergirding the processes of force. These works start and end in the practical problems associated with military conflict. Embedded deeply in the existing military and state organizations means there is an associated power structure that obscures the genesis of the idea, and thus the ability to further incorporate the work into broader theory.<sup>27</sup> If one were to apply these texts to an Arquilla square, they would be firmly embedded in the lower right. Current military professional education is stale, with most of the important work on the future of war occurring outside the uniformed services, in universities and some think tanks.

On yet another level, determining what, exactly, military philosophy is can best be answered by differentiating between political philosophy, theory, strategy, military doctrines and other works that deal with security studies. One will not be able to separate these groups so easily, as there is a subtle, necessary interplay between them. However, military philosophy concerns the state and the role and nature of organized violence. Military theory is a subset of that philosophy, which is less clear cut and more complex. For example, in political science, philosophy revolves around the concepts of justice, power, equality and freedom (among a few) and those discussions inform political theories that become platforms for how society should be

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<sup>26</sup> Wirtz, John James and Colin Gray, eds. *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; Kassimeris, George and John Buckley (eds.) *The Ashgate Companion to Modern Warfare*. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010.; Gray, Colin War, *Peace and International Relations*. London: Routledge, 2007; Jordan, David, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck and Dale C. Walton. *Understanding Modern Warfare*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

<sup>27</sup> Goldstein Judith and Robert Keohane, eds. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.

governed and organized.<sup>28</sup> Likewise, military theory concerns the organization of the components of violence. Here I make an important assumption, that military philosophy should be concerned with the linkage between the state and force, *and* its effects on justice, equality, and liberty. In reality, this dissertation is as much about political philosophy as military philosophy as it attempts to link complex concepts with the process of military devolution. Another delineation is necessary: Military philosophy is not strategy, nor is it doctrine. Strategy is the direction of national power to achieve an objective; a narrower definition of military strategy might be the employment of a country's armed forces to achieve an objective. Like the difference between philosophy and theory, national strategies employ *all* national assets in peace, time and conflict, while military strategy is concerned with the movement and logistics of employing divisions and corps against an enemy. Military doctrine functions at an even lower level after the decision to employ force is made. Doctrine prescribes how military force is used, how it is deployed and employed.<sup>29</sup> A writer with whom I have become very familiar over the last year, Carl von Clausewitz, did not believe that it was the business of theory and philosophy to generate doctrine, writing that theory was not supposed to provide new methods of conducting war.<sup>30</sup> Finally, I have to address history and the many matters that can be related to military studies through their connection to conflict. Military history deals with tangible, distinct, individual events. History is descriptions of those events, and while historical texts are informative, what is required in this dissertation is more than a description. The five case studies in this dissertation are historical in nature, but are meant to provide practical examples of power and identity. This dissertation is not history and outside the developmental description of regular war and the case studies, literature that is purely historical will not be used.

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<sup>28</sup> Angstrom, Jan, and J.J. Widen. *Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War*. New York: Routledge, 2015. pg. 4. Print.

<sup>29</sup> Posen, Barry. *The Sources of Military Doctrine*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984. pg. 13-14.

<sup>30</sup> Paret, Peter. *Clausewitz and the State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007, pg. 328.



This dissertation attempts to get at the nature and form of war, and so many texts on international relations, political philosophy, security studies and peace studies, anthropology, sociology and others will not be reviewed.<sup>31</sup> Likewise, much political discourse will not be covered. Not all disagreements become violent, and not all escalate to what can be called conflict.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen. *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

<sup>32</sup> I am using the UDCP definition of conflict which is at least twenty-five deaths a year.

#### 1.4. Chapter Outline

*"It is pleasant, when the sea is high and the winds are dashing the waves about, to watch from the shores the struggles of another."*

Lucretius

In the rest of this introductory chapter, I will briefly discuss great powers, their advantages, and small wars. In chapter two, I will describe the rise of Liberalism and its transformative power in the international system. While transcribing Liberal international relations theory into Liberal War theory, the latter part of the chapter will describe war in the late Liberal age and the role of force in society, both domestic and international. This desire for stability and expansion for the functioning of modern economic institutions explains the internationalization of conflicts wherein a great power such as the United States or the Soviet Union, intervenes in a conflict of a middle power or weak state. The descriptions of force in society are particularly useful in understanding how Liberalism harnessed the social contract and the subsequent sclerotic hardening of social mobility and the rejection of the state. This situation sees violence as a means to change the role of the state. Chapters three, four and five are the heart of this dissertation. In chapter three, I will lay out a quick survey of the western way of war, and how it spread, a product of the European comparative advantage. During the enlightenment, the long hard work of creating standard definitions by which to see and study the world had a transformative effect on society, releasing millions from the bondage of the *ancien regime*. But those same systems became coercive information processing routines, limiting many institution's ability to see outside that definition. There is no right and wrong in the use of information processing routines, and this chapter will only serve to point out what is lost through the singular application of western philosophy to the study of the art of war. Ultimately, the French and German schools approached the study of war in remarkably similar ways, but the German *Aufklärung* sidestepped the philosophical underpinnings of the Enlightenment, integrating much more heavily the role of free will in war, an important aspect in the irregularity

of identity wars. Having come down to contemporary times as the penultimate expression of strategy, Clausewitz and his remarkable trinity will be covered in chapter four. Despite his strong descriptions of the power of moral force in war, Clausewitz missed the possibility that people could, and would, do whatever was necessary to remain free from the physical and cultural oppression Clausewitz' own legacy would demand. While many have criticized Clausewitz with the end of the Cold War and the explosion of small wars, this is not an argument about old wars and new ways, but a simple statement that the West is unprepared for the change. Second, the evidence shows that culture and the philosophical understanding of war is a powerful motivator of how a state approaches war. Indeed, I argue that states define regular war, and under coercive information processing routines, are thus extremely vulnerable to the 'other'. The record will show that far from learning from defeat, states tend to retreat to purer forms of regular war. States that invest heavily in the technologies of regular war have much to lose if the infrastructure of those technologies fail. States tend to 'double down' and paint a picture where the threat they are best prepared to defeat are the most *likely* threats. Consequently, powerful offensive capabilities drive states to engage in regular war. This chapter will end with a survey of how the U.S., arguably the superpower, and largest single participant in small wars at this time, has developed a certain style of war, dubbed the 'American' way of war, based on Clausewitz and its own comparative advantage, high technology. I provide, based on Clausewitz' own research in *On War*, a new analogy, the singularity, to describe the engine of irregular war, the partisan or the guerrilla. The singularity then powers the rest of the investigation. Without chapter four, this dissertation becomes ungrounded and speculative.

Chapter five is not meant to be a diametric opposite of chapter four, but reviews the processes of identity formation, the history of the development of small wars 'theory' and the impact of Marxist historical-materialism on the surge of separatist, internal conflicts from the

1960s to the early 1990s. Feelings that the distribution of resources, be they economic or political, is unfair, then violence becomes a way to bypass political stalemate.<sup>33</sup> Hostility and frustration produces insecurity, a feeling that the group's special identity is under attack. In social wars, the killing is personal, rooted deeply in the social contexts in which victims know the killers. Following the impersonal Cold War, this was the shock of the Yugoslav ethnic wars and Rwanda massacres, with "people in rage against each other and people fleeing from the rage."<sup>34</sup> Based on analysis of the values of ethnicity that provide the elastic interconnectivity that powers groups through conflicts, this paper will argue that far from fading, ethnicity and its commitment to social identities have an extraordinary durability and much conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will evolve around it. This will show that western philosophy has constrained how western militaries have viewed irregular (and all) conflict. Organizationally, western militaries have been influenced to deconstruct everything in an attempt to predict cause and effect. The distribution of technologies (power is Vasquez' word) drives the Liberal/illiberal confrontation. These chapters are not meant to be country specific, and much of what will be written can be applied across time and geography, but the U.S. occupies a position of extraordinary influence, not much different than that of Clausewitz. As the dissertation drives to its conclusion, particularly in the alternative case studies and remarks about Iraq and Afghanistan, the reader will have a much more greatly informed reference system than if the U.S. was not discussed. I attempt to uncover what makes identity and identity conflicts so durable, exploring the idea that conflict is a social act rooted in identity. The ability of language, religion and ancestry to bind people together in turn is a powerful motivator of violence. This chapter also serves to trace the development of U.S. doctrine concerning small wars. Weak

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<sup>33</sup> Mansbach, Richard W., and John A. Vasquez. *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, Pgs. 283-284.

<sup>34</sup> Schorr, Daniel. *Come to Think of It: Notes On the End of the Millenium*. New York, Viking, 2007, pg. 30.

groups fight the way they must, using what is available in ways that can inflict damage, willing to lose battles in order to win the war.

Chapters six, seven and eight are the case studies and analyses. France in Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan were all




Figure 2. The case study themes, while not providing direct causal linkages, are surprisingly simple to uncover. Liberal states, represented here as the 'West' cause disorder, and their normative method of war drives groups to capitalize on their superior distribution of knowledge in order to achieve reciprocity through the targeting of civilians.

attempting to spread or maintain their economic systems and were defeated largely through the irregular methods utilized by their adversaries. In those places, the draw of alternative governance models capitalized on the marginalization of sub state groups by the dominant modality- Liberalism. The quest for stability through humanitarian interventions and attempts to implant democracy is counterinsurgency on a global scale in which any resentment of Liberalism becomes an insurgency. The paradoxical requirement of Liberalism that is has to have an 'other,' an 'external' periphery in order to justify continued conflict and interventions. Finally, in chapter nine, I detail the signature tactic of the changing nature of war from the Clausewitzian trinity to the identity singularity, that of targeting civilians as the ultimate form of preemption. The discussion gathers literature from both sides, finally focusing on the U.S. strategy of using drones to kill suspected terrorists. This chapter will also explore how the

affective nature of the instabilities so threatening to Liberal states may increase putting pressure on states to continue to refining their preemptive response. Chapter ten will provide conclusions and some final thoughts.

## **1.5. Great Powers in the Periphery**

“The strong did what they could, and the weak suffered what they must.”  
Thucydides, *The Melian Dialogue*

This research does not set out to prove or disprove any IR theory, particularly Realism. In fact, this dissertation adopts much of the language and accepts many of the assumptions of the Realist theorizing that has gone on over the past seventy years. The system produces power- through coercion and force, tied up in, and directed by, a unitary bureaucracy. However, traditional IR has problems explaining state actions in irregular war, focusing as it has on conventional war as the vehicle to explain power and changes in the international system. In continuing to scope down the research, I abbreviate the issue of Liberalism as a concept by focusing on the actions of the largest states in the international system, which in effect become stand-ins for the concept itself. These largest, most powerful states in the international system get involved in other nation's internal conflicts. Studying the COSIMO data, Larisa Derizaglova found that the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, China and the United States have engaged in the most conflicts since 1945. The United Kingdom was involved in twenty-seven conflicts, which can be explained through the rise of the anti-colonialist revolutions in the British Empire and territories. France and the Soviet Union follow with seventeen conflicts, then China with sixteen and finally, the United States with eleven conflicts. Great powers also participate in small wars, through mediation or economic and military aid. By this count, the U.S. has been involved in seventy-eight conflicts, and the Soviet Union/Russia in fifty-five. The U.S. is the most active mediator, attempting to settle thirty-three conflicts.<sup>35</sup> What is surprising is that great states are increasingly failing to achieve their objectives against groups that had significantly less material resources with sub-state groups achieving their goals has dramatically increased.

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<sup>35</sup> Deriglazova, Larisa. *Great Powers, Small Wars: Asymmetric Conflict Since 1945*, Baltimore MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pg. 40.





influences their behavior towards each other as the occurrence of systemic wars suggests.<sup>38</sup> Those states at the top have the ability, through large populations and land mass to control raw materials, sources of capital, markets, and hold competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods.<sup>39</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz based their domination on the command of superior power resources (capabilities) – factors such as “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”<sup>40</sup> These great states then hold control over international economic and security institutions, and the rules of conduct between them. However, other factors that are distinctly social in nature and have no relation to material factors, such as ideology, propensity to peace, aggressiveness and so forth, are explicitly excluded as markers of power.

Great powers also dominate in the ability to exercise influence and resist influence. Power, then, is more than the number of divisions and carriers a state controls, but the latent capabilities a state can marshal when competing with peers. A state’s wealth and the ability to create wealth through control of its population are all assets in the accumulation of power.<sup>41</sup> Using power, these states seek to organize and maintain the system in order to maximize their economic benefits. The British, Roman, Napoleonic and Soviet empires were designed to extract resources from the edge back to the center.<sup>42</sup> The modern U.S. economic empire, predicated on the free-markets enshrined in neo-liberalism, does the same. From the Monroe Doctrine to the latest war in Iraq, the U.S. has used violence and the threat of violence to

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<sup>38</sup> Beyer, Cornelia. “Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counter Power: A Synthetic Approach.” *International Relations* 23.3 (2009): 411–427. Print.

<sup>39</sup> Keohane, Robert. “Theory of hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Regimes, 1967–1977,” Ole Holsti, ed. *Changes in the International System*. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1980.

<sup>40</sup> Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House, 2002, Print. Pg. 131.

<sup>41</sup> Knorr, Klaus. *The War Potential of Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956; Knorr, Klaus. *Military Power and Potential*. Lexington, MA: DC Heath, 1970.

<sup>42</sup> Doyle, Michael. *Empires*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1986. Doyle, Michael. *Empires of the Atlantic World*. Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2006; and Eisenstadt, S.N. *The Political Systems of Empires*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963.

maintain political and economic systems. Likewise, the Chinese attempt to control the South China Sea is the latest example of a great power expanding in search of access to needed resources in order to continue its own domestic programs. Conflict is a form of negotiation, but one in which the conditions for resolving the conflict are usually lopsided in favor of the materially stronger. Problems in negotiation revolve again, around the power relationship between the parties with the weak party attempting to change the political structure and the stronger party attempting to maintain it. William Zartman wrote:

“The government seeks to turn asymmetry into escalation, to destroy the rebellion and break its commitment, and force the rebels to sue for peace. The insurgents usually seek to break out of their asymmetry by linking up with an external host state and neighbor, thus internationalizing the conflict. In so doing, insurgents radically change the structure of the conflict from a doubly asymmetric dyad to a wobbly triad of great complexity.”<sup>43</sup>

Internationalization of a conflict has a corresponding change in the asymmetry of the weak-strong relationship. Strong international support can weak the domestic standing of the state, while support for the weak group raises the visibility and thus the legitimacy of their cause.<sup>44</sup>

Obviously, with much greater access to resources, how great states evolve their philosophy of war to secure themselves is much different than small states and resistance groups. Inevitably, great states will exercise power in the international arena in the search for resources, going to war with each other over the division of those resources and *spheres of influence*.<sup>45</sup> Great powers are equal consumers and producers of power, being driven to develop offensive capabilities in order to ensure their security, which in turn requires more resources, a bigger economy and so on. Great states are driven to expand, and war is the

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<sup>43</sup> Zartman, William. “Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts,” in *Elusive Peace: Negotiating and End to Civil War*, ed., William Zartman, ed. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995. Pp. 3, 7-11.

<sup>44</sup> Larisa Deriglazova, Larisa. *Great Powers, Small Wars: Asymmetric Conflict since 1945*. Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pg. 40.

<sup>45</sup> Gilpin, Robert. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1987, and Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981.

simplest, not easiest or most moral, way to expand.<sup>46</sup> The overwhelming distribution of power at the top, i.e., the great states, actually drives resistance groups unhappy with the status quo to go to war in ways that great states, for all their power, have a difficult time dealing with. From this beginning, I argue that state capability and military theory are exaggerated and is acutely ill-positioned to deal with the conflicts of late Liberalism. In order to get at that end, one must understand the changing nature of strategy, from one of Clausewitzian war, which ably supported the state-as-paramount international system, to one of the war machine.

Many of the recurring debates over the conduct of war since the end of the Cold War, particularly in the United States, have been disagreements about these hypotheses of power and its use. There were similar arguments after the Second World War with access to atomic weapons. The policies that have emerged have depended on which set of hypotheses have been endorsed. The question is whether or not these hypotheses are correct. Often, these questions have been answered wrongly. When one thinks of military defeat, it is pictured as a purely military issue- the Marne, the Bulge, Korea- one rarely thinks of defeat as the adoption of a wrong set of assumptive policies like in Vietnam. Only in hindsight can one see that strategies which failed were the product of wrong policy, itself derived from wrong assumptions. The plethora of inputs that create assumptions also create a sense of intuition. This intuition is the product of history and time, filtered through the consciousness of millions of individuals. Answering how all of this works together is a principal goal of this study.

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<sup>46</sup> Organski, Katherine and A.F.K. Organski in *Population and World Power*. Knopf, New York, 1961.

## **1.6. Conclusion**

*“The wise man speaks because he has something to say, the fool because he has to say something.”*

Aristotle

Defining the conflict I am studying in this research is not a straight forward endeavor. The problem comes from the entanglement of articles, both popular and academic, that have been published since the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Many terms have been used to describe the phenomena: Guerrilla war, rebellion, small wars, operations-other-than-war, asymmetric conflict, civil wars, ethnic conflict and counterinsurgency are the primary ones, but there is a thread of consistency. The one thing the ideas behind the names have in common is that the *event/instance/activity* is different from what the state would might call *normal* or *regular* war, which is to say hierarchical, with the state as the legitimate director of force. Carl Schmitt makes this point in his *Theory of the Partisan*: “The partisan fights irregularly. But the distinction between regular and irregular battle depends on the degree of regularity.”<sup>47</sup> It would appear to me that the conflict must be distinguishable from the notion of regular war and so one must look for the *event/instance/activity* which is not regular. What will be made clear is that *regular war* resides in the Weberian/Westphalian world, while irregular war taxes the Clausewitzian trinity, and indeed, requires a new analogy that accounts for the fourth plane, the individual. The analogy must also account for the changing tactics that support the emerging quaternity. Even the discussion of tactics and strategy, which should be simple, can be complexified into nullity. In the interim, for ease of adoption, one can think of the Liberal/illiberal competition in terms of strategy: A broad plan that harnesses all elements of power- economics, influence, and identity

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<sup>47</sup> Schmitt, Carl, *The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political*. Trans. G.L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007. pg. 3.

and is concerned about the far future. Targeting civilians and the state response of pre-emption is tactics: actions and reactions meant to achieve reciprocity.

What matters most as we begin the painstaking process of deconstructing normative war in order to discover its philosophical sources and possibly develop a theory of partisan war is that these word themselves- irregular, asymmetric, small- are descriptions of a power differential that drives a protagonist to adopt certain methods. Hierarchical war, the kind Liberalism wants to fight, insists that only one side has authority to wage war and it denies the political aspirations of the guerrilla by criminalizing his cause regardless of how he conducts himself in the pursuit of it.<sup>48</sup> The irregularity of the insurgent is tied to his or her occluded relationship to whatever normative notion of the political exists. In this case, it is his rejection of Liberalism that makes him an insurgent. Partisan warfare is about restructuring a political order, the same as the structural wars of the nineteenth and twentieth century. This effectively removes the discussion of identity war from tactics and weapons (irregular, asymmetric), into the realm of political philosophy, where it belongs. It may help to picture that word, irregular, as a fulcrum on which two forces operate. As one grows, it forces the other to adopt strategies apart from brute force with which to compete. Likewise, if the weaker force adapts and begins to grow, it is because the other side has revealed itself to be vulnerable to asymmetric attacks. As will be made clear in chapters two and three, asymmetry is simply a function of the relationship between, and the reaction to, normative Liberalism as the force and the actor being acted upon.

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<sup>48</sup> Ralph, Jason. "War as an Institution of International Hierarchy." *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 39.2 (2010): 279–298. Print.

## CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

*"The sinews of war are endless money."*  
Vegetius

### 2.1. Liberalism and the West

This chapter is designed to provide the theoretical structure necessary to understand how Liberal states see themselves as the good center surrounded by an illiberal periphery. Of particular interest is the interplay between those visions, how they reinforce each other through the effects of their actions. Starting over with the purpose and effect of Liberalism allows us to trace the progress of military philosophies through the current environment without getting bogged down in reviews of normative IR theories that explain outcomes of 'big' wars.<sup>1</sup> This dissertation is not looking into structural wars. As the now dominant social paradigm in the west, Liberalism explains the relationship between the state, society and force and it is back to these basics that one must go in order to understand its affective power for the types of conflicts it now experiences.

The essential nature of these conflicts begin much earlier, in the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon may seem a strange point at which to begin a description of Liberal security, but he figures heavily in these chapters on the nature of the West. The connection between then and now is the enmity needed for existential destruction. With his genius for war, Napoleon destroyed much of the *ancien regime*. It was partially reinstalled by the Congress of Vienna, which set expectations for the interaction of the great powers, but left the people with desire for change and an intuitive understanding how to go about it. The revolutions of 1848 that swept

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<sup>1</sup> The best examples are Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*. New York: Knopf, 1972; Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010; Mearsheimer, John J. *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton, 2001; Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers*. New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1989.

the continent pushed governance towards the political middle and away from the conservative right. Thus the rise of the Liberal west was well begun, and its early ascendant position can be seen in the power and influence of those Liberal great powers today. France, Germany, Italy, and particularly Great Britain and the United States saw their fortunes flourish in that first wave of Liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their pursuit of empires, subsequent administration, and the associated mercantilism is hard to reconcile with the classical liberalism that was rising domestically in the European states, but taken contextually, the periphery was often seen as an arena for experiments in humanitarianism. Gary Bass has even found evidence that early military interventions were meant to stop atrocities in Greece (1821-1832) Syria (1839-1841) and Bulgaria (1876-1888).<sup>2</sup> The other aspect of Liberalism, that of globalizing commerce, arguably began in Great Britain and eventually would lead to British military and diplomatic policies that backed open trade, the gold standard, and freedom of the seas.<sup>3</sup> This was a significant change as Daniel Deudney points out, writing that “for most of history, republics were confined to small city-states where they were insecure and vulnerable to conquest and internal usurpation, but over the last two centuries, they have expanded to continental size through federal union and emerged victorious from the violent total conflicts of the twentieth century.”<sup>4</sup> As for the rest of the world, William McNeill points out the outcome of the industrial and Liberal revolutions was that: “Taken together, the result was to raise the power and wealth of the Western style of life so far above those familiar to other civilizations as to make resistance to Western encroachment no longer possible.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Bass, Gary. *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*. New York: Random House, 2008. Pp. 343-344.

<sup>3</sup> Ikenberry, G. John. *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order*. Princeton NJ; Princeton University Press, 2011. Pg. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Deudney, Daniel. *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. Pg. 2.

<sup>5</sup> McNeill, William H. *A World History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pg. 411.

Following the First World War, the United States took a commanding position in the international system and began building a similar order in receptive western, liberal leaning states.<sup>6</sup> Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations was ineffective, but provided a blueprint for Liberal intervention in world affairs. With Europe prostrate after World War Two, the United States once again worked to build a world order. Through the United Nations and other international organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the West, at this point broadly coterminous with the victorious Allies, expanded their economies. Using regional defense treaties like NATO, SEATO, and NORAD, the slow work of communicating across the dangerous realm of military activities began, creating an incredibly stable and peculiarly hierarchical, yet interconnected group of countries that would come to be the liberal West.

During the ascendancy of the global region, alternatives have been offered: authoritarian, right wing visions in the shape of Germany and Japan, and authoritarian, left wing utopianism disguised as communism. As John Ikenberry has stated: "World politics was, in a profound sense, a competition between these alternatives. Success was defined in terms of the ability to generate power and wealth, build coalitions and alliances, and overcome geopolitical challengers."<sup>7</sup> The bi-polar Cold War gave cohesiveness to the western Liberal system and as states across the globe chose market economies, the Liberal system spread, along with trade.<sup>8</sup> The two greatest success stories have been Japan and South Korea- feudal, agrarian and authoritarian, they are today great bastions of Liberal, capitalist democracies. The Soviet Union imposing a draconian vision of Liberalism on an empire of some three-hundred million people

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<sup>6</sup> Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*. pg. 16.

<sup>7</sup> Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*. pg. 18.

<sup>8</sup> Ekbladh, David. *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.



finally collapsed under its internal contradictions, not least influenced by its attempt to export that vision.

## **2.2. The Center and the Periphery**

*"Let them hate us as long as they fear us."*  
Caligula

Today, the body of work on all the Liberalism is vast and has touched all areas of academic study and this causes some trepidation when simplifying the concept in order to build a model that reflects contemporary conflict. At its most basic, Liberalism attempts to improve life; at its most complex, it attempts to illuminate the meaning of life. Liberalism, as its root suggests, is about liberty, but it needs an actor to realize its potential, and subsequent, organized states represent a fundamental incursion into liberty. Thomas Hobbes first articulated this role as being a trusteeship of a social contract, under which the boundless liberty of the state-of-nature would be curbed. Individuals would be governed by an absolute ruler in return for stability and security. John Locke would agree with the social contract aspect, but not the absolute sovereign, arguing that a ruler who infringed on the natural rights of Man should be overthrown. The Lockian idea would become the basis of every modern state with authority providing the stability under which society labors for their wealth and property. Hobbes would agree: without authoritative force people would be left in a competition that arises from the instinct for survival. Thus, the connection between an ideal and real force was made.

Liberalism as an idea of governance has changed since its initial emphasis on democracy, private property, and individual rights. The crux in the arguments between liberty and opportunity hinge on how one defines liberty. Classical liberalism mean freedom from tyranny with John Stuart Mills writing that "the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way."<sup>9</sup> Thomas Hill Green would go further, opining that he

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<sup>9</sup> Young, Shaun. *Beyond Rawls: An Analysis of the Concept of Political Liberalism*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002. p. 33.

wished “the term ‘freedom’ had been confined to the ... power to do what one wills.”<sup>10</sup> Tied to pursuit of property in the form of profits, Frederik Hayek would argue that robust capitalism could also preclude the possibility of totalitarianism through peoples’ self-interest.<sup>11</sup>

As Liberalism took hold through the latter 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, the role of government was seen to encompass not just liberty, but opportunity for its citizens. Providing that opportunity has caused major shifts in how the rights of individuals are perceived in relations to pluralism, toleration and private property. Today, the general direction of liberals have been to support limited constitutional government while petitioning for greater state services. The argument is that the:

“...guarantees of individual rights are irrelevant when individuals lack the material means to benefit from those rights and call for a greater role for government in the administration of economic affairs.”<sup>12</sup>

As classical Liberalism gave way to social liberalism, the social contract was extended to groups hitherto left out of the resource distribution process.<sup>13</sup> John Rawls, one of the most consequential philosophers of the latter 20<sup>th</sup> century, has argued that states have a role to play in the fair distribution of resources to newly liberated groups. Promoting concepts like pluralism and toleration requires states to ensure that people have enough resources to pursue their own ideas of fulfillment. Pluralism itself is inherently unstable with the endless division of groups, identities and demands constantly stressing the state. The toleration that Liberal philosophers thought ought to be the by-product of healthy democratic societies has not appeared. The stress in providing equality through material resources necessarily demands infringement on liberty and property. This will become a key component in the anger that drives many of the

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<sup>10</sup> Wempe, Ben. T. H. *Green's theory of positive freedom: From metaphysics to political theory*. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2004. Pg. 123.

<sup>11</sup> Wolfe, Alan. *The Future of Liberalism*. New York: Knopf, 2009. Pg. 74.

<sup>12</sup> Young, Shaun. *Beyond Rawls*. pp. 32–33

<sup>13</sup> Young, Shaun. *Beyond Rawls*. p. 36

extant conflicts today as the materially weak are taken advantage of to provide the strong with resources. In the case studies, lack of opportunity and rejection of the western, Liberal tradition is *the* key component that drives the conflict through threatening the stability of the system. Paradoxically, this increases social pressure on states to intervene in the outside world in order to spread democracy and equality.

Following the Second World War, the leading powers in the West, Great Britain and the United States, were determined to restructure the international society. Both world wars were largely understood to be caused by geo-political rivalries in the pursuit of resources, by way of unbalanced empires and dissatisfaction with the status quo. The Bretton Woods agreement, and the collusion of the United States and Great Britain produced the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and atypically non-economic, arguably political institutions, like the United Nations, were created to control the flow the wealth. This decades-long global reformation was a designed attempt to craft a middle way between raw capitalism, with no state control, and the full state control of communism.<sup>14</sup> What was fully retained from the *laissez-faire* classical liberalism of the prewar era was the commitment to property rights and the pursuit of profit. It would be the regulation of the free market, either more or less, by the state that would be the mechanism over which politics would argue.

This idea of economic freedom and private rights under the protection of Liberal state controlled institutions created the Neoliberal movement. This made it very difficult to take any contrary position, particularly since the Cold War had created this black/white framing of the issue with the Soviet Union's very austere version of economic and personal freedom. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 triggered a reaction in which almost all states chose to become part of the neoliberal system. The sweeping triumph of neoliberalism can be seen by membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), created in 1994 to replace the antiquated

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<sup>14</sup> Harvey, David. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 2007. Pg. 12.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Fully 164 countries are members of the WTO, out of 193 states recognized by the United Nations.

While the trend towards neoliberal economies seems to be inevitable, there are structural issues with neoliberalism as a force. It is a process that means to bring all life into the market, i.e., free-market principles determining the costs and benefits of societal transactions, governed by a hegemonic elite.<sup>15</sup> The natural inclination towards managed socio-political structures is replaced by economically managed social structures.<sup>16</sup> The conundrum that defies this inevitability is that the market requires producers and consumers, and when taken in conjunction with Liberalism, there needs to be a poor external, producing cheap labor as a




Figure 7. Members of the World Trade Organization; full members in green, observers in yellow, with non-members in red. The EU (in blue) is a member of the WTO.

primary resource, and a relatively wealthy internal, consumers of resources. This creates a structural global inequality in which globalized communications exacerbates local inequalities.

<sup>15</sup> Brenner, Neil, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore. Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, modalities, pathways. *Global Networks* 10:2 (2009):182-222.

<sup>16</sup> Crotty J. (2003) 'Structural contradictions of the global neoliberal regime', *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 32:3 (2000): 369-78.

The desire for expansion to feed the domestic, under the guise of humanitarianism is the reason great Liberal states get involved in small wars, exporting power to shape the periphery. At its core, Liberalism believes it is a search for a better way of life. Since its rise in the sixteenth century, Liberalist ideas have raised billions from poverty and slavery and it would see that continue. How is it, then, that Liberalism lies at the root of modern conflict? There have been two broad paths taken: Consensus and coexistence. The first was founded in the belief that there *could be* agreement on how to live that better life.<sup>17</sup> That route led through universal values and norms, reinforced by the very cosmopolitan institutions made possible via universalism. In the latter, they promote peaceful coexistence through toleration. Under the universalism of liberalism, toleration was a means to the end; under coexistence, toleration was the end. This bifurcated argument is as old as Liberalism itself, with the philosophers John Locke and Immanuel Kant professing the former, while Thomas Hobbes and David Hume the latter. More recently, John Rawls and Michael Oakeshott have weighed in on both sides.<sup>18</sup>

Liberalism's search for universalism was an objective truth, and it was seen as a responsibility of governments to promote it. Toleration of difference was seen as a short term provision along the path to eventual consensus on the absolute truth. Space made for difference then, by definition, becomes illiberal. Conflict inevitably follows. Some Liberal societies, having achieved consensus of a kind through economic integration, will have the most difficult time, as people choose to cling to their own chosen norms, norms that are either Liberal, or different and therefore, illiberal. Liberalism as it sees itself is a product of the first societies to raise it up. France and England were relatively homogenous; compared to today's modern societies, their homogeneity was virtually dictated. In the twenty-first century, mass migration, cheap travel, and nearly universal communication technologies means that homogeneity of

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<sup>17</sup> Gray, John. *Two Faces of Liberalism*. New York: The New Press, 2000.

<sup>18</sup> Oakeshott, Michael, *On Human Conduct*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999; and Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003

norms is difficult to create; individual identity choices will not fade. The problem is not diversity per se, but the hierarchical nature of late Liberal societies which precludes equality.<sup>19</sup> Equality as a social value is seen as the paramount building block of justice, but one that is increasingly a chimera. The value of equality does not sit well with identity differences, as it uses uniformity as its metric to judge success.

Justice itself, a growingly infamous word in this age of Late Liberalism, is plural, not universal. Justice may very well be the supreme good, but to some it means the fair distribution of resources, to others, the protection of natural rights. At any rate, any explicit version of justice is the result of a power struggle, at some time and some place, and so it is a norm, in and of itself a value for only a portion of society. The search for justice then, is a never-ending search for a value-norm and it lies at the root of communities and their conflicts. Justice for one is inevitably a penalty for another. The concept of universal justice falters on this incompatibility, and so then, does consensus. Coexistence, too, as a Liberal concept is accepting continual conflict as the end, as justice is redefined by one group in power, then another, and another. Either of the two paths find itself embroiled in conflict. Coexistence requires a concept of justice that can be accepted by people of difference. John Rawls went far in advancing the idea that the Liberal state is the only form of governance which is legitimate, given that it legitimates its existence on the proper distribution of resources as a human right. Conflicts can be resolved by weighing the demands of justice and rights. But conflict is created by the idea of justice, itself born out of the victory of one set of value-norms over others. Liberalism suffers from a will to dominate, a bad thing, in order to spread human rights and democracy, two good things. Bound up with the neoliberal search for broad economic benefits, conflict becomes a legitimate tool for creating justice. The search for consensus, justice and its proliferation, has caused as

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<sup>19</sup> Gray, John. *Two Faces*. Pg. 15.

much suffering as the former has created happiness. The clash between Liberal states and their subjectified enemies is inevitable.

This is not to say Liberalism, or its champions, are failures all the time. Twice in the twentieth century, illiberal states attempted to rearrange the system to better suit themselves. Normative IR can explain this: The system is anarchic and all states, Liberal and otherwise, seek power to secure themselves. Whether from *animus dominandi*, or “maximizing their relative power,” states are intent on acquiring power and using it to maintain or improve their positions.<sup>20</sup> Large states acquire more resources, and then need even greater resources and attempt expansion in order to get them. Some states, like the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and lately, Russia and China, are able to gather enough power that the system becomes polarized. Growth leads states to align along the polarized competition between them. These general wars between great power states is central to many IR theories: Long Cycle theory of Modelski, the capitalist world-economy theories of Wallerstein and Chase-Dunn, Organski and Kugler’s power transition theory, Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic war, and Doran’s power-cycle theory.<sup>21</sup>


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<sup>20</sup> Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001. Pg 21.

<sup>21</sup> See Morgenthau, *Hans Politics Among Nations*. New York: Knopf, 1972. Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001. Waltz, Kenneth, N. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill. 1979.



What is important to this research is that some IR theorists, like Thompson, indicate that great powers would engage in small wars in order to ensure balances in local hierarchies are maintained.<sup>22</sup> Small brushfire wars, if allowed to grow, could destabilize the overall system, particularly in the multi-polar world of regional hierarchies because that multi-polar internal structure provides a logarithmic level of interactions between states, which are impossible to



**Figure 8. Great powers develop hierarchies which they manage in order to maximize their benefits, often becoming involved in downstream conflicts.**

predict or for which to account. Policy makers working under limited information invariably make mistakes leading to war. This suffices as a structuralist explanation as to why great powers would stumble into small wars. Still, while Realism can explain much of the actions of

<sup>22</sup> Lemke, Douglas. "Towards an Understanding of Parity and War." *Conflict Management and Peace Sciences* 14.2 (1995): 143–162. Print.

the great powers at the upper end of structural conflicts, it grows weedy when trying to account for the effects of wars of transformation and identity in late Liberalism.

### **2.3. The Role of Force**

*“Force always attracts men of low morality.”*  
Albert Einstein

A fundamentally paradoxical feature of a philosophy that promises liberty and opportunity is the role of force. How force is used domestically is invariably tied up with its projection and purpose in the international society. Internally, structure is generated by the integration of people through the use of force. Norms, values and status are derived after the structure is in place. Society is the product of the relationships and power differentials between the components in the structure.<sup>23</sup> It is significant that Hobbes saw society as the answer to the war of all against all. To Hobbes, society could not exist without force, which is necessary to enforce peace, and eventually, stability. Force was useful, according to Hobbes, who wrote that:

“If any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy they become enemies; an in the way to their end (i.e., pleasure, endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another.”<sup>24</sup>

Humans have the very basic desire to have the things they consider important for their safety, and in modern times, to fulfill their purpose, to self-actualize, in life. Hobbes' view of the role of force led directly to the Weberian state, in which the bureaucracy has a successful monopoly on the legitimate use of force over the state. It is not simply the criminal element that requires an organization with the power to coerce, but the social organization itself. Society is the successful integration of people and that integration must overcome resistance. Some element of society must be able to use force as a *policing* function. Limited resources require a political authority that can manage the distribution of those resources, and that political authority requires a coercive element to manage the conflicts that arise from that distribution. Force,

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<sup>23</sup> Johnson, Chalmers. *Revolutionary Change*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982. Pg. 16

<sup>24</sup> Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*, Parts I and II. A.P. Martinich, ed. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2005. Pg. 94.

what violence is called when it is legitimately given to an organization within a state, regulates both political agreements, and along with values, perpetuates the division of labor and its social stratification of society.<sup>25</sup> As Weber put it:

“If no social institution existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of state would be eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be designated as ‘anarchy’ in the specific sense of the world. Hence ‘politics for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.’”<sup>26</sup>

Similarly, the structure of the international system is also built on force. The idea of applying domestic experience to the international arena was brought up by no less a leading light than Hans Morgenthau.<sup>27</sup> The social organization of the home is scaled up to international society. It was the coming to power of the bourgeoisie in France wherein the extension occurred, with the image of polite society becoming interchangeable with civilization. As the new ruling class strove to improve itself, it came to see for itself a mission in civilizing the rest of the world.<sup>28</sup> This mission was transferred to Liberalism. Patricia Owens makes this point in *Economy of Force* that the new intellectual task was to describe the conditions under which social harmony could exist, with the political class engineering society to meet those conditions, a domestication of sorts, that hearkens back millennia to the ancient patriarchy<sup>29</sup> Jairus Grove agreed that Liberalism has a counter-insurgent vision, which removes it from the arsenal of military tactic and upgrades it to strategy and beyond. Grove wrote:

“By placing the construction of the social and its attendant crises as a space for modern governance... there is no fundamental break between politics and war, and citizen and enemy...”<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Johnson, Chalmers. *Revolutionary Change*. chapter two.

<sup>26</sup> Weber, Max. *Essays in Sociology*, H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. Pg. 78.

<sup>27</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J. *Scientific man vs. power politics*. Chicago, IL : The University of Chicago press, 1946. Pg. 113

<sup>28</sup> Elias, Norbert. *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 2000. Pg. 43.

<sup>29</sup> Owens, Patricia. *Economy of Force*. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pg. 138.

<sup>30</sup> Grove, Jairus. “The Stories We Tell About Killing,” *The Disorder of Things*, 6 Jan 2016, found online at <https://thedisorderofthings.com/2016/01/06/the-stories-we-tell-about-killing/>

It is the actual use of force in which there is a divergence between its roles in the domestic and periphery. Domestically, the actual use of force is the last resort of coercion, a form of politics. Stability, the goal of any society, actually rests the deterrent effect of force. Stability is seriously compromised when force is used. If the use of force is valued by the society, almost any action is allowed, but the use of force brings with it a disagreement, a subtle understanding that force is indeed a terrible expression of power. The capricious use of force, particularly if it does not adhere to the norms and values of the society, will generate unease, disagreement, disorientation, condemnation, and finally, violence. Society will lose its legitimacy.

In the periphery, force is one of the few tools Liberals states have when confronted with conflict. External societies, if they are amenable to Liberal values, respond to economic and other normative enticements. If the external is illiberal, then the rejection of the liberal consensus is baked into the pie, so to speak, thus the bloody edges of coexistence. That imperial systems transplant their center to the new colonies is not a revolutionary thought. The French, Spanish and British, settlers of the largest empires actively sought to improve the lot of the indigenous peoples they found in the lands they claimed. This does not exclude the heavy handed tactics of pacification and resource extraction from the external to the internal, but was used to justify wide spread conflict and destruction of indigenous ways of life. What becomes painfully obvious is that any attempt to retain identity or traditional ways of life are soon targeted as illiberal. What is illiberal cannot be compatible with the universal goodness of Liberalism. Latent force becomes active war.

## **2.4. Liberalism as War**

*"War gives the right of the conquerors to impose any conditions they please upon the vanquished."*

Gaius Julius Caesar

Liberalism as war revolves around the concept of 'internal' and its relationship to the social and political collectives that are 'external.' In this context Liberal states create a system-within-a-system: Neoliberal states that practice democracy, protection of private rights, surrounded by potentially hostile, illiberal states. Putting aside the idea of the illiberal periphery for a moment, we must explore the domestic. The rise of international economic institutions after the Second World War further constrained states ability to create conflict.<sup>31</sup> Governments empowered by self-interested citizens determined to protect their hard earned life and property were the best guarantors of international stability. As liberal states spread, the Kantian 'pacific union' became a systemic determinant that was supposed to pacify the behavior of states, based on their internal preferences for stability.

Self-interest is supposed to govern Liberal states, who are answerable to a body politic engaged in the free market and so are more likely to develop peaceful trade relations with other liberal states.<sup>32</sup> The resulting economies become so interlocked that economic considerations override any political difficulties with other juridically equal states. Conversely, lack of economic ties to counter problems are likely to lead to war since people have less to lose. Liberal countries also engage in aggressive behavior toward illiberal actors to protect economic interests. It would appear that while Liberalism has largely eliminated war between liberal

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<sup>31</sup> Buchan, Bruce, "Explaining War and Peace: Kant and Liberal IR Theory," *Alternatives* 27:4 (2002): pp. 407-422.

<sup>32</sup> Michael W. Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12:3 (1983): pp. 205-235.

states, Liberalism still provides ample space for conflict.<sup>33</sup> The normative superiority of the tenants of Liberalism then falter on the built in desire to spread itself.

The will to war is bred deep. Machiavelli argued in *The Prince* (1513) that republics were not pacifist at all, but were made to expand as the only way to guarantee their survival. In republics, Michael Doyle explains, governments employ social narratives in their management of the people to provide resources. Greater resources allow for expansion in search of more resources, and this increases population and property. The citizens are happy because their self-interest aligns with the state, namely, to protect and secure personal goods. This feeds large, well equipped armies who in turn fight for the glory and pride of the state, because the state is in fact, a product of their own work. The energy of the citizens is turned to wars of occupation that extend the republic's territory because, Michael Doyle writing as Machiavelli, would say:

"We are lovers of glory. We seek to rule or, at least, to avoid being oppressed. In either case, we want more for ourselves and our states than just material welfare. Because other states with similar aims thereby threaten us, we prepare ourselves for expansion. Because our fellow citizens threaten us if we do not allow them either to satisfy their ambition or to release their political energies through imperial expansion, we expand."<sup>34</sup>

This line of thought would find itself ascendant again in Mearsheimer's *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001).

In a similar vein, Schumpeter would make the argument in his *Sociology of Imperialism* (1919) that military bureaucracies, created to save the state from some existential danger, then capture the state, taking control of its foreign policy. A combination of the military, the will to dominate, and the desire to create economic markets create the unstoppable force of modern

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<sup>33</sup> Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12:4 (1983): 335-337.

<sup>34</sup> Doyle, Michael. *Liberalism and World Politics*. *American Political Science Review*. 80:4(1986):1151-1169.

imperialism. In perhaps a single sentence which sums up this research, Schumpeter wrote:

"Created by the wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required."<sup>35</sup>

While Schumpeter's analysis of the causes of wars is simplified, it allows him to pivot to a description of their demise. In the modern era (for him, the twentieth century) the old drive for imperialism would fade as capitalism replaced the need for war to expand markets. The elites who had previously profited from wars of expansion could now do so through international markets. The decline of imperialistic urges from the elites would create domestic populations that are "democratized, individualized, and rationalized."<sup>36</sup> The very instability of modern economies, the creative destruction that is inherent in the efficiency of the market absorbs the passion of the people who have none to spare for adventures in far lands. As citizens go about their lives, they demand stability through democratic governance in order to maximize their economic opportunities and resources.

This idea of the democratic peace has become a cornerstone of liberal IR theory, arguing domestic populations provide pressure for stability.<sup>37</sup> Kant's original thesis of asocial sociability described a world in which the horror of war once experienced would drive states to learn from the mistakes that led to war in the first place, learning to cooperate or perishing.<sup>38</sup> The people, the ones who suffer the most in war, would reject governments that chose war. Since power in liberal democracies is distributed, totalitarian leaders cannot concentrate power and rush a state into war.<sup>39</sup> The liberal prerogatives of human rights, rule of law and democracy also pressure states to pursue peace. Liberal states also tend towards freedom of

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<sup>35</sup> Schumpeter, Joseph. *The Sociology of Imperialism*. In *Imperialism and Social Classes*. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1955. Pg. 25.

<sup>36</sup> Schumpeter, Joseph. *The Sociology of Imperialism*. Pg. 68.

<sup>37</sup> Levy, Jack S. "Domestic Politics and War," In *Origins and Prevention of Major Wars*. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Pg.88.

<sup>38</sup> Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Macmillan, 1992. Pp. 58-64.

<sup>39</sup> Jervis, Robert. Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace. *The American Political Science Review* 96:1 (2002): Pg.4.



information, making state decisions towards conflict more transparent and less liable to misinterpretation. The interlocking economic institutions of neoliberalism also serve to reduce conflict as the communication and interdependence between states increase. In such a system, the costs of conflict are greater than any potential gain.<sup>40</sup> Since Liberalism pictures itself as the best future for humanity, Liberal states focus on promoting the creation and care of other Liberal state regimes. This expansionist vision has led to a contemporary environment in which liberal states routinely disregard the sovereignty of non-democratic societies.<sup>41</sup> The U.S. in its attempt to spread democracy and human rights has been at war for “two out of every three years since 1989.”<sup>42</sup> This is the element of structural antagonism not explained missed by Kant in his pacific union which “maintains itself, prevents wars, and steadily expands.”<sup>43</sup> The democratic peace has been anything but peaceful.

The defining, and concluding, characteristic of expansionary Liberalism is the belief in the inherent superiority of Liberalism’s norms and values.<sup>44</sup> Liberal states attempt to install liberal governance in illiberal regions through promoting democracy and human rights and will resort to war to do it, even while these military interventions have little history of success. In fact, war is waged against illiberal states because they are not democratic or reflect the preferences of their people.<sup>45</sup> The argument that Liberalism is, itself, a war generating institution is founded on the idea that “fuzzy norms” can be imposed on the external.<sup>46</sup> This is

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<sup>40</sup> Fukuyama, *The End of History*. Pg. 212.

<sup>41</sup> Fukuyama, *The End of History*. Pg.42X.

<sup>42</sup> Mearsheimer, John J. Imperial by Design. *The National Interest*, No. 111, 2011. p.19

<sup>43</sup> Michael W. Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12:3 (1983): pp. 205-235.Pg.226.

<sup>44</sup> Donnelly, Jack. "Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?" *International Affairs* 74:1 (1998):1-24.

<sup>45</sup> Doyle, Michael "Liberalism and World Politics Revisited," in *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, Kegley, Charles W., ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

<sup>46</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Pp. 28-29.

the central proposition of *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996), in which Samuel Huntington warns that Liberalism has created a situation of inevitable conflict and must succeed or perish.<sup>47</sup>

Blocking consensus is the complex relationships of economic and cultural exchanges that determine if the distribution of resources is just.<sup>48</sup> While *interest convergence* would hold that disparate groups in any given area will eventually support some sort of norm of justice, this only provides temporary relief. Not all groups can achieve the desired change in policy to reflect their preferences. Some groups have no power, being proscribed by various machinations of state power. Other groups become very powerful and have considerable influence in determining “interests.” In some cases, the state or group is captured by charismatic, often violent persons who become dictators like Pol Pot or Stalin, surrounded by cults of personality.<sup>49</sup> Some can practice broad, representative democracies. Most are somewhere in between the two ends, due to various structural limits to access of the resources needed to provide expression to preferences.

Preferences can change over time, meaning the goal can change, and the pursuit of the goal becomes political, and can become violent. For juridical states, it is their own position and that of other states that determine the strategy. Some states will have compatible goals; others will be in conflict. Jeffry Legro and Andrew Moravcsik have described the effort that goes into achieving the goal as either intense or weak. That effort is comprised of the links between individual preferences, multiplied by millions to be sure, and state policy and forms a kind of “policy interdependence” which is the interaction and distribution of costs and benefits needed to achieve the goal. In other words, the strength of attachment to the preference determines

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<sup>47</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Pp. 302-305.

<sup>48</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics” *International Organization*, 51:4 (1997):513-553.

<sup>49</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics” *International Organization*, 51:4 (1997):513-553.

the “form, substance, and depth” of conflict or cooperation that people are willing to support. A similar interdependence is in play with the identity advantage. It is this, not the distribution of power that determines how resistance groups win in partisan wars.<sup>50</sup> The partisan is completely committed to the goal of the conflict. The state is not. This idea separates much of the neo-liberal literature between those who emphasize the structural political-economic components of conflict such as Robert Gilpin and Robert Keohane, and those who prefer the social-political dynamics such as Alexander Wendt.

The identity advantage is a form of power, similar to influence, but very different from the material indicators of power used by Realist theory. The identity advantage is derived from interconnected preferences that Keohane and Nye call “asymmetrical interdependence.”<sup>51</sup> A strong preference for a particular outcome means that means that many actors can influence the issue, because of the intensity of the attachment to the outcome. The less attachment to an outcome means fewer outside actors can influence the state one way or another. Keohane and Nye were writing about states as actors, but obviously the relative preference concept can, and should be applied to resistance groups. In their own example of Vietnam and the United States, there was a significant asymmetrical interdependence advantage accruing to the Viet side. In both the North and the South, the population was willing to suffer massive casualties and destruction because their attachment to political independence was greater than the U.S. willingness to use all of its military power. In the end, the U.S. desire for its preferred outcome, a free, democratic South Vietnam, was less strong than the North Vietnam’s commitment to overthrowing the regime in Saigon.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Moravcsik. “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” *International Security* 24:2 (1999): 5-55.

<sup>51</sup> Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. *Power and Interdependence in the Information Age Foreign Affairs*. 77:5 (1998): 81-94.

<sup>52</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics” *International Organization*, 51:4 (1997): 513-553 and Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetrical Conflict,” *World Politics*, 27:2 (1975): Pg. 175-200.

The discussion of the difficulties of the democratic peace would seem to indicate that the urge to war is built into the Liberalist paradigm. This is because Liberalism has, as its end, a transformative vision for the world that requires destruction, not just to be fully functional, but to fully function. Most people in the West would prefer to believe that the classical democratic peace theory holds sway. In that version, liberal democracies abjure war, avoiding it as an intrinsic facet of their preferences. A form of institutionalism, liberal democracies and the international economic institutions are seen as buttressing and promoting human rights and justice through resource distribution. This was a dilemma for Michael Howard who asked, despite the Universalist, cosmopolitan narrative, liberal democracies are often not only involved in wars, but even start wars.<sup>53</sup> This translation of war from those of defense to ones of universal transformation required, and received, the character of existentialist threat. Either endless war around the edges of the illiberal periphery in order to defend the internal, or crusades to transform the external into a collegial community has been the choice proffered.<sup>54</sup> The delivery of life changing freedom and democracy securitized conflict, and received little criticism through the latter half of the twentieth century, positioned as it was in contrast to the authoritarian regimes of communism. That is changing, as Michael Dillon and Julian Reid would write:

“However much liberalism abjures war... war has always been as instrumental to liberals as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war.”<sup>55</sup>

As a transformative power, Liberal wars seek to change the way of life of the groups on its periphery, ostensibly to project the virtues of Liberalism. In doing so, resistance groups are inevitably spawned, creating a dynamic in which the humanitarian intervention acquires a violent destructionism, an aspect much different from the intended pacific transformation, in which the

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<sup>53</sup> Howard, Michael *War and the Liberal Conscience*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

<sup>54</sup> Dillon, Michael and Julian Reid. *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live*. London: Routledge, 2009. Pg. 5.

<sup>55</sup> Dillon and Reid. *The Liberal Way of War*. Pg. 5.

intervention is killing to save the target from themselves.<sup>56</sup> This humanitarian imperative can be found throughout the wars of the last two hundred years- from the British “white man’s burden” to the recent Bush declaration in 2002 that:

“...the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe... actively [working] to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”<sup>57</sup>

Wars have been projected as a model of human improvement. Liberalism has an instinct to missionarism and the desire to believe that violence can play a significant role in the ultimate transformation of the system into a liberal, collegial, community of happy, shiny people. The handmaiden of those wars, liberal political strategies, have always targeted life for improvement.<sup>58</sup> The transformation of life through conflict is a deceptively simple method. The reaction against neoliberalism’s domination and its drive towards conformity and eradication of difference causes the emergence of resistance groups whose asymmetric and adaptive methods confound the good nature and intentions of their adversaries. Nowhere is the symmetrical production of asymmetry more apparent than the liberal wars that destroy to make better.

Liberalism has always been predicated on the securitization of threats, its role to create an environment free of conflict. The tidal wave of globalization that followed the collapse of the East-West divide drove a massive spread of liberalism as authoritarian regimes lost their political and economic backing. However, the loss of the massive Soviet enemy caused a panicked loss of identity for states whose main mission went away. In one of the more ironic twists of history, the focus on individuals bounced back as individual threats from marginalized

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<sup>56</sup> Ignatieff, Michael. *Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan*. London: Vintage, 2003.

<sup>57</sup> George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy*, 2002, found online at <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>

<sup>58</sup> Michel Foucault, Michel. *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976*, trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003.

populations left behind by globalization.<sup>59</sup> The ability of liberal political schemes to focus ever more narrowly on targeted groups meant that the targeting of individuals by indeterminate threats required a commensurate policy in response. The emphasis on human rights, individual freedoms and democracy has fueled a belief that those virtues must be protected *in extremis* from all threats. This leads to a 'pacification' of the external which follows active war, since at least the United States war in Vietnam, seeking to 'pacify' the adversary with a tableau of schools and clinics. Ironically, this was itself a response to the ability of the West to destabilize any given area.

Global policies sought to ameliorate the ill-effects of illiberalism such as hunger and disease.<sup>60</sup> States unable to provide these basic human security needs were labeled fragile and war was seen as a continuation of policies that gave primacy to social development. As Mark Duffield writes, the:

“West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means,” means that each war is made out to be about the death of the external or the death of the internal “which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself.”<sup>61</sup>

Framed as humanitarian interventions, in the grand sense, to expand Liberal democracy, external societies are painted as something less, a maladjusted problem that impedes a productive fulfillment of purpose for the rest. Accordingly, Liberal war incorporates every form of stable social institutions and uses conflict to thrust them into far villages. Liberal states form and train local governments, train militias and fund development and social projects. These kinds of conflicts are not about territorial integrity since they inevitably occur far from the liberal

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<sup>59</sup> Evans, Brad “The Liberal War Thesis: Introducing the Ten Key Principles of Twenty-First- Century Biopolitical Warfare,” *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 110:3 (2011) Pp. 747-756.

<sup>60</sup> Duffield, Mark. *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*. Cambridge: Polity, 2007.

<sup>61</sup> Duffield, Mark. “Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21.2 (2008): 162.

regimes that spawn them. These conflicts determine what is allowed to live.<sup>62</sup> The attacks of 9/11 birthed a full throated roar of this modality, one that had been laboring since Algeria in the 1950s. The immediate reality is that the revolutionary guerrilla has graduated from the anti-Liberal terrorist to the insurgent.<sup>63</sup> Terrorists seek to inject a break into a stable modality but an insurgent seeks sustainable disorder, eventually culminating in the creation of a new space. Thus terrorists are not particularly useful targets for liberalism, but their cousin the insurgent becomes a *modus operandi*, which is a continual threat and target for social liberalization.

This causes problems for Liberal states and the legal basis for their wars. . In late liberalism, the idea of war reverted to *just causa*, the idea that war was fought, not for patrilineal rights or treasure, but for a common good or a “standard of civilization.”<sup>64</sup> Instead of wars between juridically equal adversaries, conflict came to enforce a normative standard. On one side, usually the winning side, was the ultimate right, and therefore the *just* cause. States were exercising their legal right to war in order to correct a wrong. Hence, the other side was not just, and their conduct, by extension was unjust. Combatants on the ‘wrong’ side had no claim to protections under the rule of law, as their status derived from their cause, not their conduct.<sup>65</sup> As war matured into collectivized conflicts fueled by nationalism, the notion of the enemy was expanded to include whole societies.<sup>66</sup> “One of the most momentous ideas in human history”, Stephen Neff writes:

“was the notion that war could be employed in a socially productive fashion, for the subduing of evil and the promotion of good – that it would be an instrument of law, rather than of greed or ambition.”<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Evans, Brad “The Liberal War Thesis. Pp. 747-756.

<sup>63</sup> Brad Evans and Colleen Bell, “Terrorism to Insurgency: Mapping the Post-Intervention Security Terrain,” *Journal of Intervention and State Building* 4:4 (2010): 9–28.

<sup>64</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1995. Pg. 178.

<sup>65</sup> Ralph, Jason. “War as an Institution of International Hierarchy,” *Millennium Journal of International Studies*. 39(2): 2010. Pp. 279-298.

<sup>66</sup> William E. Scheuerman, ‘International Law as Historical Myth’, *Constellations* 11:4 (2004):537–50.

<sup>67</sup> Neff, Stephen C. *War and the Law of Nations: A General History*. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. 29–30.

Insurgents (and terrorists) are viewed the same way. Insurgents in the identity wars against Liberalism would be viewed as illegitimate. Now that *justa causa* was once more understood as being objective, the normative representation and legal status of the enemy combatant would change. The sovereign and, by extension, the enemy combatant would now be criminalized for their cause.<sup>68</sup> Family of the enemy could be viewed as criminal accomplices and subjected to the same force.

Already noted is the enmity between Liberalism and illiberal states which do not represent their populations' consent. The destruction of illiberal states is not the destruction of people, per se, since they don't exist as legally engendered people in the Liberal sense. The same can be understood to apply to resistance groups. The problem of legal norms is particularly troubling here, since the idea of violence is legitimate as far as consent is given. If consent is not given, then illiberal societies become the exceptional event. As Brad Evans writes:

“There are then no universal, all-embracing, value-neutral, timeless, or eternal a priori norms that inhibit some purified and objective existential space where they await access by the learned justices of the peace. There is no absolute convergence point to human reason. Every norm is simply the outcome of a particular power struggle. Its inscription always follows the contingency of the crisis event.”<sup>69</sup>

In late Liberalism, wars as justice have ceased to be the exception. Drawing on changing nature of war, the indeterminate threat has become one of never-ending emergency. Conflict, once thought of as emergency and special becomes part of everyday life. What once would have been extraordinary securitization of societies is the new normal because Liberal

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<sup>68</sup> Ralph, Jason. “War as an Institution of International Hierarchy,” *Millennium Journal of International Studies*. 39(2): 2010. Pp. 279-298.

<sup>69</sup> Evans, Brad. “The Liberal War Thesis: Introducing the Ten Key Principles of Twenty-First- Century Biopolitical Warfare, *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 110:3, Summer 2011, pp. 747-756.



states relate it to the unending crisis of security threats.<sup>70</sup> What gives pause is the thought of the ability of the state to rework the possibilities of existence into permanency. Security is inextricably tied up with political discourse in Liberal societies, with the security between the external and internal actually delimiting the idea of what is political. This is why conflict, and if my thesis is correct, its changing nature, is so important. Liberal states have been struggling with the balance between their “permanent emergency” and their desire for stability, creating threats from the very change it seeks to create.<sup>71</sup> Transformation of life, once expected as the end result of existential wars, becomes a permanent state of change. Liberalism has created its own emergencies, roiling society with instabilities, in a quest for purposeful change, making all wars become existential.

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<sup>70</sup> Derrida, Jacques. *The Beast and the Sovereign, Vol. 1*. Geoffrey Bennington, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

<sup>71</sup> Dillon, Michael. “Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Bio-political Emergence,” *International Political Sociology* 1:1 (2007): 7–28, Pg. 7.

## **2.5. Liberalism as Counterinsurgency**

*"We make war that we may live in peace."*  
Aristotle

The antagonism between liberty for the domestic and the disciplining of the periphery creates the partisan. Carl Schmitt described this antagonism in his lecture *Concept of the Political* in which he traces the separation of life into a friend/enemy dyad from the "birth struggle of Liberalism" through to current conflicts.<sup>72</sup> Leaving be what a friend is, the enemy is not a personal enemy, but a public one. This presupposes that the political is a public collective. This is very important since a threat to identity becomes a collective threat. The political then occupies that space where decisions are final because the threats are existential. Schmitt writes:

"It does not mean competition, nor does it mean pure intellectual controversy, nor symbolic wrestlings, in which, after all, every human life is somehow always involved, for it is a fact that the entire life a human being is a struggle and every human being symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing."<sup>73</sup>

Domestically, Liberalism rests on compromise which is the apotheosis of the political. The loss of the concept of the political leads to the "neutralizations and depoliticalizations" of the total state in which the interest of the individual has been subsumed under the state's interest in stability.<sup>74</sup> The most devastating power a state has is the power to destroy life. As Liberalism lifts people further from the war of all against all, the jungle, their clinging to comforts, physical and ideal, they are horrified by this power, and seek to reject it. Thus, the friend-enemy concept

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<sup>72</sup> Schmitt, Carl. *The Concept of the Political*. Chicago. George Schwab, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Print. Pg. 31.

<sup>73</sup> Schmitt, *Concept*. Pg. 33

<sup>74</sup> Schmitt, Carl. *The Concept* Pg.. 69.

is diluted. Domestically, to have life ordered in its existence in the friend-enemy paradigm, and thus to be ordered to kill is considered repression, which is a threat to individual liberty. The idealistic basis of Liberalism is its commitment to equality and so death becomes an encroachment against freedom. This defeats Liberalism's attempts to secure the greatest conditions for liberty and opportunity.

Liberalism transmits its competition to the periphery wherein the identification of friend and enemy is easier. The disassociated enemy is "the stranger, and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in an especially intense way, existentially something different."<sup>75</sup> Conflicts that arise in these circumstances are the most intense and inhumane, the "absolute last war of humanity" because the political can only exist based on enmity, and enmity exists based on the existential friend-enemy basis.<sup>76</sup> Enmity requires a decision, and the political destroys all other communities of interest. The friend-enemy conflict forges the political into the decisive entity. This is the structural contradiction of Liberalism. It only exists because of the *other*, both domestically and internationally, but it is consumed with the desire to destroy the illiberal other. Schmitt is quite clear on this account, writing that "the political entity cannot by its very nature be universal" since if the "human groupings on earth should be so unified that a conflict is impossible... then the distinction of friend and enemy would also cease."<sup>77</sup> Since a concept of the enemy is required for the political to exist, it follows that Liberalism, and liberal states - the West - need an enemy in order to have a *zeitgeist*.

A "typical dilemma" is the turning of liberty and opportunity into the pursuit of economic largesse, even while politics seeks to reduce the concept itself to democratically distributed equality. Liberalism then uses conflict to expand its economic reach, in an effort to pacify its

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<sup>75</sup> Schmitt, Carl. *The Concept of the Political*. Chicago. George Schwab, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Print. Pg. 31. Pg. 27.

<sup>76</sup> Schmitt, *The Concept*. Pg. 36.

<sup>77</sup> Schmitt, *The Concept*. Pg. 53.

domestic audience. War is condemned as a product of the friend-enemy matrix embedded in the concept of the political, even while punishment in the form of “sanctions, punitive expeditions, and pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and measures to assure peace” continue.”<sup>78</sup> Therein lies the subtle, swift plasticity that defines Late Liberalism.

The enemy had been a finite, rational actor of sorts, which could be dealt with through expensive, professional, distant and indistinct Clausewitzians. However, the positioning of Liberalism as the ultimate good, and crossing of its path of the illiberal periphery projects a far more sinister modality, one in which the enemy becomes an irreconcilable existence. Disturbances to social interests, inextricably tied up with economic interests, in the Liberal sense, become existential in nature. Anything in disagreement can “with the aid of propaganda, turn into a crusade and into the last war of humanity... this allegedly non-political and apparently even anti-political system serves existing or newly emerging friend-and-enemy groupings and cannot escape.” Globalization has shrunk the distance between the friend/enemy and that reduction illuminates a division between the ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ or illiberal world. The former is comprised of a stable center of socialist-democracies underpinning free-market oriented economies and the former is a periphery of weak states rife with resistance groups.<sup>79</sup> The Liberal order is increasingly ill served by its primary pacification tool in an environment where Liberalism is attempting to extend itself into the fringe, where authoritarianism, civil war, identity conflict, underdevelopment and ungoverned spaces are increasingly common.

The division of the social into liberal and illiberal is constructed from the interaction between the two injects of Liberalism. First, Liberalism’s transformative project is reliant on Liberal subjects themselves. It is not expected to spring up on its own, but must be helped

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<sup>78</sup> Schmitt, *The Concept*. Pg. 79.

<sup>79</sup> Williams, David. “Development, Intervention, and International order.” *Review of International Studies*, 39:5 (2013): 1213-1231.

along, and the second is the willingness to define 'us' and 'them' or the Liberal and illiberal.<sup>80</sup> Equally significant in the Liberal divide is the ability to overlook inconsistencies with its own Universalist notions as it constructs regimes amenable to neoliberal economic, such as racism or embedded domestic discrimination, even as Liberalism requires the periphery to service the center.<sup>81</sup> The key to the wars of late Liberalism is its vision of how the social must be organized and regulated. Understanding this reification of Liberalism is crucial to understanding how Liberalism advances itself through the reification of desirable behaviors and the suppression, repression or destruction of undesirable ones. The governmentality of Liberalism occurred as certain states were able to position themselves ahead by virtue of their comparative advantages in population, territory and resources, and rationalized political rule which emphasized economic gain and the valorization of individual freedom.<sup>82</sup> Since freedom is only exercised within the boundary of state, Liberalism has, in practice, been most closely identified with certain nation states: Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States, and its colonial offshoots like Australia and Canada, in short, the West, which has become a euphemism for the Liberal center.<sup>83</sup> Thus Liberalism is linked to the territorial states in the center which claim to practice pluralist political communities, when, in reality, the compromises of politics have imposed a cosmopolitan civic framework of inclusiveness on minorities who otherwise might be encouraged to rebel.<sup>84</sup> The example of successfully using domestic force in the service of Liberalism becomes deeply problematic in the periphery where the work of counterinsurgency

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<sup>80</sup> Hutchings, Kimberly. "Liberal quotidian practices of world ordering." In Dunne, Tim and Flockhart Trine, eds. *Liberal world orders*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pg. 162.

<sup>81</sup> Laffey, Mark and Nadarajah Suthaharan. "The hybridity of liberal peace: States, Diasporas and (in)Insecurity." *Security Dialogue* 43:5(2012):403-420.

<sup>82</sup> Hutchings, Kimberly. "Liberal quotidian practices of world ordering," in Dunne, Tim and Flockhart, Trine, eds. *Liberal world orders*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pg. 160.

<sup>83</sup> Mitchell, Dean. *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. 2nd Ed. London: Sage Publications, 2010. Pp 146-153.

<sup>84</sup> Richmond, Oliver P. *The Transformation of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pg. 13

proceeds. There the notion of 'homeland' drives groups to willingly choose conflict to protect their tellurian selves.

## **2.6. Conclusion**

*“The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home.”*

James Madison

It is, then, no great stretch to think of the Liberal center as trying to pacify the illiberal periphery. The reaction of the marginalized groups who feel their distinctive identities are under existential threat revolt in insurgencies, thus making the system transformative mission of Liberalism one of counter-insurgency. Vacillating between “imposition” and “restraint” has encouraged reactions against Liberalism which in turn has furthered the idea that pre-emptive/preventive wars are integral to securing life.<sup>85</sup> Different identities and claims to redistribution may be voiced but they are minimized through law that favors pluralist conduct. Any demand for a redistribution of resources based on identity is seen as exclusive and dangerous. It is the persistent insistence of such groups that make them problems for liberal rule. Force used domestically to forestall the possibility of violence becomes violence that is used to extend Liberalism in international society. Democracy and the free market become shibboleths in exchange through which individuals can achieve personal progress, relieving states from the requirement to enforce equality. Variegated federalism bounded by identity goes against the idea of equal and undifferentiated citizenship and appears to privilege ethnic allegiance over the unitary state.<sup>86</sup> It is simply the same kind of ethno-centrism that the West struggles with in its own post-colonial telos.

In other words, the problems the Liberalism faces today are problems that exist because of the injection of Liberal economic and civic development ideas into areas where they have been rejected in favor of local, identity bound futures. Reorganizing populations and territory

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<sup>85</sup> Dillon and Reid. *The Liberal Way of War*. Pg. 43

<sup>86</sup> Kymlicka, Will and Baogang He, Eds. *Multiculturalism in Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pg.41

have always required reorganizing methods of governance that sit more squarely with neoliberal economics, in some cases, creating authoritarian regimes capable of providing stability. This often brings Liberal states into competition, and inevitably, conflict with previously existing social orders: families, tribes, nationalist and globalist that depend on a variety of identities and social relations derived from power distributions that are seen as obstacles to the vision of expanding the liberal peace. These 'obstacles' are sometimes co-opted at lower costs than outright war, and this leads to some Liberal interventions being exploited by local actors who then become strengthened by outside powers. Seizing on neoliberal economic liberalization, these despots exacerbate inequalities and hierarchies and thus potential for conflict and war.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that Liberalism would inevitably spread.<sup>87</sup> In some cases, where local life proved resistant to the charms of the West, operations were undertaken to contain or exterminate it.<sup>88</sup> Despite the best intentions of western liberal states, international organizations, and a host of non-governmental actors, the results have been a spate of illiberal states, stable, but fragile.<sup>89</sup> These irregular spaces are hotspots wherein illiberal agents sustain conflict and actively prevent the international efforts to birth legitimate state institutions that are the basis for sustainable peace, as in the West. Local modes of life rejected the coercive intrusions into local life of the activities meant to expand the global neoliberal capitalist arena.<sup>90</sup> Identity based mobilizations like the rise of transnational Islamism and the seemingly endless military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan signal an incomplete and messy end to the ability of Liberalism and its agents to transform the system.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Duffield, Mark R. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books, 2001.

<sup>88</sup> Dillon, Michael and Julian Reid. *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live*. London: Routledge, 2009.

<sup>89</sup> Jahn, Beate. *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

<sup>90</sup> Cooper Neil, Turner, Mandy, and Pugh Michael. "The end of history and the last liberal peacebuilder: A reply to Roland Paris." *Review of International Studies* 37:4(2011) Pp. 1-13.

<sup>91</sup> Ikenberry, John G. "Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal world order." *Perspectives on Politics* 7:1 (2009): Pp. 71-87. Pg. 84;



Emerging social modalities seek a greater say in the management of the international society, creating a natural balance between Liberal and illiberal.<sup>92</sup> If unable to carve out their own space in the normative foundations of hegemonic Liberalism, new actors would seek to create stable dyadic and regional orders “based on their own cultural, ideological and socio-economic trajectories.”<sup>93</sup> The Liberal West is confronted by areas that generate forms of capitalism which are part of the larger global system, but less liberal than Europe and the United States, which ultimately fuels illiberal regimes, which further spawn resistance groups.

The resistance of identity-based mobilizations against Liberalism found solid footing in the U.S. led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The end of Liberalism’s march and its apparent boundaries are tied, implicitly or explicitly, to geographical and cultural differences. It should become very clear that the vast momentum and forces that underpin international Liberalism are overshadowed by domestic, local politics.<sup>94</sup> The rejection of cosmopolitan, universal liberalism proceeds apace and the picture is bleak with illiberal conflict spanning the globe, and Liberal states engaging in Liberal counter-insurgencies. The Liberal theories underpinning these conflicts are not complex. Rather simply, unequal resource distribution by elites drive feelings of relative deprivation at the individual level which are translated to the group through framing. Mobilization of the group occurs and if political redress is not available, or as is more likely, group leaders fail to reduce feelings of grievance after redress, violence occurs. It is at the point of conflict that force in the form of military intervention occurs as the physical manifestation of the security *dispositif*.

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<sup>92</sup> Adler Emanuel. “Resilient liberal international practices,” in Dunne, Tim and Flockhart, Trine, eds. *Liberal world orders*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

<sup>93</sup> Rampton, David and Suthaharan Nadarajah. “A Long View of Liberal Peace and its Crisis. *European Journal of International Relations*, June 2016, Pp. 1-25, pg. 7.

<sup>94</sup> Tansey, Oisín. “Evaluating the Legacies of State---Building: Success, Failure, and the Role of Responsibility.” *International Studies Quarterly* 58:1(2014):174-186.

## CHAPTER THREE: THE WAR MACHINE

*"Before all else, be armed."*  
Machiavelli

### **3.1. War in the West**

The security dispositive creates the war machine. The international system has then regularized warfare through the very iterative and reinforcing process of conflict. The conflicts over the last few centuries have driven imitation and innovation, with the most recent wars between them fought with similar equipment and tactics. This has been true particularly for great power states. After the Meiji restoration, Japan rapidly industrialized and developed a western style Army and Navy which defeated Russia on land (1904) and on water (1905) before conquering Korea and taking over vast swaths of China. Following a disastrous defeat at the hands of the French in 1866, Germany unified and occupied Paris in 1871, then began a massive ship building program that eventually threatened England. Its emphasis on perfecting its internal lines of communication in order to attack both eastward and westward was so worrying that it drove the rest of Europe into defensive alliances triggering World War One. The horrors of the war to end all wars caused France to invest in defensive fortifications, but a rearming Germany focused on mobile warfare, and simply went around the Maginot line. After that, every country in the world would follow suit with the production or purchase of tanks, and the integration of air and ground forces.

As war is imitative, whatever form the leader uses, others must use the same forms of coercion in order to catch up, or risk being left behind, eventually to be destroyed and forgotten. After World War Two, the Soviet Union bent its industry towards manufacturing its own atomic bomb, and its naval history to the end of the Cold War was one of states developing a blue

water, global capability, eventually building their own aircraft carriers.<sup>1</sup> At the end of the Cold War, the idea of the Space Defense Initiative was enough to bankrupt the Soviet Union, hobbled under an inflexible economy already skewed towards military spending. In the twentieth century, the pattern has been clear: Airplanes, tanks, satellites, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and, now, autonomous robots have been developed by leading states and then adopted by trailing states in order to maintain their own position. Lately, cyber war has the promise of reciprocity between small states and large, including non-state resistance groups. The assumption is that any new technology may give an edge to a competitor, and, in order to avoid being left behind, one must copy that same technology. This diffusion tends towards isomorphism. Ken Waltz described this as “competition produces a tendency towards the sameness of the competitors... and so the weapons of major contenders, and even their strategies begin to look the same.”<sup>2</sup> History is replete with examples of arms race copy catting- from chariots to cavalry, to tanks, submarines and the ultimate weapon- nuclear missiles. In some cases, truly revolutionary weapons require a host of subsidiary technologies. The British introduced the tank at Cambrai in 1917, but it was the radio that allowed combined arms maneuver called *blitzkrieg* in 1940.<sup>3</sup>

The position of the European powers in the international system in the sixteenth century ensured that its forms of commerce and politicizing power would be exported around the world. There is no doubt that its military organization and doctrines now reign supreme. There is no state in the world that does not have a military built along European/western lines, based on mobility and firepower. A large number of states simply purchase their weapons systems from European/western countries. The other great supplier, China, provides genuinely sophisticated

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<sup>1</sup> *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992. Pg. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House, 2002, Print. Pg. 127.

<sup>3</sup> Welch, Thomas J. “Revolution in Military Affairs: One Perspective.” In *Strength Through Cooperation: Military Forces in the Asian-Pacific Region*, ed. Francis Omori and Mary. Sommerville, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1999. Pg. 122.

equipment, but still doppelgangers of the west. Regular war is a constant leapfrog of innovation and catch-up. As new weapons and doctrines are introduced, the efficacy of the innovations becomes apparent, driving other states to adopt similar methods, even if the costs are high. In the years leading up to World War I, most militaries, and all the great states adopted the machine gun, leading to the devastating static warfare of the Western Front. The creation of chemical weapons, while used, did not force changes in the employment of the armies. On the other hand, airplanes changed how battles and wars would be fought, with new branches of service created by 1918.<sup>4</sup> Alliances are another technology of war that allows states to spread the costs of defense and share knowledge, particularly when allied with early adopters of technologies. Britain, with the United States' aircraft carriers in the Pacific, was able to achieve power projection at much lower costs, and certainly much earlier, than if it had tried to go it alone.<sup>5</sup> The diffusion of military technology is not new. The introduction of gunpowder, particularly with cannon, changed Europe. Geoffrey Parker describes how cannon allowed Charles II to retake Normandy in a year in the mid-fifteenth century. By the mid-sixteenth, walls and castles had become obsolete.<sup>6</sup>

Primacy of the military in Europe began when strong central monarchs liberalized their economies, transferring control of capital to the nobility.<sup>7</sup> This tamed the internecine wars of resource re-allocation, but transferred back to the sovereign the responsibility and power over a strong defense. Strong sovereigns ensured that access to resources was secured. Long after this requirement had passed, the tendency to view a strong military as a necessity remained.

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<sup>4</sup> Horowitz, Michael. *The Diffusion of Military Power*, Princeton University Press, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Goldman Emily O. and Andrew L. Ross. *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas*, Emily Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. Pp. 375-379.

<sup>6</sup> Parker, Geoffrey. "The Gunpowder Revolution, 1300-1500." *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, Geoffrey Parker, ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pg. 103.

<sup>7</sup> Schumpeter, *Sociology of Imperialisms*. Pg. 76.

Combined with the urge to expand, a strong military became a convenient means to an alliance between the war machine and the ruling capital class and the military elites who had a domestic interest in war. In order to ensure support from the public, wars were cast as defensive necessities, and this has been shown over and over through history, beginning with the ejection of the Hyskos from Egypt down to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Schumpeter would point out that through most of history, war was an aberration, and abnormal emergency in which civilians joined when he or she had to. The peasant and farmer and even the merchant were oriented towards the private sphere of life, participating in the civic as necessary, but eschewing war as wasteful, losing sons, crops and merchandise to death, destruction and looting. The change during the age of late Liberalism is that life is only fully realized because of the threat concomitant with the securitization of conflict. The war machine makes this possible with its permanent political and social responsibilities. It achieves permanency as war becomes normalized, with the requirement that newer and greater threats be provided. Exploring the deep origins of the war machine is the focus of this chapter.

### **3.2. The Enlightenment**

*“Not creating delusions is enlightenment.”*

Bodhidharma

Arguably, development of the war machine began during the Enlightenment when the dominant European position in the international system had its origins. The politicization of the ideas behind Liberalism cannot be separated from the development of military philosophies through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thinkers like Newton, Bacon and Descartes would construct an empirical, positivist framework for understanding the world. Military thinkers would do the same for war, believing there was an optimal way of war. Stretching from the seventeenth through the eighteenth centuries, the Enlightenment was not so much *schools of doctrines or theories*, but a general direction of human development. Dramatic changes in natural science, philosophy and politics swept away the old order and gave rise to the modern western world. Developments in math and sciences culminated in the destruction of the French king and nobility that represented the old hierarchical orders and privileges. The role of the Church was swept away and new states were founded on the ideals of liberty and equality, informed by human reason.<sup>8</sup> The rise of science and men like Copernicus and Galileo not only challenged the concept of Man in the heavenly cosmos, but all the assumptions that had limited and constrained philosophical inquiry. The simple, relatively few logical progressions that explained an increasing number of natural phenomena turned philosophy from the sole realm of theology to an independent field practiced by men not beholden to the church.

The Enlightenment's rationalist philosophy urged society to understand nature without resorting to explanations based on the mysteries of God. Enlightenment scientists developed knowledge by induction, the basic building blocks that led to theory.<sup>9</sup> Epistemologically, for the

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<sup>8</sup> Loudon, Robert B. *The World We Want: How and Why the Ideals of the Enlightenment Still Elude Us*, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 2007. Pg. 51.

<sup>9</sup> Redman, Deborah A. "Adam Smith and Isaac Newton", *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, 40:2(1993):210-230.

study of war, the rationalist understanding of the position and influence of *a priori* fundamentals is important: It assumes an objective, or perfect form of war, of which the keys of its construction can be discovered and thus, war can be deconstructed and solved.<sup>10</sup> Unlike the French ideal of man's role in reality and its subsequent influence on art, the awakening of the German *ganze* would develop in a highly political direction, with a strong emphasis on the role of the state. The enshrinement of the role of bureaucracy would become a central theme in the later development of western militaries. This oppositional positioning of the French and the German schools in popular thought was helped by its appearance to the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and the subsequent threat Napoleon would pose. The German school would be dominated by writers such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) and Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788).

German philosophers would argue that every culture was a product of unique historical circumstances and evolved to fit the particulars of this time and place. New methods to analyze the relationships between the economic, religious, political and environmental elements of societies and cultures were developed to support this view.<sup>11</sup> Only close and detailed study, with heavy specialization, could reveal the nature of a place. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) would emphasize the study of folk tales and songs, considered a vulgar sub-culture by the men of the Enlightenment.<sup>12</sup> Human reality, according to this Historicist school, was affected by, and continued to effect the social, thereby defeating any attempt at contextualizing universal principles.

The counter-enlightenment writers from Germany would emphasize these unknown and unknowable elements of the environment. Writers led by Hamann, felt the emphasis on skepticism made Enlightenment writers lose touch with the vivid richness of reality which was

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<sup>10</sup> Corr, Charles A. "Christian Wolff and Leibniz," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 36:2(1975):241–262.

<sup>11</sup> Beiser, Frederick, C. *The German Historicist Tradition*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> Beiser, *The German Historicist Tradition*. Pg. 137.

too complex to be saddled by “artificial, crude and superficial principles and conceptual frameworks.”<sup>13</sup>

This is the origins of the unknown in military art and would later culminate in the writings of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and embraced the trends of romanticism, nationalism and idealism.<sup>14</sup> Kant believed that knowledge was incomplete if it only concerned what did happen. Knowledge was only complete when it could explain what *must* happen. Of course, this puts Kant at an epistemological angle to the skepticism of David Hume (1711-1776).<sup>\*</sup> Kant would ask how science was possible, including the heavily empiricist natural sciences, given that any knowledge must be real and demonstrative. If all knowledge is physical, how is first principle, or a priori, knowledge possible? From this, Kant developed his thesis that all ideas conform themselves to human knowledge, since cognitive forms are already in the human mind, i.e., people assign familiar definitions to what is new, i.e., knowledge is coercive. Objects must conform themselves to human knowledge, rather than knowledge conforming around the objects. This is a significant Kantian *rätsel*<sup>♦</sup> to the military strategists’ declaration of absolute principles is that without *a priori* objects, there can be no inductively derived principles of war, i.e., all conflict is only knowable at the moment of discovery. Later in his life, Kant would draw back, struggling with the role of free will in nature, attempting to reconcile his earlier position that humans could only have rational knowledge of objects in the domain of possible experience, not of supra objects such as God and the soul. However, this does allow an opening for conflict, as the free will of man is the fountain of creativity. Significantly for our understanding of identity

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<sup>13</sup> Berlin, Isaiah. “Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism,” in *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Pp. 165-170.

<sup>\*</sup> On the other hand, David Hume’s investigation argued that there were limits of experience which can only, at most, tell us what happens, not what *must* happen. See Johnassen, David H. “Objectivism versus constructivism,” *Educational Technology Research and Development*, 39:3(1991):5-14.

<sup>14</sup> Beiser, Frederick C. *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics*, Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 1999; see also Duncan Heath (2000) *Introducing Romanticism*, Cambridge, UK, Totem Books, 2000. pp.

<sup>♦</sup> German for ‘puzzle, riddle, or mystery’.



conflict, and the problems the war machine has therein, if free will exists, then war derived from identity is essentially an expression of free will, therefore it is unknowable. In other words, the unknown in war is an expression of man's free will. Clausewitz would incorporate these elements into both the 'genius' and the 'passion' of his trinity. *On War* was only in manuscript form when Clausewitz died, so it is impossible to know if he could have completed the logic: If Men are truly free and imaginative, then conflict is essentially unknowable and unpredictable. War, irrevocably bound to a time and place, was absolutely influenced by that time and place - a lesson lost on military theorists who continued to look for a predictable theory of war. Clausewitz would incorporate this idea of 'placeness' into his theory of war and would find itself in Schmitt's "tellurian character" of the partisan.<sup>15</sup>

The relationship between natural philosophy and military writers is inescapable. Ultimately, it was the rationalists who most influenced the military writers of the enlightenment. They varied in their interpretations and what they emphasized, particularly in strategy, but all were searching for a rules based general theory of war. The rich conceptual environment of the Enlightenment drove them to question what had passed before as military doctrine. These writers believed that war, like all fields of human endeavor, could be systematically deconstructed in order to uncover the underlying universal principles which governed it. This reduction was meant to simplify, with some writers even reducing strategy to mathematical certainties. This quest for geometric proofs hearkened back to Newton, revealing his influence on all aspects of the Enlightenment. While the arc of changes in military doctrine from the mid-1600s to the mid-1800s is huge, from writer to writer, the changes were as incremental as those in the sciences and philosophy. It was in this milieu that Clausewitz wrote his *ultima ratio regum*, not just a military treatise but a book that should be considered a culminating point in

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<sup>15</sup> Schmitt, Carl, *The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary on the Concept of the Political*. Trans. G.L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007. Pg. 13.

philosophy, one that tied together the two great endeavors of mankind, self-determination and conflict.<sup>16</sup> *On War* would be a great departure of from all the strategists who wrote before it.

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<sup>16</sup> Gat, Azar. *A History of Military Thought*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pg. 142.

### **3.3. The Origins of Regular War**

*"What coast knows not our blood?"*

Horace

A combination of economics and luck created the first military-industrial complex and led to the extraordinary success and proliferation of the European way of war. Beginning in the fourteenth and continuing through the late sixteenth century, religious wars and dynastic wars were carried on by contract soldiers, popularly known today as mercenaries, particularly in Italy. As these military contractors spread over of the Alps, they introduced northern states to new technologies. Armed forces were expensive, and in the fragmented feudal system, central governments could afford only a few soldiers; contract companies filled the void. These contract militaries were incubators of early innovation, like use of the pike, being sought specifically for their ability to specialize. At the same time, few commanders of contract companies wanted to risk their investment on battle. After the initial battles between the French, Swiss and Spanish *tercios* in the Italian war, there followed a long period with almost no decisive battles in Europe.<sup>17</sup>

The Swiss and the Germans dominated the mercenary trade. The Swiss offered the highly prized pike companies for a fee, but canton and organization cross hatching that allowed them to be deeply specialized, also made them resistant to later technological changes beginning to take hold across Europe, like implementing the cannon or muskets. German military companies were more willing to diversify, adopting firearms early, and in large enough numbers to become notable formations on the battlefield. The minor nobility of southern Germany, originally recruited as cavalry and artillery, eventually moving onto the pike and firearms as they became more common. The influence of the Germans on the military trade

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<sup>17</sup> Howard, Michael. War in European History, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 2009. Pg. 27

lasted as long as it did because so many knights of noble birth, but without land or title, were continually drawn into these commercial companies.<sup>18</sup> Fighting for money was an important step in the spread of war and its regularization. The prospect of pay attracted landless nobles and the poor across international borders. As soldiers returned home or settled in conquered lands, they spread their hard won ideas of how war should be.<sup>19</sup>

Ironically, the size, sophistication, professionalism and capability of the contractors led the states of Europe to begin building their own professional, but more important, loyal, armies. Officers, the backbone of any army, were no longer bound by feudal obligation, nor fighting for personal honor or wealth. They were employees paid a wage to further the goals of the state. With professionals loyal to the state, the idea of a military and civilian spheres of society were possible.<sup>20</sup> It did not take long for all states to see the benefits of similar types of military organizations. This was a key point in the development of the idea of regular war, where the state chose to invest in force and tied military success to economic expansion. State control over its resources was eased by its military and the state's ability to grow and refine its armed forces was eased by greater control over resources. Armies had become not just external defense, but an instrument of internal coercion.<sup>21</sup> The benefits of an army responsive to the leader was first and foremost its ability to impose policy. Armies established peace across vast rural areas inhabited by roving bands of thieves and brigands. As peace spread, commerce and industry grew and increasing tax receipts could be invested in other wealth producing projects. This was the head start that Europe enjoyed, and has turned into its comparative

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<sup>18</sup> Redlich, Fritz. *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*. Wiesbaden, FRG: F.Steiner, 1964.

<sup>19</sup> Howard, Michael. *War in European History*, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 2009. Pg. 29

<sup>20</sup> Parker, Geoffrey. *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West*, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

<sup>21</sup> Finer, Samuel .E. *State and nation-building in Europe: the role of the military* *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, in Charles Tilly, ed., Princeton, NJ: , Princeton University Press, 1975.

advantage over other regions in the world.<sup>22</sup> The West's vast economic advantage has been translated into sophisticated weapons and militaries that few states can match, and none can surpass.

While improvements in weapons catch the observer's eye, it was the organization of cavalry, artillery and infantry that was the most important innovation. These units began cooperating in battle to provide shock and firepower at the decisive point. The structure of the Army was changing from quasi-independent groups of armed men answering to themselves, operating vaguely under the command of a general who may or may not have the moral authority to command all the forces on his side, into something homogenous, an extension of the will of the single commander. The mounted hordes of the khans had achieved something similar, using flags and bugles to simultaneously change the direction of thousands of horses, like a flock of birds or a school of fish. The golden age of commander's directing battles *during* the battle was about to begin. Arguably, this was also the beginning of armies that could be recognized as modern.

It was France which achieved the first modern army as an expression of the state. Louis XIV worked with his Finance Minister Colbert to concentrate control of the state in order to fund an army of 300,000. This was a game-change from the 12,000 soldiers France had trouble mustering during the Thirty Years' War.<sup>23</sup> The growth of the tax base from improvements in agriculture and industry allowed for an expansion of wealth that fueled the reorganization. The growth of the French Army can be put down to another French innovation: a state bureaucracy that could support the raising, equipping and training of the army.

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<sup>22</sup> McNeill, William H. *The Pursuit of Power*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pg. 117.

<sup>23</sup> Rowlands, Guy. *The Dynastic State and the Army Under Louis XIV*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pg. 200.

The physical growth of armies inevitably led to written doctrines governing their use. The early writers concerned themselves with easily manipulated models of organization and combat formation. All of the sources prior to 1500 revolve around narratives of tactical employment of various versions of the Greek Phalanx or Roman legion. Xenophon extolled the virtues of the Spartan phalanx while Polybius and Vegetius looked to the early Roman legions as the sublime military units. The works of Arrian, Vegetius, Frontinus, Aelian, Polyean, Vitruvius and the Byzantine emperors Maurice and Leo were widely distributed, enabling them to survive the thousand years between the fall of Western Roman Empire and the rise of Modern Europe. The constant use, review and analysis of this limited number of texts, while creating a uniform basis of study, limited the experience by which writers and military thinkers could develop theories and models of war.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Gat, Azar. *A History of Military Thought*, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 2001. Pg. 157.

### 3.4. Creating Regular War

“How could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?”  
Plato, *The Allegory of the Cave*

The expanding literacy of Renaissance Europe created a surge of writing about contemporary wars in order to account for the introduction of firearms, with Machiavelli's *Art of War* appearing in 1521. Gunpowder caused a revolution in military affairs, greater than the Roman roads and the stirrup. For the first time, dispassionate, disconnected killing on a vast scale could occur, leading to decisive defeat and the codification of military capability as power. Obviously, Machiavelli considered force and power as paramount, not only in foreign affairs, but in domestic politics as well. Machiavelli's thesis in *Art of War* was to draw a line between successful states of the past and a schema for an army of his time. Many other writers followed suit, setting out to prepare a *scientific* understanding of war. These few works had an outsize influence on other writers for the rest of the Renaissance and through the Enlightenment. One of the earliest writers, Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609-1680) wrote that:

“Many ancients and moderns have restricted themselves to generalities, without getting down to the details of the supporting sciences... which make the perfect military general. It is impossible to understand the whole fully, if one is not familiar with its constitutive parts.”<sup>25</sup>

In an excellent example of the monolithic spread of military writers that became a self-reinforcing mechanism, Montecuccoli's works were translated into all the major European languages and the end of the seventeenth century, had been published in seven Italian, two Latin, two Spanish, six French, one Russian and three German editions.<sup>26</sup> Montecuccoli was so influential because his works were commissioned during the Austrian wars against the Turks,

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<sup>25</sup> Barker, Thomas Mack. *The Military Intellectual and Battle: Raimondo Montecuccoli and the Thirty Years War*, Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1975. Pp. 5, 58.

<sup>26</sup> Rothenberg, Gunther E. 'The Seventeenth Century' in Peter Paret, Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pg. 60.

meant to provide real world advice during the war and was thus highly valued as practical examples. Both his *Treatise* and *Art* provided a theoretical approach to war, but his *On War Against the Turks* was his attempt to apply those theoretical principles via case study.<sup>27</sup> Later military works would follow Montecuccoli's basic design: developing principles and uncovering them in case studies.

Maurice De Saxe (1696 – 1750) would explain this search for principles as an attempt to remove the obscuring shadows.<sup>28</sup> De Saxe primary contributions was describing the difference between the imaginative maneuvering between states and armies, and the actions of troops on the ground. De Saxe would actually describe his work as a criticism of contemporary military affairs with the first part on the legion (still using the Roman word for the largest tactical unit) and the second on the 'sublime parts' of war, dominated by the failures of the general's genius: war in the open field, during a siege, and against fortifications.

Count Turpin de Crisse (1669-1720) was more sanguine than De Saxe about the failures of generals. Turpin would argue that war was difficult to study, being largely unobservable *in situ*, thus the application of principles necessarily being blind. He would write:

"Of most other sciences the principles are fixed... but the study of war is of another kind... nothing but a mind enlightened by a diligent study can make a due application of rules to circumstances."<sup>29</sup>

Turpin determined that the principles of war had to be studied, not *simply* left to the genius of the general. Turpin was onto the next great pedagogy of military affairs: Professional, liberal education was required. A four-hundred-year program of determining what, exactly, to

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<sup>27</sup> Rothenberg, *The Seventeenth Century*, Pg. 59.

<sup>28</sup> De Saxe, Maurice. *Reveries*, in Thomas Phillips, ed., *Roots of Strategy* (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940. Pg. 189.

<sup>29</sup> Gat, Azar. *A History* Pg. 38.



study, was well begun. An ardent classicist, Paul Gideon Joly de Maizeroy (1719-1780) would write that:

“The theory of the Greeks was fixed, certain and uniform... The art of directing the great operations is still the same.”<sup>30</sup>

Previous military doctrine had been based on the Greek phalanx, organized for depth, cohesion and morale, and maneuvered through the genius of the general and Maizeroy felt to disregard the genius principle would reduce war to the craft of amateurs, rather than a science. What Maizeroy added to military theory was a new technical term, tactics. Only at the end of the century, with the popularity of Bulow and his geometric battle, did *tactics* settle on the description of units maneuvering on the battlefield, which has come down to the present. Maizeroy called the conduct of operations *strategy*, translating Byzantine classics into French and introducing the concept of the *strategicon*, a general who concentrated on the whole of the war. Still, after elevating strategy to the highest art, Maizeroy would develop some general rules:

“Not to do what one’s enemy appears to desire; to identify the enemy’s principal objective in order not to be misled by his diversions; always to be ready to disrupt his initiatives without being dominated by them; to maintain a general freedom of movement for foreseen plans and for those to which circumstances may give rise; to engage one’s adversary in his daring enterprises and critical moments without compromising one’s own position; to be always in control of the engagement by choosing the right time and place... [and] not to deviate from one’s main objective and secure one’s communications.”<sup>31</sup>

The last French writer that must be discussed is Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert (1743-1790). Strongly influenced by his father who served on the French Marchal Broglie’s staff during the Seven Years’ War, Guibert believed that war was a science, one that proper study could reveal. He wrote that:

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<sup>30</sup> Gat, Azar. *A History* Pg. 43.

<sup>31</sup> Maizeroy, *Theorie de la guerre*, cited in Gat, Azar. *A History*. pg. 44.

“almost all the sciences have certain or fixed elements...”<sup>32</sup>

Guibert would maintain that his theory could provide the correct methodology needed, writing that “the military have for a long time been ignorant of how to analyze the subject... and unacquainted with the method of explaining and arranging their ideas.”<sup>33</sup> Guibert actually predicted Napoleonic maneuver and his books would be central to developing the French revolutionary armies’ strengths in mobility, rapidity and boldness. Guibert envisioned divisions and *corps de armee* maneuvering in open column to the edge of battlefield, being able to cover much ground before quickly deploying into the firing line. When published, his *Essai General de Tactique* (1772) became the talk of the *philosophes* of the Parisian salons and was considered the definitive treatment of war. Guibert, even *before* Clausewitz, would assert that the power of the masses, harnessed to a military constitution that could deliver vast power into the hands of its republic.<sup>34</sup> However, Guibert believed the states of Europe were too weak to use this model but his ideas would be encapsulated in the official *Ordinance* of 1791, and *Essai* became a bible of sorts for Napoleon.<sup>35</sup>

The differences between the French and German philosophical schools were reflected in their military philosophies. While the French searched for rational systems the Germans were driven by a more humanistic, holistic vision. French writers looked for precise formulae for success, thin-slicing tactics and operations into ever more minute and complex forms. The German military writers, undoubtedly influenced by Hamaan and Goethe, viewed the conduct of

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<sup>32</sup> Guibert, J.A.H. *A General Essay on Tactics* cited in Manabrata Guha. *Reimagining War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Hoboken, NJ: Routledge, 2010. Pg. 63.

<sup>33</sup> Guibert, J.A.H. *A General Essay on Tactics*, Pg. 63.

<sup>34</sup> Guibert, J.A.H. *A General Essay on Tactics* cited in Gat, Azar. *A History of Military Thought*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pg. 49.

<sup>35</sup> Gat, Azar. *A History of Military Thought*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pg. 54.

war as having an inherent ebb and flow. The role of training of the officer was to recognize and recognize and capitalize on the subtle, unpredictable changes during battles.

Frederick the Great (1712-1786), the greatest military commander of the eighteenth century, was intent on maximizing the few military resources of Prussia, and determined to do this through the education of his officer corps, writing the standard texts, *Military Instruction for this Generals* in 1746 and the more comprehensive *Elements de Castrametrie et de Tactique* in 1770. Frederick believed that officers must use their judgement based on study, when leading an army.<sup>36</sup> The regularization of war took a giant leap as Frederick greatly expanded formal military education for his officers and founded schools for the various branches. Other countries quickly followed. Senior officers, already having graduated from official military schools, established regimental classrooms to continue junior officers' educations. The growth in military schools, both formal and informal, was due to the proliferation of easily available military writings. A critical mass was quickly achieved with ever flattening of the professional learning curve and a growing group of officers who could converse about military matters across national borders. The emphasis on education was typical of the Enlightenment value on knowledge, but not everyone felt a broad education was necessary. Leopold Schonberg von Brenckenhoff, a German strategist in the latter half of the eighteenth century would write "philosophy clarifies our mind and makes us better human beings, but worse soldiers."<sup>37</sup>

Henry Lloyd (1718-1783), an Englishman, translated much of the French military literature into German.<sup>38</sup> Advances in cartography had made map studies popular for the layman, but became crucial to the planning of operations as, increasingly, strategic planning was pictured on a map. Lloyd developed the *line of operations* which portrayed the line of

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<sup>36</sup> Frederick, *Oeuvres de Frederic le grand*, cited in Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pg. 59.

<sup>37</sup> Brenckenhoff, L. *Paradoxa, Grosentheils militarischen Inhalts*, cited in Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pg. 65.

<sup>38</sup> Gat, A *History*. pg. 69.

march of an army in relationship to his supply depots, fortresses and the objective, usually enemy towns or its capital. Turning the enemy from his supply was becoming a major feature of eighteenth century warfare, as armies became larger and could no longer support themselves by foraging off the land. In order to advance as far as possible with most strength, the attacker must extend his supply along the shortest line of operation. The defender must maneuver to threaten the line of supply (along the line of operation) from which being cut off, the attacker must withdraw, even without giving battle. All else being equal in the war, the protagonist with the shorter and more secure line has the advantage.<sup>39</sup> A contemporary of Lloyd, Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bulow would take the idea of the line of operations and create the ultimate mathematical expression of military science.

In Germany, Bulow (1757-1807) took Lloyd's line of operation and supply and based the entire conduct of war on it, arguing that the introduction of firearms and the size of armies required a regular resupply.<sup>40</sup> For Bulow, securing the army's line of operations and the complex line of fortresses supporting it was the center of warfare, not battle.<sup>41</sup> In his *The Spirit of the Modern System of War* (1799) Bulow created a perfect geometrical description of battle based on the isosceles triangle. As an attacker ranged from his base (of the triangle), he extended his line and flank, increasingly in danger of a flank attack. Napoleon would use rapid maneuver against his enemy's flanks to inflict defeat, especially against the Prussian and Austrian armies depending on complex and ponderous line formations. In the debate that followed his publication, the sides were split between the complex Frederickian system of maneuver that depended on extensive drill and discipline, and the flexible tactics of the French

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<sup>39</sup> Lloyd, Henry *A History of the Late War in Germany Between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Austria and her Allies*, London, Ulan Press, 2012. This is a very pedantic book, but with a good contemporary map, is a wonderful study in 18<sup>th</sup> century warfare.

<sup>40</sup> Bulow, Dietrich. *The Spirit of the Modern System of War*. Malorti de Martemont, ed. and trans. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013. pg. 86-87.

<sup>41</sup> Bulow, *The Spirit of the Modern System of War*, pgs. 1-5.

revolutionary and Napoleonic armies.<sup>42</sup> In the end, deployment of open skirmishing lines and the moral energy of patriotic Frenchmen overwhelmed the paid professional armies of Prussia motivated by esprit de corps.<sup>43</sup> Malort de Martemont, suspected as much when he wrote that “in part [war] could be reduced to rules and principles, another part, influenced by the diversity of political, moral, and physical conditions, was perpetually wavering, and required application




Figure 9. Bulow's geometric strategy, showing (a) a strong position, that becomes weak when (b) the army moves on the offensive along a line of operations (c) and becomes weak and vulnerable to a flank attack.

by creative genius.”<sup>44</sup> Lloyd's concept of the line of operations was key in the rationalization of strategy and was conceptually a cornerstone of the decisive action which Napoleon would harness under the moral energies and material resources of the entire state placed against one point. Napoleon was also able to see the weakness in Bulow's use of the line, and would take advantage of overextended lines, placing the destruction of the enemy army as his objective.

<sup>42</sup> Lynn, John A. *The Bayonets of the Republic*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1984.

<sup>43</sup> Gat, A *History*. Pg. 87.

<sup>44</sup> Bulow, *Modern System of War*. pg. 86-87.

Keeping the ultimate political goal in sight, after the destruction of his covering army, the enemy government would be exposed and helpless to resist his demands.

Writing twenty years after Napoleon had blasted the ancient regime away, and coincidentally, all the Enlightenment era theorists, Clausewitz would criticize military thinkers of the late 1700s who exalted in the rationalization of operations, which led to increasingly complex and “artificial forms.”<sup>45</sup> Clausewitz also would criticize Bulow deeply, when writing *On War*:

“One ingenious mind sought to condense a whole array of factors... into a single concept, that of the base. He started by substituting this concept for all these individual factors; next substituting the area or extent of this base for the concept itself, and ended up substituting for this area the angle which the fighting forces created with their base line. All this led to a purely geometrical result, which is completely useless. This uselessness is actually inevitable in view of the fact that none of these substitutions could be made without doing violence to the facts and without dropping part of the content of the original idea. The concept of the base is a necessary tool in strategy and the author deserves credit for having discovered it; but it is completely inadmissible to use in the manner described.”<sup>46</sup>

Perhaps the state most exposed to the new regular warfare was Austria. A polyglot collection of ethnicities barely contained by the Imperial regime in Vienna, popular conscription and nationalism went against the very *zeitgeist* of the Empire. Limited conscription was attempted in 1771, but abandoned as unworkable. Accordingly, the Austrians developed a very large, permanent professional army, and safeguarding it against rapid employment and destruction were paramount considerations because it simply could not be replaced before the next campaign season. In such circumstances, the doctrinal use of an army assumed outsize importance and that meant a reliance on hard and fast rules. The Archduke Charles (1771-

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<sup>45</sup> Gat, A History. Pg. 79. For a good modern illustration how strategists heavily favored mathematics in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, see Martin Van Crevald's *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

<sup>46</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Ed., Trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. Pg. 135.

1847) was the Empire's best general, obliged, writing in *Principles of the Higher Art of War* (1806) that:

"The principles of the science of war are few and unchanging..."<sup>47</sup>

His contribution to the rationalization of operations, significantly for the American way of war, was the concept of key strategic points, in the enemy's base, his communications and ultimately, the objective. Situated on vital junctions, they become the "key to the country".<sup>48</sup> The identification of such is now the first consideration in operational planning.

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<sup>47</sup> Rothenberg, Gunther. *Napoleon's Great Adversary*. New York: Da Capo, 1995. Pg. 127

<sup>48</sup> Delbruck, Hans. *The Dawn of Modern Warfare*, Vol IV, Walter J. Renfrow, Jr. trans. Lincoln NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1990. Pg. 432.

### **3.5. Conclusion**

*"Men grow tired of sleep, love, singing and dancing sooner than war."*

Homer

These writers believed the war puzzle could be solved through study and diligence. What they ended up demonstrating is the divergence between the political philosophers and the military strategists. They believed that war could proceed in an orderly fashion, imposed from above, instead of what it is, a series of individual combats, bloody and painful, and utterly destructive to the individual. Regular war harnessed force and mass, funded by the passion that Napoleon had brilliantly unlocked. An unimaginable amount of resources provided by the state to their militaries on the backs of the people, had become the new way of war. War is still pictured as the movement of blocks on a map, despite recent military doctrines describing nonlinear battlefields connected by information highways. The essence remains, from Machiavelli to Petraeus, that *this* remains friendly, and *that* is enemy, and by applying resources in the form of men, machines or destructive force, one can make the enemy to submit. It is this simplicity that makes conflict so seductive and thus, pervasive. It is the belief that there is an additive effect to material means that continues this simplistic notion. It is by no means the least likely component of the expansion of Europe, and through its empires, the influence of the European way of war becoming the *regular* way of war. There is a fleeting feeling of dysfunctionality when one surveys the vast canon of regular war, with its history, pageantry, and exultation of its own sacrosanctity, but I am reminded of the words of Aldous Huxley that "However expressive, symbols can never be the things they stand for."<sup>49</sup>

The regularization of war marched away from the fundamental work being done on the nature of Man. As the war machine proved its worth in set piece battles against other states, the bureaucracy *increased* its emphasis on the rational and knowable. The war machine began

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<sup>49</sup> Huxley, Aldous. The Doors of Perception and Heaven and Hell. New York: HarperCollins E-books, no date. Pg. 14.



to see the enemy, not has a free agent, but a version of itself. This had the effect of instilling an aggressive form of information coercion, bound up in the cult of personality surrounding the 'genius' of the general. Freed from a responsibility to think, military strategists doubled down on their building block approaches, losing sight of the fact, long known now to the *philosophes*, that free will makes war unknowable. One man could go far towards healing this breach.

## CHAPTER FOUR: CLAUSEWITZIAN WAR

*"War can be a matter of degree."*

Clausewitz

### 4.1. Clausewitzian War

Clausewitz had written several works on war before he began crafting his opus, *On War*. At his premature death in 1831 from cholera, only the first book had been rewritten to final draft form, although book Eight, the last drafted coheres well with the first. His wife and confidant, Theresa, gathered up his notes and found a publisher for them in 1832. The final



Figure 10. Portrait of Clausewitz, aged about 35, artist unknown. Given to the Clausewitz Society by his descendants in 2014.

work was dense, but its focus on the simplicity and importance of battle was stark. In Germany, Clausewitz had enjoyed nearly legendary status in military schools since Scharnhorst had written the introduction to an 1851 edition of *On War*. Von Schlieffen, writing in 1905, thought that Clausewitz' principles could propel an army to victory because the moral advantages of the attack could outweigh the material strength of defense. Reducing its complexity to "To make war means to attack" it

appeared that the only acceptable purpose of maneuver was to position one's army for a successful attack.<sup>1</sup> The simplicity of

Clausewitz was compelling and Moltke, reforming the German army would inculcate Clausewitz' emphasis simplicity and directness at all levels of command from the Army to platoon. There was a very real possibility that entire Corps could be cut off during movement to battle but would still be expected to achieve their objective. In armies of that scale, to rely on innate 'genius' was absurd- orders must be simple in order to be

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<sup>1</sup> Strachan, Hew. *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. New York: Routledge, 1988. Pg. 102.

coordinated across time and distance and echelon. In these cases, the superior will of the junior officer must come into play and simplicity and directness was needed as industrial age armies grew in size to millions of men with only crude command and control technologies.

A student all his life, by 1808, Carl von Clausewitz had firmly distinguished between the utilitarian and pedagogic functions of his war theory. The first, improving the soldier's effectiveness- tactics- was the major and often the *only* aim of contemporary military theorists. Clausewitz shared their wish to define and respond to the practical issues of modern war, but it was in the area of an ontological formulation of military theory that Clausewitz would take a giant leap. States, like wars, were products of their history and time and place, and so the difficulty of theories of war was fitting them into all circumstances. In order to overcome that limitations of the previous historical works, Clausewitz advocated a critical analysis approach to the application of theory, a careful sifting of the causes and most importantly the effects of the past on current events. Otherwise, he cautions, strategic discourse would degenerate into "a lawless rabble of camp followers" using jargon and metaphor in place of facts and figures.<sup>2</sup> Military thinkers would fall into the trap of accepting their own perceived wisdom because the convenience of agreement lulls them into complacency. Clausewitz insisted that convenience was the enemy of success in war, convenience being the shortcuts used by armies in determining the nature of the enemy and their own courses of action. He argued that the military theorist must always keep the relationship of power to action central to his [or her] argument.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 168.

<sup>3</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 152.

Clausewitz' also wrote extensively on tactics. His *Principles of War for the Crown Prince* written in 1812 is excellent, its text not so dissimilar from contemporary manuals of war. He emphasized different aspects of preparation, but remained committed to discerning the role of war in society and the use and effects of battle on armies. Clausewitz was a master writer, notwithstanding the draft form *On War* was in at his death. He refrained from specifying absolutes, instead providing general rules that would take on different meanings for different eras, even different readers. Clausewitz was not the only writer to see the intricate connections between all the expressions of warfare- Bulow and the Archduke Charles also understood the central position of battle, and by the time of the Napoleonic campaigns, total mobilization, aggressive offensive action and rapid decision in battle dominated warfare. Machiavelli had observed the weakness of the mercenary condottieri against the new, motivated national armies of France and Spain and called for the creation of a civil militia, answerable to a central government and motivated by similar feelings of nationalism. Machiavelli saw the once powerful city-states of Italy eclipsed by the real political and military powers of France and Spain and the Netherlands. The banking systems of Florence, Genoa and Venice, enthralled as they were to personal connections and oligarchic families, could not match the innovative financing of France and Spain.



Figure 11. Wilhelm Wach's oil painting of Clausewitz, 1830, as a Major General on the Prussian Staff.

Yet it was Clausewitz, a Prussian officer in the utterly defeated former great power that was able to give a durable voice to these new imperatives. The defeat of his home nation deeply affected Clausewitz's theorizing about war as a continuation of the pursuit of power.<sup>4</sup> He understood the social forces that had produced Napoleon, who harnessed them into a

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<sup>4</sup> Paret, Peter. *Clausewitz and the State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. Pg. 79.

powerful war machine that defeated the former Prussian empire in a single powerful blow. Echoing Machiavelli, Clausewitz thought that states should go to war focused on singular objective. Simple, dramatic objections would rouse the moral energies of the nation that animated its politics and also provided the impetus to that power. The same would not only occur to the partisan, but was the only modality for the partisan.

The key to understanding those social forces and the role they play in powering conflict is revealed by Clausewitz' descriptions of the wars of Napoleon in the nineteenth. During the Age of Romance, war was limited in method and limited in scope, seeking only to change the rules within the system. Napoleon's wars sought to change the system itself. The key enabler of this change was unlimited enmity powered by nationalism, a form of identity. Clausewitz intuited this, although his notes are difficult to follow, with his transition from absolute war as concept early in *On War*, to that of total war as reality. The partisan also exhibits this unlimited enmity. The Spanish and Prussians of the early 18<sup>th</sup> centuries have their 21<sup>st</sup> century equivalent in the denizens of the Islamic State and Al Qaida. The tellurian nature of the partisan is triggered by the existential threat of change to his identity, i.e., his land, his language, religions, marriages and norms and values.<sup>5</sup> Carl Schmitt translated the classic guerrilla in his jungle perch to the interstate trotting communist vanguard. In a similar way, the partisans of the twenty-first century have moved from "real enmity" which ends with the ejection of the invader from the sacred homeland. That territorial anchor has been translated from the physical to the abstract through the threat to identity, which being existential, is absolute.<sup>6</sup> The response to Napoleon was, as Schmitt, makes clear, a call to arms for all the inhabitants of the occupied territories. The creation of the partisan was a reaction to the systemic change threatened by

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<sup>5</sup> Carl Schmitt. *The Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*. Trans. G.L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007. Pg. 20.

<sup>6</sup> Carl Schmitt. *The Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*. Trans. G.L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007. 13

Napoleon. By changing the nature of war from one of limited observation, to one of political nationalism, the only object of Napoleon's wars was to threaten the existential political and social structure of his enemies. The action was political; that response was political. It was action/reaction. In the same way, the creation of ISIS and AQ is a reaction to the vast spread of the proto-culture of neoliberalism which threatens their way of life.

Accordingly, I cast *On War* first and foremost as a political text in order to explore this sense of the partisan. A much stronger word than irregular, it carries a definition that itself is political 'a strong supporter of a party or a cause.' To be a partisan is to be bound up in the society in which one exists. Recent articles exploring 'irregular war' miss this point, focusing as they must on the relationship between the two sides. Discussions of asymmetry have the same problems. Starting over with *On War* as philosophy allows us to elevate the partisan from function to form. It is the necessary first step in a broader understanding of the conflicts in the twenty-first century.

Coming out of the Napoleonic wars, Clausewitz built his ideas around the idea that politics would be harnessed to war, with it becoming "a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."<sup>7</sup> Politics was a process, of which war was both part and product. The signal contribution of Clausewitz to the understanding of war was placing it in its proper place with his promulgation of society as a Trinitarian construct. War and the state were a product of passion, reason, and the military. Yet wars had largely been limited, seeking an adjustment to the status quo. Napoleon was the *genese* of a fundamentally new war in which unlimited force would be used in wars for unlimited objectives. Clausewitz understood the social forces that had produced Napoleon, who harnessed that power into a powerful war machine that defeated the former Prussian empire in a single powerful blow. He

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<sup>7</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 87.

wrote that force should be focused, overwhelmingly, at the point at which the object could be destroyed. Anything else diluted the purpose of power. To Clausewitz, the concept of war and the actual battle could not be separated or changed.<sup>8</sup> He rejected any theory of war in which battle was not the goal. The importance to the state of fighting, the tactical closure with the enemy, the maneuvering of units on the battlefield, and the movement of armies throughout the map, determined the character of war. Clausewitz rejected war of maneuver, and particularly, the turning of the enemies' flank, as written by Bulow and Lloyd, rendering his fortresses useless and positioning one's own army on the enemy's lines of communication. Clausewitz insisted that the purpose of war, i.e., the purpose in marshaling vast force, was to destroy the enemy. Clausewitz was very clear through all of his writing that the destruction of the enemy's armed force was the central object of war, and it was achieved by battle. Maneuver, of the type illustrated by Lloyd and Guibert only prolonged war. Even with capitulation, if the enemy army was allowed to survive, it could and would, be resurrected to fight again. Only by destroying the Army could the trinity be unbalanced and achieve the decisive defeat necessary to justify the costs of total war.

Clausewitz would frame this kind of warfare around his "remarkable trinity" the object of which was to separate the components of power from each other.<sup>9</sup> The famous trinity provided the translation of Hobbesian theory of the state into power production and the projection of force. People equaled passion, harness so aptly by Napoleon, and the people connected to their government and military force became the famous 'trinity.' This trinity succinctly describes the collectivization of war and reflects the great change in the eighteenth century with the rise of nationalism, where personal enmity was redirected into state policy with military power seen as key way to transform adversarial states. Clausewitz would describe his trinity as a balancing

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<sup>8</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 127.

<sup>9</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 89.

act, writing that 'Our task is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.'<sup>10</sup> That trinity in war as 'primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability and its subordination as an instrument of policy, and reason.'<sup>11</sup> Real war was a composite of these three elements the actions in conflict influenced by hatred and aggressiveness and tempered by the reasonable policies of government which extract the energy that is used to animate the army.<sup>12</sup>

Re-reading *On War* as a political text is important because the goals of war have subtly changed from ensuring stability in order to maximize benefits to providing social control. These groups, bound together by identity, convert their knowledge of self into an advantage that translates into winning strategies that nullify the Clausewitzian advantages in the distribution of military power.<sup>13</sup> To extend Clausewitz metaphor towards irregular war, to maintain the position of the magnet, one can increase the power of the three poles, as is the instinct of a state, or one can reduce the distance between the poles and the magnet, as in the case of groups fighting an irregular war. This has the effect of collapsing the poles until a *singularity* is achieved. This is the practical application of Clausewitz' moral factors, only applied to the irregular fighter. How else to describe the willingness to engage in war under vast power differentials?

These systemic insurgents do not labor under a trinity of passion, government, and military. Instead, all three are centered in the individual and produce an unlimited enmity because neoliberalism requires a change in life modality- an existential threat. The objective is no longer to separate the trinity and force defeat. Within the singularity, only destruction can achieve transformation into peace because the partisan *only* fights under unlimited enmity.

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<sup>10</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 89.

<sup>11</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 89

<sup>12</sup> Peter Parat. *Clausewitz and the State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007, pg. 369.

<sup>13</sup> J. A. Vasquez. *The War Puzzle Revisited*, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pg. 59.



Regular war machines attempt to disarm adversaries in order to dictate terms, breaking the Clausewitzian trinity. The partisan fights his existential self, completely committed to his goal. The history of regular war is one in which states develop bureaucracies that delimit how war is supposed to be waged. The protagonist in irregular wars rarely achieve that level of control. However, partisan war is not about the layering of bureaucracy or weapons. It is about the relationship of means to ends and how social conditions facilitate the group mobilization required to sustain conflict against a more powerful adversary.

Clausewitz did address this unlimited animus through the analogy of the duel. In a deadly conflict between two persons, there is unlimited animus, up to and including death, and over in an instant.<sup>14</sup> War had a similar animus, a motivation, when the conflict was between states. He would write that “Essentially combat is an expression of hostile feelings, but in largescale combat, that we call war, hostile feelings often have become merely hostile intentions. At any rate, there are usually no hostile feelings between individuals.”<sup>15</sup> This truly is the difference between armies of regular war and partisans. Filtered through reason, the passion is blunted, channeled, into effective force, able to be modulated. Operating under the singularity, the passion of the people allows war to approach the extreme. ISIS, AQ, the Taleban, the Tamils, the Mujahadeen, the Viet Cong and the FLN in recent memory were able to link the survival of the people with support for conflict, and ultimately, horrific acts of violence. The partisan gives himself up to absolutes, in hatred, in force, in goal.<sup>16</sup> Clausewitz formulation of absolute war, described as reciprocal enemies between whom, in theory, there was no limit to the use of force. Napoleon was able to do the same. Fear leads to ambivalence, and a lengthening of war. The genuine fear of destruction at the hands of the ‘other’ is what drives the escalation of violence in reality, producing hitherto unspeakable acts of violence. This is why

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<sup>14</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 75

<sup>15</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 137

<sup>16</sup> Carl Schmitt. *The Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*. Trans. G.L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007. 7

modern liberal states, while constraining methods through *jus in bello*, frames their wars as good versus evil, thereby allowing, in theory, unlimited action to achieve their objectives. Conversely, in state war, this fear of death limits strategies of violence, since reason provides that what happens to the other can just as easily happen to oneself. Escalation would then naturally follow to an extreme point, what Andreas Herberg-Rothe called the “disinhibition of force.”<sup>17</sup> This *threat* of the escalation of force could cause one side to ameliorate its use of force. It is not the action of the enemy that explains this de-escalation, but the fear of one’s own destruction.<sup>18</sup> This is a fundamental motivation of the decisive battle that Clausewitz advocated, that liberty can only be delivered when the enemy army, and its implicit threat, is destroyed.

Paradoxically, this same fear drives states to invest in new technologies meant to overpower an adversary- more force at the point of irrevocable, unavoidable attack. Andreas Herberg-Rothe brings up a good point- increased force tends to lead to shorter conflicts.<sup>19</sup> This is borne out by several episodes in history. Napoleon capitalized on horse artillery and after Germany innovated with tanks and aircraft, mechanized warfare has become the generally normative form of warfare with on “tactics... based on overwhelming speed, concentration and surprise.”<sup>20</sup> This kind of warfare is meant to destroy the morale of the adversary, as in the case of Prussia in 1806, France in 1940, and Iraq in 1991. Morale collapses because states are not prepared, cannot reach, nor match the violent force of the attacker. The passion of the people, which powers the destructive policies enacted through military means, crumbles and the government yields.

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<sup>17</sup> Andreas Herberg-Rothe. *Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pg. 76.

<sup>18</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 77

<sup>19</sup> Andreas Herberg-Rothe. *Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007. 94

<sup>20</sup> Michael Howard. *War in European History*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Pg. 132.

In partisan war, state actions are limited by the objective. To destroy the army of partisan, the state must destroy the partisan himself. The response of the irregular fighter is that he “expects neither justice nor mercy from his enemy. He is turned away from the conventional enmity of the contained war and given himself up to another – the real – enmity that rises through terror and counter terror, up to annihilation.”<sup>21</sup> This willingness to endure is part and parcel of the motivation of the partisan, predicated on a sense of identity and solidarity. Like the Spanish during the Peninsular War, modern conflicts evoke a response *en masse* as a people defending themselves from an existential threat. The partisan, and the modern insurgent are motivated by their commitment to identity that is enlarged by these perceived threats.

Clausewitz made a key discovery concerning political goals. He uses the phrase ‘calculation of probabilities’ to describe the process of determining what force a protagonist will use to achieve his political objective.<sup>22</sup> If the objective of the attacker is worth little to the defender, the defender will only make a small effort to deny it. The greater the objective, the greater the resistance. This implies a polarity of political goals. Clausewitz writes: ‘The more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must.’<sup>23</sup> Here, Clausewitz lays bare both the problem and the solution to partisan wars. States, rational and seeking stability are always willing to accept less, while invariably, in internationalized internal conflicts, the antagonist’ goals are bound up in identity. Clausewitz would call this the principle of polarity and is easily recognizable in regular war. If it is advantageous for one side to attack, it is equally advantageous for the other to defend; if one side is victorious, then the other is defeated. But in partisan war, the polarity of adversaries lies in their relationship to the political object. In these wars, particularly ones which have as a

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<sup>21</sup> Carl Schmitt. *The Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*. Trans. G.L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007. 7

<sup>22</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 80

<sup>23</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 81

participant one of the great powers, the political objective determines the total means and strength of will. For the great power and its state ally, the desire is for stability, i.e., no change. For the irregular adversary, the goal is change, often in the form of independence, a redistribution of resources. The process of political mobilization requires an element of identity threat, which in turn demands action to preserve identity. The operative mode of the singularity means that the political cannot be overcome by the through violent military action. Perhaps this is what Clausewitz meant when he wrote 'The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered isolation of their purpose.'<sup>24</sup> This explains why some groups engage in conflict when the power differential is so heavily in favor of the state as to make the act seem irrational to the observer. This is largely the result in goal mismatch between the two actors. The state, possessing vast resources, lacks the strategic purpose, i.e., the existential threat, to engage in unlimited war. The resistance group possesses few physical resources, but faced with a real or imagined threat to survival, are able to achieve total mobilization. Full commitment to the conflict is expressed in generational terms with fathers indoctrinating sons (and daughters) in the methods of warfare over historicized grievances. With fewer resources, ethnic groups engage in asymmetric conflict, with the state, with violent acts executed primarily to extract political concessions, not to impose their will on the battlefield. Clausewitz had an inkling of this in 1812 when he wrote that 'Small states cannot wage wars of conquest in our times. But in defensive warfare even the means of small states are infinitely great.'<sup>25</sup>

The requirement of force, and a preponderance of power is not required by irregular forces because regular forces only attack when knowledge and strength is in their favor. Irregular forces overcome Clausewitz' friction of individuals since the span of control is

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<sup>24</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 87

<sup>25</sup> C. Clausewitz. *Principles of War*. Hans W. Gatzke, trans., ed. The Military Service Publishing Company, 1942, found online at <http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/principlesofwar.htm>

effectively one in irregular wars. The unchanging concept of war is the will to dominate.<sup>26</sup> In Clausewitz time, unitary armies could dominate the opposing army and compel the foreign government to do its will. In irregular war, with its free will tendencies, the span of control is effectively one, meaning that the state must dominate individuals. The tension between unlimited animus and the fear that ameliorates it creates the possibility of judgement, thus free will. War is the most fertile field for this condition. Clausewitz writes that for most people, fear and danger leads to indecision and immobility, but where it does not 'we can be sure that we are in the presence of exceptional ability.'<sup>27</sup> Under the operative singularity, in the face of overwhelming force, guerillas appear to meet this test.

Clausewitz did argue for unlimited violence in guerrilla warfare, believing that to 'reply cruelty with cruelty, reply to acts of violence with more acts of violence' would drive the population to cease support for the irregulars. Clausewitz believed that escalating violence could be a successful strategy, but as events in Moscow and Spain revealed, if violence could always be escalated then it would cease to have any merit. Napoleon was successful in part because he was the first to break through the strictly regulated warfare of the eighteenth century. When escalating violence, the benefit goes to the offense.<sup>28</sup> For the partisan, this translates into the strike at soft targets and provides militarily weak groups with an incentive to strike early against soft targets.<sup>29</sup> What is called terrorism is really the only escalatory offensive strategy available to the partisan.

Limiting and escalating force have very real effects. Clausewitz is very critical of theory that places war in a vacuum, explaining that his own theoretical styling of unlimited war is mean only as a hallmark against which to judge real conflict. In his examples of absolute war, the

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<sup>26</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 127

<sup>27</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 585

<sup>28</sup> Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz*, 68

<sup>29</sup> Barry Posen. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*. 35:1(1993):27-47.

theory rejected social considerations as the experiment includes extreme force.<sup>30</sup> But wars do not occur in a vacuum. They occur in time, and are subject to the state's own vision of itself as a product of its history, and what it thinks its future state will be.<sup>31</sup> Clausewitz wrote that the social conditions of states and 'their relationships to one another... are the forces that give rise to war; the same forces circumscribe and moderate it. They themselves, however, are not part of war; they already exist before fighting starts.'<sup>32</sup> These social conditions modulate the use of force. This is the 'norms and values' of Morgenthau that limit the passion of the people for unlimited violence, a desire that is heeded by the state. Limiting force first then limits passion, prolonging the conflict. Avoiding military defeat on one side inflicted a political defeat on the other when the justification for entering the conflict and rationale for consuming state power were lost. This loss of political will to continue the war, the total mobilization achieved by the weaker group, and pressure to limit the war in the stronger state creates the asymmetric strategy that leads to victory: avoiding military engagement on the strong side's terms. The nature of irregular war and its identity entanglements make this kind of conflict greater than the sum of its parts, and in Andrew Mack's words 'the conflict as a whole which must be studied in order to understand its evolution and outcome.'<sup>33</sup> In the conflicts of today, and most importantly, the conflicts of the future, the wars take place in disintegrating states, or areas where there is little state control, or people with a profoundly different view of the way life ought to be.<sup>34</sup>

While *On War* should be considered a political text first and foremost, the majority of the its essays deal with the operational art of war, that of directing military forces in the offense or in

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<sup>30</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Ed., Trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. 76

<sup>31</sup> Herberg-Rothe, 86

<sup>32</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 76

<sup>33</sup> Andrew Mack. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics*, 27: 2 (1975):175-200. Pg. 188.

<sup>34</sup> M. Kaldor. "Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror," *International Politics*, 42:4(2005):491-498.

the defense. It was this facet of Clausewitz' work that was seized upon, along with his mantra about the superiority of the offense in generating moral force, by the French and German military theorist in the mid-to-late 1800s. The vast network of schools, texts, and lectures provided an irreversible momentum which catapulted Clausewitz to the fore of western Military thinking. The emphasis on the purely military made the political assume a secondary role. Military doctrines, grounded in the Clausewitzian philosophy assumes enemies with unitary leaders, organized armies, and fixed geographical boundaries, not people centric conflicts that operate amorously.<sup>35</sup> Wars have been idealized by a vast military industrial complex that cranks out tanks and bombers that are designed to fight the kind of war prevalent between the mid nineteenth and end of the twentieth centuries. This creates a situation in which new adversaries must be viewed as unitary and organized because so much political capital, vast physical resources, and money have been spent to create the weapons and organizations that can defeat those 'old' enemies in the decisive battle so important to Clausewitz.<sup>36</sup>

In the theoretical abstract, devoid of any connection to physical means of producing force, the enemy could "[dictate] to me as much as I dictate to him... You can make your efforts as great as possible, but the enemy will do the same' Clausewitz would call this "the field of abstract thought... a clash of freely operating ideas."<sup>37</sup> Clausewitz seemed to understand the risks inherent on relying on force only, which could lead to establishing the wrong political objectives for the war, which could lead to a disastrous strategy, writing that politicians should 'establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.'<sup>38</sup> Clausewitz demanded simplicity in war, and crafted his theory of war around the very simple idea that battle, and battle only, was the aim of

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<sup>35</sup> Yee Kuang Heng. "Unravelling the 'War' on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War Clothing?" *Security Dialogue*. 33:2 (2002): 227-42. Pg. 227.

<sup>36</sup> M. Kaldor. "Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror," *International Politics*, 42:4(2005):491-498.

<sup>37</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 78

<sup>38</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 88

maneuvering against the enemy. The need for simplicity came about because Napoleon had demonstrated that through harnessing the hatred of the people could create huge armies fueled by the moral spirit of Nationalism. The purpose of the engagement remained being able to dictate the terms of peace, only *after* destroying the enemy's army. In his correspondence in 1827, he cited both options as having the single aim of overthrowing the enemy.<sup>39</sup> There is no application of power that can separate the partisan from his objective, which is the safeguarding of his existential self.

Criticism of Clausewitzian philosophy is not mean to reject all Clausewitzian wars. Some have been very useful: The U.S. Civil War, the First and Second World Wars were all Clausewitzian in nature, destroying the enemy armies in order to dictate unlimited terms. In all three, the enemy form of government was extinguished and justifiably so. Modern war, already exceedingly complex, becomes more so by the inability of Clausewitzian war to achieve policy objectives generating ever more complex plans. This is the crux of the problem with the hierarchical way of war; an enterprise that has become so vast, that simpler and simpler directives are given, with little thought to the complexity of the situation. This became a self-fulfilling prophecy in which simple directives became the way to simplify the war. During the years in Iraq and Afghanistan, headquarters of ten-thousand people compiled reams of orders and directives. In order to avoid the overwhelming cognitive slow down, the complexity of the war was distilled to the simple violence of tactical action at the lowest level. This drive to violence became singular, and the need for more and more tactical actions, the idea that just a few more battalions would solve the riddle was paramount. Clausewitz would write in *Principles of War* 'that war always demanded the fullest mobilization of resources, and their most energetic

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<sup>39</sup> Raymond Aron. *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*. Trans. Christine Booker and Norman Stone. New York: Touchstone, 1983. Pp. 88-89.



exploitation.<sup>40</sup> For the modern military states, this has become the need for mass, for *more*, the idea that *more* will both reduce risk and increase success. But the idea of mass as strategy is antiquated when balanced against Clausewitz' own definition that strategy *is the use of individual engagements to achieve the aim of the war*. This is because in identity wars, the adversary is the individual. In order to break the trinity, battles would become a never ending series of executions of individuals. Put another way, Clausewitz limited strategy to the use of battles which the application of violence against the enemy: each individual becomes a battlefield.

For powerful states, and it seems the U.S. in particular, great offensive capabilities bring with them the overwhelming urge to use them and recently, technology has sought out ways to bring battle to bear on the individual. This urge to offense, and the changing requirements of the wars of the twenty-first century weighs heavily states, particularly on the U.S. with its American way of war.<sup>41</sup> The belief in the offensive' and success in conflicts like WWII and the first Gulf War has bred the belief that when the nation goes to war, it goes all in, and nothing less than unconditional defeat is acceptable. Vast military-industrial complexes are created to support this notion. Embodied most recently as the 'Powell doctrine', it is, however, a false notion, since most conflicts in our history have not ended with our enemies' unconditional defeat.<sup>42</sup> This

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<sup>40</sup> Carl Clausewitz. *Principles of War*. Hans W. Gatzke, trans., ed. The Military Service Publishing Company, 1942, found online at <http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/principlesofwar.htm> pg. 46.

<sup>41</sup> T. Mahnken. *Technology and the American Way of War since 1945*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. T.H. Ferhenbach. *This Kind of War* (Brassey's, Washington, DC, Brassey's, 2000, discusses the pivotal changes towards heavier use of technology following the Second World War and its problems in the Korean Wars.

<sup>42</sup> In short, the Powell doctrine holds three tenants: One, that only overwhelming force be considered, two, only when the entire nation is solidly behind the use of force, and only when 'vital' national interests are at stake. Read Campbell, Kenneth. "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, *Armed Forces and Society*, 24:3(1998): 357-374; Colin Powell, Colin "Powell's Doctrine, in Powell's Words," *Washington Post*, 7 Oct 2001, pg. B02. For skeptics of the Powell doctrine, read Thomas Ricks' "Powell's Doctrine on Use of military force is now being questioned by senior U.S. officers," *Wall Street Journal*, 20 August 1995, p A12 and Robert Haddick, "The Long Death of the Powell Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, March 5, 2010, online edition, and finally, James Armstrong's "From Theory to Practice," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, found at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536670>

belief in American exceptionalism, particularly in armed conflict, provides a challenging obstacle to success in IW. Few of the extant adversaries can be identified clearly, much less defeated.

Clausewitz left *On War* in an unfinished state, more a collection of fifteen years' notes than a final draft. He was a product of his time, of the military education system of Frederick the Great, and he studied those wars, and considered himself an heir to the Prussian military tradition. Only late in his collection of writings did he begin to incorporate identity war- he terms it people's war- and only then as an item of strategic defense.<sup>43</sup> It is important here to note that Clausewitz did not conceive of insurgency in terms familiar to the twenty-first century, but properly parsed, *On War* holds tantalizing clues for an explanation for twenty-first century insurgencies in defense of identity.

Much of what Clausewitz wrote two hundred years ago is good and remains relevant, even as the material attributes of war would be unrecognizable to the author. I do believe that from his accounting of total war and the effect of moral force, he realized that in partisan war, as in real war, the trinity would approach a singularity in which the complete destruction of the other would be required for victory. Clausewitz would argue that the force seeks to the extreme, and we see that in the irregular wars of ISIS and Al Qaida, the massacres of Rwanda, the Yugoslav disintegration, and leveling of Grozny. The objective in those wars was destruction of the other, *animus extremis*, using all the force available. There is no "logical limit to the application of that force"<sup>44</sup> The principle is the same, whether for an army of hundreds of thousands, or an army of one.

For the partisan, under the singularity, the passion, the policy and the military become one. Partisan forces hold a superior moral position because their identity is wrapped up in the conflict. The only way for their identity to survive is through victory. Western forces will not

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<sup>43</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 482

<sup>44</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 77

achieve this moral superiority laboring as they are under the trinity. As the arc of conflicts not amenable to Clausewitzian philosophy grows longer, the dissonance increases.

In regular war, the political, economic and social influences the art of war to such an extent as to make it a product of those forces. We see plainly that the military is a product of the political. In the singularity, the passion, the policy and the military become one. As to the moral forces in war, Clausewitz felt they were paramount. In social wars, the irregular forces hold a superior position in moral force because their identity is wrapped up in the conflict. The only way for their identity to survive is through victory. Western forces will not achieve this moral superiority laboring as they are under reason.

The Prussian who set out to “write a book that would not be forgotten after two or three years, and that possibly might be picked up more than once by those who are interested in the subject” had succeeded beyond his wildest imaginings.<sup>45</sup> Clausewitz’ seminal work *On War* is so heavily referenced that it has become “the prism through which we have come to look at war.”<sup>46</sup> Unfortunately, the war machine is sclerotic and is loath to change. The emphasis on offensive battle, first promulgated by the military theorists of the eighteenth century and perfected by Clausewitz, worked very well in the hierarchical wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The emphasis on simplicity was, in theory, an idea capable of controlling force. Unfortunately, this same emphasis has blinded most theorists to the complexity of identity wars, a failure they attempt to correct with the application of more force.

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<sup>45</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 63

<sup>46</sup> Strachan, Hew and Andreas Herberg-Rothe. *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007. pg. 1

## **4.2. The Modern Blitzkrieg**

*“You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want, or wish to have at a later time.”*

Donald Rumsfeld, 2004.

While *On War* is a political text first and foremost, its influence in the creation of the modern blitzkrieg is undeniable. The majority of the book deals with the tactical employment of military units. It was this facet of Clausewitz' work that was seized upon, along with his mantra about the superiority of the offense in generating moral force, by the French and German military theorists in the mid-to-late 1800s. The vast network of schools, texts, and lectures provided an irreversible momentum which catapulted Clausewitz to the fore of western Military thinking. The emphasis on the purely military forced the political into a secondary role. Of the military essays, a few ideas of Clausewitz were grasped quickly, and became central to the western way of war in the twentieth century.

Military doctrines, grounded in the Clausewitzian philosophy assumes enemies with unitary leaders, organized armies, and fixed geographical boundaries, not people centric conflicts that operate amorously.<sup>47</sup> Wars have been idealized by a vast military industrial complex that cranks out tanks and bombers that are designed to fight the kind of war prevalent between the mid nineteenth and end of the twentieth centuries. This creates a situation in which new adversaries must be viewed as unitary and organized because so much political capital, vast physical resources, and money have been spent to create the weapons and organizations that can defeat those 'old' enemies in the decisive battle so important to Clausewitz.<sup>48</sup> Three concepts, simplicity, absolute war, and center of gravity are discussed here because of their importance in regular war, and ultimately, the futility of relying on force. In

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<sup>47</sup> Heng, Y.-K. "Unravelling the 'War' on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War Clothing?" *Security Dialogue*. 33:2 (2002): 227-42. Pg. 227.

<sup>48</sup> Mary Kaldor, Mary. "Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror," *International Politics*, 42:4(2005):491-498.

the theoretical abstract, devoid of any connection to physical means of producing force, the enemy could “[dictate] to me as much as I dictate to him... You can make your efforts as great as possible, but the enemy will do the same” Clausewitz would call this “the field of abstract thought... a clash of freely operating ideas.”<sup>49</sup> Clausewitz seemed to understand the risks inherent on relying on force only, which could lead to establishing the wrong political objectives for the war, which could lead to a disastrous strategy, writing that politicians should “establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”<sup>50</sup>

Clausewitz demanded simplicity in war, and crafted his theory of war around the very simple idea that battle, and battle only, was the aim of maneuvering against the enemy. The need for simplicity came about because Napoleon had demonstrated that harnessing the hatred of the people could create huge armies fueled by the moral spirit of Nationalism. The purpose of the engagement remained being able to dictate the terms of peace, only *after* destroying the enemy’s army. In his correspondence in 1827, he cited both options as having the single aim of overthrowing the enemy.<sup>51</sup> Clausewitz’ imagination was fired by Napoleon, who had harnessed the hatred of the people and, unleashing it, created a synergy between the people and policy.<sup>52</sup> The hatred of the people demands the overthrow the enemy, by widespread death and the defeat of his army, and the threatening of his capital. In this case, that hatred informed war as policy, and Napoleon set out to defeat his enemies, using the decisive battle as his tool. After 1804, Napoleon’s goal would be to destroy the enemy’s state or dictate terms of unconditional surrender. This would heavily influence Clausewitz, and the simplicity of the message, would find a home in militaries around the world.

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<sup>49</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 78

<sup>50</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 88

<sup>51</sup> Aron, Raymond. *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*. Trans. Christine Booker and Norman Stone. New York: Touchstone, 1983. Pp. 88-89.

<sup>52</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 581.

One of the Clausewitz' earliest ideas was using the idea of absolute war as an abstract from which the reality of war could be judged, not simply adopted as a principle by armies without critical thought. Clausewitz himself was very clear that his conception of absolute war was meant only in the abstract, as a simplified idea in order to more effectively describe the reality of contemporary wars. As his theory matured, Clausewitz realized Napoleon had fundamentally changed warfare, from the tightly scripted wars of the age of Romance, to the collectivized wars of the state. He reoriented his concept based on Napoleon's overthrow of the ancient regime. The wars of Napoleon, capturing as they did the massive *levees* of the people "took on an entirely different character, or rather closely approached its true character, its absolute perfection."<sup>53</sup> This led to the possibility of two kinds of war, the absolute war in which the destruction of the enemy army and subjugation of its government is required, or a war of observation, limited in aim and national scope. It was not until much later, in 1827, that absolute war was used to describe war as it could be experienced. It was "*true war- or absolute war*" in which the continued existence of the society under attack was in question that approached most closely the absolute war of his early theory.<sup>54</sup> In limited war, the political object is limited, not the application of force; there was no limit on the violence in the engagement itself. What was limited was the strategy. This is true, and it leads to terrible acts of violence in pursuit of a goal for which it the violence may not be warranted.

Clausewitz believed that many generals engaged in unnecessary maneuvers, preferring to avoid the risk of battle and engagement. This inevitably led to failure making the theories behind them empty truths.<sup>55</sup> Striking for the enemy center of gravity was the key. That center was a product of the local conditions with every war and battle informed by the areas' unique political, social, and cultural conditions, to include the personal formation and cognitive

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<sup>53</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. pg. 593.

<sup>54</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pp. 488-89, 593.

<sup>55</sup> Gat, Azar. *A History*. Pg. 213

adaptations of the general. It was, Clausewitz argued, Napoleon's strategy to focus mass, speed and battle there. Clausewitz described the center of gravity as:

"Always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity. The same holds true in war. The fighting forces of each belligerent—whether a single state or an alliance of states—have a certain unity and therefore some cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the center of gravity can be applied. Thus, these forces will possess certain centers of gravity, which, by their movement and direction, govern the rest; and those centers of gravity will be found wherever the forces are most concentrated."<sup>56</sup>

In the first use of the term in *On War*, Clausewitz uses it to describe the process of deciding whom to attack during the 1814 campaign as the Allies' armies, greatly outnumbering Napoleon's own, closed in on Waterloo.<sup>57</sup> Later, Clausewitz refers to the possibility of other centers of gravity, such as the capital, which in the seventeenth century was generally the seat of political, social, intellectual, cultural, and economic activity. But no mistake should be made that Clausewitz believed anything other than the destruction of the enemy army was paramount. The capture of the capital city was, if feasible, would weaken the army by cutting it off from its support, making it more vulnerable.

The principle of the center of gravity become a fetish, and over time, warped all out the context in which Clausewitz viewed it. J. C. Wylie argued that centers of gravity equated to the "critical aspects" of the particular kind of conflict (continental, maritime, air, guerrilla, etc.) The control of which could compel an opponent to comply with one's strategic objectives.<sup>58</sup> Similarly, counterinsurgency experts like Andrew Krepinevich held that the center of gravity "would be oriented around securing the population."<sup>59</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense in 2006,

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<sup>56</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pp. 485-487

<sup>57</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 162.

<sup>58</sup> Wylie, J.C. *Military Strategy: A general Theory of Power Control*, Annapolis MD, US Naval Institute, 1989. Pp. 77 - 78.

<sup>59</sup> Andrew Krepinevich, Andrew. *How To Win In Iraq War in Iraq*. *Foreign Affairs*. 84:5(2005):87-104. Pg. 94.

stated that “the center of gravity of that struggle is not simply on the battlefield overseas; it’s a test of wills, and it will be won or lost with our publics, and with the publics of other nations.”<sup>60</sup>

The confusion over centers of gravity increased during the latter stages of the Cold war, with U.S. military publications calling any source of enemy strength or key vulnerabilities a center of gravity. Some strategists complained that the term had come to mean anything that should be attacked, and their proliferation came to resemble so many *Jomnian* decisive points.<sup>61</sup>

Some of the confusion is due to Clausewitz himself, who would write in the final sections just before his death that the center of gravity could be elsewhere:

“For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Frederick the Great, the center of gravity was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures. In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally the capital. In small countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. It is against these that our energies should be directed. If the enemy is thrown off balance, he must not be given time to recover.”<sup>62</sup>

Written only in draft by his death, but taken with his description of the weakness of allies, can only mean that it is the defeat of the army that matters. All other attacks on other centers of gravity, however they would be defined, could only be supporting efforts to the main focus of war. Surprisingly, with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the vogue thinking of the population as the center of gravity, no theorist made the final leap between the trinity being reduced to a singularity. The problem arises when, if the enemy army is the center of gravity, and irregular war exists no state represents the will of the people, then the people are the enemy.

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<sup>60</sup> Wood, Sara. “Rumsfeld: U.S. must outdo terrorist in Public Opinion Battle,” Armed Forces Press Service. 18 Feb 2006.

<sup>61</sup> Echevarria, Antulio. Clausewitz and Contemporary War. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. 2013. Pg. 178

<sup>62</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Ed., Trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. Pp. 595-597



Criticism of Clausewitzian philosophy is not mean to reject all Clausewitzian wars.

Some have been very useful: The U.S. Civil War, the First and Second World Wars were all Clausewitzian in nature, destroying the enemy armies in order to dictate unlimited terms. In all three, the enemy form of government was extinguished, justifiably so. Important to the securitization of conflict in Late Liberalism is the position of the United States, traced through those wars, to the present. The narrative is one of the perfect tool being used perfectly in its appointed task, around which is built all tasks thereafter, whether the tool is appropriate or not. It is important to explore the singular position of the United States and how it applies violence through regular war. This is due partly to its hyper power position in the system, and partly because, since 9/11, the U.S. has been involved in two giant small wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the U.S., Clausewitz has come down as maximum offense, maximum battle and his influence cannot be overestimated.

The influence of Clausewitz can be demonstrated through two events. The first occurred in 1864 during the U.S. Civil War. Ulysses S. Grant, recently named commander in chief of all Union Armies, leaving Meade in charge of the Army of Potomac achieved one of the rare insights in war that is both simple, and direct. He ordered Meade "Wherever Lee goes, there

you will go also.”<sup>63</sup> After the massive, days long battle with heavy casualties at Spotsylvania Courthouse, Grant sent an apocryphal telegram to the Secretary of War, writing that “Our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. ... I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.”<sup>64</sup> This principle, strongly held by Clausewitz, which Grant had divined for himself (which McClellan never did) was that the army would take the offensive and destroy the enemy army, which would lay the enemy capital bare. Without the Army of Northern Virginia guarding the Confederate capital of Richmond and its important rail hub at Petersburg, the South would collapse.

The second event, reinforcing the first, occurred in 1917 with the formation of the American Expeditionary Force in France. Lacking artillery, machine guns, and most importantly experience in maneuvering large units, U.S. divisions were put through hastily established French schools, adopting French doctrines on artillery, machine gun employment and the organization of divisions and corps. Ferdinand Foch who would become the supreme Allied commander in 1918 wrote his own book *The Principles of War* in 1903 where the idea of offensive battle, after Jomini, was evident: “You must henceforth go to the very limits to find the aim of war. Since the vanquished party now never yields before it has been deprived of all means of reply, what you have to aim at is the destruction of those very means of reply.”<sup>65</sup> Precipitating a military crisis, General Pershing, commander of the AEF demanded his own sector of the Western Front, in order to attack *en masse*. The impact of fresh divisions on the tired German Army began a ripple effect that ended in their headlong retreat. Jominian principle of mass at the decisive point, was married to Clausewitzian offensive battle as the

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<sup>63</sup> Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983. Pg. 525; Trudeau, Noah Andre. *Bloody Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May–June 1864*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1989. Pp. 29–30

<sup>64</sup> Simpson, Brooks D. *Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph over Adversity, 1822–1865*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000. Pp. 307–308.

<sup>65</sup> Foch, Ferdinand. *The Principles of War*, London, 1918, pg. 37. <https://archive.org/details/principlesofwar00foch>

purpose of war and the United States would labor under this ideation for the next hundred years.

Modern war, already exceedingly complex, becomes more so by the inability of Clausewitzian war to achieve policy objectives generating ever more complex plans. This is the crux of the problem with the western, hierarchical way of war; an enterprise that has become so vast, that simpler and simpler directives are given, with little thought to the complexity of the situation. This became a self-fulfilling prophecy in which simple directives became the way to simplify the war. In Iraq and Afghanistan, American and NATO headquarters of twenty and fifteen thousand people compiled reams of orders and directives. In order to avoid the overwhelming cognitive slow down, the complexity of the war was distilled to the simple violence of tactical action at the lowest level. Clausewitz had written in *Principles of War* “that war always demanded the fullest mobilization of resources, and their most energetic exploitation.”<sup>66</sup> Mistaking force for power, this drive to violence became singular, and the need for more and more tactical actions, the idea that just a few more battalions would solve the riddle was paramount. For the U.S. this has become the need for mass, for *more*, the idea that *more* will both reduce risk and increase success. But the idea of mass as strategy is antiquated when balanced against Clausewitz’ own definition that strategy *is the use of individual engagements to achieve the aim of the war*. This is because in identity wars, the adversary is the individual. In order to break the singularity, battles would become a never ending series of executions of individuals. Put another way, Clausewitz limited strategy to the use of battles which the application of violence against the enemy: each individual becomes a battle. Technology has sought out ways to bring battle to bear on the individual. This urge to offense, and the changing

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<sup>66</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *Principles of War*. Pg. 46.

requirements of the wars of late Liberalism weighs heavily on the U.S. with its American way of war.<sup>67</sup>

Every state seeks to maximize its comparative advantage and align its military strategy with its society. Capitalizing on a nation's comparative advantage is the most efficient way to engage in war, but this strategic input evolves slowly over generations of war planning. Russell Weigley argues that since the success of a similar strategy in the Civil War, the U.S. has pursued wars of annihilation, in which heavy firepower, coupled with increasing technology, destroys the enemy. Weigley noted that the military fosters an attitude of aggression at all levels of war, which, combined with careful planning, is meant to produce a decisive battle, and the belief that maximum effort should be expended to overwhelm the enemy.\*

Weigley makes two assumptions, two facts become evident assumptions: One the United States has successfully waged several Clausewitzian wars for unlimited political objectives. The Civil War and World War II were both fought to utterly destroy the enemy in order that the victor could dictate terms. The second fact is that Americans prefer the clean ending of a fight to the finish, and have tended to see their enemies in terms of absolute evil. Hitler in Germany, Kim Il Sung in Korea, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia have all been cast as antithetical to American values.<sup>68</sup> Americans are averse to the idea of limited war- MacArthur was so insistent on total war in Korea, that he lost the trust of the commander-in-chief and was relieved.<sup>69</sup> Limited objectives are not worth dying for, so goes the

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<sup>67</sup> Mahnken, Thomas. *Technology and the American Way of War since 1945*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. TH Ferhenbach, T.H. *This Kind of War*. Brassey's, Washington, DC, 2000, discusses the pivotal changes towards heavier use of technology following the Second World War and its problems in the Korean Wars.

\* However, Brian Linn notes that history only supports Weigley's contention if one takes into account how the United States would like to fight its wars. Instead, Linn argues, history shows that most conflicts since the Civil War have been wars of attrition. With Iraq and Afghanistan evolving into long term counter insurgencies, some authors have even argued that 'small-wars' are a new American Way of War. Jairus Grove makes an excellent argument that the expansion of the westward spread of the U.S. was a required counter-insurgency campaign in "Stories".

<sup>68</sup> Mahnken, Thomas. *Technology and the American Way of War since 1945*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

<sup>69</sup> Guttman, Allen. *Korea: Cold War and Limited War*. New York: DC Heath, 1972.

conventional wisdom, and difficult to measure. Wars for limited objectives tend to slide, growing longer, bigger and amorphous because there is no clear cut goal. Domestic populations grow 'war weary' as successive leaders change goals and strategies. Political considerations become the bogey man, the reason for defeat, with interference from politicians becoming the standard reason given for the loss in Vietnam.<sup>70</sup>

The reliance on technology and the belief that better technology can make war clean and short is the other central pillar of American's belief. Starting in World War II with the Manhattan Project, the United States has sought to harness the intellectual power of its scientists to create bigger and better weapons. The inability of the American army to beat its enemies in Vietnam contributed to the development of guided munitions and stealth technology. As the cost of research and development arches ever higher, the military has been content with purchasing less of these modern age wonder weapons. The most recent development has been the introduction of information technology designed to reduce the entire battlefield to easily digestible bits of information, readily available to the commander. Billions of dollars have been spent to create these new digital operation centers. No one doubts the supremacy of U.S. weaponry, and the world was impressed with the U.S. ability to overthrow the Hussein regime, however, technology was not able to quell the follow-on insurgency.

The second is the U.S. commitment to a powerful offensive force, long seen as the most credible deterrent against strategic threats. This idea that the offensive is paramount runs through all levels of the U.S. military. At the lowest level, the ideology of the offensive is written into Army and Marine field manuals, and inculcated in junior officers as one of the principles of war. At the strategic level, the idea of the offensive becomes transformed into the ability to project military force anywhere in the world. A vast amount of the collective Department of

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
<sup>70</sup> Karnow, Stanley. *Vietnam: A History*. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. Also, see Krepinivich, Andrew. *The Army and Vietnam*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Defense budget over the last seventy years has been committed to overcoming the tyranny of distance. Nuclear powered capital ships allow the Navy to remain afloat for six months at a time, while air refueling allowed B2 stealth bombers to take off from Nebraska, drop ordnance on Serbia, and return. The Army has vast stockpiles and mobility to deploy task forces for years at a time, and the Marine Corps, with its expeditionary mindset, although smaller, carries everything a task force needs to fight for fourteen days without resupply. Having all this ability may actually increase the chance of conflict. Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling, writing at the beginning of the Cold War, believed that offensive strategies and first strike imperatives could lead states to attack, even in self-defense. This idea of preemption would be codified long after Schelling's work when President Bush announced his national defense strategy in 2002. Robert Jervis and George Quester have elaborated that offensive capabilities actually lead to war by creating an 'all or nothing' mindset in which states are unsure of each other's intentions and so are forced to act. John Mearsheimer recently developed his theory of offensive realism which ties all this together under the international relations umbrella.\*

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\* There has been quite a bit of synthesis of this material, most notably by Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, and Jack Levy and James Fearon. The 'myth of the offensive' is central to the IR theory of term offensive realism, which is a reinforcing mechanism to Clausewitzian war, as formulated by Mearsheimer which is the desire of states to attack in order to secure themselves. The organizational and cognitive theories of decision making which lead to the offensive bias is covered in exhaustive detail (in order of importance) Snyder, Jack. *Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984; Van Evera, Stephen. "Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security*, 9:1(1984):58-107; Stephen Van Evera *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999; Van Evera's "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," *World Politics*, 38:1(1985): 80-117 offers perhaps the best review of the how the interactions of the major powers in 1914 led to an unstoppable chain reaction that led to war. For the best read for the general audience, Tuchman, Barbara. *The Guns of August*, New York: Macmillan, 1990.

The point is, that Clausewitzian war emphasizes the offensive, and successful offensive wars in the past has created a myth of offensive superiority. This myth is carefully nurtured in order to bolster the morale of the people and the military, going back to the domestic considerations in *Principles of War for the Crown Prince* in 1812. This myth is built around a carefully indefinable variable that somehow adds to the hard power of tanks and aircraft. The almost infallible belief in this intangible led to the Powell Doctrine in the United States and strategies of dominant conventional forces which seek victory in quick kinetic operations.<sup>71</sup>



**Figure 12. Map showing the coalition strategy during the 1991 blitzkrieg, which relied on massive firepower and rapid advances to flank the Iraqi Army and trap it in Kuwait. From the Center of Military History.**

However, if this intangible were real, then added to the absolute power of the U.S., then final

<sup>71</sup> In short, the Powell doctrine holds three tenants: One, that only overwhelming force be considered, two, only when the entire nation is solidly behind the use of force, and only when 'vital' national interests are at stake. Read Campbell, Kenneth. "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, Armed Forces and Society, 24:3(1998): 357-374; Colin Powell, Colin "Powell's Doctrine, in Powell's Words," *Washington Post*, 7 Oct 2001, pg. B02. For skeptics of the Powell doctrine, read Thomas Ricks' "Powell's Doctrine on Use of military force is now being questioned by senior U.S. officers," *Wall Street Journal*, 20 August 1995, p A12 and Robert Haddick, "The Long Death of the Powell Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, March 5, 2010, online edition, and finally, James Armstrong's "From Theory to Practice," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, found at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536670>

victory in Iraq and Afghanistan, two minor powers, would have happened quickly. These two cases alone seem to refute the national myth of invincible military power.



### **4.3. Failures in Cognition**

"When you have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail."  
Abraham Maslow

Unlike the predictable movement of units on the Clausewitzian battlefield, the singularity causes a cognitive dissonance with its independence. There is a body of evidence that suggests that the root of failure for states in identity wars run much deeper than tactics on a battlefield. In the convoluted asymmetries and unpredictability of resistance groups, the power of massed armies is mitigated by the knowledge of the human society in which it occurs. As demonstrated by the description of the Enlightenment on military philosophy, likewise do identity and culture shape beliefs and socialize the way information is collated and processed.<sup>72</sup> Basic human cognitive routines, influenced by their philosophical milieu, masks the problems in contemporary war.

The norms of these coercive information processing routines at the personal level effect both the structural and system levels of analysis. The very complexity of identity wars pushes people to search and rely on easily digestible methods of information processing and control. It is somewhat syllogistic that activities such as counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, stability operations, and unconventional war are so complex that there is no processes that can simplify them. Each is political in nature and so demands that the human element of the environment is where the solution resides. Since politics is about manipulating how others perceive reality and partisan war is political in nature, it follows that these kinds of conflicts are heavily predicated on a free will influenced by identity. Perhaps the biggest obstacle to an understanding of identity war is the theorists' *perception* of the conflict environment. For the West, the influence its

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<sup>72</sup> Hernandez, Miriam and Sheena Iyengar. "What drives whom? A cultural perspective on human agency." *Social Cognition*, 19:3(2001): 269-294. Also, Michael Varnum, et al. "The origin of cultural differences in cognition: Evidence for the Social Orientation Hypothesis" *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 19:1(2010):9-13.

conceptualization of individualism has had on its military compounds the problems significantly.<sup>73</sup>

The West in general and western military culture in particular create an interpretive scheme which is culturally different from the populations it tries to affect in the periphery.<sup>74</sup> The West has inculcated and propagated the notion of the universality of man, this fundamental assumption becomes highly questionable when examined against the reality of combatants operating under the singularity. In the west, psychologists might argue that all persons' motivations are the same but the how they interact with their environment is defined by the individual.<sup>75</sup> This is the root cause of the cognitive dissonance which afflict military planners when directing the war machine during identity wars.<sup>76</sup> In unfamiliar situations, planners attempt to understand the operational environment by forcing information into comfortable, well-oiled mental processing routines, striving for consistency between his environment and their own collected knowledge. People, particularly the regimented military officers bred by the *coeur* of the war machine closely hold psychological constructions of themselves and thee conceptions about self can, in many ways, influence the nature of their physical experience itself. This *cultural variation* is heavily influenced by the larger group, with an emphasis on fitting in.<sup>77</sup>

This points to a deep, hardwiring of culture, not simply the affectations of people who are motivated by the same ideals and produces strong in-group/out-group feelings. In identity wars, over and over, it has been nearly impossible to convince indigenous people to change their views of the in group and not be suspicious of the out-group. Hearts and Minds programs that

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<sup>73</sup> Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

<sup>74</sup> Kilcullen, David. "Countering Global Insurgency." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28:4(2005):597-617.

<sup>75</sup> Ross, Lee and Richard Nisbett, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980. See also Altman, Irwin and Martin Chemers, *Culture and Environment*, Monterey, CA:Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 1980.

<sup>76</sup> Festinger, Leon, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957. Pg 1.

<sup>77</sup> Markus, Hazel, and Shinobu Kitayama. "Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation." *Psychological Review*, 98:2(1991):224-253.

build schools and hospitals become foreign objects in the social fabric of targeted society, with no deep, in-group connections. This alone creates conflict as individuals attempt to redefine their interactions with society *vis a vis* the new obstruction.

This is particularly important when state agents, i.e., militaries, interact with groups who have a knowledge advantage. Intelligence analysts must be comfortable with never being able to point to a 'thing' as the cause. Conversely, the success of weak groups is due to their ability to manipulate the fabric of society as a result of a better ability to perceive connections and reactions that are not readily apparent to westerners. For example, the Afghan Taliban have been able to maximize the effectiveness of their tribal affiliations, even though military intelligence understood they were taking advantage of this 'fish in the sea' approach. Conversely, al Qaida in Iraq became the 'fish out of water' when they overextended the hospitality of the tribes in western Iraq. This goes beyond a difficulty in comprehending new situations, which happens across all cultures. Rather, this seems to precipitate the failure of resettlement programs in counter insurgency, such as the strategic hamlet program in Vietnam. Likewise, there is some caution to training and educating programs funded by external supporters of weak states. Adherence to western standards may not count for much since the ability to intuit non-apparent connections, which is important in police work, may not transfer.

Militaries, with their insistence on unitary leaders and subordination are acutely susceptible for a phenomenon called *fundamental attribution error* in which they attribute actions to individuals' internal traits at a greater rate than to environmental factors.<sup>78</sup> *Causal attribution*, closely related, can be explained as a person's habitual way of explaining events by referencing internal or external events. Westerners tend to assume that the actions of an individual are predicated on internal attributes.

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<sup>78</sup> Reynolds, Phil W. Past Failures and Future Problems: The Psychology of Irregular War. *Journal of Small Wars and Insurgencies*. 26:3(2015):446-458.

Some studies reveal that people are willing to accept that different situations would result in different actions, a prospect hard to reconcile with western, Greek understanding of universal principles. External constraints on behavior such as role obligations and social pressure are accepted as legitimate causes to changed behavior. It has been clearly demonstrated that the same personality traits which observers declared were the main motivators of action failed to predict actors' behaviors. Even worse, after being informed that situational factors were the main cause of the behavior, westerners continued to select personal motivations for behavior to a significant degree.<sup>79</sup> Clausewitzian planners assume the motivations driving the enemy's actions are intrinsically personal; therefore, the person is bad. In this environment, western styles of policing and investigation can be fruitless. A platoon leader in a village would think that the village elder, who is not part of the violence, should see violent actions as wrong, and be willing to identify (and so attribute wrongness) to an individual. The elder is probably thinking of the environmental/external conditions that might be motivating the Taliban soldier, and weighing his own in-group pressures.

In western societies, this strong sense of personal control has been linked to individualism and the propensity to attribute behavior to personal motivations. Americans in particular believe individuals have some control over a situation, acting in order to change reality, while other cultures act in order to conform to the reality.<sup>80</sup> This tendency towards an *illusion of control* was defined as expectancy of personal success higher than the objective probability would warrant and appears to affect many cognitive functions. Control is so central to military planners that it is extraordinary that military hierarchies would fail to distinguish between what they can and cannot control. They then compound this mistake by perceiving

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<sup>79</sup> Pietromonaco, Paula, and Richard Nisbett. "Swimming upstream against the fundamental attribution error: Subject's weak generalizations from the Darley and Batson Study." *Social Behavior and Personality*. 10:1(1982):1-4.

<sup>80</sup> Hsu Francis L.K., *Americans and Chinese: Passage to differences*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Honolulu. 1981.

more control than they actually have, and report high levels of predictability.<sup>81</sup> Even when no conditions changed over time, people will predict even higher probabilities of planned events happening.<sup>82</sup>

Most ominously, research has found that Americans in particular were more likely to increase the probability of a desirable event, a trend influenced by Americans generally optimistic belief that they can somehow control events.<sup>83</sup> This *durability bias*, the tendency to over predict the effect of personal actions on future events is particularly troublesome for Clausewitzian brigade and division operations centers which have a strongly vested interest in the success of their planned operations.<sup>84</sup> Logical planning, combined with a strong commitment to the 'offensive' and taking the 'initiative', thereby gaining an illusion of some control over events, it seems likely that units at all levels of war would optimistically over-predict the success of their actions. With this data, it cannot be assumed that new information would significantly change perceptions or inferences for causality of future events if the information conflicts with prior assumptions. This is absolutely disastrous for operations in identity war.

Michael Howard and Alan Macmillan have observed that "military forces are shaped not only by the weapons with which they are armed, but by the social background from which they emerge and the political function for which they are intended."<sup>85</sup> Given how technology has dominated wars and the public imagination over the last seventy years, one can see how the war machine has been influenced towards greater force. Repetitive interactions between information, knowledge and institutionalized individuals reinforce feelings of substance and

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<sup>81</sup> Ji, Li-jun, Kaiping Peng, and Richard Nisbett. "Culture control and perception of relationships in the environment." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 78:5(2000):943-964.

<sup>82</sup> McGuire, William.J. "Cognitive consistency and attitude change." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. 60:3(1960)345-353.

<sup>83</sup> Nesbitt, Richard. *The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently... and Why*. New York: The Free Press, 2003. Print. Pg 173.

<sup>84</sup> Wilson, Timothy D., Thalia Wheatley, Jonathan M. Meyers, Daniel T. Gilbert and Danny Axsom. "Focalism: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 78:5(2000): 821-836.

<sup>85</sup> Howard, Michael. *The Franco-Prussian War*. London, England: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1961.

value.<sup>86</sup> Doing something the same way it has been done before feels good. However, this introduces an artificial, active sensory construct into the irregularly complex environment of partisan wars that blots out the condition of local knowledge.<sup>87</sup> That local knowledge is the basis of the independent partisan, and as such, is a dangerous instability confronting a regime which places a premium on predictability.

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<sup>86</sup> Axelrod, Robert. *Complexity of Cooperation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.

<sup>87</sup> Anderson, J.R. *Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications*. New York: Worth Publishers, 2005.

#### **4.4. Conclusion**

“A soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon.”  
Napoleon

In this chapter, I have attempted to extend the Clausewitzian universe to account for the singularity of the partisan. The fecund verboseness of *On War* is the first problem one confronts during analysis of Clausewitz. Without a doubt, Clausewitz' opus is a dense read, a thick book, in which sentences sometimes run to paragraph length, and long paragraphs at that, full of commas and semicolons. The 1976 Howard and Paret edition is the best of the three English translations, but still requires patience and deep thinking for comprehension. The introductory monographs are superb. The second problem is that *On War* is actually two works. Clausewitz set out to write a theory of war, and there are many sections of *On War* in which he does just that. He also was a serving general, and the commander of a Prussian Army in 1831, when he set about organizing a book on the conduct of battle, that is, of tactics, in the tradition of Maizeroy or Guibert or Bulow.<sup>88</sup> It is the former that concerns war. Many casual readers of Clausewitz are never able to move beyond the latter.<sup>89</sup> A whirlwind of analyses followed the attacks of 9/11, dividing scholars between the idea of old wars and new wars. In this paradigm, old wars were “traditional state-centric warfare which could be described as Clausewitzian”.<sup>90</sup> New wars would be “fought by networks of state and non-state actors”<sup>91</sup> thus breaking Clausewitz on a present reality that could not be parsed by his theory. Neither are untrue. Antulio Eschevarria, a prominent scholar at the U.S. Army War College still holds that “his [Clausewitz] conception of war, his remarkable trinity, and his grasp of the relationship between

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<sup>88</sup> Howard, Michael. *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. Pg. 4.

<sup>89</sup> Robert Cassidy, Robert. *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.

<sup>90</sup> Helen Dexter (2007) “New War, Good War and the War on Terror: Explaining, Excusing and Creating Western Neo-interventionism,” *Development and Change*. 38:6(2007):1055-1071. Pg. 1058.

<sup>91</sup> Kaldor, Mary. (2005) “Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror,” *International Politics*. 42:4(2005):491-498.

*Politik* and war will endure as long as states, drug cartels, warrior clans and terrorist groups have a mind to wage war.”<sup>92</sup> Some notable theorists have declared Clausewitz out of date, with a seemingly confused Martin Van Creveld writing that “The Clausewitzian Universe is rapidly becoming out of date and can no longer provide us with us with a proper framework for understanding war.”<sup>93</sup> Perhaps Van Creveld didn’t read *On War*, since Clausewitz himself wrote that:

“every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war, even if the urge had always and universally existed to work things out on scientific principles. It follows that the events of every age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities. One cannot, therefore, understand and appreciate the commanders of the past until one has placed oneself in the situation of their times, not so much by a painstaking study of all its details as by an accurate appreciation of its major determining features.”<sup>94</sup>

Clausewitz is not dead. Not anymore than Plato or the *Bagavad Gita*. The innumerable articles and books describing new wars and old wars and providing the obituary of Clausewitz have forgotten the General’s dictum that ‘war can be a matter of degree.’<sup>95</sup> It is modern strategists’ responsibility to apply Clausewitzian philosophy to the times, not to wedge the times onto the philosophy and declare the process null and void when the result doesn’t quite fit. It is past time to re-examine the Clausewitz in light of growing evidence that that one, Clausewitzian strategies fail more often than not at securing states, and two, the introduction of the concept of the singularity, which is an extension, if I may, of Clausewitz’ own thought. In regular war, decisive action in battle reduces chance until there is no room for hope for the defeated. Stripped of a covering army, the adversarial government must accept whatever terms may be

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<sup>92</sup> Eschevarria, Antulio “War, Politics and RMA- The Legacy of Clausewitz,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (1995-1996):76-80. Pg. 80.

<sup>93</sup> Van Creveld, Martin. *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, 1991. Pg. 58.

<sup>94</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Pg. 593.

<sup>95</sup> Carl Clausewitz. *On War*. Pg. 581.



presented by the victor. In identity war, there is no domination possible of the adversarial General, defeating him and placing his government in a position to be compelled to anything. Only destruction of each individual singularity can provide domination.

Understanding the evolution of the Enlightenment and its influence on military philosophy, and the education and creation of Clausewitz leads directly to the social psychology of institutionalism. People formalize their particular way of thinking and for western militaries, burdened by an ingrained conservatism, this is particularly true. Institutions are coercive in nature and they tend to limit individual's choices through evaluation and search routines and routines for searching for information. Institutions impose limits on cognition through coercive routines meant to limit the amount of information that needs to be analyzed through certain approved processes. In short, institutional thinking provides individuals cognitive shortcuts. This attitudes and behavior constitutes a strategic culture that is embodied by state militaries that produces tendencies and predispositions to choose certain policies, almost certainly policies that have been chosen before. Guided by psychological cognition, information processing routines infuse western military institutions with shared values about "the way things are and the way things should be."<sup>96</sup> Such thinking forms the basis of shared social structures and processes which in turn creates an organizational bias. In a very real sense, behaviors are derived from the received knowledge of interactions with the collective. In other words, individual cognition leads to behavior, which when reflected by the group, reinforce the idea that the behavior is correct. Understanding that social behavior and the institutions derived from that behavior are affected by individual cognition is supremely important to how the West engages the singularity as Liberalism advances.

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<sup>96</sup> Stein, Johan. "How Institutions Learn: A Socio-cognitive Perspective." *Journal of Economic Issues*. 31:3(1997): 729-740.

What should now be clear is that the concept of regular war is very western, the product of *defining* itself. In a wonderfully symmetric way, it appears that the irregular nature of partisan war is created in response to the introduction of Clausewitzian strategies. The war machine has been overwhelmingly successful in the past, and has created in the West the idea that Liberal interventions could, and should be used to protect and defend Liberal ideals, becoming in the latter twentieth century, humanitarian interventions meant rub out the illiberal and extend itself.

## CHAPTER FIVE: IDENTITY WAR

“And how can man die better than facing fearful odds; for the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods.”

Thomas Babington Macaulay,  
*Horatius at the Bridge*

### **5.1. Exporting Force to the Periphery**

After the Second World War, most identity conflicts took place in the developing world, aided by the devolution of pre-war empires. Conditions began to emerge that were favorable to weak groups engaging conflicts with superior adversaries such as the strengthening international norms that would limit great state response to insurgencies and the bipolar competition of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> These political wars were first described in the 1950s as political scientists questioned the character of conflict under the new nuclear umbrella of the Cold War. New vocabulary was created to describe the wars- the first was small, then limited. Counter-insurgency became popular from the state side, peoples' war from the other. Technical terms such as low intensity conflict were introduced by doctrinaire militaries. International relations' theorists began the work of defining these wars as early as the 1950s. Raymond Aron, Hans Morgenthau and Ken Waltz each studied these conflicts, but none progressed far enough to place the new partisan wars into their own larger descriptions of international relations. Aron in 1962's *Peace and War*, wrote that “relations among states involve in essence, the alternatives of war and peace” of which the emerging guerilla wars of the period were included as a viable alternative to nuclear war.<sup>2</sup> Nuclear weapons had made war impossible, but states would continue to pursue security objectives via alternatives. Aron

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<sup>1</sup> Walter Laquiere, *Guerrilla Warfare: A historical and Critical Study*. Boston: NJ: Little, Brown. 1976. Ian Frederik and William Beckett, eds. *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750*. London: Routledge, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Aron, Raymond. *Peace and War: A theory of International Relations*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003. Pp. 5-6.

believed that war could become limited in nature, avoiding the total war envisioned by strategists since Napoleonic times. Less than total war did not mean less military means, but war by other means. Aron could see war ceasing to be primarily a military imposition of force and become political. The Korean War seemed to be a turning point since “for the first time in its history, the United States gave up an annihilating victory. After half a century of total wars, there began the half century of limited war” like Vietnam and Afghanistan.<sup>3</sup> Beyond the analysis of risk versus benefit of war for doubtful objectives, Aron predicted that states would maximize the use of irregular war, where “the rivalry will be pursued in traditional ways with or without the use of conventional military techniques *with guerrilla warfare playing an increasingly important role* (italics added).”<sup>4</sup> Hans Morgenthau was primarily concerned with irregular conflict as it related to his understanding of total war. His definition was more parsed than Clausewitz, with war being total:

“...with regard to the fraction of the population engaged in activities essential for the conduct of the war; with regard to the fractions of the population affected by the conduct of the war; with respect to the fraction of the population completely identified in its convictions and emotions with the conduct of the war and with respect to the objectives of the war.”

Morgenthau correctly predicted that states, particularly great powers, would be subjected to the pressure of norms and values of international law, international morality, and global public opinion which would restrain their actions.<sup>5</sup> Morgenthau also foresaw the system coalescing into a balance-of-power structure dominated by a few powerful states, with competition devolving into contests between subordinate clients in local power systems.<sup>6</sup> Echoing Aron, Morgenthau believed the Indochina wars of the 1950s and 1960s were an important link between the purely military objectives of total war and the political objectives of limited wars. He

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<sup>3</sup> Aron, Raymond. *Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflection*, trans, George Holloch. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990. Pp. 211-212.

<sup>4</sup> Aron, Raymond, “A Half Century of Limited War?” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 12:4 (1956): 99-104. Pg. 103.

<sup>5</sup> Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993. Pg. 26.

<sup>6</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics*. Pp. 183-216.

wrote that “the Indochina war for all practical purposes obliterated the distinction between combatants and civilian population.”<sup>7</sup> It was this inclusion of the population as a legitimate tool, and target, of war that would become the main characteristic of these wars. As the case studies will show, the civilian population increasingly came to be seen as the generator of conflict, thus making it a legitimate target.

Ken Waltz’ central ideas revolved around the stability of the international system at its higher levels while allowing conflict at the lower echelons, writing that “never in this century have so many years gone by without the great powers fighting a general war,” and that “small wars have been numerous but somehow violence has been controlled and limited.”<sup>8</sup> He wrote that “the striking characteristics of world politics since the [second] world war have been: peace among the powerful; their occasional use of force against others; war at times within and among the weak; the failure of such forces as have been used to lead to wider wars at higher levels of violence.”<sup>9</sup> Great powers involvement in these peripheral conflicts began gradually, usually as economic assistance, then graduating to technical, then military assistance, finally culminating in direct combat aid. The slow drip of assistance rarely led to victory for its recipients. By the mid-1990s, the impact of being the sole superpower raised debates and generated political analyses in the West. In the U.S., security think tanks began the laborious task of developing consensus on what, exactly, asymmetry meant.<sup>10</sup>

In the recent past, most analysis on these identity wars has focused on the methods of guerrilla hit and run tactics. These assessments stem from the massive U.S. wars of the post-9/11 era. The evolution of asymmetric tactics has been most readily visible in the war on terror.

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<sup>7</sup> Morgenthau, Politics. Pp. 199-233.

<sup>8</sup> Waltz, Kenneth, N. “The Politics of Peace,” *International Studies Quarterly* 11:3 (1967): 199-211. Pg. 199

<sup>9</sup> Waltz, “Politics,” Pg. 199.

<sup>10</sup> Institute for National Security Studies, *Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power for Peace*. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1998, especially chapter 11; Steele, Robert D., “The Asymmetric Threat: Listening to the Debate,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (1998) pgs. 78-84.

Despite easily moving on the battlefield and killing its enemy, their enemies have produced such a complex war that the U.S. and NATO have arguably been at no time, close to achieving a recognizable victory. After the captivating narrative of running the Taliban out of the urban centers of Afghanistan, the U.S. invaded Iraq, relying on its massive information dominance to precisely deliver kinetic weapons. Much reporting has been penned that points to the lack of post invasion security, but it fails to recognize that the occupation itself created the insurgency with the tactics of the insurgency were dictated by the distribution of power between the occupier and the occupied. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the protagonists maintained low level contact with the antagonist until it could break the technological momentum of the dominant state with some sort of local, tactical superiority.<sup>11</sup>

As chapter two made clear, the difference with the Liberal war machine is rooted in power relationships between the protagonists, based on a disequilibrium in value-norm framework.<sup>12</sup> Asymmetry invokes a difference in status between parties in a hierarchical relationship. Like the international system as a whole which is divided along power hierarchy lines. The symmetry in regular war implies reciprocity, the idea that one's adversary can strike back with something approaching equality.<sup>13</sup> Asymmetry is forced by a lack of that capability. Actors in conflict with materially more powerful states to adopt tactics and strategies which can succeed. Understanding asymmetry as a power relationship, not simply a description of method allows a broader understanding of the *political* in war.

These internationalization of these conflicts have transitioned through three distinct phases. Following the Second World War, and reaching its peak in the mid-1960s, were the

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<sup>11</sup> Deriglazova, Larisa. *Great Powers, Small Wars: Asymmetric Conflict Since 1945*, Baltimore MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pg. 17.

<sup>12</sup> Mittelstrass, "Symmetry and Asymmetry" in Georges Andrea and Anthony Dunning, eds., *The Age of Asymmetry and Paradox; Essays in Comparative Economics and Sociology* (London: Athena, 2007)

<sup>13</sup> Womack, Brantley (2006) *China and Vietnam: Politics of Asymmetry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pg. 76.

decolonization wars, primarily against the European states. The second period ran to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and saw the diametric opposition of the two superpowers in many developing world states. In the first half the 1990s, there was first a collapse in internal conflicts as one side or another was abandoned by the U.S. or the now defunct Soviet Union who saw no further benefit from supporting opposing sides, then a bump as resistance groups geared up no clear external support restraining them.<sup>14</sup> Finally, the conflicts engendered by 9/11 have seen non-state actors capitalizing on the identity advantage which favors them. The voluminous literature falls in two general categories: the first is academic in nature and analyzes the variables of decolonization and ethnic conflict which attempt to proceed inductively from cases to general principles. The second category are studies which look at irregular wars as a problem of tactics and strategy, using eyewitnesses, military personnel and other practitioners, and the memoirs of politicians. The first will be explored in some detail in this chapter, while the second will largely be addressed through the cases studies.

Irregular conflicts have their own structure and follow their own logic. Instead of neat lines on a map, reinforced by expert analysis, irregular conflicts grow and shrink, disappear in time and place, only to show up again in another. Irregular conflicts often have a diverse construct, ranging from asymmetric, to unconventional, to conventional.<sup>15</sup> *Asymmetric* in which the state is strong and sub group weak, *conventional*, in which both sides possess roughly equal power and technologies and employ similar tactics, and *unconventional*, in which both sides employ low levels of military power. During the Cold War, asymmetric conflicts were common as much of the world decolonized and the superpower blocs jockeyed to influence new state formation. Conventional conflicts are fairly rare even while occupying an outsized position

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<sup>14</sup> Deriglazova, Larisa. *Great Powers, Small Wars: Asymmetric Conflict Since 1945*, Baltimore MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.

<sup>15</sup> Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Lisa Balcells. "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict." *American Political Science Review*, 104:03(2010):415-429

in the popular imagination; the classic example being the U.S. Civil War and now, arguable, the Ukrainian conflicts, even with Russian involvement. Unconventional civil wars have states and groups engaging each with less than overwhelming force but with precisely targeted violence mean to achieve greater-than-local effects. Each type of warfare can occur simultaneously by both sides. For example, the U.S.-Vietnam war actually proceeded through all three levels, with each type of warfare occurring sometimes simultaneously. More recently, the Israeli conflicts have followed a similar pattern, with periods of highly technical, low force counter-insurgency interspersed with periods of heavy volume, high troop level combat operations, as in 2006. This is significant for analysis of the future of conflict as it helps erase the increasingly illogical divide between the 'regular wars' of rational states and the ethnic coalitions that engage in 'irregular wars' particularly since the power differential is so heavily in favor of the state that the choice to engage in violence is irrational. This is largely the result in goal mismatch between the two actors. The state, possessing vast resources, lacks the strategic purpose, i.e., the existential threat, to engage in unlimited war. The ethnic group possesses few physical resources, but faced with a real or imagined threat to survival, are able to achieve total mobilization. This full commitment to the conflict is expressed in generational terms with fathers indoctrinating sons (and daughters) in the methods of warfare over historicized grievances. With fewer resources, ethnic groups engage in asymmetric conflict, with the state, with violent acts executed primarily to extract political concessions, not to impose their will on the battlefield. This is prima facie evidence of Vasquez' proposition that it is "*the distribution of capability [that] will determine what form war will take.*"<sup>16</sup> Irregular forces "gained their objectives in armed confrontations with industrial powers which possessed an overwhelming superiority in conventional military capability."<sup>17</sup> Groups fighting asymmetric wars under a resource imbalance are able to avoid defeat largely through the information mismatch and the local

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<sup>16</sup> Vasquez, John. *The War Puzzle Revisited*, Cambridge UK:Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pg. 59.

<sup>17</sup> Mack, Andrew. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," *World Politics*, 27:2(1975) 175-200. Pg. 175.



superiority they hold over state forces, i.e., groups under a resource imbalance *will* fight asymmetrically because they *can only* fight asymmetrically. Avoiding military defeat on one side inflicted a political defeat on the other when the justification for entering the conflict and rationale for consuming state power were lost. This loss of political will to continue the war, the total mobilization achieved by the weaker group, and pressure to limit the war in the stronger state creates the asymmetric strategy that leads to victory: avoiding military engagement on the strong side's terms. The nature of partisan war and its identity entanglements make this kind of conflict greater than the sum of its parts, and in Andrew Mack's words "the conflict as a whole which must be studied in order to understand its evolution and outcome."<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Mack, Andrew. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," Pg. 188.

## **5.2. Origins of Irregular War**

“Their frail deeds might have danced in a green bay.”

Dylan Thomas, *Do Not Go Gentle  
into That Good Night*

The security dispositif is ubiquitous. A society is only successful when violence and force is contained and the global Liberal society is no exception. As discussed earlier, it is the legitimacy of force that gives rise to society or the lack of legitimacy that gives rise to the political violence that rejects it. In the conflicts this research looks at, the legitimacy of the coercion is rejected. In the instance of the export of the dispositif into the periphery, the societal norms and values that help define its behavior no longer keep a lid on violence. No longer do all the strata of the erstwhile peripheral society see those norms and values of force as in the best interests of the entire society.

Force is woven throughout the idea of society so finely in fact, that force provides the structure of the society. To Foucault, this force in life was a discipline, taking on a life of its own when it begins to manage the threats to life in such a way that it empowers itself. In Foucault's example of famine, France had to regulate the grain supply. However, there were still those who resisted the grain regime, thus the necessity of regulating the scarcity (threat) itself. The deaths of a few remind the many of the necessity of the regulatory apparatus of the state. The security apparatus is intimately connected to the neo-liberal free market, allowing prices to rise in one area, causing a shortage in another. With his smallpox example, Foucault explains that the securitization of the bio-politic was the interplay of different normalities. Different populations would be affected in different ways by the smallpox epidemics. Whereas discipline attempted to cure each individual, the apparatuses of security attempted to normalize the various sub group death rates across the population as a whole. Foucault called this the

“interplay of differential normalities.”<sup>19</sup> Like the valve on a cooker, the constant adjustments of the market release just enough pressure to stave off disaster. By not preventing the scarcity, the *dispositif* is created. Foucault described this as

“arranging things so that, by connecting up with the very reality of these fluctuations, and by establishing a series of connections with other elements of reality, the phenomenon is gradually compensated for, checked, finally limited, and, in the final degree, cancelled out, without it being prevented or losing any of its reality.”<sup>20</sup>

The *dispositif* legitimates the distribution of labor and resources around which its society is “a relatively established ‘politically organized community... clearly a moral community, to some degree, its members sharing common norms, values and culture.”<sup>21</sup> The *dispositif* allows for the description of two things. It explains the purpose of the society, and deliver standards of conduct which are expected of members in any given situation. Values allow members of a society to orient their own behavior to others.<sup>22</sup> This orientation is important, and is exactly how groups build their identity because social interaction requires that “the behavior of other people under various circumstances is predictable, irrespective of knowledge of their motivations, and thus is capable of being predictably related to one’s own actions.”<sup>23</sup> Values establish what Anthony Wallace called “equivalent behavioral expectancies,” or more briefly, “implicit contracts.” Connecting value to culture, he wrote that “it is culture which is shared (in the special sense of institutional contract) rather than personality, and culture may be conceived as an invention which makes possible the maximal organization of motivational diversity.”<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978*. Ed. Michel Senellart. Trans. Graham Burchell and Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2009. Print. Pg. 91.

<sup>20</sup> Foucault, Michel. *STP*. Pg. 60.

<sup>21</sup> Parsons, Talcott. *Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process*, Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, New York: Free Press 1964. Pg. 34.

<sup>22</sup> Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, Pg. 22.

<sup>23</sup> Parsons, Talcott. *The Social System*. New York: Free Press 1964. Pg. 42.

<sup>24</sup> Anthony F.C. Wallace, Anthony F.C. *Culture and Personality*. New York: Random House, 1970. Pp. 26

The dispositif also allows (requires?) the division of labor, which also reinforces the social cohesion necessary for a successful society. Efficient labor division allows basic needs like food to become more plentiful through innovation and efficiency. Values systems provide the intellectual construct that allows people to provide meaning to their position in life. Values in society allows the maintenance of the division of labor, and thus winners and losers. Instead of coercing lower caste individuals to perform less desirable jobs, values are the alternate compensation. History is replete with the values infused idea of noble work. In the west, the Bible's commandment that "The meek shall inherit the earth," and the blessed poor were called the 'salt of the earth" and the "light of the world." This injunction that hard work was holy became the thesis of Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

It is these subtle cross currents of force, values, norms and labor which cause conflict on a larger scale.<sup>25</sup> In western, hierarchical states, the strata are highly organized and exists for the purpose of producing power. These meta-strata are called states. States are adept at producing power through the extraction of resources and applying them to overcoming resistance. Some resources are diverted to military means, while others produce economic gains. These compacted, broadly accepted norms and values have created a synergistic cycle in which the West grows more powerful and rich. But in international society, some elements, providing resources and labor, grow unhappy, rejecting that particular value system. Force applied, like a police action, is meant to rid the system of potential instabilities. Rejection of Liberalism's international legitimacy drive some states and non-state groups to challenge the status quo through violence. Enough resistance, squeezed by norms from the center to the edges, causes enough instabilities along with the requisite responsive force that conflict

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<sup>25</sup> Dahrendorf, Ralf. *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1959. Pg. 64.

becomes routine. Society has come full circle, from the war of all-against-all, to encompassing violence, labor, resources, politics, force, society and finally violence again.

Understanding the genesis of force, its role in providing the structure of norms and values is required to understand its failure in identity wars. This is why Andrew Mack's *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars* is so influential.<sup>26</sup> Its socio-political approach to conflict attempts to account for the origins of the phenomena, the relationship of politics to conflict, and the processes that influence the whole. Mack's work in 1975 sought to understand the process that drove resistance groups into asymmetrical conflict. His research meant "to undertake an analysis of several asymmetric international conflicts in which an external power confronts indigenous insurgents." His analysis roved over the U.S. war in Vietnam and conflicts in Indonesia, Algeria, Cyprus, Aden, Morocco, and Tunisia. In all of these, "local nationalist forces gained their objectives in armed confrontations with industrial powers which possessed an overwhelming superiority in conventional military capability."<sup>27</sup> Mack's article, hugely influential, offers deductive hypotheses only in terms of outcomes. Mack himself considered *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars* to be pre-theoretical only, but did away with the "once prevalent assumption—that conventional military superiority prevails in war."<sup>28</sup> The inability of the state power to impose its will on the enemy, long a first principle of warfare, provided the partisan force the opportunity to avoid military defeat. Avoiding military defeat on one side inflicted a political defeat on the other when the justification for entering the conflict and rationale for consuming state power were lost. Mack's explanation of defeat included the loss of political will to continue the war, the complex motivations of the weaker force, including mobilization for total war and commitment to limited war by the stronger state, the use of an asymmetric strategy by the weak party- avoiding military engagement on the strong side's terms, and the pressure to

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<sup>26</sup> Mack, Andrew. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," 175-200.

<sup>27</sup> Mack, Andrew. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," 175.

<sup>28</sup> Mack, Andrew. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," 177-179.

the international community to stop fighting. Mack was correct to invoke Aristotle when he wrote that the whole of partisan war is greater than the sum of its parts and that “the conflict as a whole which must be studied in order to understand its evolution and outcome.”<sup>29</sup> Gil Merom extended Mack’s hypothesis that political and moral considerations take precedence over material power relations. Merom argued that society is not a passive “amorphous collective” but shapes a state’s ability to wage war.<sup>30</sup> Like Clausewitz, Merom described the “modern power paradox” as the struggle between the state and its influence wielding middle class over the three dilemmas in small wars: One the educated middle class’ humanitarian values and the inherent violence of conflict, two, unwillingness to find the balance between force and civilian casualties, and three, preserving moral support for the conflict without resorting to repressive political tactics.<sup>31</sup> These are largely the lessons of Vietnam.<sup>32</sup>

The method of conflict undertaken by weaker resistance groups- asymmetric, guerilla or insurgency, is part and parcel of the resistance group’s knowledge advantage. These methods only work when the resistance group possess a superior knowledge of the operating environment. This translates into tactical speed- the ability to physical move over the battlefield to assault, defend and disappear before an army can arrive. This physical speed implies faster, leaner cognitive processes. This is particularly true under the singularity where every partisan is essentially a sub-contractor of the larger cause. He only has to convince himself of the utility of the action before committing to the attack.

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<sup>29</sup> Mack, Andrew. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 188.

<sup>30</sup> Merom, Gil. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pg. 3.

<sup>31</sup> Merom, Gil. *Democracies* Pp. 229-231.

<sup>32</sup> Prados, John *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009.

Ivan Arreguin-Toft looked at the strategic interaction between these forms of struggle of the two adversaries determines its outcome.<sup>33</sup> One side uses direct strategies of a military nature, i.e., the normative ideal of war of which the goal is the destruction of its counterpart's military forces and resources. Indirect strategies are pursued by weaker opponents and look to wear away the will to continue the war all the while avoiding direct confrontation. Arreguin-Toft specifically tied together the tactical to his "strategic-indirect approach" by developing the idea of the "its most important element is depredations against noncombatants (viz., rape, murder, and torture) ... barbarism has been used to destroy an adversary's will and capacity to fight."<sup>34</sup> There follows a hypothesis:

"When actors employ similar strategic approaches (direct-direct or indirect-indirect) relative power explains the outcome: strong actors will win quickly and decisively. When actors employ opposite strategic approaches (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) weak actors are much more likely to win, even when everything we think we know about power says they shouldn't."<sup>35</sup>

Arreguin-Toft identified weak opponent's ability to attack the moral factors of a stronger opponent's strategy as capitalizing on the "democratic social squeamishness" and external support to the weak.<sup>36</sup> These combined with the indirect strategies pursued by weak groups such as [guerrilla warfare strategy] or terrorism presents "strong actors with three unpalatable choices: an attrition war lasting perhaps decades; costly bribes or political concessions, perhaps forcing political and economic reforms on repressive allies as well as adversaries; or the deliberate harm of noncombatants in a risky attempt to win the military contest quickly and decisively."<sup>37</sup> Arreguin-Toft's concluding comments on the unique challenges facing the United

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<sup>33</sup> Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26:2(2001): 93-128.

<sup>34</sup> Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars," 93-128.

<sup>35</sup> Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars," 31, 18.

<sup>36</sup> Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars," 93-128.

<sup>37</sup> Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars," 222-223.

States are pertinent: "If the United States wants to win wars, it must build two different militaries if it wants to win the peace- a far more ambitious and useful goal- it must support its resort to arms by eliminating foreign policy double standards by increasing its capacity and willingness to use methods other than violence to resolve or deter conflicts around the world... The current US government confused military power with state power, and by over-applying the former has actually undermined its interests. If this policy continues and follows the historical pattern of very previous attempt to accomplish the same ends (peace) by the same means (the overwhelming application of military force, supported by political, economic and administrative resources) the result will be costly quagmires such as Vietnam, Afghanistan (both 1979 and 2002) and Iraq (2003) and a future attack on the United States or its allies that makes the attacks of September 11, 2001 pale by comparison."<sup>38</sup>

At the same time that states were grappling with the problem of small wars, leaders in developing countries were developing offensive guerilla strategy, which seemed to be the most efficient mode of liberating their countries. Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, Ernesto Guevara and T.E. Lawrence all wrote down their ideas on the tactics weak groups can use to achieve their goals. T.V. Paul proposed four structural conditions that create the opportunity for weaker groups to initiate conflict. Serious disagreement over an issue of interest, which the weaker side places great value than the state, in a political system that is unable to address the issue or one which is used to block the weak from non-violent political redress.<sup>39</sup> This directly speaks to Clausewitz' polarity of political goals. The weaker group places a higher value on its objective than the strong side, which again, bears a strong resemblance to the "moral superiority" of Clausewitz.

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<sup>38</sup> Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars," 227.

<sup>39</sup> Paul, T.V. *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, Pp. 12, 16, 20, 23-35.



Michael Fisherkeller examined these moral imperatives of weaker states who engage in aggressive war with stronger states. He found the 54% of all major power/weak power conflicts in the period 1916-1996 started this way. Fisherkeller wrote “a reliance on objective, quantitative indicators place a theorist in peril of deducing unfounded behavioral propositions because subjective, cultural prejudice can play an equally monumental role in the assessment process.” In other words, an academic product of in his case studies, he found that:

“...the weaker state’s judgement of the target as culturally inferior results in discounted capability evaluation of the quantitatively superior enemy. Viewing itself as culturally superior to its rival, the weaker state is encouraged to sound the trumpets for war when its quantitative inferiority seems to call for a more cautious policy.”<sup>40</sup>

Fisherkeller’s research separated out the moral factors that weigh on a state’s decision to go to war. He wrote that “Classical realists and other power-determinists have written of such factors as national character and national morale in their conceptual discussion of power. Since these factors are actually derivative of subjective cultural judgements, they should be considered separate from conventional measures of power. This separation is not merely superficial, it has significant theoretical utility, as the deduced partial explanation for the ‘incongruous’ weak power behavior in asymmetric wars demonstrates.”<sup>41</sup> He determined that the perception of the adversary as a cultural equal had the effect of reinforcing the quantitative analysis of power. Materially weak states “[are] encouraged to adopt a defensive, independent fortress or containment strategy.” When the adversary is perceived as culturally inferior the opposite is true with “the perceiving power is encouraged to adopt an aggressive, imperialist strategy” In spite of any material difference.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Fisherkeller, David. “David versus Goliath: Cultural Judgements in Asymmetric Wars,” *Security Studies*, 7:4(1998): 1-43. Pg. 2-3.

<sup>41</sup> Fisherkeller, David. “David versus Goliath,” Pg. 43.

<sup>42</sup> Fisherkeller, David. “David versus Goliath,” Pg.. 45.

Finally, the predominantly offensive orientation of resistance groups is a product of the power asymmetry inherent in the dominant position of states.<sup>43</sup> This creates a dynamic in which terrorists specifically, and insurgents in general flourish. Ekaterina Stepanova, regarding specifically Islamists, wrote that:

“within the asymmetrical framework... states and the international community of states are incomparably more powerful in a conventional sense, enjoy a much higher formal status within the existing world system, and remain its key formative units [but] in the situation of a full scale conflict of ideologies with violent Islamists they put themselves at a disadvantage.”

The very stability that allows the system to flourish puts states at a disadvantage with newcomer ideologies. “It is precisely because of the modernized, moderate, relatively passive nature of the mainstream ideologies of state actors that they cannot compete with the radical quasi-religious ideology. They can offer little to compete with Islamist extremist as a mobilizing force in asymmetrical confrontation at the transnational level. In other words, on the ideological front, the state and the international system may be faced with a reverse (negative) asymmetry that favors their radical opponents.”<sup>44</sup>

Stepanova offers an intriguing hypothesis that suggests as the global community marches towards greater integration, the ability of groups (and individuals) to move upward is stymied by elites’ ability to manipulate and maintain a self-beneficial economic system. She suggests that “politicization [is] as a toll for structural transformation.” The political process of co-opting radicals through integration is increasingly problematic as groups splinter with new demands emerging and the high political cost to the system of implementing such strategies. Furthermore, there is a moral hazard to leaders, elites and commoners (who bear the brunt) of dealing with people who are willing to resort to violent criminal acts to further their narrative in order to achieve their political goals. While there is nearly universal consensus that negotiations

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<sup>43</sup> Stepanova, Ekaterina. *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict*, SIPRI Research Report No. 23. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008.

<sup>44</sup> Stepanova, Ekaterina. *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict*, Pg. 153.

are better than continued conflict, it is an exceedingly complex issue with significant subjective difficulties. Stepanova's formulation that radicalization occurs as a byproduct of structure brings us very close to this thesis, namely that the interaction between state power and group knowledge produces asymmetry.

### **5.3. The Partisan**

“It is the cause, not the death that makes the martyr.”  
Napoleon

The previous discussions of the methods of identity conflicts still lack an understanding of the animus of the partisan, which is his motivation. As we have discussed in chapter two, the history of regular war is one in which states develop bureaucracies that delimit how war is supposed to be waged. The partisan rarely achieves that level of control. The partisan war is about the relationship of means to ends and how social conditions facilitate the group mobilization required to sustain conflict against a more powerful adversary. Regular war machines attempt to disarm adversaries in order to dictate terms, breaking the Clausewitzian trinity. Irregular adversaries do not operate under a trinity that can be broken. The partisan's motivation is much harder to define because there is asynchronicity to his existence. He is out-of-step with the larger Liberal world. As established by Kant, the world conforms itself to our perceptions. When it fails to do so, a cognitive dissonance occurs. The same is true for the partisan: He cannot assimilate difference into his world view which could become a consuming threat. In the coming fight, if he loses, he disappears. His fear is that his identity will disappear too.

Carl Schmitt began to address this in his *Theory of the Partisan* (1953). In that structure, the irregular fighter, the partisan, identifies with his society, and people, not a military bureaucracy with its uniformity. The partisan's rejection of uniformity is the very cause of his irregularity. The intense political commitment sets the partisan off from the merely criminal or violent sociopath, subjecting himself, as it is, to some form of goal hierarchy. The mobility of the partisan, the free will to appear, attack and defend at a time and place of his choosing, was

made easier by his influence and identification with a given population.<sup>45</sup> A fourth characteristic of insurgent, that of his “tellurian character” is usually dismissed in analysis of Schmitt.<sup>46</sup> This is because at the time of Schmitt’s lecture, international communism was seen as the primary instigator of illiberal insurgencies. Analysts are drawn (and still are) to the much simpler framework of enmity and mobility producing fighters to whom the enemy was not an invader, but an idea. However, in this update of the partisan, the tellurian character becomes at least as important as enmity, if not more.

To Schmitt, the tellurian nature of the partisan was his connection to the land on which he was fighting, i.e., his identity, tied up in all the aspects discussed here: language, religion, marriage, norms and values. The tellurian partisan was fighting an invader or occupier, for which was reserved “real enmity”, a limited form, which one assumes ended with the ejection of the invader from the sacred homeland. What Schmitt failed to do was translate this territorial anchor from the physical to the abstract through the threat to identity, which being existential, is absolute.<sup>47</sup> What is somewhat lacking in *Theory of the Partisan*, but clearer in Schmitt’s *Concept of the Political*, is the creation of the insurgent/partisan as a reaction to the system changing wars of Napoleon. By changing the nature of war from one of limited observation, to one of political nationalism, the only object of Napoleon’s wars was to threaten the actual political structure of his enemies. Napoleon’s intention was to fundamentally change the states of Spain and Germany, and if he had won, Russia; in short, all of Europe. The response to Napoleon was, as Schmitt, makes clear, a call to arms for all the inhabitants of the occupied territories. The political drives the partisan; it is action/reaction.

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<sup>45</sup> Schmitt, Carl, *The Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*. Trans. G.L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007. Pg. 10

<sup>46</sup> Schmitt, *Theory*. Pg. 13

<sup>47</sup> Schmitt, *Theory* Pg. 13

The political characteristics of the partisan is the strongest characteristic, and provides for the unlimited enmity, against a third kind of enemy, the absolute enemy. In Schmitt's elucidation, this was the abstract, universalistic ideals, of which Lenin was the prognosticator of the absolute enemy, finding him in "the class enemy, the bourgeois, the Western capitalist and his social order in every country in which they ruled".<sup>48</sup> Lenin was able to export the communist wars of liberation due to the abstracted, indeterminate enmity of the class struggle. Before Napoleon, and during the long peace in the nineteenth century after the Congress of Vienna, wars were fought within the system. Lenin understood the power of the insurgent was in the lack of constraint- the system was the target, therefore everything was a target and was allowed.<sup>49</sup> Schmitt's "motorization" the mobility of his partisan is infinitely increased by the profusion of weapons and technology, and the ability of non-state actors to wage state-like power. The international communist partisan of the immediate post war period, personified actors like Che Guevara, and became the ISIS of the twenty-first century. Central to the offensive/defensive insurgency is that they can be effectively welded together, much like Mao capitalized on in China, fighting both the Kuomintang and Japanese, while exhorting his followers that the destruction of the landed class- capitalism- was the true enemy. The occupations of Algerian, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq comingled the real and absolute enmity in similar ways.

The key to understanding the nature of irregularity is tied to this transformation of war. During this period, roughly 1500 to 1750, war was limited in method and limited in scope, seeking only to change the rules within the system. Napoleon's war sought to change the system with the unlimited enmity of nationalism, the passion of Clausewitz. Liberalism, while constraining methods through *jus in bello*, frames its wars as good versus evil, thereby allowing, in theory, unlimited action to enforce consensus. Napoleonic war was nationalist war,

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<sup>48</sup> Schmitt, *Theory* Pg 36

<sup>49</sup> Schmitt, *Theory* Pg. 36.


predicated on a sense of identity and solidarity. Likewise, the reaction of the marginalized populations like Spain and Prussia was to respond *en masse* as a people defending themselves from an existential threat. The partisan, and the modern insurgent are motivated by their commitment to identity that is enlarged by the threat posed by Liberalism. In the case of late Liberalism social wars, identity can take the place of the political, because it assumes the highest position and it is this commitment to some form of goal hierarchy, a political organization if you will, that differentiates the insurgent from a criminal.

Like the soldiers in Napoleon's armies, and the international communist fighters of Schmitt, anti-Liberalist insurgents are linked to each other by their convictions. In the twenty-first century, these convictions are based on communal identity, the tellurian nature having become global while remaining intimately local. Identity subsumes the tellurian invariable. The political characteristic of the insurgent is still the strongest motivator of unlimited enmity. In late liberalism, the insurgent's only political ideology is resistance to the Liberal globalization mandate that he fears will destroy his identity. The role of identity has assumed the mantle of the political. This makes the irregular war of the insurgent a political war, closing the circle described by Clausewitz.

#### **5.4. Knowledge and Identity**

“All warfare is based on deception.”  
Sun Tzu

Identity is the significant difference between regular war and the conflict we are exploring. State war tends to be impersonal with agents as appendage, killing functionaries of the opposing state, but identity conflicts are personal, often with the combatants knowing each other. This is affectation of the distribution of power. For resistance groups, the values of identity and self-knowledge provides the elastic inter-connectivity between partisans that powers them through conflicts. Resistance groups use the embedding dynamics of their group to



**Figure 13. States rely on force to break adversaries' Trinitarian resistance; Resistance groups rely on intimate knowledge of self to create the time needed to persevere.**

achieve the intimate knowledge of self that they use to achieve tactical superiority at the times and places of their own choosing, in the face of superior material means. This is the identity advantage.

Far from fading, identity and its commitment to local norms and values have an extraordinary durability and much conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will evolve it. An initial survey of the Uppsala Conflict data reveals that the role identity is a powerful motivator of conflict and plays a



large role in the forty conflicts in 2014.<sup>50</sup> Expanding the data to all small conflicts since 1945 shows there have been over 800 conflicts involving states against some 500 discrete groups. These conflicts will become more prevalent as classic hegemony recedes in the face of the increasing pressure of international opinion which restrains states' actions in small wars. Uppsala University in Sweden began collecting data on *less-than-war* conflicts in the mid-1970s, necessitating the production of knowledge to account for conflicts much smaller those included by Singer and Small.<sup>51</sup> The UCDP database would lower the number of deaths required for conflict to twenty-five, expanding greatly the number of cases in that would be included in their UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, the UCDP reduces conflict to "a contested incompatibility... between two parties, of which at least one is a government of a state."<sup>53</sup> This has been most helpful since another characteristic of identity conflicts is that they simmer for years at a relatively low level of deaths, leaving them just at the edge of popular awareness. The data reveals that the average length of these conflicts is some thirty years, with the Marxist/Maoist conflicts hitting sixty years!

Deconstructing the normative form of conflict, one finds that state-versus-state war in Europe grew in form and complexity along with the ability of the state to extract and organize resources. Wars were over territory or rule, progressing to conflicts between ideologies and resources control.<sup>54</sup> The almost constant warfare in Europe reduced the numbers of weak states, as they were absorbed into their more powerful neighbors. This created a relatively low

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<sup>50</sup> Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: [www.ucdp.uu.se/database](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database), Uppsala University, Pettersson Therése & Peter Wallensteen (2015) Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014. *Journal of Peace Research* 52:4(2015):536-550.

<sup>51</sup> Kende, Istvan. "Wars of Ten Years," *Journal of Peace Research* 15:3(1978): 227-42; Gantzel, Klaus Jurgen. Another Approach to a Theory on the Causes of International War," *Journal of Peace Research* 18:3(1981):39-55

<sup>52</sup> Pettersson Therése & Peter Wallensteen (2015) Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014. *Journal of Peace Research* 52:4(2015):536-550.

<sup>53</sup> Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksoon, Margareta Sollenberg and Harfard Strand. Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39:5(2002):615-637

<sup>54</sup> Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.

number of strong states.<sup>55</sup> New international norms and pressure from the new cold war adversaries discouraged states from raiding weak neighbors and expanding. States refrained from engaging in the internecine conflicts that ground out ethnicities and created homogenous societies in Europe. Decolonization complicated integration efforts, leaving some states with few resources with which to achieve the economic growth of Europe and North America. This has ensured that weak actors remained weak and unable to provide the security and welfare expected in return for state coercion.<sup>56</sup> This provides an environment in which aggrieved populations have strong motivation to continue to fight. In the case of today's conflicts, access to technologies of violence and the sensitivity of the modern liberal state to even low levels of violence means that relatively small groups can achieve significant effects. Large populations of angry, under- and unemployed males are attracted to the possibility of conflict alleviating problems quickly.<sup>57</sup> Groups are motivated by past attacks and the simple adrenaline rush of participating in a dangerous event.<sup>58</sup> Weak groups focus on internal organization and position improvement carefully selecting actions that benefit the group.<sup>59</sup> This is likely to occur in states with structural inequality and plentiful resources. Weak states are more likely to have internal conflicts because of their limited domestic capabilities.<sup>60</sup> The ability of the state to enforce its writ internally is also affected by geography, with rebel organizations able to survive by locating themselves in rough mountainous or jungle terrain where avenues of approach can be controlled.<sup>61</sup> It may follow that rich countries are rich because of the relative ease of

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<sup>55</sup> Hironaka, Ann. *Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

<sup>56</sup> Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. *Causes of War*. Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Pg. 195.

<sup>57</sup> Munkler, Herfried. *The New Wars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

<sup>58</sup> Mueller, John. *The Remnants of War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.

<sup>59</sup> Collier, Paul and Anne Hoeffler (2004) "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56:4(2004):563-595.

<sup>60</sup> Fearon, James D., & Laitin, David D. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review*, 97:1(2003): 75-90.

<sup>61</sup> Hegre, Havard and Nicholas Sambanis "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50:4(2006):508-535.

transforming its geography into economically productive land, with poor countries relegated to marginal areas with their subsequent, chronic inequality.

Within groups, elites describe and ascribe meaning to individual actions which then serve to secure collective action in defense of identity. This linking of decision-making over the actions that surround an issue provides a strong sense of conscious agency. This process of framing provides a link between feeling and context and action.<sup>62</sup> Group elites harness this process, developing emotionally resonant, easy to absorb narratives that are consonant with group identities that provide descriptions of the problem, propose solutions, and motivation for action.<sup>63</sup>

Successful framing requires a strong sense of group identity, or at least the ability to make an individual feel strongly for the group. A bottom up theory, it develops around discourses and narratives of identity and the state. This would suggest that framing can explain how individuals are psychologically connected to a larger group, thus creating the same sense of injustice. Relative deprivation can be singular and focused on the self, what Runciman called egoistic deprivation. If one person has something that another person wants, the individual feels deprived.<sup>64</sup> However, if the individual identifies with a group and perceives the group is being deprived, that is fraternal deprivation, and lies at the heart of effective framing. People can feel both, and egoistic deprivation provides the passionate personal motivation and energy

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<sup>62</sup> Benford, Robert.D., & Snow, David A. "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26:611-639. Chong, Dennis. & Druckman James N., (2007). Framing theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10:1(2007): 103-126. Druckman, James N. (2004). Political preference formation: Competition, deliberation, and the (ir)relevance of framing effects. *American Political Science Review*, 98:4(2004):671-686. Snow, David.A., Rochford, E. Burke, Worden, Steven K., Benford, Robert D., (1986). Frame alignment processes, micro mobilization, and movement participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51:4(1986): 464-481.

<sup>63</sup> Benford, Robert.D., & Snow, David A. "Framing processes," Pg. 614.

<sup>64</sup> Runciman, Walter G. *Relative deprivation and social justice: A study of attitudes to social inequity in twentieth-century England*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1966.

to propel individuals to engage in group action.<sup>65</sup> People are able to differentiate between social groups and as we will learn later, identify with at least one as their primary identity.<sup>66</sup> As the internalization of identity creates a “psychological attachment to the group” that “is also a strong motivator [of collective action].”<sup>67</sup> It can also address the transition from egoistic (individual) deprivation to fraternal (group) deprivation necessary at the structural level for conflict.

Expectancy value theories have some aspects in common with framing issues as a source or relative deprivation.<sup>68</sup> While much of the literature looks at material resources, some theorists do use grievance and political process theory as a superior explanation of how the strengths and weaknesses of the dominant group that encourage collective action.<sup>69</sup> This synthetic approach has been widely used to explain political rebellion.<sup>70</sup> These theories hold that it is irrational for an individual to participate in a conflict for redistribution of a good unless they have specific incentives or some sort of compelling force.<sup>71</sup> Collier and Hoeffler would have proposed that people rebel based on the chance of success, a rational choice.<sup>72</sup> There is great empirical support for these theories. Studies of civil wars have accounted for

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<sup>65</sup> Hafer, Carolyn & Olson, James. (1993). Beliefs in a just world, discontent, and assertive actions by working women. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19:1(1993):30-38.

<sup>66</sup> Petta, G. & Walker, I. (1992). Relative deprivation and ethnic identity. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 31, 285-293.

<sup>67</sup> Abrams, Dominic & de Moura, Georgina R. “The psychology of collective protest.” Victor C. Ottati, R. Scott Tindale, John Edwards, Fred B. Bryant, Linda Heath, Daniel C. O’Connell, Yolanda Suarez-Balcazar, & Emil J. Posavac, Eds. *The social psychology of politics*. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2002. Pg. 199

<sup>68</sup> McAdam, Doug. “Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions.” *Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings*, Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Eds. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

<sup>69</sup> Lichbach, Mark. I. (1995). *The Rebel’s Dilemma*. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1995. Tarrow, Sidney G. *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics*, 2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

<sup>70</sup> Olson, M. *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965; Lichbach, M.I. (1995). *The rebel’s dilemma*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995.

<sup>71</sup> Olson, *Logic*.

<sup>72</sup> Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke. Resource rents, governance, and conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49:4(2005):625-633.

assessments of strengths and weaknesses, including geography and state stability in the decisions of non-state groups to go to war.<sup>73</sup>

Identity is a powerful motivator of conflict and the support for the connection between identity and mobilization is strong.<sup>74</sup> Tajfel and Turner looked at the impact of artificially constructed groups, what they called 'minimal groups' on behavior.<sup>75</sup> Their research showed that resource scarcity was at least a secondary consideration for conflict, instead it was the group itself which encouraged conflict.<sup>76</sup> People choose their group with an eye towards maximizing their personal reward for doing so, but in the process, the connection with the group becomes so powerful that it can explain their actions which would appear to be irrational.<sup>77</sup> As Abrams and de Moura state "it offers some insight into why individuals will act as a group, for the interest of the group and in order to achieve a group goal – even when the personal costs may be very high."<sup>78</sup> Weak group identification leads to individual strategies that favor high mobility and strong group identification leads strategies of collective mobilization to address grievances.<sup>79</sup> Other researchers have found a link between identifying with a group and acting

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<sup>73</sup> Fearon, James D., & Laitin, David D. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review*, 97:1(2003): 75-90.

<sup>74</sup> Tajfel H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W.G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations*. (pp 33-47). Monterey: Brooks-Cole.

<sup>75</sup> Tajfel, Henri. "The social identity theory of intergroup behavior." Stephen & William G. Austin, Eds., *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986.

<sup>76</sup> Turner, John. Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. London: Blackwell, 1987; Tajfel, Henry. Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific American*, 223:5(1970):96-102.

<sup>77</sup> Brewer, Marylynn B. & Michael D. Silver. "Group distinctiveness, social identification, and collective mobilization." In: *Self, identity, and social movements*. Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens, & Robert W. White, Eds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000. Pp 153-171. Haslam, Alexander S. *Psychology in organizations: The social identity approach*. London: Sage, 2000, chapter 7.

<sup>78</sup> Abrams, Dominic & de Moura, Georgina R. "The psychology of collective protest." Victor C. Ottati, R. Scott Tindale, John Edwards, Fred B. Bryant, Linda Heath, Daniel C. O'Connell, Yolanda Suarez-Balcazar, & Emil J. Posavac, Eds. *The social psychology of politics*. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2002. Pg. 199

<sup>79</sup> Abrams, Dominic & de Moura, Georgina R. "The psychology of collective protest." Victor C. Ottati, R. Scott Tindale, John Edwards, Fred B. Bryant, Linda Heath, Daniel C. O'Connell, Yolanda Suarez-Balcazar, & Emil J. Posavac, Eds. *The social psychology of politics*. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2002. Ellemers, Naomi, Spears, Russell, & Doosje, Bertjan. "Sticking together or falling apart: In-group identification as a psychological determinant of group commitment versus individual mobility." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72:3(1997):617-626.

in support of the group.<sup>80</sup> It should be fairly clear that there is a link between individual grievance, group identity, and feelings of group grievance. Other research has shown that language, religion, appearance, ancestry or place are the vehicles by which people transmit the importance of sameness to newcomers. Marriage and childbearing are methods used to capture self-perpetuation.<sup>81</sup>

Ethnicity itself is a collection of attributes usually grouped under culture and include language, religion, appearance, ancestry or place.”<sup>82</sup> Ethnic groups then, “are both actual and constructed”<sup>83</sup> as “both self-identification and the perceptions and attitudes of others.”<sup>84</sup> The standard anthropological definition of ethnicity includes practicing overt cultural activities and self-perpetuation through inter-marriage and birth, and is identified as such by neighboring groups. Religion occupies a special place as it assumes a position of “sacred value”<sup>85</sup> and ties

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<sup>80</sup> Kawakami, Kozan & Dion, Kenneth L. “Social identity and affect as determinants of collective action: Towards an integration of relative deprivation and social identity theories.” *Theory and Psychology*, 5:4(1995):551-577.  
Kawakami, Kozan & Dion, Kenneth L. “The impact of salient self-identities on relative deprivation and action intentions.” *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 23:5(1993):525-540. Mummendey, Amelie, Kessler, Thomas, Klink, Andreas & Mielke, Rosemarie. “Strategies to cope with negative social identity: Predictions by social identity theory and relative deprivation theory.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76:2(1999):229-245.

<sup>81</sup> Definitions of ethnicity are complex, but the idea is solidly backed up by science. This definition is synthesized from Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *The American Political Science Review*, 88:2 (June 1994):384-396; Bobo, Lawrence “Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth Century.” Pp. 262-299 in *America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences*, Smelser, Neil J. William J. Wilson, and Faith Mitchell. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2001; Nagel, Joane “Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture,” *Social Problems*, 41:1(1994):152-176; May, Stephen. *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, New York: Routledge, 2012. Fought, Carmen. *Language and Ethnicity*, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Barth, Frederik, ed. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, Waveland Press, Long Grove, IL, 1998. Altran, Scott and Robert Axelrod “Reframing Sacred Values,” *Negotiation Journal*, 24:3(2008):221-246; Altran, Scott & Robert Axelrod (2008), *Reframing Sacred Values*, *Negotiation Journal*, 24:3(2008):221-246; also Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod, and Richard Davis. *Sacred barriers to conflict resolution*. *Science*, 317:5841(2007):1039-1040. Pp.1039-1040

<sup>82</sup> Bobo, Lawrence, “Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth Century.” in *America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences*, edited by N. Smelser, W. J. Wilson, and F. Mitchell, eds. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2001. Nagel, Joane “Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture,” *Social Problems*, 41:1(1994):152-176

<sup>83</sup> May, Stephen. *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, New York: Routledge, 2012. Pg. 26.

<sup>84</sup> Fought, Carmen. *Language and Ethnicity*, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pg. 6.

<sup>85</sup> Altran, Scott & Robert Axelrod (2008), *Reframing Sacred Values*, *Negotiation Journal*, 24:3(2008):221-246; also Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod, and Richard Davis. *Sacred barriers to conflict resolution*. *Science*, 317:5841(2007):1039-1040.

individuals together in public “cultural forms.”<sup>86</sup> Ethnicity is a *socially* constructed reality in which groups are motivated on the basis of meanings *they* prescribe to themselves and provides the motivation to engage in violent conflict. It is the intangible that Clausewitz would describe as the “friction of war” and provides the basis of the difference between regular and the irregular methods that ethnic groups use.<sup>87</sup> This conceptual theory of conflict accounts for the decision to fight in light of the distribution of power being overwhelming in favor of states. One must consider the “intersubjective understandings and expectations [and] the *distribution of knowledge* that constitute their conceptions of self and the other.”<sup>88</sup> This knowledge about self is the product of individual identities washed through constant group interactions and boundary crossings and is deeply rooted in the concepts of identity and security, so much so that social institutions must make way for individuals’ conception of self and group identity. Following the cold war, the international system based enforcement of multiethnic states began to disintegrate. Withstanding global integration and the erasure of boundaries highlights an extraordinary level of commitment to this form of self-identification. Far from the teleological argument that ethnicity fades in the face of modernity, people cling to what sets them apart from others, what makes them different. These ethnic groups design their actions in terms of their interests what Wendt called the “cognitive and deliberative basis of desire.”<sup>89</sup> The requirement of an ‘other’ reveals the abstract nature of ethnicity. Persons who identify themselves by via ethnicity believes in their identity by virtue of calling him or herself such, and acting in ways that validate that identity, even though they may blur their own norms and boundaries and share similarities with other groups.<sup>90</sup> Within ethnicities, positive identification with the welfare of the

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<sup>86</sup> Barth, Frederik, ed. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, Waveland Press, Long Grove, IL, 1998. Pg. 11

<sup>87</sup> Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*.

<sup>88</sup> Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is What a State Makes of It,” *International Organization*, 46:2(1992):391-425.

<sup>89</sup> Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pg. 123.

<sup>90</sup> Jenkins, Richard. *Social Identity*, New York: Routledge, 2014.

group is very strong, so much so that other individuals in the group are seen as a cognitive extension of the self, rather than independent agents. This is the basis for feelings of solidarity, community, and loyalty and thus for collective definitions of interests.<sup>91</sup>

These groups make judgements about what beliefs are shared in order to infer connectivity with each other and create efficiencies when passing information to each other. Group norms then reinforce the way signals are filtered and processed, further shaping and socializing information.<sup>92</sup> Early coalition building begins as children are taught how to observe the world around them. Proper cognition is rewarded by the intimacy of the group. Surrounding one's self with others who observe the world in similar ways helps reduce the dissonance between normative feelings and outsider status. Constraints on behavior such as role obligations and social pressure are accepted as legitimate causes to changed behavior.<sup>93</sup> Outsiders introduced into safe spaces create several layers of conflict. Individuals would be conflicted internally as they attempt to re-order the interactions and create internal consistency *vis a vis* the *other*. This urge to "communal hegemonism" is a strong motivator of ethnic violence.<sup>94</sup> Political mobilization, and ultimately, physical violence becomes an easily accessible, simple and cheap method to remove the cause of the inconsistency. Ethnic politics arises to minimize disruptions to the group through collective action on issues like conflict in order to maximize group reward.<sup>95</sup> If the challenge is recurrent, conflict can become a coping

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<sup>91</sup> Wendt, Alexander "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review*. 88:2 (1994):384-396.

<sup>92</sup> Hernandez, Miriam and Sheena Iyengar. "What drives whom? A cultural perspective on human agency." *Social Cognition* 19:3(2001):269-294. Also, Michael Varnum E. W., Grossmann, Igor, Kitayama, Shinobu, Nisbett, Richard E., Michael E. W. Varnum, Igor Grossmann, Shinobu Kitayama, Richard E. Nisbett "The origin of cultural differences in cognition: Evidence for the Social Orientation Hypothesis" *Current Directions in Psychological Science*. 19:1(2010):9-13..

<sup>93</sup> Choi, Incheol, Richard Nisbett, and Ara Norenzayan. "Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and universality." *Psychological Bulletin* 125:1(1999):47-63.

<sup>94</sup> Bynum Daniel and Stephen Van Evera. "Why They Fight: Hypothesis on the Causes of Contemporary Deadly Conflict, *Security Studies*, 7:3(1998):1-50.

<sup>95</sup> Lopez, Anthony C., Rose McDermott and Michael Bang Petersen. "States in Mind: Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and International Politics," *International Security*. 36:2(2011):48-83.



mechanism for evolutionary roadblocks.<sup>96</sup> Threats and opportunities generate responses, putting pressure on the group to adapt or disintegrate.<sup>97</sup> Through political processes, protective boundaries are erected around resources that ensure survival privileges, privileges often earned through earlier violent conflict. This creates overlap between social and political spheres.

Identity creates the simplest call for politics and through the political process, groups struggle for better resource distribution.<sup>98</sup> Discrimination against minority ethnicities may very well be based on physical and cultural differences, but the resulting conflict is always about resource distribution. Political mobilization based on expectation of political rewards often follow ethnic boundaries and identification.<sup>99</sup> It would follow that at the group level there are rewards for this self-identification. At the ethnic level, broad strategies for collective political and economic advantage can be discerned.<sup>100</sup> In terms of domestic politics, identity composition and location is itself created by attempts to assimilate into the dominant culture, which is an attempt to position one's self in the resource distribution system. Once 'insider' and 'outsider' has been defined, all that is needed to spark offensive action is effective leadership. The closeness of the ethnic connections translated into allegiance to political leaders where voters supported political candidates whose political message was consistent with their own self-image.<sup>101</sup> Group coercion based on social identities are meant to influence how individuals think, advocate on issues and support institutions at both the domestic and even international

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<sup>96</sup> Alford, John R. and John R. Hibbing. "The Origin of Politics: An Evolutionary Theory of Political Behavior," *Perspectives on Politics*. Vol 2:4(2004)707-723.

<sup>97</sup> Lopez, Anthony C., Rose McDermott and Michael Bang Petersen. "States in Mind,"-83.

<sup>98</sup> Nagel, Joane "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture," *Social Problems*, 41:1(1994):152-176

<sup>99</sup> Nagel, Joane "Constructing Ethnicity," 152-176

<sup>100</sup> Sambanis, Nicholas and Moses Shayo. "Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict. *American Political Science Review*. 107:02(2013):294-325.

<sup>101</sup> Caprara, G.V. and P. Zimbardo, (2004) "Personalizing politics: A Congruency model of political preference," *American Psychology*, Vol 59:7(2004):581-614.

levels.<sup>102</sup> These designed behaviors take advantage of coercive information processing routines that limit and define the parameters through which the environment can be viewed. These feedback mechanisms build and reinforce the ideas of sameness and solidarity so important to group identity. This simplifies leadership problems of motivation and overcoming resistance via solidarity, but quickly blunts the ability to transform ethnic identity into new and more effective coalitions as needs and requirements change. Much like the individual ability to assess the fighting ability of opponents<sup>103</sup> groups may make similar decisions based on social cues like size and strength when deciding if aggressive conflict would be beneficial.<sup>104</sup> Group social structures embody cognitive adaptations that were designed to take care of problems. In other words, psychology drives organizations to handle problems in ways that are evolutionarily beneficial. This drives a conflictual conservatism in which what has proved beneficial before becomes sacrosanct, again, pointing to an almost religious veneration of identity. The psychological connection between threat minimization and its related conservative reaction has been documented.<sup>105</sup> Experiments found that presenting politically self-defined liberals, moderates and conservatives with thoughts of death increased issue specific conservatism among all groups. Conservative cultures scored higher in death anxiety in any given scenario. Both studies found that the need to manage uncertainty and threat creates a desire to close

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<sup>102</sup> Wendt, Alexander, "The State as Person in International Theory," *Review of International Studies*, 30:2(2004):289-316.

<sup>103</sup> Sell, Aaron, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, Daniel Sznycer, Christopher von Rueden and Mechaul Gerven, "Human Adaptations for the Visual Assessment of Strength and Fighting Ability from Body and Face," *Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences*, 276:1656(2009):575-584; and Sell, Aaron Gregory Bryant, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, Daniel Sznycer, Christopher Von Rueden, Andre Krauss, and Micheal Gurven, "Adaptations in Humans for Assessing Physical Strength from the Voice," *Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences*, 277:1699(2010): 3509-3518.

<sup>104</sup> Sterelny, Kim. *The Evolved Apprentice*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012. Pg. 103.

<sup>105</sup> Jost, J.T., G Fitzsimmons and AC Kay, "The Ideological Animal: A System Justification View," *Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology*, eds. Greenberg, Jeff, Koole, Sander Leon and Pyszczynski, Thomas. New York, Guilford, 2004, Pp. 263-282.

down avenues of change.<sup>106</sup> Individually, conflict makes a person more aware of their mortality and drives them to value established belief systems and identities. This *mortality salience* produces greater hostility towards critics of a person's identity and belief system, particularly the sub-structural role of religion, which produces a unique self-validity.<sup>107</sup> Groups then harness religion and idealized identity "to institutionalize violence and the bend the will of individuals and clans to its own."<sup>108</sup> Individuals and groups will kill to in the name of their sacred values and this has a singular impact on the duration of ethnic conflicts.<sup>109</sup>

Well defined identity groups have coercive self-enforcing mechanisms to reduce conflict inside the group. Boundaries create a sense of what is okay and not, what is in and out, determining even eligibility, time and place of status, through a number of vehicles, as leaders compete for power over the group. Individual choices are prescribed and proscribed by the categories available by the larger group. Individuals can choose from a set of ethnic options, but the set is defined by the advantages and disadvantages attached to those choices by the group. Humans seem to have developed over eons a psychological tool designed to parse and manage personal and coalitional dynamics within and between ethnicities. Identity groups have a positive feedback mechanism, i.e., culture, which has enabled the social evolution of a sophisticated apparatus to regulate behavior between individuals to ensure coalition solidarity in order to ensure coalition survival.<sup>110</sup> Perceived threats, like the uneven distribution of resources,

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<sup>106</sup> Jost, John.T., Jaime Napier, Hulda Thorisdottir, Samuel D. Gosling, Tibor P. Palfai and Brian Ostafin, "Are Needs To Manage Uncertainty and Threat Associated with Political Conservatism or Ideological Extremity?" *Personal and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33:7(2007):989:1007.

<sup>107</sup> Greenberg, Jeff, Sheldon Solomon, and Tom Pyszczynski, "Terror Management Theory of Self Esteem and Cultural World Views: Empirical Assessments and Conceptual Refinements," *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 29(1997):61-139.

<sup>108</sup> Vasquez, John A. *The War Puzzle Revisited*, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pg. 41.

<sup>109</sup> Altran, Scott and Jeremy Ginges. "Religious and Sacred Imperatives," *Science*, 336:6083(2012):855-857. Also see Neuberg, Steven L ; Warner, Carolyn M ; Mistler, Stephen A ; Berlin, Anna ; Hill, Eric D ; Johnson, Jordan D ; Filip-Crawford, Gabrielle ; Millsap, Roger E ; Thomas, George ; Winkelman, Michael ; Broome, Benjamin J ; Taylor, Thomas J ; Schober, Juliane (2014) "Religion and Intergroup Conflict" *Psychological Science*, 25:1(2014):198-206.

<sup>110</sup> Forgas, Joseph, Haselton, Martie, and William Von Hippel. "Evolution and the Social Mind" in *Evolution and Social Psychology*, Mark Schaller, Jeffrey A Simpson, and Douglas T. Kenrick, (eds.), New York: Psychology Press, 2006.

would cause individuals to identify more strongly with their ethnic group. The loss of that identity, influence or group would cause a person to lose a link to his or her immortality. This would make the individual hew more tightly to ethnic identification and support the actions needed to win the conflict. This is a key in the total mobilization that ethnicities often achieve in conflict. Conversely, states can rarely achieve full mobilization when combatting ethnic conflict; the citizenry is too diverse to consider threats from small ethnic groups as existential in nature. The strategic will and purpose of ethnic ideologies is tied up in the simple structural connections between early self-identity, ethnic identity and political ideology. Threatening situations drive conservatism, i.e., conflict draws ethnically self-identified individuals closer together.

Identity simplified and stripped of myth and distanced from personal narrative is a coalition. The simplest coalitions to form are those in which the participants share the same values and norms. The simplest kind of war to ignite is when the protagonists differ greatly. The ability of leaders to mobilize for war is aided by the ability to illustrate the menacing difference between the two groups. Group mobilization for conflict is what sets apart violence as a political act from the individual violence of murder, rape or assault. There is a further connection between territoriality over which political units fight and the idea that fighting will “enhance the wealth and status of a... people.”<sup>111</sup> Framing the hostility and frustrations as an attack against the unique attributes of the group’s identity produces feelings of insecurity. As marginalized groups tender feelings that the distribution of resources, be they economic or political, is unfair, then violence becomes a way to bypass political stalemate.<sup>112</sup> Strong ethnic bonds create several advantages. Ethnic cohesiveness translates into motivation. Motivated irregular combatants fighting over historicized grievances can go far towards evening the odds with heavily mechanized and technologically advanced forces. That motivation often is derived from

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<sup>111</sup> Vasquez, John A. *The War Puzzle Revisited*, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pg. 30.

<sup>112</sup> Mansbach, Richard W. and John A. Vasquez. *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. Pg. 283-284.

the feelings of encirclement ethnicities feel from the dominant culture. This creates an inherent insecurity in ethnic islands in a sea of dominated culture. Outside forces will not be able to discern these subtle social cues. The offensive capability imparted by ethnic solidarity should not be underestimated. Tactically offensive actions such as rape, famine and bombings directed against civilians, enemies and wayward allies can do much to motivate endogenous groups and caution states or groups who may think of intervening. This provides militarily weak groups with an incentive to strike early against soft targets.<sup>113</sup> This provides an interesting twist on Robert Jervis' original security dilemma.<sup>114</sup> The need for neoliberal states to provide a needed service, security, requires realist (anarchical) interpretations of an environment full of threats. This in turn drives conservatism, a reinforcing mechanism for identity. It seems that, for state regimes, stability balances on a tiny fulcrum between identity on one side and the threat of inter-state war on the other.

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<sup>113</sup> Posen, Barry. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*. 35:1,(1993):27-47.

<sup>114</sup> Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", *World Politics* vol. 30:2(1978):186-214.

## **5.5. Conclusion**

“We are the hollow men; we are the stuffed men, leaning together.”

T.S. Eliot, *The Hollow Men*

Group identities have survived, and seem to be thriving, in the face of liberalism and globalization and the postmodern world.<sup>115</sup> Analysis begins at the individual level can account for decisions made by political leaders and accounts for belief systems, psychological processes, political socialization, and lessons from history and similar variables. Beyond the individual level, traditional analysis becomes increasingly ineffective as most ethnic groups in this study lack a centralized bureaucracy for continuous extraction of resources. . There is a much stronger connection between the individual and the group, than there is between the individual and the state in structuralism’s traditional sense. The complexity of the emerging globe writhing with identity conflicts in the twenty-first century brings to mind what Kenneth Waltz wrote:

“I am tempted to predict, perversely, that in the coming years, students of politics will look back on the era of the Cold War, if indeed it has ended, with the nostalgia that diplomatic historians felt for nineteenth-century Europe.”<sup>116</sup>

War has changed, from the simple good/bad dynamic which makes war easy to sell, to a messy application of norms and values where they simply don’t fit. Public opinion plays an increasingly constraining role on the decisions to engage in conflict. Accordingly, total mobilization was replaced with specialized troops and technologies, with particular attention given to not destabilizing the domestic populations. The internationalization of developing countries’ internal conflicts marked a turn from the anti-colonial rebellions and marked a turn towards ideological wars and this mass appeal to the political has become a core part of asymmetric wars. The symmetry that was understood to be parity in material capabilities has been upset by the

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<sup>115</sup> May, Stephen. *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, New York: Routledge, 2012. Pg. 27.

<sup>116</sup> Waltz, Kenneth, N. “The Politics of Peace,” *International Studies Quarterly* 11:3 (1967):199-211. Pg. 199.

inherent asymmetry in influence that comes from knowledge, over populations. Influence over relevant populations is the method by which weak actors achieve power reciprocity and it is exceedingly difficult to measure and employ.

The simplest kind of war to ignite is when the protagonists differ greatly. The ability of leaders to mobilize for conflict is aided by the ability to illustrate a perception of menacing difference between the two groups. Conflicts in the future will revolve around these ethnic coalitions and the division of resources. Often, established groups engage in violence because of perceived threats, and new groups initiate conflict because of an inability to integrate with the dominant group. Feelings of encroachment in previously established groups, and feelings of marginalization that intrude on identity values produce the pre-cursors of conflict. Inability to assimilate through economic avenues leads to an increasing ossification of social strata. Minority elites may have an avenue of assimilation as talented individuals are co-opted into the dominant majority. As the state structure matures, authoritarian formations of control can provide a false sense of stability, with ever-increasing levels of force used to quell dissent and protest. When the systems' restraining rules breakdown, the anarchical nature of identity competition increases. The collapse of this central state power containing rival ethnicities greatly increases the chances of violence.<sup>117</sup>

Migration from the poorer global south provides one of the most vexing problems of late Liberalism as failed and failing states push people to move in search of better lives. The more prosperous North may be a surprising victim of its greatest success: The modern economy. The desire for unending growth and the inexorable pull of resources from the south has created a belief that the 'economic pie' is unlimited. This disconnecting of money from value has made

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<sup>117</sup> Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. *The Causes of War*, Chichester, UK: Wiley and Sons, 2010. Pg. 240; see also Wucherpfenning, Julian and Nils, W. Metterhich, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War," *World Politics*, 64:1(2012):79-115.

the economy a product of social-technical practice.<sup>118</sup> The slowing of established economies creates a situation in which conflict is inevitable. In the past, this conflict from encroachment could be muted, in capitalist states because economies were expanding; in socialist states with authoritative discipline. The general feeling was that economies were expanding and opportunities for personal enrichment abounded; this limited the feelings of threat from newcomers. There appears to be the real possibility that there is a limit to money, and that limit, perceived or real, may be reached. The economic crisis of 2008 may be an indicator that the international economic superstructure that has provided so much expansion after World War Two may finally be grinding to a halt, severely limiting personal economic mobility.

What this chapter has made clear that people fight for each other, and especially their belief in the idea of self. Government policy doesn't engender this kind of devotion and fidelity. Far from separating a population from its cause, the terror, horror and pain of war becomes part of their identity. This makes people an unsettling threat to states whom predicate their stability on the acquiescent management of the masses. The war machine as the forcing function in the periphery increasingly fails because there is no Trinitarian elements to separate. Partisans fight for their identity, names, their gods, and their homes and they are willing to die for them. This has driven a search for a new way to apply disciplinary force in the periphery- strategy is too limiting a word. Strategy is a series of interconnected methods, a plan of action. What has developed is a mode of warfare, a new way of experiencing conflict for both the war machine and the partisan. If the terror, horror and pain of war is enough, a population can be separated from its government if that means the war will stop. But in identity wars, people fight for their names, their brothers, their gods and their homes. And they're willing to die for them

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<sup>118</sup> Mitchell, Timothy. "Rethinking Economy" *Geoforum* 39:3(2008):1116-1121.



## CHAPTER SIX: PREEMPTION

“Man is a wolf to man”

Thomas Hobbes, *The Citizen*

### **6.1. Invisible Hand**

The case studies will show that the nature of conflict is changing from state directed violence against states, to violence against the individual. In the age of late Liberalism, one has to question the assumption that force wins wars, and if the continued refinement of failed force means there are no more moral constraints on the use of force. If conflict is being pared down to the individual, with the individual both the target and the targeteer, preemption is assassination and terrorism.

With preemption, the key is crafting an environment which demands action. Michel Foucault, in his 18 January, 1978 lecture on *Security, Territory and Population* describes the French state reaction to scarcity, which is an instability, and the construction the *dispositif* “for arranging things so that, by connecting up with the very reality of these fluctuations, and by establishing a series of connections with other elements of reality, the phenomenon is gradually compensated for, checked, finally limited and in the final degree, canceled out.”<sup>1</sup> Liberal states excel at the presentation of the meta-problem that requires its meta-power to form the *dispositif*. Since the Cold war, there have been two: Climate change and now, the global transformative terrorism of ISIS and Al Qaida. Both securitize the threat and provide the solution. This ties together populations and territory, returning to the insurgent the tellurian character of his own destruction. Environmental securitization provides purpose for liberalism as the regimes capable of affording themselves a position as stewards of the environment are able to dictate to

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<sup>1</sup> In book form, the 18 Jan 1978 lecture is styled Chapter Two. Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, Michel Senellart, ed, Graham Burchell, trans. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Page 37.

poor states the status of their own relationship to the land.<sup>2</sup> The securitization of Islamic identity allows the Liberal West to dictate the right way, and thus identify wrong, illiberal, and antipodal practices. Poor territories have become both the *bete noir* and the indispensable object to rich regimes' securitization through the spread of Liberalism.

Brian Massumi, introduced in chapter one as an *agent provocateur*, describes in his *Power at the End of the Economy*, this affective power of the Liberalism. It is the modern invisible hand constantly distressed by the billions of individual decisions made in blind self-interest, as preemptive.<sup>3</sup> The cascade of effects soon overwhelms the system, and the difference between action and reaction is voided. In the post-Cold War period, this had driven states away from state focused security to *human security*, which is meant to protect people from widespread and cross-cutting threats. Since the first United Nations report on Human Security in 2003, the phrase "freedom from fear" has rung out in committee pronouncements and reports. The noble desire is to provide the "political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity."<sup>4</sup> Human security becomes "prevention oriented."<sup>5</sup> Taken with Massumi's self-action as a form of preemption, the individual, searching for self-actualization for his identity becomes the unstable insurgent action which requires preemption as a form of counter-insurgency. Fear of instability drives action, requiring preemption in order to mollify the startled populations of sedated Liberalism. Prevention requires a threat; preemption only requires a fear. What is lost is the subtle difference between preemption and prevention as states become

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<sup>2</sup> Evans, Brad and Mark Duffield, "Biospheric Security: How the Merger between Development, Security and the Environment (DESENEX) Is Retrenching Fortress Europe," in *A Threat against Europe? Security, Migration and Integration*, Peter Burgess and Serge Gutwirth, eds. Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2011.

<sup>3</sup> Massumi, Brian. *The Power at the End of the Economy*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015.

<sup>4</sup> Commission on Human Security, 2003:Pg. 4. Found online at [http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/chs\\_final\\_report\\_-\\_english.pdf](http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/chs_final_report_-_english.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> Commission on Human Security, Human Security Unit Strategic Plan, 2014-2017. <http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/hsu%20documents/HSU%20Strategic%20Plan%202014-2017%20Web%20Version.pdf>

involved in partisan war. Prevention is reaction against a credible, occurring threat. Partisan war is political war, and in late Liberalism, political war is revolutionary war. Preemption is action against what may become a threat, and revolutionary partisans are existential threats to stability.

This biopoliticization of individual threat and response takes preemption out of the Clausewitzian war paradigm and into the singularity. The birthplace of the actions, each of which could destabilize the status quo, start with the individual. No individuals are more dedicated to their individuality than the partisan. The animus that propels the insurgent is informed by free will, an unpredictability that threatens to overwhelm the security dispositif and the war machine. Insurgents fighting to protect their lives, not just biological, but social, and now, counterinsurgents fighting from fear, in new ways, as the old ways have failed to provide the security it craves. Mark Duffield described this nexus of development and security as:

“Development as security is used to explore the possibility of a global civil war between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' species' life. Rather than competing ideologies, such a war-or rather tableau of wars-pitches contrary ways of life against each other. Instead of conventional armies, both sides mobilize opposing assemblages of state and, especially, non-state actors that blur and operate across the national/ international dichotomy. It is a war that is characteristically fought on and between the relations and modalities of life itself.”<sup>6</sup>

This nexus is increasingly found in the illiberal edge, reinforced by the military interventions of the last thirty years. Mary Kaldor described these as “bad neighborhoods” like the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Resistance to Liberalism, and the violent conflicts it spawns can cause instability far beyond the edge and deep into the center through ill-informed political rhetoric and hubris in search of votes that take advantage of displaced persons and transnational crime. From this perspective, counter-insurgency and

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<sup>6</sup> Duffield, Mark. Global Civil War: The Non-insured, international Containment and the Post-Interventionary Society,” *Journal of Refugee Studies*. 21:2(2008):145-165.

human security are the same because tactically, both are organized around the “two key principles of providing security and vital services to the population and separating “the *reconcilables* from the *irreconcilables*.”<sup>7</sup> Kaldor and Beebe point out a subtle difference between the means and the end, writing about America’s intention in Iraq and Afghanistan: “In counterinsurgency, human security, or population security, is a tactic, not a strategy. The end goal is not the security of Afghans or Iraqis – that is a means to an end...”<sup>8</sup>

As the threats to the liberalizing process of development frequently come from groups resistant to the idea of evolution, military interventions are seen as a less complex and a faster method of delivery. To paraphrase Wellington, nothing but a running gun battle is half so melancholy as a twenty-five-year-old Peace Corps activist who realizes her ideas aren’t well-received. This is not a pithy criticism of twenty-five-year old peaceniks. Instead, it’s an accusation that the West has not realized that *all* of its modes of injection of its norms and values trigger identity reactions.

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<sup>7</sup> Kaldor, Mary and Shannon Beebe. *The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon*. New York: Public Affairs, 2010. Pg. 68

<sup>8</sup> Kaldor and Beebe. *The Ultimate Weapon*. Pg. 73.

## **6.2. Origins of Preemption**

“War, as the saying goes, is full of false alarms.”  
Aristotle

In this chapter, I broaden preemption from a *tactic* of war, that is, a method, to that of a *mode*. In the first three case studies, the framework of preemption will be clear, onto which the targeting of civilians is a given way to achieve a security objective. The last two case studies show a broadening of preemptive killing to include the identification of the illiberal as a justified target, both internally, and externally. What will be most obvious is that the Clausewitzian war machine creates more problems than it solves when used in identity wars. In fact, if one counts the conflict years for the U.S. since 1965, in only five has it been successful, while in forty-one, it has bogged down.<sup>9</sup> A new method was needed, and combined with increasing technological capability, states created new methods of preemption.

Globalization has made groups resisting Liberalism’s seemingly inexorable expansion more dangerous and this has driven states, particularly great states with the longest arms of violent reach to develop a new strategy, looking to succeed where Clausewitzian war has failed. This “new” strategy of preemption has a long history in the *jus as bellum* tradition, but was created as a state policy in June 2002. Still reeling from the impact of 9/11, the United States was groping for a strategy against global resistance groups like Al Qaida. Articulating what has become known as the Bush doctrine, President Bush said:

“If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long... Our security will require transforming the military you will lead—a military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready

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<sup>9</sup> Vietnam, 8 years, Grenada, 1 year, Panama, 1 year, First Iraq War, 1 year, Afghanistan, 15 years (and counting), Second Iraq War, 8 years, Third Iraq War (ISIS), 2 years (and counting). The successful years were in Grenada, Panama, the First Iraq War, and the first years of Second Iraq and Afghanistan.

for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”<sup>10</sup>

Resistance organizations with their own transformative missions required the West to protect itself. The terrorist organizations most visible in the post 9/11 fight against the West chose as their strategy one of asymmetry that focused on violence against civilians. Necessarily, the West responded in self-defense, which in late Liberalism, as President Bush directed, meant preemption.

Before preemption became policy, a small group of political scientists had been studying the issue, and their prognoses revolved around the temporal element. Stephen Van Evera defined the term: A preemptive mobilization or attack is mounted to seize the initiative, in the belief that the first mover gains an important advantage and a first move by the opponent is imminent. A preventative attack, in contrast, is mounted to engage an opponent before it games relative strength. The incentive to preempt is two sided: both adversaries gain by forestalling the other. The incentive to prevent is one-sided; the declining state wants immediate war, while the rising state wants to avert war.<sup>11</sup> Dan Reiter offers a similar definition based on time: A war is preemptive if it breaks out primarily because the attacker feels that it will itself be the target of a military attack in the short term. The essence of preemption, then, is that it is motivated by fear, not by greed. This definition is limited to perceptions of short term threats to national security.<sup>12</sup> Robert Harkavey agreed, arguing that preemption “is usually linked to an immediate crisis situation, one with mutual escalating fears and threats.”<sup>13</sup> Jack Snyder “a preventive war,

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<sup>10</sup> George W. Bush, “Commencement Address to the United States Military Academy Class of 2002,” June 1, 2002; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>; Internet; accessed January 31, 2003.

<sup>11</sup> Van Evera, Stephen. *Causes of War: Power and the roots of Conflict*. Ithaca NY. Cornell University Press, 1999. Pg. 40

<sup>12</sup> Reiter, Dan. “Preemptive Wars.” *International Security*, 20:2(1995):5-34. Pg. 6.

<sup>13</sup> Harkavy, Robert E. *Preemption and Two-Front Conventional Warfare: A Comparison of 1967 Israeli Strategy with the Pre-World War One German Schlieffen Plan*. Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1977. Print. Pg. 7

which forestalls the creation of new military assets and preemptive attack, which forestalls the mobilization and deployment of existing forces.”<sup>14</sup> John Gaddis wrote that “preemption implied military action undertaken to forestall an imminent attack from a hostile state. Prevention implied starting a war to keep such a state from building the capacity to attack.”<sup>15</sup> Haass agreed that “preventive uses of force are those that seek either to stop another state or party from developing a military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it thereafter.”<sup>16</sup>

Gaddis would provide contextual urgency for the Bush doctrine, writing for the influential news magazine *Foreign Affairs* that the diffusion of technology had made distance, both in space and time, is no longer enough to protect the state, as The U.S. found out at Pearl Harbor in 1941. This makes the previous dyadic definitions of preventive and preemptive wars outdated. What the Bush doctrine had really done was combine the Cold War definition of preventive war with preemption. Gaddis wrote:

“To wait for terrorist threats to become clear and present was to leave the nation vulnerable to surprise attacks. Instead, the United States would go after states that had harbored, or that might be harboring, terrorist gangs. It would at first seek to contain or deter such regimes-the familiar means by which the Cold War had been fought-but if those methods failed, it reserved the right to pre-empt perceived dangers by starting a preventive war.”<sup>17</sup>

Gaddis would go on to highlight a key component of preemption, which was the shock of attack, delivered primarily through the unknowable surprise that significantly advanced technology could deliver in the form of air, drone and remote power. The shock of terrorist attacks would be

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<sup>14</sup> Snyder, Jack. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pg. 160.

<sup>15</sup> Gaddis, John Lewis. *Surprise, Security and the American Experience*. Cambridge MA. Harvard University Press, 2004. Pg. 123

<sup>16</sup> Haass, Richard. *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the post-Cold War World*. Washington D.C.:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994. Pg. 51.

<sup>17</sup> Gaddis, John. “Grand Strategy in the Second Term.” *Foreign Affairs* Jan. 2005: 2-15. Print.

answered with “shocks be administered in return, not just to the part of the world from which the attack came, but to the international system as a whole.”<sup>18</sup>

Michael Walzer, a prominent political theorist and author of *Just and Unjust Wars* argues that preemption is a legitimate form of anticipatory self-defense. He criticizes the view that preemption can only be used as a last resort against an imminent threat, like “a reflex action, a throwing up of one’s arms at the very last minute.”<sup>19</sup> This view is too restrictive, limiting the state’s ability to protect its citizens, and inevitably leading to deaths. Walzer, taking into account changing technologies like Gaddis, determined that the legitimate use of force was not at the point of imminent attack, but at sufficient threat. He defined as sufficient threat as “a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk.”<sup>20</sup>

The danger is that the unknown, rather than driving caution, requires action because one cannot know if a threat is imminent, and unanswerable technological dominance in the distribution of power encourages states to act. This hegemony of the powerfully preemptive is addressed by Bruce Cumings who wrote:

“Hegemonic power is ultimately conditioned by technological and industrial power, which helps us understand its beginnings; that advantage is locked in by military power, which helps us understand the long middle years of a hegemonic cycle; and the requirements of military supremacy and a (probable) later tendency toward financial speculation and resultant capitalist torpor helps us grasp its decline.”<sup>21</sup>

The fear is that a strategy of preemption validates overly proactive behavior, based on intent, which, in many cases, cannot be known because the crisis has to be destroyed before it metastasizes. This precludes time for talk or investigation. It is a doctrine without logical limits.

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<sup>18</sup> Gaddis, John. “Grand Strategy,” Pg. 14.

<sup>19</sup> Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. New York: Basic Books, 2006. Print. p. 75.

<sup>20</sup> Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. p. 81.

<sup>21</sup> Bruce Cummings, *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American–East Asian Relations at the End of the Century*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999. Pp. 205–6.



This hearkens back to the discussion of Clausewitz' absolute war. Technology has allowed states to neck down absolute force, from the absolutely indiscriminate destruction of the nuclear bomb, to the absolutely discriminating and lethally personal death delivered via drone.

Heeding back to the shock component of the Bush doctrine, preemptive force must be constantly refreshed in order to remain relevant. Targets must be identified in order to justify the offensive nature of preemptive power. States that preempt do so because of a perceived weakness and it is that perception that requires demonstrations of power. In the years since 9/11, it is the inability to protect its citizens, and so a singular component of shock and awe is the idea that violent death can be dealt to adversaries at any time and any place.

### **6.3. Preemption As Method**

"So this is a just war - a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense."  
Barack Obama, President, 2013

Once the singularity is accepted as the basis of true conflict, preemption takes on a very dark character. People kill people, and the easiest to kill are civilians, more specifically, non-military and paramilitary groups. It's been going on for thousands of years. In order to understand the connection between preemption as a tactic, its transformation to mode, we must explore the targeting of civilians. That begins with a review of 'ethnic' killing and terrorism. Since the 1990s, political science has come to appreciate the connection between armed conflict and the killing of civilians and has recognized that it is not arbitrary or unintended and should be considered as an act of war, distinct from the moral arguments against it. Military strategies derived during the heyday of Clausewitzian war saw civilians as separate from the conflict, at best a group that had to be protected from armed violence itself. At worst, the ability to protect civilians was seen an objective to be attacked by partisans.

Since the mid-1990s, terrorism has become a prominent tactic. Again, the distribution of power forced weak actors to adopt the method most expedient. AQ and ISIS are the leading acolytes of the method, with many lesser known groups rising, splintering around the world. The use of violence against one group, always civilians, to send a message to another group in the pursuit of political goals should be considered an evolutionary step in the asymmetric confrontation between powerful, technologically driven First World states and the poor, and poorly equipped, guerrilla movements. The idea of attacking targets that cannot be protected by the strong is a method used for centuries, if not longer, but had not become the *mode* of conflict until recently. As chapter five made clear, mortality salience and its fears, and deeply held beliefs about identity, cause people to react. Violence begets violence.

After 9/11, research exploded on why resistance groups themselves target civilians. A primary reason appears to be that resistance groups are often too weak to challenge state forces directly.<sup>22</sup> Likewise, the relatively weak position of resistance groups in providing positive inducements, such as public services means they may look at violence against civilian targets as a form of coercion in order to exact support.<sup>23</sup> Targeting civilians can be part of a coercive strategy meant to raise the costs of not negotiating on states and that leads to a parsing of the definition of terrorism and terrorist groups.<sup>24</sup> Most 'terrorist' organizations so routinely target civilians of their erstwhile supported/supportive group that they meet the criteria for a belligerent in a civil war.<sup>25</sup> Terrorism is not synonymous with targeting civilians, but has been common enough used to explain the tactics of militarily weak groups.<sup>26</sup> Robert Pape concluded that "terrorism is a strategy of coercion, a means to compel a target government to change policy."<sup>27</sup> The central logic of this strategy is simple: . . . to inflict enough pain on the opposing society to overwhelm its interests in resisting terrorists' demands, and so to induce the government to concede, or the population to revolt against the government."<sup>28</sup> What is left is the obvious reason why resistance groups target civilians- because democratic, i.e., liberal states are predicated on, and thus most responsive, to the security of their citizens.

The popular view that "tribal" hatreds drive groups to kill non-combatants during collectivized violence extends back to the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. Robert Kaplan wrote the widely read *Balkan Ghosts* (1993) about the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the

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<sup>22</sup> Hultman Lisa. "Battle losses and rebel violence: raising the costs for fighting." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19:2(2007):205–22

<sup>23</sup> Wood, Reed. "Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians." *Journal of Peace Resolution*. 47:5(2010):601–14

<sup>24</sup> Hultman, Lisa. "Attacks on civilians in civil war: targeting the Achilles heel of democratic governments." *International Interactions*. 38:2(2012):164–81

<sup>25</sup> Pape, Robert. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House, 2005.

<sup>26</sup> de la Calle, Luis, Sanchez-Cuenca, I. 2011. What we talk about when we talk about terrorism. *Politics and Society*. 39:3(2011):451–472.

<sup>27</sup> Pape RA. 2005. *Dying to Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random Housepp. Pp. 27–28.

<sup>28</sup> Kydd Andrew and Walter, Barbara. "The strategies of terrorism". *International Security*. 31:1(2006):49–80.

nihilistic, sadistic targeting of the three major religious groups, the Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox by each other.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, Samuel Huntington wrote his article (later a major book, mentioned earlier) “The Clash of Civilizations” whose thesis was that the “fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed.”<sup>30</sup> This became a shibboleth of sorts among laypersons seeking to understand the seeming irrational killing of others after the ideologically driven cold war. Others, particularly in the fields of the behavioral sciences have tended to agree that there is a strong emotional component to targeting people based on identities (while avoiding the grand theorizing of Huntington).<sup>31</sup> But to a small group of academics studying terrorism, the killing of civilians made sense. Even while the public saw the terrorism of the 1970s as driven by simple hatred, Brian Jenkins saw a rational calculus behind the killing, writing that “terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead.”<sup>32</sup>

There is evidence that rarely do majorities of any given ethnicity want an identity war, much less targeted killings on the basis of identity. Studies on the intra-Serbian wars in the 1990s show that most people did not want the targeted killing of Muslims or Christians done in their name. Gagnon put forward the idea that major ‘ethnic’ conflicts are not caused by ‘ancient animosities’ or ‘deep seated hatreds’ but rather that the violence is created and directed as a purposeful action in pursuit of a goal.<sup>33</sup> Human Rights Watch agreed, when in 1995, it produced a book *Slaughter Among Neighbors*, on the conflicts in Yugoslavia wherein the authors agreed

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<sup>29</sup> Kaplan, Robert. *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*. New York: St. Martins, 1993. Print.

<sup>30</sup> Huntington, Samuel. *The clash of civilizations?* *Foreign Affairs*. 72:3(1993):22-49. Pg. 29.

<sup>31</sup> Post Jerrold M. “Terrorist psycho-logic: terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces.” *Origins of Terrorism*, Reich, Walter, ed. Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 1990. Pp. 25–40

<sup>32</sup> Jenkins, Brian Michael. “International terrorism: a new mode of conflict.” *International Terrorism and World Security*. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds. London: Croom Helm, 1975. Pp. 13–49. Pg. 15

<sup>33</sup> Gagnon, VP. “Ethnic nationalism and international conflict: The case of Serbia.” *International Security*. 19:3(1994):130–66 Pg. 164.

that “time after time the proximate cause of communal violence is governmental exploitation of communal differences” in the effort to achieve political ends.<sup>34</sup> While different identities living in the same political unit exhibit tensions, genocidal violence based on those difference has remained relatively rare.<sup>35</sup> Martha Crenshaw modeled killing by avowed terrorist organizations and found that “terrorism can be understood as an expression of political strategy . . . a willful choice made by an organization for political and strategic reasons, rather than the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors.”<sup>36</sup> Subsequent studies that have attempted to explain ethnic violence through the existence of ‘ancient hatreds’ have failed to identify strong links between identity differences and the likelihood of violence against those who are different.<sup>37</sup> What was turning up in ‘ethnic wars’ was evidence of intra-ethnic violence- people in the same identity group killing in order to grab or defend power in the group. As Gagnon would note, “the terror against and killing of Croats by the Croatian nationalist forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina—or the killing of Serbs by Serb forces in Krajina or Republika Srpska—is difficult to categorize if we use the framework of ethnic conflict.”<sup>38</sup>

This strategical thinking can be seen in the case of Rwanda, in which moderate Hutu who might have opposed the Tutsi regime were targeted first.<sup>39</sup> Popular reporting, again, categorized the violence as more “neighbor killing neighbor,” but in reality, the roving murder patrols were members of the Rwandan military, or gang-like paramilitary organizations that were

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<sup>34</sup> Human Rights Watch. 1995. *Slaughter among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press. Pg. 2.

<sup>35</sup> Fearon, James and David Laitin. “Explaining interethnic cooperation.” *American Political Science Review*. 90:4(1996):715-735.

<sup>36</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Choice.” *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism* 2:1(1998): 54-64.

<sup>37</sup> Valentino, Benjamin A and Huth, Paul K ; Croco, Sarah. *Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War*. *World Politics*. 58:3(2006):339-377.

<sup>38</sup> Gagnon VP. *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pg. 11.

<sup>39</sup> Human Rights Watch. 1995. *Slaughter among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press. Pg. 23.

surprisingly small- less than one percent of the adult male population.<sup>40</sup> This tight control is less indicative of a streamlined command and control structure in the Clausewitzian sense. The networked nature of partisans does not preclude the strict control of messaging and mode, while allowing for decentralized execution.

During rebellions and insurgencies, there is a strong correlation between the resistance groups and the killing of civilians with a study of Latin American insurgencies finding that the targeting of civilians by both sides was a regular feature of those conflicts, at higher instances than even the killing of civilians during the great inter-state wars of the twentieth century.<sup>41</sup> Civilians are targeted because of the relationship between the insurgent and their support. Like in the Rwanda case, resistance groups must rid their base of potential weak actors who could fail in their resistance to state strategies, thus giving away vital information which the counter-insurgency could use to overwhelm the identity advantage. Much more than state forces, resistant groups 'swim in the sea' and rely on the population to provide resources that enable the insurgency. Like the governments they oppose, insurgents often use targeted violence to coerce civilian populations into providing support for them or at least withholding support from their enemy.<sup>42</sup> At the same time, resistance groups must show the illegitimacy of the state force, targeting state friendly populations in order to show that the 'social contract' cannot be supported. States often resort to 'draining the sea' if not through outright killing, the forms of population control.<sup>43</sup> When resistance groups draw from large populations of complacent support, the efforts to control the relevant population ranges from individual targeting of resistance leaders, massive information programs, resettlement and physical incarceration. In

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<sup>40</sup> Valentino, Benjamin. Final solutions: the causes of mass killing and genocide. *Security Studies*. 9:3(2000):1–59

<sup>41</sup> Wickham-Crowley, Timothy. "Terror and guerrilla warfare in Latin America, 1956–1970." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 32:2(1990):201–37. Pg. 225.

<sup>42</sup> Wood, Reed. "Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians." *Journal of Peace Resolution*. 47:5(2010):601–14

<sup>43</sup> Valentino Benjamin, Paul Huth, Balch-Lindsay Dylan. 2004. Draining the sea: mass killing and guerilla warfare. *International Organization*. 58:2(2004):375–407

the worst cases, military power can be used in operations meant to depopulate- kill- entire areas.<sup>44</sup>

Still, the reason why resistance groups target civilians does not completely explain how it tipples over into civilian targeting occurs. The answer is *politics*- the harnessing of force to gain a *goal*. The motives of political leaders to gain power, material goods, or achieve an ideological goal through the distribution of resources creates incentives for violence. The competition between elites of groups, either the counter-insurgent/insurgent or external/internal dynamics within resistance groups uses the fear of the other to generate political support. As support wanes, more extreme rhetoric is used, eventually cascading into violence, sometimes controlled, sometimes not.<sup>45</sup> The argument is that in demi-democratic systems, appeals to identity or nationalism are powerful because identity becomes a “convenient doctrine that justifies a partial form of democracy, in which an elite group rules in the name of the nation yet may not be fully accountable to its people.” Violence is not necessarily preordained as part of appeals to identity, but it becomes a “by-product of elites’ efforts to persuade the people to accept divisive nationalist ideas.”<sup>46</sup> In other words, persuading one group to identify *as a group* means castigating another group. It takes two to tango. Inevitably, the fear generated by political rhetoric leads to low level ethnic clashes and leads to a program of mobilization and counter-mobilization based on identities. Groups then initiate their own population control measures in an effort to created ethnically cleansed territories.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Fjelde, Hanne, and Hultman Lisa. “Weakening the enemy: a disaggregated study of violence against civilians in Africa.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 57:4(2013):1–28

<sup>45</sup> Brass, Paul R. *Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.

<sup>46</sup> Snyder, Jack L. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: Norton, 2000. Pg. 32.

<sup>47</sup> Lake, David A. and Rothchild, Donald. “Spreading fear: the genesis of transnational ethnic conflict.” *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*. Lake, David A. and Rothchild, Donald, eds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998. Pp. 3–32.

Contrarily, Gagnon argues that violence by one identity can be used to 'demobilize' political adversaries, without actually killing them. In the case of Yugoslavia, mistrust of moderates as generated to "shift the focus of political discourse away from issues of [political and economic] change toward grave injustices purportedly being inflicted on innocents, thus serving to demobilize—by silencing and marginalizing—those who posed the greatest threat to the status quo."<sup>48</sup> In these cases, the wider audience is influenced as violent episodes serve to delineate the 'correct' view of self/others as part of a larger racial ideology under which groups identities serve to make them inevitable enemies. The us/them equation was powerfully in effect in Rwanda, where elite Hutu hardliners was to equate 'enemy' with 'Tutsi' and to declare that Rwanda's 'enemies' had to be eliminated."<sup>49</sup> The small size of the organizations doing violence allows elites to manipulate the public at little cost to themselves. As in the case of Rwanda, a small number of death squads were responsible for the large scale violence, and their size meant that elites could reward them. Many conflicts in the post-Cold war era demonstrate similar characteristics, with elites controlling small groups that initiate and carry out violent acts within a larger population that, if not actively supporting the violence, are at least acquiescent.<sup>50</sup> There are limits to the violence perpetrated by resistance groups against the population, with the most notable in the recent past being the rejection of Al Qaida in Iraq in 2006-2007, after al-Zarqawi calling for attacks against every other religious sect.

The consensus of the few scholars who have conducted rigorous analysis in this subject is that large scale, indiscriminate violence gains civilians, while achieving short term, tactical gains, rarely achieves the long term goals of the group.<sup>51</sup> There seems to be a relationship

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<sup>48</sup> Gagnon VP. *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pg. 180.

<sup>49</sup> Straus, Scott. *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006. Pg. 9.

<sup>50</sup> Mueller, John W. *The Remnants of War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pg. 1.

<sup>51</sup> Valentino, Benjamin. *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pg. 68.



between the size of the population targeted and the ability to 'seal' the geographic area in which the population resides.<sup>52</sup> This is echoed by Ivan Arreguin-Toft who agreed that violence could work as a military strategy in the short term, but the ability of a military to completely control people and areas was limited in scope, not least because the scope of violence necessary would trigger strong opposition."<sup>53</sup> In fact, in civil wars particularly, killing civilians tends to "backfire on those who use it."<sup>54</sup> A significant study on the U.S. led war in Iraq found that coalition attacks on civilians provoked increased insurgent attacks against the coalition, while insurgent targeting of civilians, particularly by the Sunni led AQIZ against the local Shia, caused a loss of support from the population to the insurgency.<sup>55</sup> Despite careful legal justifications and information campaigns, states suffer the problems, particularly with the perceived indiscriminate targeting through aerial bombardment generating "more public anger against the attacker than against the target government."<sup>56</sup> The act of violence itself could possibly be the inherent reason why violence fails to convince a population to acquiesce because the target thinks there is no way to bargain with the attacker.<sup>57</sup> In some counter cases, the tactic seemed to work. In Chechnya, Russian forces used artillery to shell insurgent held villages which seemed to at least cause problems for the insurgents' freedom of movement, leading to decrease in attacks.<sup>58</sup> Francisco Herreros found that during the Great Terror (1937-1938) the Soviet authorities were able to convince the target population that the violence was not arbitrary through heavily

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<sup>52</sup> Downes, Alexander B. "Draining the sea by filling the graves: investigating the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence as a counterinsurgency strategy." *Civil Wars* 9:4(2007):420-444

<sup>53</sup> Arreguin-Toft, "How the weak win wars," Pg. 123.

<sup>54</sup> Kalyvas Stathis N. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006. Pg. 388.

<sup>55</sup> Condra, Luke N. and Shapiro, Jacob. 2012. "Who takes the blame? The strategic effects of collateral damage." *American Journal of Political Science*. 56:1(2012):167-87.

<sup>56</sup> Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996. Pg. 25.

<sup>57</sup> Abrahms, Max. "Why terrorism does not work." *International Security*. 31:2(2006):42-78. Pg. 76.

<sup>58</sup> Lyaal, Jason. Does indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? Evidence from Chechnya. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 53:3(2009):331-362.

propagandizing the false confessions and show trials, which led to a deterrence in opposition to the regime.<sup>59</sup>

It is because of the close ties of identity that preemption as a method becomes a mode, a way of war. The idea of population control is a euphemism for clearing a place of the problem of human life. If the killing one partisan, however needed, creates three more partisans because of the knowledge advantage, then fairly quickly states must move to the eradication of life modalities.

Preemption by the state has become synonymous with drone warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles, since the U.S. debuted their use in Afghanistan. Seen as more responsive than satellite imagery, drones were being routinely used in the first Gulf War for reconnaissance, but it was not until the CIA pushed for, and received funding to arm and test Hellfire missiles in the summer of 2001 that the idea of remote warfare took off. On October 7, 2001, the CIA launched a Hellfire guided missile from a Predator drone. That first target was Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, in Kandahar, a city in southern Afghanistan that was still months away from liberation by the Northern Alliance.<sup>60</sup>

Since then, all the U.S. military services operate drones, but only the CIA and U.S. Air Force have armed versions. The drone campaign has expanded beyond Afghanistan, an established warzone, to Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia with reports of strikes in other countries. Drones are becoming common, Israel, China and Iran all developing their own drone capabilities. Hezbollah has operated drones over Israel.<sup>61</sup> With the success of drone strikes

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<sup>59</sup> Herreros, Francisco. "The full weight of the state: the logic of random state-sanctioned violence." *Journal of Peace Resolution*. 43:6(2006):671–89.

<sup>60</sup> Woods, Chris. "The Story of America's Very First Drone Strike. *The Atlantic*. 30 May 2015. Found online at <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/america-first-drone-strike-afghanistan/394463/>

<sup>61</sup> "Iran Muscles into the UAV Battlefield," *United Press International*, 5 October 2010, <[http://www.upi.com/Business\\_News/Security-Industry/2010/10/05/Iranmuscles-into-the-UAV-battlefield/UPI-47421286303914/?rel=10991287154490](http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/10/05/Iranmuscles-into-the-UAV-battlefield/UPI-47421286303914/?rel=10991287154490)>.

and their popularity with policy makers loathe to put conventional troops on the ground in winless wars, drones are likely to become even more common. The use of drones and other remote weapons combined with a strategy of preemption raises moral and ethical questions.

The great problem with preemption by drone is the unknowable true costs of the strike itself. Critics have argued the drone operations lack the precise intelligence to know exactly who is being killed, with large numbers of noncombatants dying in the strikes. In an unbelievable statement, but one that has a level of support in Pakistan, Syed Munwar Hasan who is the leader of the Islamic political party Jamaat-e-Islami claimed that drones strikes “are killing nearly 100 percent innocent people.”<sup>62</sup> A more nuanced calculation came from the counterinsurgency experts David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum arguing that as many as fifty civilians are killed for every insurgent/terrorist.<sup>63</sup>

The Obama administration significantly increased the number of drone operations as an answer to the increasingly unpopular strategy of using conventional troops.<sup>64</sup> Between 2009 and the end of 2015, 473 drone strikes had been launched, killing between 2372 and 2581 combatants.<sup>65</sup> Releasing a study in 2016, the administration said between 64 and 116 noncombatants had been inadvertently killed in its drone strikes. This differs from the highest estimate from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism who counted 325 deaths. The Long War Journal and the New America Foundation came with 212 and 219 respectively.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Sebastian Abbot, “New Light on Drone War’s Death Toll,” Associated Press, 26 February 2012. Found online at <<http://news.yahoo.com/ap-impact-light-drone-wars-death-toll-150321926.html>>

<sup>63</sup> Kilcullen, David and Andrew M. Exum, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” The New York Times, 16 May 2009.

<sup>64</sup> President George W. Bush authorized approximately 50 drone strikes that killed 296 terrorists and 195 civilians in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia, from Zenko, Micah. “Obama’s Embrace of Drone Strikes will be a Lasting Legacy. New York Times, 12 Jan 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/01/12/reflecting-on-obamas-presidency/obamas-embrace-of-drone-strikes-will-be-a-lasting-legacy>

<sup>65</sup> DeYoung, Karen and Greg Miller, “White House Releases Its Count of Civilian Deaths,” The Washington Post, 1 July 2016.

<sup>66</sup> DeYoung, Karen and Greg Miller, “White House Releases Its Count of Civilian Deaths,” The Washington Post, 1 July 2016.

Critics of the United States' use of drones to kill suspected terrorists opine that they are "extrajudicial" killings, in the sense that only a court can order the death of a criminal. As the hunt for terrorists' speeds away from 9/11, the use of drone strikes to kill has become routine with very little oversight from the public. This is particularly troublesome in the instances when non-combatants are killed from afar. Mary Ellen O'Connell and Benjamin Wittes point out that "Targeting with the intent to kill an individual is only lawful under international humanitarian law or LOAC (the Law of Armed Conflict) within armed conflict hostilities, and then only members of regular armed forces, members of organized armed groups, or direct participants in those hostilities . . . [thus, because] the United States is only engaged in armed conflict in Afghanistan, targeted killing elsewhere is not commensurate with the law."<sup>67</sup> But the Authorization for the Use of Military Force passed by the U.S. Congress following the 9/11 attacks authorized operations anywhere to prevent future terrorist attacks and has been used to justify strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The use of drones has been defended when the costs and risks of capture by ground forces or local police are too high.

To a large extent, the way the U.S. is conducting the war, outside the major theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan, has come to resemble the very irregular wars conducted by those it hunts- Covertly, in the shadows, with little perception by the larger world around of the preparation and execution, except for the message sent to the population affected by the strike: Anywhere, anytime, without warning.

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<sup>67</sup> Benjamin Wittes and Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Predator Drones, Targeted Killing, and the Law," Debate given at Fordham Law School, New York, October 2010. For a recording of this debate, see <[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tb62LLvy\\_aU](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tb62LLvy_aU)>.

#### **6.4. Conclusion**

“The end of the fight is a tombstone white, with the name of the late deceased; And the epitaph drear; ‘A fool lies here, who tried to hustle the East.’”

Rudyard Kipling, *The Naulahka*

The increasingly blurred lines between non-combatants, civilians and legitimate targets are a hallmark of identity wars, but the introduction of preemption as a mode has changed its character. The giant wars of the twentieth century caused the deaths of an estimated fifty million civilians, both directly and from the effects of war: famine and disease. This high number is of course, the result of the power states wields in war with single engagements causing as many as one-hundred thousand deaths at Nuremberg and Hiroshima.<sup>68</sup> The targeting of civilians is interesting because it happens despite the widespread public opposition to it. One possible reason is that, while disliked by publics at large, it is still strongly linked to militant organizations. A recent Red Cross survey found that “a striking 64 per cent say that combatants, when attacking to weaken the enemy, must attack only combatants and leave civilians alone.”<sup>69</sup> Attitudes in the U.S. have been similar and consistent over time. Before World War II Americans were opposed to urban bombing because of the belief in American humanitarian ideals, and before the invasion of Iraq, opposed bombing there if it would result in thousands of Iraqi civilian deaths.<sup>70</sup> Still, as Robert Pape points out, intentionally targeting civilians has a dubious success rate. On the state side, airpower and economic sanctions rarely extract meaningful concessions.<sup>71</sup> In a strange way, perhaps this is contra-evidence in support

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<sup>68</sup> Eckhardt, William. “Civilian Deaths in Wartime,” *Security Dialogue*. 20:1(1989):89-98. Pg. 91. Figures are from *ibid.*, pp. 90, 92. Interstate wars are particularly deadly, killing about twice as many noncombatants as civil, colonial, and imperial wars combined.

<sup>69</sup> Greenberg Research, *The People on War Report: ICRC Worldwide Consultation on the Rules of War* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1999), p. 13 Found online at <http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p0758?OpenDocument>.

<sup>70</sup> Hopkins, George E. “Bombing and the American Conscience during World War II,” *Historian*. 28:3(1966):451-473. Pg. 453.

<sup>71</sup> Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996.

of preemptive drone strikes against individuals, particularly those committed to themselves. After all, dead bodies are easy to bargain with.

In the first analysis, preemption is a method, made infamous by the War on Terror, with images of drones and (in the future) robots dealing lethal force from afar. In a second analysis, one thinks war writ large, with the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the 2003 invasion of Iraq looking large. Although the distance between preventive war and preemptive war narrows quite a bit, they suffice. However, there is a third analysis, wherein the idea of people need preempting, given that people seek their own definitions of liberty and opportunity. It is the third analysis where the affective power of preemption lies, away from the normative effect of simple killing. Affect triggers a cause. Effect is an end. Affect is part of a chain reaction. This is what changes preemption from simple killing to a mode aimed at life.

There are varying degrees of chance that people will choose a life that does not fit in with the natured modality Liberalism creates for itself. Preemption is certainly a method. Later, I will lay out how both protagonists in identity war target individuals in an effort to decapitate the opposing side. But there is a mode to preemption, which is very dark indeed. Anything that Liberalism can co-opt, and live with, it will, through various incentives. If it cannot live with it, it- whatever *it is*- must go away. In the age of late Liberalism, the physical threat of death, dismemberment and abruptly interrupting terror creates a paranoia, a paranoia that is used to justify the means of the security dispositif. Any threat is useful: Thank god, murmur the politicians, for hurricane Katrina and global climate change. Paranoia translates into votes. These votes become a blank check of sorts for power.

Preemption is a power that demands usage early in the life cycle of the threat. Beyond the ontological arguments about defining threats, there is a very real epistemological thrust of preemption- the ways and means of the thing itself- that demands a very quick decision about whether an emerging awareness is an emerging threat. This is where preemption begins to

occupy the space of *ontopower*. Preemption presumes 'right' thus the power to do what it will. It is a reaction that means to become action, the first thing. That is the whole point. Preemption becomes 'self-propelling'; in a fascinating *ouroboros*, the destruction of the partisan creates more partisans, for reasons explained in chapter five.<sup>72</sup> Thus the self-propelling agency Massumi references in *Ontopower*.

Massumi says "Preemption revolves around a proliferative effect."<sup>73</sup> That proliferation comes from the 'invisible hand' that washes one affect over others, fully individual, but effecting in unison, like a school of fish. The role of free will in conflict indicates that the effective target of preemption is the individual, but the affective purpose is the preemption of the identity that powers the partisan. The destruction of an individual for whatever crime is self-equalizing: In the ancient sense, an eye for an eye, and tooth for tooth. Preemption is not about being equal. It manes to be the first and only, response and action.

From Algeria, to Vietnam, to Afghanistan, Clausewitzian strategies have failed, leading states to adventure into the philosophies of self, described here as the singularity. The new strategy of preemption, in many way, brings one back to the old idea of asymmetry. Preemption may be the ultimate asymmetry because it occurs in the space provided by the lack of knowledge of *self/other* an army brings to the fight. Ethnic groups focus on adversary weakness; states focus on their own strength. The idea that power, as physical violence, can destroy the strategic will of the enemy has been the central pillar of military philosophy since the Napoleonic era. This is because states, realizing the latent power in mobilizing the masses along nationalist ideals, projected their own weakness on their enemy. This works as long as the enemy is Clausewitzian in nature. In identity wars, the emphasis is on the individual, the meat sack for the singularity of violence, reason and free will, effectively making every person

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<sup>72</sup> Massumi, *Ontopower*, pg. 7.

<sup>73</sup> Massumi, *Ontopower*, pg. 15.

his or her own government, mob and general. Clausewitzian war machines cannot break the connection between the will to fight and the reason to fight, and so are left with a strategy that is meant to kill the will, the individual. The identity advantage, the links of identity that tie individuals to each other quickly close up, the absence of one disappearing under the multiplied links of many, now agitated by the very application of force that was meant to correct it.



## CHAPTER SEVEN: CASE STUDIES

“We have reached an important point where the end begins to come into view.”  
Westmoreland, General, U.S.A, 1967.

### **7.1. Power Strategies and Preemption**

These case studies are not meant to simply illustrate technical differences between the adversaries, usually described in terms of weapons and tactics in the mass literature. In fact, this is the least important aspect of the case studies. Instead, these cases illustrate the evolution of strategies meant to defeat war machines to strategies meant to destroy people. These case studies illustrate the asymmetry between the adversaries, one which starts with overwhelming material superiority on one side, and ends with identity dominance on the other. The difference is between a descriptions of a *method* of war as opposed to a *mode* of war. Usually, when authors begin to describe guerilla war, they are describing a method, a version of ‘hit and run’ tactics. When I describe partisan war, I am describing a mode of warfare in relation to its goals. The partisan fights to affect a revolution, to impose his version of reality on his environment. He is willing to suffer death for this cause, which makes his death by preemption the only logical course.

There are overlapping themes that must be brought out of the cases in order to justify a path from idea to thesis to hypothesis. The idea is that Liberalism tries to spread itself, thus the selection of cases in which great Liberal powers involve themselves in ostensibly other’s internal wars. Algeria and Vietnam are the basis for the hypothesis. Afghanistan is the outlier as the Soviet Union practiced an extreme version of Liberalism. Together, they suffice to show the failure of Clausewitzian war machines. In sequence, they show the growing understanding that to ‘win’ these wars, targeting civilians must occur. Later, the studies of Iraq and Afghanistan, illustrate a complete understanding of the importance of erstwhile civilians in identity wars.

This makes the case studies complex. As described in chapters one through four, these conflicts consist of several layered and interrelated forces. First, at the *strategic* level, the action of Liberal states and the rejection of Liberalism, and at the *tactical* level, the failure of state militaries to force these largely illiberal regimes to accept their writ.<sup>1</sup> The nexus of the two is the understanding that the threat of Liberalism to identities is what drives the distribution of knowledge into positions of ascent over the distributions of power that states bring to bear.

The case studies will describe the conflict and the roles of identity and Clausewitzian military machines, the disorder of society and the reaction of the disenfranchised group, and eventually the inclusion of civilians as legitimated targets of war which I refer to as the ‘democratization of war’. Clausewitz rationalized the translation of state power into military force, and in these case studies, we will see how states employed their militaries in attempts to extend Liberalism, even in the case of the Soviet Union, its occupation of Afghanistan was meant to implant a version of Liberal utopianism. Arguably all states, but particularly western states, seek to dominate their adversaries for a variety of reasons: Empire, stability, or additional security. How states seek to dominate each other should be obvious at this point, and for that reason, they have an inability to dominate sub state groups. Sub state groups use their advantage in the distribution of knowledge about self/other to achieve periods of tactical superiority that allow them to achieve reciprocity on the way to strategic victory.

Civilians are targeted because, fundamentally, asymmetries are sought in every competition in order to generate conditions under which goals can be achieved. No one wants a ‘fair’ fight, with both sides having statistically even odds of success. States do this by applying massive military firepower and technology at what they perceive to be the decisive point. The identification of the civilian population was a key moment in the evolution of preemptive

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<sup>1</sup> The use of the terms ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’ are only loosely related to their military definitions. See Chapter 1.

strategy. The weakness that resistance groups have been able to exploit is the links between the state, its people, and its military. Conversely, the absence of those links in insurgencies means that states are reduced to indiscriminate killing of all people in a given area. The increase in internal and internationalized internal conflicts, the increasing communication and diffusion of war methods across leading states, and the intuitive understanding of state weakness has brought us to the threshold of Martin Van Creveld's position that "strategy in the classical sense disappear."<sup>2</sup> Read that with Everett Dolman's definition that strategy "in its simplest form, is a plan for attaining continuing advantage" the two statements appear at crossroads, the first arguing for the end of strategy, and the second that strategy is a continuum, but both are correct.<sup>3</sup> Clausewitzian war capitalized on a strategy, one that used mass and speed and power as its elements. It was a type of strategy that worked well with the rise of states, the industrial revolution, the spread of popular government, and the creation of nationalism.

Protagonists who have capitalized on asymmetry have done so by defeating the enemy using "minimal direct combat, while western military strategies are designed to produce a direct collision of opposing armies."<sup>4</sup> All strategies are meant to secure advantages.<sup>5</sup> The production of asymmetry provides the opportunity for advantage. Unlike state wars, in which the asymmetry can be predicted, prepared for, and capitalized upon, usually by destroying the adversary, in irregular wars, the asymmetry is the result of the interaction of the two protagonists, usually in favor of the weaker side. Preemption may be changing that. Weak groups attack individuals/civilians because they are not protected; states target individuals in order to preempt those attacks.

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<sup>2</sup> Van Creveld, Martin. *The Transformation of War*. New York: Free Press, 1991. Print. Pg. 207.

<sup>3</sup> Dolman, Everett C. *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age*. New York: Frank Cass, 2005. Print. Pg. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Lowther, Adam. *Asymmetrical Warfare and Military Thought*. London: Glen Segall Publishers, 2006. Pg. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Milevski, Lukas. "Asymmetry Is Strategy, Strategy Is Asymmetry." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 75.4 (2014): 78. Print.



## **7.2. Algeria and Identity**

“For a colonized people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity.”

Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*

In this case study, problems which led to French withdrawal and Algerian independence were structural in nature, tied to ideas of Empire and colonialism. The French empire was in a race with the British, under pressure to continually expand the mercantilist system of economics practiced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the twenty-first, the purpose had grown in grandeur. The domestic French audiences on both the right and left widely believed in the universalist mission of France to civilize its periphery. France would export the ideas of *egalité*, *liberty* and *fraternité* in return for economic benefits. These ideas legitimized French presence in its vast African colonies. Incidentally, the loss of Indochina in 1954 increased the feelings that France's military and diplomatic power were centered in Africa, increasing the intensity of the coming conflict in Algeria. In the French third republic, this meant claiming to be a liberal parliamentary democracy yet housing the supreme authority of an empire that stretched across the bulge or northern Africa through the Levant and anchored in Indochina.<sup>6</sup> The very idea of 'empire' could not be subjected to hard scrutiny. In Indochina, only northern Vietnam had any sense of social and cultural connection to Paris. It was Algeria that had high numbers of immigrants from Metropolitan France, almost a million by 1954. Imperial presence was measured in most of the colonies by the adoption of the French language and property laws.

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<sup>6</sup> Martin, Thomas. *The French Empire Between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005. Print.

French colonial theories attempted to reconcile her image as the birthplace of modern liberalism (and Republicanism) and her control of indigenous populations through the racial hierarchy in which Africans and Asians were being improved through colonial infrastructure, learning to govern from superior French masters.<sup>7</sup> Although French attitudes softened during the interwar period, young people in the colonized areas who had strived to assimilate to the ideals to Greater France were locked out the governance structures by the attitudes of the ruling class in Paris that they were not ready to be full citizens of metropolitan France. Associationism was a less intrusive style of governance meant to lighten the ruling hand by respecting local



Figure 14. Algeria is a large country, stretching from the green Mediterranean coast to the deep Sahara; many different cultures inhabit the land, from the mountainous Berber, to the Arab, to the French in the cities. The modern name of the country is related to the old Arabic word 'jeria' which is related to 'plateau', a geologic formation found off the Maghreb.

customs and norms but again, indigenous peoples were rejected for citizenship based on the idea that they needed to retain their *bona fides* as local elites. Opposition began to be voiced, first by ex-patriate *immigres* in France itself, and spreading to the homelands, that stressed the distinctive culture of colonized lands and eventually called for the radical break with France.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas, Martin, Bob Moore and L.J. Butler. *Crises of Empire*. London, Hodder Education, 2008. Print.

Before the German crises of the late 1930s, genuine efforts were made to reform the worst aspects of the colonial infrastructure. The government proposed a bill to expand French citizenship and voting rights to Algerian officials, soldiers who had fought during the World War, and university graduates. Unfortunately, the merry-go-round of French governments kept the proposal from being voted upon. It would not be resurrected until the end of the coming revolution.<sup>8</sup> Other nuanced changes in French domestic politics played equally large, if hidden roles. After their own liberation from Germany, the hero-general De Gaulle created the Fourth Republic, and with it, perhaps French citizens believed government was not accountable to past colonial mistakes. Their new political parties were focused on internal reconstruction and emancipating new voting blocks. The inter-war growth of the French Communist party continued unabated, destined to bring down many post-war governments, and the remnants of the French political right was busy holding onto its fading power. Communism brought along its own shade of imperialism that fit well with the concept of French cultural superiority, so it is not clear that a communist government in France would have resulted in unmitigated decolonization. There was an optimism in a decidedly French future where, if there was no money, there were new ideas that would cement French superiority.

The French experience in Algeria began in 1830 when the settled coastal lands of Algeria were quickly overrun by the French Army. The pacification of Algeria was to last some forty years and the surprising longevity to the resistance drove an ever closer nexus between the military leadership, settlers and business interests. The increasing use of force to solve problems of administration, along with the two major resistance movements of Emir Abd al Qadir and Ahmed Bey during the first two decades meant that the French settlers viewed their gains as increasingly valuable and insecure. This in turn lent a moral salience to brutality, already accepted as a price of the civilizing mission of the colonial effort. Efforts to increase

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<sup>8</sup> Thomas, Moore and Butler. *Crises of Empire*. Pg. 135

French presence to a point of irreversible momentum would lead to greater rates of appropriation of Muslim lands.<sup>9</sup> Land, geography, was still the basis for wealth. What may have started as sharp disagreements over the finer points of culture became a fight over resource distribution.

The colonization of Algeria and its transformation into a *department*, considered integral France as the metropolitan itself was considerably sped up following France's crushing defeat in the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian war. The punitive terms dictated by Germany meant the loss of industrial areas of Alsace and Lorraine, which triggered an impetus for strategic depth. Large amounts of open lands, held communally by the Arab Muslims were confiscated as vacant, and laws were passed imposing metropolitan property laws on the new areas. French settler number increased tenfold from forty thousand in 1841 to four-hundred thousand in by 1881.<sup>10</sup>

Pierre Mendes-France had overseen the withdrawal of France from Indochina in 1954, but went about the Algerian question in a fundamentally different way. Instead of retaining absolute French control, he sought reforms to the colonial administration with the idea of addressing basic Algerian concerns, particularly about land distribution. The reforms, which had existed on paper since 1947, had been resisted by the Algerian Assembly, but with the goal being integration, not assimilation, slowly began to bear fruit. Algeria would become part of France, but there was a recognition of a distinct Algerian nature to Algeria.<sup>11</sup>

In the Algerian conflict, the issue of religion has both structural and metaphysical properties. The influence of Islamic institutions on the early attempts by the FLN on state formation is clear. The Muslim sacred writings provide for governance, for structures. Algeria

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<sup>9</sup> Von Silvers, Peter. "Rural Uprisings as Political Movements in Colonial Algeria, 181-1914." *Islam, Politics and Social Movements*. Ed. Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988. 39–59. Print.

<sup>10</sup> Ruedy, John. *Modern Algeria, 2d Ed.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2005. Print. Pp. 69,81.

<sup>11</sup> Tyre, Stephen. "Algerie Francaise to France Musulmane: Jacques Soustelle and the Myths and Realities of Integration, 1955-1962." *French History* 20:3(2006):276–296. Print.



had already been divided into military commands by the rebels. Once full mobilization had begun, courts, tax administration and social programs to support the indigent population were created. This crystallization further disintegrated the *de jure* colonial structures administered by France. Much like President Mendes-France, the call to action for Muslims invoked God as the arbiter of difference. When a conflict is couched in those terms, to disobey is a sin. From there, all is permissible. Histories of the conflict make it clear early on that Islam was the rallying mechanism for mobilization with graffiti appearing as early as 1945 exhorting “Muslims awaken” “It’s the Muslim flag that will float over North Africa!” and “Francais, you will be massacred by the Muslims.”<sup>12</sup> By the time the FLN was established in November 1954, taking the revolution from a political discourse to a violent insurrection, the Islamic identity of the rebellion was firmly established. The rallying cry *Algérie aux Algériens* should be understood as Algeria for Muslim Algerians. As the *Comité révolutionnaire d’unité d’action* (CRUA) dissolved into the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) and issued its birth charter, it called for “national independence... within the framework of Islamic principles” and North African unity “within its *natural* (italics added) Arabo-Muslim framework.”<sup>13</sup> What needs to be understood in terms of the conflict is that when defining itself, the one side automatically creates the ‘other’, in this case, the white French settlers became the other. In all wars, and particularly irregular wars, one makes the enemy as different as possible. In Algeria, the two sides had different religions, different skin color, language and even clothes. Of course, the French were doing the same to the Arabs for generations.

The organization of the revolutionaries in Algeria went through several phases, but by the summer of 1954, the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA) had become the nucleus of the National Liberation Front. Most of its members had been part of the *Organisation*

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<sup>12</sup> Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace*. New York: New York Review of Books, 2006. Pg 24.

<sup>13</sup> Horne, *Savage War of Peace*. Pg. 95.

*Speciale*.<sup>14</sup> The change over time in the organizations was the socio-economic status of its members. In the early days of political activism, the leading members had been prominent members of the colonial establishment. This was an important demographic change. The new members of the revolutionary front were relatively uneducated, and from small towns and villages. They were much closer in political disposition to the most marginalized of the Algerian population, as opposed city politicians in Algiers or Oran.<sup>15</sup>

It was actually the CRUA in the summer of 1954 that developed the social-geographic structure of that the FLN would use throughout the war. Originally dividing Algeria into five, later six, military districts, these would become known as *wilayas*. These were further subdivided into mantaqas (zones), which in turn contained nahayas (regions), qasmas (sectors) and duwwars (circles) in descending order. Wilayas were given the highest ranking officer to be in charge, with descending ranks for the lower elements, but once active combat started, rarely did the FNL solidify this structure.<sup>16</sup> By the declaration of open war on 1 November, 1954, the number of active fighters ranged from a low of 900 to a high of 3000.<sup>17</sup> Attacks were to begin in all five wilayas simultaneously and the FLN did have some success in the mountains, but in the major cities, disoriented, with poor communications and hampered by French policing and intelligence, most attacks failed.<sup>18</sup> The French police were able to dismantle Wilaya four through attacks and arrest. The leader of the FLN in the area around Constantine was killed, and Ben Bouliad of Wilaya one was killed when a booby trapped radio blew up in his hand.<sup>19</sup> In Wilayah three, located in the mountainous Kabilya along the coast, guerrillas were able to cut

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<sup>14</sup> Ruedy, John. *Modern Algeria*. Pg. 114

<sup>15</sup> Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*. pg. 157

<sup>16</sup> Bennoune, *Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.. Pg. 84.

<sup>17</sup> Bennoune, *Contemporary Algeria*. Pg. 84.

<sup>18</sup> Bennoune, *Contemporary Algeria*. pg. 84

<sup>19</sup> Naylor, Phillip C. *Historical Dictionary of Algeria*, 4<sup>th</sup> Ed. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. Pg. 119.

phone and telegraph lines, and kill some local office holders, but they were confined to the least accessible, and hence, least populated areas.<sup>20</sup>

The French military strategy of *centres of regroupment* and *quadrillage* was rapidly progressing and the construction of the fortified *Morice Line* was strangling the rebellion, destroying the tenuous lines of communication between the center and the outlying *wilayas*. The spell of De Gaulle seriously threatened to undermine the influence of the FLN among Algerians. Despite a called for boycott “79.9 percent of Muslim men and women came to the polls” to vote on a new French constitution and an overwhelming [ninety-six] percent of those voted yes.<sup>21</sup> The key proposals, along with the social and economic reforms of the Constantine plan, was universal adult suffrage and guaranteeing that two-thirds of Algerian representation in the French parliament would be Muslim. A month of intimidation by the FLN achieved better results: only 65% of eligible voters turned out to elect Algerian deputies to the Fifth Republic. As despotism, this move by the FLN is classic; as politics, it is shrewd. One of the goals of the CRUA/FLN heterotopia in late 1954 was to become the sole representative of the Algerian revolution. This precipitated any dissent and De Gaulle’s plan was an attempt to influence the Algerian middle back to the French side. Undoubtedly, Algerians elected to the Parliament, and any subsequently elected to the French dominated National Assembly in Algiers would have leaned French. The revolution was not meant to meet France half-way, or even to negotiate. The FLN meant for the revolution to sweep away everything before it in order to start anew. As much as Mendes-France held no room for *Algérie* in France, by 1962, there would be no place for what was *européen* in Algeria.

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<sup>20</sup> Evans, Martin and John Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the dispossessed*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. Pp. 11-25.

<sup>21</sup> Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*. pg. 173.

The most significant operational initiatives the French developed were the electrified fence and mine fields along the Tunisian border.<sup>22</sup> Many groups of FLN fighters, using Tunisia as a sanctuary, were trapped there, unable to infiltrate back into Algeria.<sup>23</sup> The French committed a mobile force of some 80,000 men to patrol the border. The last major attempt to breach the Morice line led to a reported 6000 casualties on the FLN side.<sup>24</sup> The Morice line was meant to 'seal' the battlefield, allowing French forces the ability to separate the non-combatant civilian population from the armed insurgents. However, as the line became effective, and FLN attacks were mounted against it, the line had the effect of drawing international attention to Algeria. The French were criticized after pursuing FLN groups into Tunisia, and mistakenly bombed a school and hospital in the Tunisian border town of Sakiet Sidi Youcef.<sup>25</sup> Tunisians transported journalists "to the still smoking scene of the raid" to document the French brutality.<sup>26</sup>

By the fall of 1956, the French military and police forces were gaining the upper hand in the military conflict. French forces, just 80,000 in 1954, had been increased to over 400,000. As the war dragged on into the early 1960, and after De Gaulle was brought to power in the Fifth Republic and increasingly saw Algerian independence as the only way to end the war, French settlers in Algeria formed a right wing terrorist organization, the *Organisation de l'armée secrete* (Organization of the Secret Army or OAS). The OAS fought against the FLN to be sure, but targeted anyone, European or Algerian, who backed an "Algerian Algeria," setting off a series of bombings and targeted assassinations in Algiers to terrify the Muslim and European communities.<sup>27</sup> The OAS was able to avoid police actions, hiding as they did in the poor white

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<sup>22</sup> Shrader, Charles R. *The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria 1954-1962*. Westport Conn: Praeger Publishers, 1999. Pg. 206.

<sup>23</sup> Derradji, Abder Rahmane. *A Concise History of Political Violence in Algeria: 1954-2000*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002. Pp. 118-119.

<sup>24</sup> Horne, *Savage War*. Pg. 266.

<sup>25</sup> Horne, *Savage War*. Pg. 250.

<sup>26</sup> Horne, *Savage War*. Pg. 250.

<sup>27</sup> Horne, *Savage War*. Pg. 486.

neighborhoods of Algiers and Oran, where it got most of its support from the people who feared a Muslim takeover the most: the uneducated, immobile and poor.<sup>28</sup>

The FLN was committed to showing the world that they were the true representatives of the Algerian people, through freely given authority. The headquarters of the FLN, the CCE (safe in Tunisia) called for an eight-day general strike in the entire country. They were also determined to carry the battle from the countryside, where it was scarcely covered by the international press, to the cities, via urban terrorism. A leading activist in the FLN reportedly declared that “one corpse in a jacket is always worth more than twenty in uniform.”<sup>29</sup> If the FLN could control the cities, which were the heart of the French socio-economic colonial system, then the FLN could control Algeria. Through fear, the FLN would “bring the city to its knees” and forcibly elevate the French-Algerian War to an international audience.”<sup>30</sup>

The Kasbah, in the heart of Algeria, was dominated by tight and winding streets, with a densely packed population of 80,000. Overwhelmingly poor, young Muslim males in the Kasbah were ripe for recruitment into the FLN.<sup>31</sup> It was here that the center of gravity for the urban campaign would be found. What would become known as the *Battle of Algiers* was planned as a campaign and began on the evening of 30 September, 1956. The FLN recruited three well-to-do young Algerian women who could pass through police checkpoints.<sup>32</sup> They placed bombs in crowded locations, killing three Europeans, wounding scores, including children. Orchestrated by Saadi Yacef, the commander of the Autonomous Region around the city of Algiers, and hiding in the Casbah, the bombings and assassinations continued through

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<sup>28</sup> Horne, *Savage War*. Pg. 490.

<sup>29</sup> Kantowicz, Edward. *Coming Apart, Coming Together: The World in the Twentieth Century, Volume 2*. Grand Rapids, MI. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999. Pg. 213

<sup>30</sup> Derradji, Abder Rahmane. *A Concise History of Political Violence in Algeria: 1954-2000*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002. Pg. 51.

<sup>31</sup> Talbott, John. *The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. Pg. 80

<sup>32</sup> Horne, *Savage War*. Pg. 185.

the winter and spring of 1957. The French civilians responded with 'rattonades' rat-hunts intent on killing Arabs.<sup>33</sup>

In early January 1957, the French Tenth Paratroop Regiment entered Algeria under martial law. The long planned strike was called and the French responded with leaflets and loudspeakers telling the Algerians to return to work. The paratroopers forcibly opened the shops by cutting locks and allowing looting until shop owners "emerge[d] in order to protect their unguarded goods, and were then ordered to remain open under threat of imprisonment."<sup>34</sup> The strike breaking continued through the week, with French troops rounding up workers and driving to their factories and shops, beating and even killing those who resisted. Movement in the city was curtailed aiding heavy intelligence operations. Infamously, torture was widespread and systematically used against hundreds in order to uncover equally murderous terrorist cells. International indignation rose over the disappearance and assumed execution of Maurice Audin, as assistant professor of mathematics who was collaborating with the nationalists. By summer 1957, the main spokes of the terror network had been found and cut; by the fall, the Battle of Algiers was over.

While the strike and urban campaign was a tactical failure for the FLN, with other Arab leaders criticizing the FLN leadership which had fled in Tunisia, the French reaction ultimately provided more political ammunition for the FLN's cause. The French President attempted to soften the coming loss of Algeria by telling his countrymen that "it is altogether natural to feel nostalgia for what empire was, just as many yearn for the soft light of oil lamps, the splendor of the sailing ship navy, the charm of the horse and buggy era. But what of it? No policy valid apart from realities."<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Horne, *Savage War* Pg. 187

<sup>34</sup> Horne, *Savage War*. Pg. 191

<sup>35</sup> Stora, Benjamin. *Algeria, 1830-2000. A Short History*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.

The causes of the Algerian conflict are fairly easy to surmise: Feelings of relative deprivation on the part of the Muslim Algerians who believed that a national state of, by and for Algerians would greatly solve the issues of social and economic inequality. Ties of identity, primarily through the use of Islam, provided the advantage that powered the materially weak FLN through tactical defeat to strategic victory. The militarization of that knowledge took a very violent turn, surprisingly early in the war. Faced with certain military (in the normative sense) defeat, the FLN turned towards targeting civilians. The French would respond in kind.

The leaders of the FLN had read the works of Frantz Fanon and Carlos Marighela, who advocated unlimited violence, including the targeting of civilians. Marighela rationalized an absolute war of terror in which decentralized and random violence would create panic and distrust in the state security apparatus. Increasingly repressive tactics meant to stop the violence would backfire on the state, generating more sympathy for the insurgents.<sup>36</sup> After the winter of the 1955, the coldest on record, and following the languishing of their urban strategy, the FLN cast about for method to bring the population into the fight. The critical phase of the war began with the killing of civilians in the Philippeville massacres of 20 August 1955. The decision by the FLN to target civilians- some 123 were killed in one village near Philippeville brought the war into the nakedly soft and unprepared ground of the civilian population. In Wilaya Two, the FLN commanders were confronted with the population to whom the revolution was an abstraction. The FLN actually attacked civilians in twenty-six locations in and around the capital city.<sup>37</sup> The FLN would go on to announce a total war against French *pède noir*, justifying “collective reprisals” against civilians in an attempt to “militarize” the conflict.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Moss, Walter G. *An Age of Progress? Clashing Twentieth Century Global Forces*. New York: Anthem Press, 2008. Pg. 25. Fanon argued that only violence could break colonialism in *The Wretched of the Earth*. Marighela’s two works are *For the Liberation of Brazil* and *The Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla*.

<sup>37</sup> Aussaresses, Paul. *The Battle of the Casbah*. New York: Enigma Books, 2006. Print. Pg. 49

<sup>38</sup> Horne, Savage War. Pg. 119.

On both sides, the result was a hardening of attitudes. President Mendes-France's declaration that Algeria was "irrevocably French" was a defacto ultimatum that led the FLN to assume a 'victory or death' attitude towards the war.<sup>39</sup> Instantly, a negotiated settlement was off the table. Metropolitan actions became an existential threat; the FLN had no choice but to fight to the death. The French reaction was widespread and collective, with swaths of Algerian society declared enemies. This transformed a rather successful police action into a heavy handed military operation and by September 1955, the native deputies of the National Assembly in Tangiers declared the majority of Algerians supported the goal of independence. The French responded heavily. Government figures indicated that 1273 insurgents died, while the FLN reported at least 12000 Muslims were killed across Algeria.<sup>40</sup> Mixed communities that had been at peace became polarized and violent, and the "*drole de rebellion*" was over. The Algerian response was to volunteer in the FLN. In Wilaya two, the strongest of the cells, the number of fighters rose from a few hundred to over a thousand.<sup>41</sup>

Politically, the democratization of the war was a turning point also. Jacques Soustelle, Governor General, had pushed a liberalizing platform intending to increase Algerian representation both domestically in Algiers, and in the National Assembly in Paris. The events of the summer and fall killed the plan, with Soustelle becoming much more hardline. In Algiers, in the Algerian Assembly, local representatives issued a "Declaration of the Sixty-One" which predictably conducted the French policy of collective punishment, but also integration of the pied noir and native Muslim Algerians, claiming that "the overwhelming majority of the population now supports the Algerian national idea."<sup>42</sup> The small group of Muslim Algerians who would

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<sup>39</sup> Horne, *Savage War*. Pg. 98.

<sup>40</sup> Stone, Martin. *The Agony of Algeria*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Pg. 122.

<sup>41</sup> Evans, Martin. *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pg. 141.

<sup>42</sup> Connelly, Matthew. *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pg. 87



have benefited from reform from above, and tentatively backed the French plans, now moved quickly to the revolutionary camp to avoid being targeted by the FLN.

### **7.3. Vietnam and the Wrong Way War**

“One cannot waken the dead.”

Ho Chi Minh, President, North Vietnam

The French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, immediately triggering negotiations for the withdrawal of its colonial administration from Indochina. The creation of two countries, a western backed South Vietnam and a communist North Vietnam was never accepted in principle by Ho Chi Minh and the politburo in Hanoi. The United States, having supported French efforts to retain Indochina as a colony immediately became the protector of South Vietnam, a role for which it had been preparing since the end of World War Two. The groundwork for U.S. involvement anywhere in the world had been laid as far back as the Truman administration. In his 1949 inaugural address, the United States, Truman would say, would “strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression” with “military advice and equipment.”<sup>43</sup> Eisenhower would echo the new national policy of delivering and defending freedom “conceiving the defense of freedom, like freedom itself, to be one and indivisible.”<sup>44</sup> Kennedy went further: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.”<sup>45</sup> Lyndon Johnson, finally in January 1965, cast down the gauntlet, determining that the mantle of world leadership the U.S. had held since 1945 called for exceptional American sacrifice: “Terrific dangers and troubles we once called foreign now constantly live among us. If American lives must end, and American treasure be spilled, in

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<sup>43</sup>Truman, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949. Found online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13282>

<sup>44</sup> Eisenhower, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1953. Found online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9600>

<sup>45</sup> Kennedy Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961. Found online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8032&>

countries that we barely know, then that is the price that change has demanded of conviction and of our enduring covenant.”<sup>46</sup>

It was in this environment that the National Security Council concluded in 1950 that Indochina was “a key area of South East Asia and is under immediate threat.”<sup>47</sup> If Indochina



**Figure 15. Vietnam, is a long country with a vast coastline, deep jungles in the south, deciduous forest in the central highlands and mountains in the north which get very cold in the winter.**

were go fall to the communist, Burma and Thailand would follow and “the balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave danger.”<sup>48</sup> This was the domino theory. The struggle in Vietnam was immediately and irrevocably cast as a contest between democracy and the West and communism.

Like great power involvement in irregular wars, the U.S. started lightly, with only ten million dollars allocated to support the French. The U.S. would organize the Military Advisory and Assistance Group-Vietnam (MAAGV) in 1952 in order to have a formal conduit for its activities.<sup>49</sup> The MAAGV was tasked to design, organize and train a Vietnamese Army (ARVN) of seven infantry divisions, organized in three Corps of about 150,000 men with the primary mission of repelling a foreign, external invasion- an attack by North Vietnam.<sup>50</sup> There was

disagreement between the Joint Chiefs and the CIA, with the

<sup>46</sup> Johnson, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1965. Found online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26985>

<sup>47</sup> Kimball, Jeffrey P. *To Reason Why: The Debate About the Causes of U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990. Pg. 73.

<sup>48</sup> Kimball, Jeffrey P. *To Reason Why: The Debate About the Causes of U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990. Pg. 73.

<sup>49</sup> Collins, Jr. James Lawton. *Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991. Pg. 1.

<sup>50</sup> Spector, Ronald H. *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1983. Pg. 263.

latter wanting a force trained for counter-insurgency.<sup>51</sup> The Joint Chiefs directed the MAAGV to concentrate on developing a military structure that could fight a conventional war, based on its experiences in Korea. By the end of 1963, the strength of MACV had grown to sixteen thousand, but with only 1500 actual advisors in the field with Vietnamese units.<sup>52</sup> With little political backing for reform, and most importantly, little money, the Vietnamese military languished. Advisors reported that the poor performance of the ARVN against the guerrillas was mainly due to lack of training, with one observer remarking that "few of the regulars or territorials knew how to adjust the sights of their rifles and carbines well enough to hit a target, let alone a guerrilla."<sup>53</sup>

The military situation deteriorated in step with the political situation. General Westmorland, the new commander of MACV<sup>54</sup> wanted to shift from a defensive/advisory strategy to one win which Americans would patrol and engage the enemy the countryside and destroy them. Westmoreland requested 179k troops, a level that would allow him to begin offensive operations. The steady increase of U.S. aid and the bombing campaign had failed to halt, or even slow, the NLF attacks against the GVN and ARVN targets. Another coup in February 1965 dissolved the weak civilian government and installed Air Force General Nguyen Cao Ky and Army General Nguyen Van Thieu in power. Johnson's advisors saw little in the new government in Saigon that could change momentum and urged the President to expand the air and ground mission. The request for 179k troops was approved.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. (1986) *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 20.

<sup>52</sup> Sheehan, Neil. *Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*, New York: Random House, 1988. Pg.28.

<sup>53</sup> Sheehan, Neil. *Bright and Shining Lie*. Pg.55.

<sup>54</sup> The name was changed when the organization's mission changed.

<sup>55</sup> Herring, George. (1979) *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, New York: John Wiley, 1979. Pp. 137-140

The first combat troops landed at Da Nang in July, with Westmoreland assured that more were available. In February 1966, the President signed another increase in troop levels, bringing the total to 429,000 by the end of the year.<sup>56</sup> The U.S. strategy in Vietnam was not to win through the outright defeat of the North, but rather to keep the South from falling. U.S. fears of drawing in the Russians, or as in 1950, the Chinese, constrained much of what the military could do. Fear of starting a superpower conflict in Asia or WWII in Europe, kept U.S. troops south of the Viet border along the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel, a move never matched by North Vietnam. Almost immediately, large operations were planned to push the Viet Cong away from cities. In late May, 1965, the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted multiple battalion level operations near Bien Hoa, using the new Huey helicopters to move suddenly into areas, setting up blocking positions meant to trap the enemy.<sup>57</sup> In November, in Operation Silver Bayonet, the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry division sent some 1000 men into the Ia Drang valley, springing two ambushes what would become famous as the book and movie *We Were Soldiers Once*. U.S. fatalities increased, as did the enemy body counts.<sup>58</sup> Operation Bushmaster, meant to clear the Michelin Rubber Plantation in Binh Duong Province, was another brigade size search and destroy mission.<sup>59</sup> The operations become more complex, usually spearheaded by a U.S. Army brigade, supported by allied troops. One of the largest operations in 1965 was Operation Harvest Moon, with elements of 2/7 Marines, 3/3 Marines, 2/9 Marines and four battalions of ARVN, some 5000 men, operating near Chu Lai, along the coast in Quang Tin Province.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Cited Berman, Larry. "The US in Vietnam," in Ariel Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman (eds), *Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. Pp. 42-43.

<sup>57</sup> Bradley, James. R. *173rd Airborne Brigade: Sky Soldier*, 3d Ed. Nashville, TN: Turner Publishing, 1992. Pg. 17.

<sup>58</sup> Cash, John (1985). *Seven Firefights in Vietnam*. Washington, D.C: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1985. Pp. 3-40.

<sup>59</sup> [Vietnam Archive Operations Database](#)". The Vietnam Center and Archive.

<sup>60</sup> Johnson, Charles. *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965*. Washington D.C: Marine History and Museums Division, 1978. Pp. 17-18.

By early 1966, MACV had graduated to division level operations, with two brigades of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division and an attached Australian battalion sent to clear the area around Cu Chi.<sup>61</sup> Cu Chi, northwest of Saigon, was a major Viet Cong staging area, riddled with a massive tunnel system. Cu Chi played an important role in the Tet offensive a few years later. Only partially cleared, U.S. forces would never fully control the area and it would remain a communist stronghold until the end of the war. One of the largest single operations of the war would be Operation Junction City near the Cambodian border, and designed to destroy the command post network (which included Cu Chi) of the Central Committee that directed all military and political activity in South Vietnam (COSVN).<sup>62</sup> Under the tactical direction of a U.S. Corps headquarters, in all, some 30,000 U.S. troops would be involved, including most of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions, an airborne brigade, and significant armored units of the 11<sup>th</sup> Cav. The operation would last three months. COSVN was not destroyed, simply retreating into Cambodia, leaving behind about 3,000 American casualties.<sup>63</sup>

The ground war, growing steadily larger, was dwarfed by the massive air war. By 1967, the United States had dropped more bombs in Vietnam than it had in all theatres in the Second World War: the 25,000 tons of bombs dropped on the North in 1965 had risen to 226,000 tons in 1967.<sup>64</sup> Loss of aircraft was driving up the cost of the war: In the first three years of the war, some 900 U.S. and allied aircraft valued at \$6 billion had been destroyed.<sup>65</sup>

By late 1967, Secretary of Defense McNamara was facing the reality that the war was not progressing favorably. "He recited comparative figures; so many tons dropped on Germany

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<sup>61</sup> Bradley, James. R. *The 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam: "The Big Red One", 1965-1970*: Nashville, TN: Turner Publishing, 1997. Pg. 30.

<sup>62</sup> Truong Nhu Tang. *A Vietcong Memoir — An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985. Pg. 169.

<sup>63</sup> Willbanks, James H. *Vietnam War: The Essential Reference Guide*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013.

<sup>64</sup> Littauer, Raphael and Norman Uphoff, eds. *The Air War in Indochina*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. Pp. 39-40.

<sup>65</sup> George Herring, George. *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, New York: John Wiley, 1979. Pp. 149-211.

and Japan and North Korea, so many more on Vietnam... [McNamara said] "It's not just that it isn't preventing the supplies from getting down the trail. It's destroying the countryside in the South. It's making lasting enemies. And still the damned Air Force wants more."<sup>66</sup> McNamara would begin developing recommendations to end the bombing and begin to bring down troop levels

The attrition strategy could not succeed unless the battlefield could be sealed, as in the case of Malaysia or Algeria. If the United States were to pursue such a strategy it would find itself occupying three countries: Cambodia, Laos and eventually, North Vietnam. The short border (forty miles) at the waist of Vietnam was heavily patrolled and defended, and the North simply flanked the DMZ by moving personnel and supplies through Laos and Cambodia. In the case of Laos, this was in violation of neutrality agreements signed in Geneva in 1962. Having committed itself to preserving safe spaces in neighboring countries, the NLF and NVA units could escape into their sanctuaries, regrouping and rearming for their next attack. Their chief aspect of the American strategy of 'search and destroy' that became a fatal weakness was that U.S. forces believed that simply destroying NVA and NLF was enough; areas attacked and cleared were abandoned as U.S. units returned to their bases. The North adopted a tactics of avoiding pitched fights, instead inflicting a few casualties and then retreating. The ARVN were too weak to assume defensive tasks after the communists were driven out.<sup>67</sup> In hindsight, there were not enough troops to both destroy the enemy and preserve the battlespace: Johnson's advisors were perhaps correct. More troops have ended the North's infiltration. The generals in MACV were left with no option but to 'see' that more U.S. troops were required. Westmoreland

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<sup>66</sup> Cited in Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts. *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1979. Pp. 169-170.

<sup>67</sup> Summers, Harry G. *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982; Hannah, Norman B. *The Key To Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War*. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1987.

would request another 200k at the end of 1967.<sup>68</sup> The situation Nixon inherited had not changed much despite Johnson's withdrawal from the presidential race and the bombing halt. The South Vietnam build-up, soon to be called 'Vietnamization' was proceeding, but negotiating with North Vietnam remained deadlocked in Paris. In June 1969, keeping a major campaign promise, Nixon began the long withdrawal from Vietnam by announcing that 25000 American troops would depart over the next two months. Nixon indicated that as the South Vietnam forces developed their own capabilities, more Americans would be withdrawn- 100k in 1969 and 100 to 150k in 1970. While the realization that America must turn the war over to South Vietnam had occurred early in 1968, in a televised address, Nixon would blame previous administrations for 'Americanizing' the war. He would complete the handover to South Vietnam and withdrawal all U.S. forces.<sup>69</sup>

In Vietnam, the Indochina Communist Party had been working since before World War Two, intent on overthrowing the French colonial system. As the legitimacy of the authorities withered away, the Vietminh were able to mobilize the northern provinces particularly against French rule. The mountainous Viet Bac provided sanctuary from largely immobile French forces. Following the imposition of French rule in late 1946, Vietminh communist forces engaged in political cleansing, the killing of prominent people in villages and districts who stood to lose from a communist takeover.<sup>70</sup> This was a tactic the communists would employ again, notably at Hue in 1968.<sup>71</sup>

North Vietnam and COSVN planned the Tet offensive as the trigger for a general uprising. In the run up to Tet, plans were drawn up for the systematic destruction of the South Vietnam government infrastructure in Hue. The planning documents captured after the

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<sup>68</sup> *The Pentagon Papers*, Vol. IV, pgs 427-428. Found online at <https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers>

<sup>69</sup> Guenter Lewy. *American in Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pg. 166.

<sup>70</sup> Tonnesson. Stein. "The Longest Wars," *Journal of Peace Research*, 22:1(1985):9-29.

<sup>71</sup> "Communist Political Executions at Hue in the 1968 Tet Offensive," (1968) CIA Report.



offensive suggests that destroying “the enemy” was a primary concern, not holding and consolidating control.<sup>72</sup> The South Vietnamese infrastructure was targeted as early as December 1967 where “local security elements were to coordinate with military units and youths to assassinate key [GVN] leaders and to suppress main [GVN] offices and oppressive agencies.”<sup>73</sup> List of persons to be suppressed, neutralized or outright killed were prepared in advance. After Hue had been captured, and for several weeks afterwards while U.S. forces fought to recapture the city, the National Liberation Front (NLF) urged sympathizers to “track down and punish reactionaries, traitors, feudalists, spies and puppet authorities.”<sup>74</sup>

While assassination and hit squads were active across Vietnam during Tet, Hue stands out with as many as three-thousand killed in and around the city. Hue was quickly captured by as many as eight Viet Cong and regular NVA battalions, with help from earlier infiltrators and collaborators.<sup>75</sup> The extra-judicial work of deconstructing the southern government infrastructure was happening in earnest. Captured documents boasted of killing “more than 3,000 RVN personnel, including the Deputy Thua Thien Province chief... The entire puppet administrative system from hamlet to province was destroyed or disintegrated.”<sup>76</sup> The citadel, a massive brick structure became an almost impregnable defensive position. While most of the city was liberated within a week, it would not be until February 25<sup>th</sup> that the last enemies were cleared. In just the little amount of time between 31 January and when significant U.S. and ARVN forces arrived, the communist soldiers were able to control the city and eliminate hundreds, perhaps as many as 1800 civilians, as well as captured ARVN soldiers. That the targeting of civilians was planned can be found in captured enemy notes that listed the “puppet

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<sup>72</sup> Oberdorfer, Dan. *Tet!* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Pg. 206.

<sup>73</sup> Stephen Hosmer, Stephen. *Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future*. Santa Monica CA RAND, 1970. Pg. 69

<sup>74</sup> Communist Political Executions at Hue in the 1968 Tet Offensive,” (1968) CIA Report.

<sup>75</sup> Hosmer, *Viet Cong Repression*. Pg. 70

<sup>76</sup> Nha Ca. *Mourning Headband for Hue: An Account of the Battle for Hue, Vietnam, 1968*, Olga Dror, trans. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2014.

regime" as a primary target of the Hue campaign.<sup>77</sup> The cooperation of local people was necessary for the efficient execution of the South Vietnamese citizens. One account describes an officer of the National Police Field Forces assisting the Viet Cong in tracking down GVN officials during the occupation. Internal communist reports that three thousand people were killed in Hue. One regiment claimed that with the help of sympathizers, it had "killed 1,000 local administrative personnel, spies and cruel tyrants."<sup>78</sup> Another document, containing a report which the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region had sent to North Vietnam, said that there were 2,867 persons killed in Hue City.<sup>79</sup>

After Tet, as U.S. forces moved back into the area, mass graves were discovered around Hue. [In 1970] Viet Cong defectors in the Chui Hoi program led an American patrol thorough the jungles some 10 miles from Hue. In a running stream in a ravine were the skeletons of some 400 people taken prisoner by northern forces. Many had been shot, but a high number had skulls that had been fractured by heavy objects. Four hundred twenty-eight names were released. About 100 were ARVN military personnel; the rest were students and civil servants.<sup>80</sup>

Nineteen mass graves were found in the Hue area by Allied troops, with a report stating that "Evidence indicated that many victims had been beaten to death, shot, beheaded or buried alive and "many bodies were found bound together in groups of 10 or 15, eyes open, with dirt or cloth stuffed in their mouths."<sup>81</sup> Some were shot, but many, as high as half, were in a condition that indicated they had been buried alive. One skeleton had every major bone broken. Non-Vietnamese were killed, too, including several French priests and four German faculty members

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<sup>77</sup> Hosmer, Viet Cong Repression. Pg. 70.

<sup>78</sup> Hosmer, Viet Cong Repression. Pg. 73.

<sup>79</sup> Hosmer, Viet Cong Repression. Pg. 73.

<sup>80</sup> Pike, Douglas. Viet Cong Strategy of Terror. Saigon, VN: No Publisher, 1970. From the Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, found online at <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?1meu1zG0gVdUdIX2yMCo.OANpA3vKrRx@3IJEX75DeoX08pW9HapVud3Cvj.WMBP@yBXVxIExuOI6FgPuqF@IX0kW5MIFv@14EiL7IP3cc/2121506008a.pdf>

<sup>81</sup> Communist Political Executions at Hue in the 1968 Tet Offensive," (1968) CIA Report.

of the Hue University medical school.<sup>82</sup> Several had also been beheaded. By late 1969, the “number of bodies of South Vietnamese men, women and children unearthed around Hue” had risen to some 2,300. This is a heavy number for a city with a population of a little more than 150,000.<sup>83</sup>

Reciprocity revolves around the people in which the conflict resides, with both sides targeting civilians. This comes as one side attempts to prop up the state while the other attempts to remove the state infrastructure that connects the people to the government. Social development and infrastructure projects attempt to separate the people who are willing to engage in political violence from the issues seen as creating the relative deprivation. A significant problem was that areas targeted for development programs were often the likeliest areas of NLF activity. Subsequently, those same areas were attacked, defeating the hard work of developing civilian infrastructure.<sup>84</sup> The credibility of the Saigon government was very low. Villagers did not believe a change at their level was reflected by a change at the national level. A national election was held, with most South Vietnamese pressured to vote. As a person voted, his or her identity card received a hole punch- this ostensibly allowed each precinct to be on guard against voting fraud, but ultimately allowed each side to earmark who supported which side since the NLF had called for a boycott of the election.<sup>85</sup> The election satisfied the Americans, but also revealed the weakness of public support for the government in Saigon, with most South Viets convinced the election results were orchestrated by the Americans.<sup>86</sup>

In the cleansing of Hue, it is probable that regular NVA units were involved, simply to achieve the scale of the killings. The Viet Cong security service had a much more circumspect record in its targeting of officials. After Tet, some elements of COSVN believed the execution of

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<sup>82</sup> Hosmer, *Viet Cong Repression* Pg. 75

<sup>83</sup> Hosmer, *Viet Cong Repression* Pg. 76

<sup>84</sup> Herring, *Longest War*. Pp. 158-159.

<sup>85</sup> Karnow, Stanley. *Vietnam: A History*, New York: Viking, 1983. Pg. 451.

<sup>86</sup> Karnow, *Vietnam*. Pg. 451-452.

South Vietnamese soldiers was inconsistent with its policies.<sup>87</sup> The heavy fighting and the quick response by Allied forces point to the trouble NVA units had in holding Hue and accounting prisoners with one cadre writing that “it was very difficult for them to handle POWs, so they executed [a] policy of 'catch and kill'”.<sup>88</sup>

Tet, more than any other event, can be considered the starting point of, specifically, American doubt about Vietnam and the ability of the government to change the situation. The American people were confronted with the sickening realization that their political leaders could lie, and probably did lie about why and how the war began. By March, 1968, there was a sharp uptick in the numbers of Americans who believed the country had been wrong to get involved in Vietnam. Johnson’s approval rating hit a new low of 26%. Polling data showed that while Americans had not decided if escalation or withdrawal was needed, they no longer believed the President had the ability or wherewithal to change the situation.<sup>89</sup> The 1968 election campaign was underway. The Tet drama served to increase the chances of Senator Eugene McCarthy. In March, he had a strong showing in the New Hampshire primary, losing to Johnson, a sitting president, by only 7%! McCarthy was running on an anti-war platform and Johnson was confronted with the sudden vision that the war was more unpopular than he had been aware.<sup>90</sup>

Tet, the disintegration of his support by the hawks in Congress, and the increasing radicalization of the doves combined with the leaked request for another 206k troops, which would have required the mobilization of the Reserves, put Lyndon Johnson in a terrible position. He could fulfill Westmoreland’s requests or continue to muddle through. Johnson realized that it would be impossible to grant Westmoreland’s request for the Reserves in the face of increasing congressional opposition. On March 22, Johnson rejected Westmoreland’s request based on

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<sup>87</sup> Hosmer, Viet Cong Repression Pg. 77

<sup>88</sup> Stephen Hosmer, Stephen. Viet Cong Repression Pg. 77

<sup>89</sup> Herring, Longest War. Pp. 199.

<sup>90</sup> Berman, Larry. “The US in Vietnam,” in Ariel Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman (eds), Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. Pg. 48

positive developments in Vietnam. President Thieu, under pressure from MACV, announced that the ARVN conscript army would increase by 135k men.

Ending the war became the central debate of the 1968 election and the final Johnson policy of Vietnamization, along with the appointment of Creighton Abrams as the top commander in Vietnam. Finding an 'honorable' end to the war would be Nixon's mantra during the next four years of negotiations. Following Tet, the Saigon government would authorize massive increases in conscription and MACV would increasingly turn to the technology of counter-insurgency as it slowly turned over the war to the ARVN.

#### **7.4. The Soviets into Afghanistan**

“A dead body revenges not injuries.”

William Blake, *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan began long before the 1979 invasion. In 1929, a Soviet friendly King Amanullah fled before a peasant revolt and asked for help in the form of Russian arms and Soviet advisors.<sup>91</sup> Amanullah ended up abdicating and fleeing to India, and his clansman, Nadir Shah regained the throne in October 1929, with British help.<sup>92</sup> Through the 1970s, the Soviet Union attempted to blunt the influence of a U.S. friendly Iran on Afghanistan. Aid from Moscow steadily increased until 1974, when it reached \$150 million.<sup>93</sup> In 1975, the Soviets gave \$425 million as part of ostensibly neutral Prime Minister Daoud's Seven Year Plan.<sup>94</sup> Daoud was unpopular domestically with heavy handed centralization of power through Soviet supplied military, unsettling the tribes. He was able to suppress the Islamist Muslim league but had alienated a broad swath of the population, including Army officers, middle class urban areas, and the poor who felt the food shortages and high taxes the most.<sup>95</sup> In 1978, as the Amin regime consolidated its power, the repression against early opponents of the Amin regime may have caused the deaths of between 50,000 and 100,000 people.<sup>96</sup> Parcham, the

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<sup>91</sup> Hammond, Thomas. *The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequence*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. Pp. 12-18.

<sup>92</sup> Poullada, Leon B. *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973. Pp. 194-195.

<sup>93</sup> Collins, Joseph, J. *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986. Pg. 36.

<sup>94</sup> Collins, *Soviet Invasion*. Pg. 71.

<sup>95</sup> Griffiths, John. *Afghanistan: Key to a Continent*: Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1981. Pp. 180-182.

<sup>96</sup> Olivier, Roy. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pg. 95

communist party in Afghanistan, orchestrated a coup against Daoud on 27 April, 1978, killing him and twenty of his relatives.<sup>97</sup>



Figure 16. Afghanistan is a land locked country, arid except for the north and eastern mountains, some of which reach twenty-thousand feet.

The new communist government, led by Hafizullah Amin, in Kabul, immediately signed new friendship treaties with Moscow, asking for additional military support to reinforce the already 3000 advisors in the country.<sup>98</sup> Many of the socialist reforms riled the adamant traditionalists in Afghan society. The official atheism of Parcham party was the underlying cause of the deep unease. An attempt to introduce education for women sparked a mob in Herat in March 1979, and by the time it was over, 5000 people had been killed, along with a hundred Soviet advisors and their families.<sup>99</sup> The Soviets increased their advisors to some 4500 and Soviet helicopter gunships began flying patrols over insurgent held territory. As Moscow considered military intervention, several high ranking officers conducted fact finding

<sup>97</sup> Hyman, Anthony. *Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-1981*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 76-77

<sup>98</sup> Hammond, Thomas. *Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Pg. 54.

<sup>99</sup> Hammond, Thomas. *Red Flag*. Pp. 69-72.

missions, similar to the McNamara-Taylor mission to Vietnam. Lieutenant General Gorelov, the senior officer in Afghanistan, recommended ending Soviet military deployments, but was countered by the senior KGB agent in the country. General Ivan Pavlovskii, equivalent to an Army Chief of Staff, went to Afghanistan. He had also travelled to Czechoslovakia before the Soviet invasion there in 1969 before commanding the eastern bloc troops in the invasion. He also advised against a military intervention. He was overruled and men and material began to mobilize in Central Asia.<sup>100</sup>

In early July 1979, a battalion of Soviet airborne troops had deployed to Kabul's Bagram Airport, and in late December, they seized control of the base, allowing for much heavier reinforcements to be flown in. In just a few days, some 5000 troops had landed at Bagram and heavy infantry and mechanized forces began crossing the Afghan border with no resistance. On 27 December, Amin was killed.<sup>101</sup> By the end of January, more than 50,000 troops were in Afghanistan, and by March, the number had risen to 85,000. By 1984, troop levels peaked at 115,000.<sup>102</sup> The Afghan army simply melted away as Soviet troops took over security functions and was down to 30,000 by 1981. Whole units deserted and were the best source for weapons for the insurgency.<sup>103</sup>

As forces flowed into the country, the Red Army was very conservative, eschewing mass and speed in an attempt to pacify the country by quickly and stealthily. This proved disastrous as it allowed the nascent mujahedeen time to observe the build-up, marking out weaknesses in the Soviet defenses, and using the time to organize and arm themselves.<sup>104</sup> After the first year, the Soviets initiated large sweeps through the countryside with the intent of clearing civilians. If

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<sup>100</sup> Galeotti, Mark. *Afghanistan: The Soviet Union's Last War*, London: Frank Cass, 1995. Pg. 9.

<sup>101</sup> Bradsher, Henry, S. *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham, NC: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1983. Pp. 179-181.

<sup>102</sup> Arnold, Anthony. *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. Pg. 98.

<sup>103</sup> Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*. Pg. 206.

<sup>104</sup> Joes, Anthony. *Guerrilla Warfare*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996, p. 122.



civilians were forced away from their homes, and into new migratory patterns, Mao's 'sea of fish' would be dried up, and the guerrillas would not be able to survive. The resulting refugee exodus into Pakistan and Iran would see almost a fifth of the 1979 population of Afghanistan living in camps.<sup>105</sup>

The forces in Afghanistan were supported by 50,000 troops in the southern Soviet Union republics of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Inside Afghanistan, about a third of the total were in the Kabul area and the mountain passes in the Hindu Kush, with other concentrations in Mazar-i-Sharif and Konduz in the north, Herat and Farah, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Major airbases were improved in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Shindand.<sup>106</sup> The strategy was to control the lines of communication between the major urban areas, carrying out raids against the insurgent strongholds in the mountains. The Soviets planned to use air power to carry out a war of attrition, killing as many rebels as they could until the cost of carrying on the insurgency was too painful for the population to support. The Soviets improved on the free fire zone approach of the early American strategy in Vietnam. They used a scorched earth approach, forcing vast numbers of the rural population to move to new areas in an effort to reduce the 'sea of fish' the insurgents swam in. Vast camps of refugees sprang up in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.

Anything left in the newly depopulated areas was considered a target and engaged with high altitude carpet bombing and roving attack helicopters.<sup>107</sup> The Soviets also used vast numbers of antipersonnel mines, including mines in books and dolls, which detonated when picked up by children.<sup>108</sup> The Soviets were suffering casualties and material losses and by 1984, some 30,000 soldiers were killed or wounded.<sup>109</sup> In attempting to defeat the growing guerrilla threat,

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<sup>105</sup> Hammond, Thomas. *Red Flag Over Afghanistan*.

<sup>106</sup> Collins, *The Soviet Invasion*. Pg. 144.

<sup>107</sup> Collins, *The Soviet Invasion*. Pg. 145.

<sup>108</sup> Collins, *The Soviet Invasion*. Pg. 147.

<sup>109</sup> Arnold, Anthony. *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. Pg. 100.

the Soviet military conducted repeated offensives into resistance held territory. There was little finesse to these operations, with heavy bombing and artillery preparations proceeding movement by heavily armored units. Armored task forces targeted suspected resistance pockets, destroying villages and crops with heavy weapons.

The Soviet Union attempted to implement large scale rural development programs designed to link the Afghan economy to the Soviet one. The Afghan economy was in ruins and by 1984, crop production was down to pre-1978 levels, threatening wide spread famine. The Soviets, already importing grain from the West, began importing grain into Afghanistan, rationing food in the cities.<sup>110</sup> The Soviets were repairing industrial facilities and training over 60,000 Afghan workers, with more than 9000 Afghans in Soviet universities.<sup>111</sup> Russian language programs were widely introduced into the Afghanistan primary school system, and over 20000 young children of the new Afghan communist elite were sent to be raised in Russia. The hope was they would return with particularly close ties to Moscow.<sup>112</sup>

Overall, Soviet military strategy remained stable until late 1984: control the cities, launch offensive sweeps through rural areas, and control the lines of communication between cities. The politburo in Moscow was happy to keep the war limited. When the short lived Konstantin Chernenko became the Soviet Secretary General, resources were marshalled to end the war. One of the largest offensives came in 1984 with 15000 Soviet troops alongside 5000 Afghan troops, supported by heavy bombing.<sup>113</sup> The ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 signaled the beginning of the end of many things, starting with the strategy in Afghanistan. He appointed a younger commander to Afghanistan who turned to Spetznaz (Special Forces) teamed with helicopter gunships to hunt and keep pressure on rebels. The Soviets developed a

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<sup>110</sup> Arnold, Anthony. *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion*. Pp. 109-110.

<sup>111</sup> Collins, Joseph, J. *The Soviet Invasion*. Pg. 141.

<sup>112</sup> Collins, Joseph, J. *The Soviet Invasion*. Pg. 146.

<sup>113</sup> Olivier, Roy. *Islam and resistance in Afghanistan*; Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pg. 192.

fast attack armored formation called the *bronegruppa*, which attacked from the rear and sides after rebels had been fixed by dismounted soldiers.<sup>114</sup>

For the United States, supporting resistance movements increased the scope and depth of its non-kinetic strategy in Afghanistan. Intent on avoiding the mistakes in Vietnam, the United States reacted to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan quite differently. Needing badly to limit the erosion of U.S. influence in the world, and slow the expanding national power of the Soviet Union, the U.S. cast about for a different way to blunt what appeared to be continued expansion of Soviet power and influence. Accordingly, early in 1979, the US began small covert operations to support Afghan rebels fighting the communist government in Kabul.<sup>115</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, the United States' National Security Advisor, informed the President Carter that 'this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention'. Years later, he would tell a French reporter: "We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would. The secret operation ... had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap."<sup>116</sup> CIA director William Casey was blunter, wanting, Afghanistan to become "their Vietnam."<sup>117</sup> A broad plan was quickly approved that ordered the CIA to provide military supplies and humanitarian aid to the mujahedeen.<sup>118</sup> By 1987, total US aid to the mujahidin was \$700 million a year and the total through the 1980s would come to over 3 billion dollars.<sup>119</sup> In Afghanistan, the US emphasized the use of proxies and allies, channeling the material through Pakistan. The CIA was able to convince Egypt and China to provide excess Warsaw Pact

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<sup>114</sup> Nawroz Mohammad Yahya and Lester W. Grau, "The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War? U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Institute, 1995.

<sup>115</sup> Steve Galster, introductory essay, *Afghanistan: The Making of US Policy, 1973-1990*, National Security Archive, found online at <http://proquest.libguides.com/dnsa/afghanistan>

<sup>116</sup> Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Interview, *La Nouvel Observateur* (France), January 15-21, 1998. Found online at [http://dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/brzezinski\\_interview](http://dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/brzezinski_interview)

<sup>117</sup> Kux, Dennis. *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 2001. Pg. 261

<sup>118</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*. Pg. 252.

<sup>119</sup> Galster, introductory essay, *Afghanistan*.

weaponry in order to maintain the secrecy and misdirection crucial to covert operations.<sup>120</sup>

Charles Cogan, Pakistan desk officer at the CIA, wrote that “we took the means to wage war, put them in the hands of people who could do so, for purposes which we agreed.”<sup>121</sup> As the war progressed, the CIA assisted in planning mujahedeen missions and instruction in demolitions proved vital in the urban guerilla tactics.<sup>122</sup> Tactically, the Red Army was innovating on the battlefield, but what were needed were additional resources in men and equipment. As Stinger missiles blunted the Soviet advantage in helicopter gunships, Moscow entered a spiral of increasing casualties and requests for more troops.

In 1986, the United States funneled ‘Stinger’ shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles through Pakistan to the mujahedeen. Previously unchallenged, Soviet airpower had proved crucial to allowing Soviet ground forces to move around the rugged countryside.<sup>123</sup> As losses mounted, aircraft were forced to fly higher than the maximum altitude of the Stingers, limiting their effectiveness at providing ground support. In some areas, the slow, low flying helicopter gunships were practically grounded. By 1987, the mujahedeen had regained the initiative, particularly in the mountainous east and north.<sup>124</sup>

The Stinger missiles increased the cost of the war, both to aircraft and crews, and through the subsequent loss of exposed ground forces, but the fact remains that by 1987, Moscow had decided to end the war.<sup>125</sup> However, the Stingers did play a significant role in the tactical war. Richard Litwak laid the failure of Zaitsev’s mobile strategy to the Stingers: “The arrival of these new American weapons marked a turning point in the war. With air losses

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<sup>120</sup> Kux, Dennis. *The United States and Pakistan*, Pg. 252.

<sup>121</sup> Cogan, Charles G. “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979,” *World Policy Journal* 10:2(1993):73 - 82.

<sup>122</sup> Coll, Steve. ‘Anatomy of a Victory: CIA’S Covert Afghan War,’ *The Washington Post*, July 19, 1992.

<sup>123</sup> Kuperman, Alan J. “Soviet aircraft were retrofitted with flares, beacons, and exhaust baffles to disorient the missiles” *Political Science Quarterly* 114:2(1999):219-263.

<sup>124</sup> Roy, Anthony James. *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical and Bibliosourcebook*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991, Pg. 23.

<sup>125</sup> Kuperman, Alan J. “Soviet aircraft were retrofitted with flares, beacons, and exhaust baffles to disorient the missiles” *Political Science Quarterly* 114:2(1999):219-263.

estimated at one aircraft per day, the Soviet military command was forced to change tactics. They were no longer able to use helicopter gunships and tactical aircraft in close ground support roles... Zaitzev's activist strategy based on mobility ground to a halt as Soviet military operations reverted back to their prior form."<sup>126</sup> Lester Grau seconded that opinion: "Without the helicopter gunship the Soviets may have withdrawn years earlier... The guerrillas adapted. They fought at night when the helicopter was least effective... The masterful employment of the Stinger by the Afghan freedom fighters heavily tilted the balance in favor of the Mujahedeen. Even the extensive use of Soviet airpower that was stationed across the northern border could not change the situation."<sup>127</sup> There was high public support for the Afghanistan program in the U.S. Congress, spearheaded by the Texas Congressman Charles Wilson, who summed up the mood when he stated "there was 58,000 dead in Vietnam, and we owe the Russians one."<sup>128</sup>

As Soviet dominance in the air was challenged, plans were made to reduce the number of Red Army troops in the country. By late 1986, the Soviets were suffering substantial losses of aircraft and mujahedeen control over territory increased.<sup>129</sup> Gorbachev, like Johnson in Vietnam had three options: He could increase troop levels dramatically and strike rebel sanctuaries in Pakistan, he could rely on the distribution of power and continue the domination of Afghanistan by maintaining the current policies, or he could withdrawal Soviet troops.

By 1988, the Soviets committed to withdrawal their forces from Afghanistan as part of an agreement with the United States. If the U.S. was willing to stop supplying the Mujahadeen, the Soviet leader Gorbachev would also reduce supplies to the Afghan regime. Finally, on 17

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<sup>126</sup> Litwak, Robert S. "The Soviet Union in Afghanistan," in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman. Eds. *Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1992, Pg. 84.

<sup>127</sup> Nawroz Mohammad Yahya and Lester W. Grau, "The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War? U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Institute, 1995.

<sup>128</sup> Daily Telegraph (14 Jan 1985). Cited in Galeotti, Afghanistan, pg. 18.

<sup>129</sup> Litwak, Robert S. "The Soviet Union in Afghanistan," in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman. Eds. *Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1992, Pg. 84.

March, 1988, the Soviets announced that they would withdraw, even if no agreement with the United States was reached.<sup>130</sup> A Joint statement by Gorbachev and Najibullah announced that: “the last obstacles to concluding the agreements have now been removed thanks to the constructive cooperation of all who are involved in the settlement, and favored their immediate signing.”<sup>131</sup>

Soviet preemption in Afghanistan took on a different character than the targeting killings in Algeria or Vietnam. In Afghanistan, conventional weapons, particularly airpower was used to forcibly remove the Afghani population and leave the mujahedeen in a desert of people. Close to one million people would be permanently disabled by landmines and disease as basic healthcare and sanitation was destroyed. By 1989, estimates of over one million killed were being reported, with over five million refugees; from the countryside, they swarmed the cities and moved into Iran and Pakistan.<sup>132</sup>

A key aspect of the Afghan case study, similar to that of Algeria, was the politicized differences based on identity. This made reprisal killings particularly simple and explains the scale of some of the massacres. The Afghan mujahedeen had the advantage in the distribution of knowledge that emphasized their ability to melt into the mountains and population. Their elusiveness drove the Soviets to enact more direct methods of preemption against the population. On one occasion, against the Tajiks in the Panshir valley, easily the largest and most competent guerrilla army, the Soviets lined up six hundred villagers and crushed them under the treads of their tanks.<sup>133</sup> Throughout 1982 and 1983, the violence against

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<sup>130</sup> Keller, Bill “Soviet Pledges Independent Pullout from Afghanistan,” New York Times, 18 Mar, 1988. Found online at <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/18/world/soviet-pledges-independent-pullout-from-afghanistan.html>

<sup>131</sup> Taubman, Philip. “Gorbachev and Afghan Leader Say Way Seems Clear,” New York Times, 8 Apr, 1988,. Found online at <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/08/world/gorbachev-afghan-leader-say-way-seems-clear-start-soviet-troop-pullout-may-15.html>

<sup>132</sup> Rasul Bux, Rais. War Without Winners: Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition after the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pg. 1

<sup>133</sup> Kaplan, Robert D. Soldiers of God. Houghton Mifflin Company; Boston, MA. 1990. Pg. 39

noncombatants increased. In September 1982, near Kabul, 105 civilians were herded into a tunnel and killed. In July 1983, the Soviets killed the tribal elders in the city of Ghazni and in October, some three-hundred civilians were killed in three different villages around Kandahar.<sup>134</sup> In a stark comparison to the U.S. experience in Vietnam, David Isby remarked that “Civilian massacres [perpetrated by Soviet and PDPA troops] like the one at My Lai were the norm rather than the aberration.”<sup>135</sup> Twelve Afghans, including children were tied up and hauled inside a mosque, which was then burned to the ground.<sup>136</sup>

The Soviet response to the mujahedeen tactics of hit and run were to apply violence on a wide scale. After a large uprising in the western city of Herat, Soviet bombed the city from high altitude, killing over three-thousand.<sup>137</sup> In the countryside, the Soviets and their Afghan intermediaries resorted to “the systematic, planned destruction of the rural economy and the deliberate creation of millions of refugees by the most violent means.”<sup>138</sup> An observer reported that in the military sweeps of the villages, “Russian soldiers shot at anything alive in six villages—people, hens, donkeys—and then they plundered what remained of value.”<sup>139</sup> In a particularly gruesome tactic, Soviets developed and deployed explosives formed inside pens, watches and toys.<sup>140</sup> These were not meant to kill, but to disable, causing an increased burden on the village’s ability to support the mujahedeen.

The depopulation of the countryside was meant to eliminate the refuge provided by ties of identity with little regard for the long term effects. In an example of the scale of depopulation that may have been contemplated, the mujahedeen often repeated an Afghan official saying

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<sup>134</sup> Amstutz, J. Bruce. *Afghanistan, the First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986. Pg. 146.

<sup>135</sup> Kaplan, Robert D. *Soldiers of God*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990. Pg. 120.

<sup>136</sup> Kaplan, *Soldiers of God*. Pg. 120.

<sup>137</sup> Amstutz, J. Bruce. *Afghanistan*. Pg. 145

<sup>138</sup> McMichael, Scott R. *Stumbling Bear: Soviet military performance in Afghanistan*. London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991. Pg. 53

<sup>139</sup> Amstutz, J. Bruce. *Afghanistan*. Pg. 145

<sup>140</sup> Kaplan, Robert D. *Soldiers of God*. Houghton Mifflin Company; Boston, MA. 1990. Pg. 5

that “if only one million people were left in the country [of 15 million], they would be more than enough to start a new society.”<sup>141</sup>

Soviet soldiers who deserted and later defected to the United States gave voice to the news reports of war crimes in Afghanistan, stating that women had been raped and reporting rumors of chemical weapons being used in the Panshir valley by both sides.<sup>142</sup> In 1982, the U.S. State Department accused the Soviets and its Afghan clients of using chemical weapons in the war. One Soviet soldier who deserted and defected described in a tape recording of dense yellow clouds that killed up to thirty percent of the people under it, and another chemical agent that was one-hundred percent effective. The State department report claimed at least 3000 civilians had been killed using chemical weapons.<sup>143</sup>

There is at least one bit of evidence that the identity conflict spilled over into the Soviet Army, mixing with, secessionists movements among Central Asian ethnicities spilled into the units heavily peopled with Tajik, Uzbek and Kazakhs. In late 1985, Central Asian troops mutinied following the execution of an Afghan civilian. Russian and Central Asians, both in the Soviet Army, fought near the city of Konduz and “450 people [were killed]... and 500 military vehicles were entirely destroyed.”<sup>144</sup>

As civilian discontent with the shortages caused by an unresponsive central planning system, the shock of the losses in Afghanistan became unbearable. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan pierced the screen of the monolithic Soviet Truth. Shortly after, the

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<sup>141</sup> Amstutz, J. Bruce. Pg. 145

<sup>142</sup> Sciolino, Elaine. “4 Soviet Deserters Tell of Cruel Afghanistan War. New York Times, 3 August 1984.

<sup>143</sup> Girardet, Edward. “New Charges of Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan.” The Christian Science Monitor. 10 September, 1982.

<sup>144</sup> Reuveny, Rafael and Aseem Prakash. The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union. *Review of International Studies*. 25:4(1999):693-708.



Lithuanian separatist leaders declared their goal of formal independence from the Soviet Union.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Senn, Alfred E. "Lithuania's Path to Independence," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 22:3 (1991):245-250.

## CHAPTER EIGHT: ANALYSIS

*"They make a solitude and call it peace."*  
Tacitus

### **8.1. Algeria Analysis**

The major aspect of the Algerian war that furthered conflict towards a strategy of preemption is that during in Algeria, ordinary people became legitimate targets of destruction because of their identity connections to the combatants. Morgenthau picked up on this when writing about populations "completely identified in its convictions and emotions with the conduct of the war and with respect to the objectives of the war."<sup>1</sup> Beyond that, the causes of the Algerian conflict are fairly easy to surmise: Feelings of relative deprivation on the part of the Muslim Algerians who believed that a national state of, by and for Algerians would greatly solve their issues of social and economic inequality. The French were attempting to maintain an economic market, complicated by the fact of heavy French immigration over the past century. Ties of identity, primarily through the use of Islam, provided the distribution of knowledge that powered the materially weak FLN through tactical defeat to strategic victory. The militarization of that knowledge took a very violent turn, surprisingly early in the war. Faced with certain military (in the normative sense) defeat, the FLN turned towards targeting civilians. The French would respond in kind because when the individual is the threat, the individual must be targeted. In a very real sense, preemption has a scale. Preemption is centered on the individual, and so, anything targeting the individual is preemptive in nature. French use of torture became a physical, very personal manifestation of preemption.

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<sup>1</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics*. Pg. 26.




Figure 17. The France-Algeria case study map clearly shows how the imposition of western liberalism in the severe form of colonialism disordered Algerian society which responded to the superior French military by democratizing the war through population mobilization and targeting of civilians.

Much of the Algerian conflict is about creating this image. For decades after the war, on both sides, the Algerian conflict was a taboo subject, little discussed in France, and formed into a mythical, heroic revolution in Algeria, with the excesses of the civil war minimized, or simply erased from history lessons.<sup>2</sup> Truly, the group most afflicted would have been the Francophile, urban Arabs, already cut loose from their tribal, Algerian affiliations, but not quite embedded in the settler culture.

The intensity of the Algerian due to the layering of conflict and Islam surprised the world. This would lead to problems in the foundation of the modern Algerian state later. By the 1990s,

<sup>2</sup> Babicz, Lionel. "Japan-Korea, France-Algeria: Colonialism and Post Colonialism." *Japanese Studies* 33.2 (2013): 201–211. Print.

Algeria, like many Arab nations was experiencing low growth and high birth rates, creating pressure against the original post-colonial, yet largely secular, governmental institutions. Culture being *indélébile* this original shadow society, seething at its marginalization, quickly made their influence known, ushering in the second Algerian war in the 1990s. The ability of revolutions to eat their own is attested by the claim that in the early years of the war, the FLN killed collaborating Muslims at a rate of six for every one European.<sup>3</sup> Exact numbers of dead is hotly contested by both sides as the leveling of war crimes have increased the opprobrium of the conflict. Unlike the unconditional ending of the Allied victory over Germany, Algeria had a disturbing and long drawn out conflict. Perhaps memories of the resistance under the German occupation prepared the *pied noir* to match the Arab way of war of personal raids.

One of the reasons to begin the history of irregular war with the Algerian case was the ability of the FLN to achieve at least operational reciprocity by harnessing the expected reactions of the French to their own terrorism activities. At the UN, an FLN representative said “[E]very time a bomb explodes in Algiers we are taken more seriously here.”<sup>4</sup> Despite quickly losing the initiative in the normative conflict, the FLN capitalized on the fuzzy political edges of the war by making the war widespread and public. The acceptance by the population of the attendant risks when mobilizing in support creates an effective base from which to wage a war. Risk acceptance is tacit mobilization and in this case, it was relatively easy to mobilize the population. Algerians were conditioned to engage in wide spread revolutionary conflict in 1955 from the previous hundred years or so of low simmering grievances.<sup>5</sup> In this case, Arab Muslim elites held certain expectations about the utility of violence, perhaps based on Koranic law and

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<sup>3</sup> Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*. Pg. 164.

<sup>4</sup> Hutchinson, Martha Crenshaw. *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. Pg. 91.

<sup>5</sup> North, Douglas, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

thousands of years of tribal justice, a “normative justification for violence.”<sup>6</sup> There is a tipping point between venting of violent acts from frustration and collectively planned action. On the part of the Arab Muslims, this occurred sometime in the early 1950s as political groups began to transition to armed groups capable of organized violence, understood to be symptomatic of internal warfare. The effects of French colonization, particularly the seizure of ancient land claims drove the scope of the conflict. Mild resource deprivation, in which only a few elites were dispossessed, to moderate, in which large numbers of previously rural persons were exposed to new modes of existence in cities which highlighted their own limited access to resources, to finally the intense deprivation which came from the combination of elite frustration and lower class agitation.<sup>7</sup> In France, the effects of the military buildup of conscripts was to bring the war home to a large number of otherwise occupied French citizens, more concerned with rebuilding their own lives after the Second World War, than a desert department across the sea. The deaths of Foreign Legionaries in Indochina and Algeria went unnoticed, and professional soldiers, a tiny, self-secluded percentage of the population, were not mourned. But sons and husbands, drafted against their will, to fight in a war that was only questionably using force and veering into the unquestionably amoral, sent reverberations across the country.

What made this war, and most irregular wars, very difficult to finish was the strong bonds ethnic Arab Muslims enjoyed in Algeria, bonds that speak directly to the *tellurian* nature of the conflict. The French settlers, the *pied noir*, were not tied to the land and not particularly tied to each other, in the same way. This durability of identity is an intangible connectedness of individuals, and provides a fertile ground mobilization and resiliency for bearing the brunt of war. As mentioned earlier, the French were positioned to draw ever greater resources to themselves, a *verite evidente* of colonialism, but one that goes to the heart of the conflict. Resource

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<sup>6</sup> Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel*, Fortieth Anniversary Edition, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Pg. 156.

<sup>7</sup> Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Pg. 9.

competition, and the concomitant power struggles often drive political mobilization along ethnic lines. Discrimination against Arab Muslims may very well have begun on physical and cultural differences, but the resulting conflict was, very basically, about resource distribution, in this case, moral as well as physical resources. At the individual level there were very real rewards and punishment for this self-identification with the Arab Muslim cause. Leaders throughout Algeria's history made use of religious symbols and rhetoric. The Messalist movement, which arguably gave rise to the rest of the nationalist groups- the ENA, the PPA, and finally the FLN, utilized much of the same imagery in its rhetoric- the call for a united Islamic community against the *manfouqin* or *manhourfiin*, those who doubt or deviate.<sup>8</sup> Slogans lifted from sacred values become a mandate.

What cannot be dismissed is that the calls for revolution could have been interpreted by the deeply pious Muslim, largely illiterate population of Algeria as calls for religious war. During the anti-colonial struggle, the foreigners were referred to as infidels, and the struggle for Algeria was a struggle for Islam.<sup>9</sup> The idea of political Islam, a blending of secular authority and legal authority, and its possibility of a form of socialism gives pause here. In the midst of a devout population, religion is a legitimate source of authority and force. In a sense, religion becomes a great counter-insurgent against the essentially amoral, irreligious, i.e., unstable outsider. Imposing order can bring about a utopia that can only exist under an "Islamic" government. That successive leaders in the Algerian nationalist movement cloaked themselves in religious deference, and even cast their actions as required by sacristy, is immensely significant.

The social and political conditions faced by Algeria at the turn of the century, well before open rebellion, led to the rise of the religious *ulemas*, faith leaders who organized themselves along political lines. Malley writes that "Their concept of power and authority implied what could

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<sup>8</sup> Malley, Robert. *The Call from Algeria*. Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1996. Pg. 59

<sup>9</sup> Malley, Robert. *The Call from Algeria*. Pg. 60

be taken as a secularization of Algerian politics but more accurately represented a modification of the interaction between the religious and the political, between religion and state power.”<sup>10</sup>

Not only in Algeria, but all through the Arab world, the imposition of western colonial rule dissociated the symbols of legitimacy, power and authority, which had been orbited by religion. The people’s desire for effective governance was so tied up with Islam’s place in their identities, and efforts to reconcile Islam with modernity were occurring in earnest, in a situation little different that the early religious emigres to North America. What occurred was the triggering of a counter-reformation by the *colons* attitudes towards Algerian society. They ruthlessly undermined the material bases of the religious groupings’ authority, directly their efforts primarily at the “dislocation of a whole series of relations and practices of production and property rights that [were] the basis of social life.”<sup>11</sup> In what Malley called the “social mutilation” of Algerian society, the:

“rural pauperization, the destruction of tribal landowning patterns... contributed mightily to the marginalization of the religious orders and to their decline as a meaningful language of resistance. They were losing their basis of economic and cultural power, and it follows, their instruments of social and political leverage.”<sup>12</sup>

This drove the ulema into politics, determined to rebuild their societies in their own Islamic vision. As a faith, Islam was changed from focus on the spiritual to a focus on the mundane, national in scope. This was a radical change.

The war in Algeria can be viewed as a prototype with a model that can be widely applied to other identity conflicts, such as the PLO, Hamas and Hezbollah in the Levant. After the FLN emerged as the front runner to the claim of representing the national body politic, it made clear that it would transcend all other political parties. The FLN forbade its members from belonging

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<sup>10</sup> Malley, Robert. *The Call from Algeria*. Pg. 61.

<sup>11</sup> Gilsean, Michael. *Recognizing Islam*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1992. Pg 145.

<sup>12</sup> Malley, Robert. *The Call from Algeria*. Pg. 63.

to other political parties, and asserted that “the party determines the general axis of the nation’s policy” and required a majority of the government be composed of party members.”<sup>13</sup>

This expressed itself in a hegemonic institutionalism, in which FLN inserted itself increasingly into the social sphere of Algerian society. The FLN declared that inter-Algerian feuds must be carried out with daggers, not modern, western arms, and the use of tobacco and wine would be punished. Algerian women increasingly used the veil, which evolved into a means of camouflage. Michael Gilsenan would write that the veil being invoked against a foreign occupation, it became “a language, a weapon against internal and external enemies, a refuge, and evasion.”<sup>14</sup> The FLN empowered its military arm, the ALN, to begin to wield considerable political clout on its own by holding up soldiers as the ideal Algerian. A report in *El Moudjahid*, the FLN newspaper, said “The Army draws from the people, with which it forms a single entity... the people see in it the expression of their own will to freedom. The ALN is a reliable model, an example to follow.”<sup>15</sup>

Suppression of dissent, the ultimate preemption, was occurring as early as the 1930s in Algeria during the internecine battles between parties vying to represent the people. After the FLN takeover, it had its own prison camps and torture centers. The long running internal conflict was even carried over the Metropolitan France, where most migrant Algerians supported the MNA. In Paris, Alistair Horne wrote, “in 1960, the killings reached a crescendo as the FLN stepped up its campaign to achieve total ascendancy. Barely a day went by without a corpse fished out the Seine, or found hanging in the Bois de Boulogne. A favorite place of reckoning was the quiet Canal Saint-Martin... which with hideous regularity yielded its crop of sacks containing the disfigured bodies of Algerians.”<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Malley, Robert. *The Call from Algeria*. Pg. 127.

<sup>14</sup> Gilsenan, Michael. *Recognizing Islam*. Pg 15.

<sup>15</sup> *El Moudjahid*, No. 9, 20 August 1957 in Malley, Robert. *The Call from Algeria*. Pg. 128.

<sup>16</sup> Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace*. New York: New York Review of Books, 2006. Pg. 409.



The inherent contradictions in a Liberal state administering a colonial empire caused instabilities that could only be resolved by separating the colony from the erstwhile master. The neo-liberal interest in a long term system that provided economic benefits in the form of resources like cheap labor was overridden by the *peid noir's* own desire for political and economic monopoly. There was no system of relief that could satisfy Algerian demands for autonomy, the settler's fear of domination, and the *Metropole's* economic pull. The role of identity in this case was particularly clear, with white, French-speaking persons on one side, and brown, Arabic speakers on the other. For the individuals and groups involved, identity became the message itself, with personal narratives and histories constantly remaking the identity's content and meaning.

## **8.2. Vietnam Analysis**

*"All revolutions eat their own children."*  
Earnest Rohm

No one sets out to lose a war, yet it happens. As the legitimacy of the authorities withered away, the Vietminh (later, the Vietcong) were able to mobilize the villages against French rule. Following the imposition of French rule in late 1946, Vietminh communist forces engaged in political cleansing, the killing of prominent people in villages and districts who stood to lose from a communist takeover.<sup>17</sup> The homogenization of the political in southern Vietnam had begun much earlier than the U.S. war. It was the French who would uncover the vast political battlefield being waged by the Vietminh, a battlefield much more important than the one with guns and artillery. In Clausewitzian war, the object is to find, fix and finish, necessarily destroying the enemy's army in order to control its territory. In identity wars, the object is the population, and by controlling the population, one controls the territory.<sup>18</sup> By training cadres to return to their villages, the center of Vietnam's agrarian society, the North Vietnamese were able to carefully survey, register and then, through inducements and coercion, reduce resistance. Cadres were given the authority to carry out extra-judicial killings, and through their iron grip, were able to organize the local populations for what would turn out to be a very long struggle. The cadre set up committees which paralleled the official government organization, from the hamlet, village, up to provincial level, with COSVN eventually being set up to organize the entire framework. Special committees were targeted towards various demographics such as the young, old, women, and disabled. Charles Lacheroy, a French officer who served in both Indochina and Algeria, described this process as allowing the Vietminh to take physical control

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<sup>17</sup> Tonnesson, Stein. "The Longest Wars: Indochina 1945-1975," *Journal of Peace Research*, 22:1(1985):9-29.

<sup>18</sup> Tucker, David. *Confronting the Unconventional: Innovation and Transformation in Military Affairs*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006.

of the people. David Tucker adds the element of psychological warfare to the political, writing that “the Vietminh aimed to take control of people’s hopes and fears, loves and hates—to take control of people’s souls. To do this, they used a variety of measures ranging from propaganda to brain-washing, supported by physical punishment. The French referred to these measures as psychological warfare. Political warfare and psychological warfare together made revolutionary warfare. Revolutionary warfare had allowed the Vietminh to beat a force that by conventional measures was far superior. Thus revolutionary warfare was itself a revolution in warfare.”<sup>19</sup> These methods were used by Mao’s communists in consolidating power after 1949.<sup>20</sup> In Vietnam, the same process is carefully described by Bill Andrews in his contemporary account, *The Village War*.<sup>21</sup>

The communists were not perfect in their political wars, and preemption takes a particularly bureaucratic form called collectivization. In Northern Vietnam, not yet free from French rule, the process began in 1953 with the division of the population engaged in agriculture into five blocks, from ‘landlord’ to ‘worker’. Perhaps as many as twenty thousand people were liquidated for being landlords or rich farmers.<sup>22</sup> Resistance to collectivization took

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<sup>19</sup> Tucker, David. *Confronting the Unconventional: Innovation and Transformation in Military Affairs*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. For Colonel Charles Lacheroy, See John Stewart Ambler, *The French Army in Politics, 1954-1962*, Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1966, p. 398.

<sup>20</sup> Dikotter, Frank. *The Tragedy of Liberation*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2015.

<sup>21</sup> William R. Andrews. *The Village War*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973.

<sup>22</sup> Duong, Van Nguyen. *The Tragedy of the Vietnam War: A South Vietnamese Officer’s Analysis*. London: McFarland & Company, 2008. Pg. 46.




Figure 18. The U.S.-Vietnam map exhibits similar traits to the Algeria case study. Unable to win a conventional conflict against the U.S., North Vietnam began executing an irregular strategy early in the war. In order to capitalize on tactical gains, the COSVN and North Vietnamese deliberating ‘cleansed’ areas of suspected southern sympathizers, as in the case of Hue.

a well-trod path. On November 2, 1956, with Bernard Fall, the French journalist, present, farmers in Nghe-An begged Canadian observers to take them to South Vietnam. Fall wrote “Hanoi no longer had any choice; it responded in exactly the same way as the colonial power had, sending the whole 325<sup>th</sup> Division to crush the rebels. It did so with typical VPA thoroughness; allegedly, close to 6000 farmers were deported or executed.” Ho Chi Minh, on becoming aware of the issue, blamed his subordinates and said “One cannot waken the dead.”<sup>23</sup> Preemption was a tactic the communists would employ again and again, notably at Hue in 1968.

<sup>23</sup> Fall, Bernard. *The Two Vietnams*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1967. Pg. 157.

Typically, the American escalation was an attempt to impose a simple American solution to a deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. The introduction of large combat units and their use was designed to destroy the enemy in battle. However, Johnson and Westmoreland badly abused Clausewitz. Having limited the war politically, though disallowing invasions of North Vietnam, the mining of its harbors, or invading Laos and Cambodia to interdict command and supply bases, the decision was made to provide nearly unlimited force inside South Vietnam. This produces the legitimacy problem. Western backed, capitalist and Catholic regimes were considered largely corrupt and alien by the poor, illiterate and mostly Buddhist population. The use of indiscriminate force then drove a wedge between the government and legitimacy. The population responded by acquiescing to its other option- the communist insurgency. The U.S. was seen as an extension of the Saigon government, further legitimizing the regime. The real problem for the United States was the delegitimizing effect of violent protests back home.

The reliance on technological force was easily countered by the Vietnamese, who capitalized on their superiority in the identity advantage. David Halberstam would write:

“To be sure, the Viet Cong did not have mobility by Western technological standards, but they had an Asian ability to filter quietly through the countryside unobserved, to move twenty-five miles a night on foot, or in sampans with excellent local guides, to gather and strike quickly and then disperse before the government could retaliate. That was the only kind of mobility they had, but it was a far better kind than the Governments, and too many American generals never understood it.”<sup>24</sup>

For the duration of American involvement in Vietnam, wave after wave of strategists trained at Leavenworth and Carlisle failed to understand, much less admit, that the US way of war with high technology and massed firepower conceded the initiative to the enemy, a mistake according to military doctrine. The North would remain able to choose the time and place, and pace, of the conflict. What was left was firepower, devastating, destructive, and ultimately,

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<sup>24</sup> Halberstam, David. *The Making of a Quagmire*. New York: Random House, 1964. Pp. 192-193.

futile, often simply becoming the objective itself, rather than a means to an end. Remarking on the town of Ben Tre, one observer said, "It become necessary to destroy the town to save it."<sup>25</sup> The costs of Clausewitzian war were proving too high, and were confirmed by the changes which occurred in 1969. While the strategic direction General Abrams took was closer capitalizing on the benefits of external mobilization, the fact that a change is proof of the failure of employing internally mobilized power with its exorbitant costs of irregular warfare methods means that the costs of mobilization may prove too high.

Perhaps the most visible effort to control the population on the Allies side was the Strategic Hamlet Program. Began in 1962, the program had two goals - one, to increase peasant access to resources provided by the state, and increasingly, to restrict access to the population. The first was meant to increase support for President Diem and the second was to reduce the freedom of the NLF, which was enjoying easy movement through the country, but failed.<sup>26</sup> Stanley Karnow described the reasons: "I drove south from Saigon into Long An, a province in the Mekong Delta, the rice basket of South Vietnam where 40 per cent of the population lived. There I found the strategic hamlet program begun during the Diem regime in shambles. At a place called Hoa Phu, the strategic hamlet built during the previous summer now looked like it had been hit by a hurricane. The barbed wire fence around the enclosure had been ripped apart, the watchtowers were demolished and only a few of its original thousand residents remained, sheltered in lean-tos... A local guard explained to me that a handful of Vietcong agents had entered the hamlet one night and told the peasants to tear it down and return to their native villages. The peasants complied... From the start, in Hoa Phu and elsewhere, they had hated the strategic hamlets, many of which they had been forced to construct by corrupt officials

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<sup>25</sup> Braestrup, Peter. *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. Pg. 193.

<sup>26</sup> Hilsman, Roger. *To Move A Nation. The Politics of Foreign Policy*. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday. 1967. Pp. 431 - 435.

who had pocketed a percentage of the money allocated for the projects... three quarters of the two hundred strategic hamlets in Long An had been destroyed since the summer, either by the Vietcong or by their own occupants, or by a combination of both.”<sup>27</sup> The program often converted peasants into Vietcong sympathizers and was abandoned as unworkable in late 1964.

David Halberstam saw that the problem went to the very top: “He [McNamara] epitomized booming American technological success, he scurried around Vietnam, looking for what he wanted to see; and he never saw nor smelled nor felt what was really there, right in front of him. He was so much a prisoner of his own background, so unable as indeed was the country that sponsored him, to adapt his values and his terms to Vietnamese realities.”<sup>28</sup> US military planners did not heed the insistence of Pham Van Dong and other North Vietnamese leaders that among the great assets the Vietnamese possessed in their unequal struggle against the United States were patience and a capacity to endure hardships when in pursuit of a righteous cause, such as independence from foreign domination.<sup>29</sup> McNamara would admit thirty years later: “We clearly lacked the understanding of Vietnamese history and culture that would have prevented us from believing they would reverse course as a function of being ‘punished’ by US power.”<sup>30</sup>

The failures in Vietnam, far from being considered valuable lessons for future wars by the U.S., were attributed to the failures of policy makers. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the military “developed its own ‘professional’ identity and emphasis and was clear

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<sup>27</sup> Karnow, Vietnam. Pg. 339.

<sup>28</sup> Shapley, Deborah. *Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara*. Boston: Little & Brown, 1993. Pp. 146-151

<sup>29</sup> Van Dong, Pham quoted in the PBS documentary “Vietnam: A Television History” based on Stanley Karnow’s *Vietnam: A History*. New York: Viking, 1983.

<sup>30</sup> McNamara, Robert. *Argument Without End*. New York: Public Affairs, 1999. pg. 304.

about what it was, what it could do, and how it should be used.”<sup>31</sup> Richard Lock-Pullan argues that the greatest impact culture had on the US military was following the Vietnam War when, “fundamentally, the social alienation that the Army suffered after the Vietnam War meant that its identity could not be... determined by the broader national culture which had turned against it.”<sup>32</sup> However, its alienation from the popular culture meant that the US military was even less prepared to execute its leaders’ policies than before the Vietnam War. US success in Europe then reinforced a cognitive bias which Jervis ascribes to being “strongly influenced by events that are recent, that they or their country experienced first-hand, and events that occurred when they were first coming to political awareness.”<sup>33</sup> Lessons learned are usually oversimplified and overgeneralized- they expect the future to resemble the past.”<sup>34</sup> Heavy firepower, big units, and regimented planning are the hallmarks of the way Americans would choose to fight their wars. The American military is markedly singular in its perception of the operating environment. US military planners are acculturated to reduce complex problems to their lowest common denominator, and optimistically predict success for achieving an ‘objective.’ Military planners still insist on the concept of a “line of operations” a series of related actions in focused to an objective.<sup>35</sup> It affects everything from the decision to go to war (Can we win?), to war termination (Did we win?), to how battlefields are organized. The problem lies in using such a task oriented military to execute irregular war when there is significant research that indicates western planners will not be able to see the battlefield accurately. A stark example of this cognitive bias can be seen early during the Vietnam conflict. In a bi-polar world, many strategists were convinced of monolithic, communist support to Vietnam from the Soviet Union and China. This insistence on identifying a single threat distorted the truth. Many Vietnamese

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<sup>31</sup> Lock-Pullan, Richard. *US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation from Vietnam to Iraq*, New York: Routledge, 2004. Pg 9

<sup>32</sup> Lock-Pullan, Richard. *US Intervention Policy*. Pg 9

<sup>33</sup> Jervis, Robert, *Perception and Misperception*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. Pg 44.

<sup>34</sup> Snyder, Jack, *Ideology of the Offensive*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.



were less concerned with communism than the overwhelming difficulty of life in the south and gladly acquiesced to insurgent rule, figuring compliance would produce a harmonious third way. General Westmoreland, focused on an identifiable enemy, insisting that large combat formations would destroy the NVA and drive the north out of the war. The heavy handed 'search and destroy' tactics destroyed the social fabric of the Vietnamese environment. The complex environment, already fragile, comes under immense strain from the very personal, social, and political nature of these conflicts. Additionally, the deeply ingrained nature of culture and bias promised that few Americans would even be aware of their mistakes in Vietnam.

### **8.3. Afghanistan Analysis**

“To those that flee comes neither power nor glory.”  
Homer

Similar to Vietnam and the United States, social unrest caused by the war in Afghanistan began to multiply in the Soviet Union. As the war entered the second half of the decade, some journalists began reporting on the gap between the official pronouncements of the war and the reality on the ground. Like America in Vietnam, criticism was raised about the justice of universal conscription policies. Letters from fathers appeared in *Pravda*, *Krasnaia zvezda* and *Literaturnaia gazeta* alleging that the privileged children of officials had avoided service in Afghanistan and the military.<sup>36</sup> Gorbachev himself called the war “burdensome and painful.”<sup>37</sup> In the early years of the war, the Soviet state press portrayed the war as an international duty, but by 1986, arguably the turning point in the war, Soviet cities began filling up with disabled and disfigured soldiers returned and cut loose from the Army. As the war dragged on, the press began to report on negative statements made by the Soviet leadership. In 1986, both Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze referred to Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound,”<sup>38</sup> and “a sin.”<sup>39</sup> Significantly, in 1989, the Soviet Congress publicly condemned the intervention in Afghanistan. Shevardnadze noted that “the deliverance of our country from the oppressing moral and material burden of involvement in the Afghan war is one of the biggest... achievements of perestroika,”<sup>40</sup> and later noted that the Soviet reforms in the

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<sup>36</sup> Gustafson, Thane “Conclusions: Toward A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations?” in *Soldiers and the Soviet State*, Colton, Timothy and Thane Gustafson, eds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. Pg. 339.

<sup>37</sup> Baumann, Robert. *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993. Pg. 175.

<sup>38</sup> Colton, Timothy. “Perspectives on Civil Military Relations in the Soviet Union,” Timothy Colton and Thane Gustafson, eds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. Pg. 318.

<sup>39</sup> Kamrany, Nake M. and David T. Killian “Effects of Afghanistan War on Soviet Society and Policy” *International Journal of Social Economics*, 19:7/8/9(1992):129-151. Pg. 129

<sup>40</sup> Reuveny, Rafael and Aseem Prakash. *The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union*. *Review of International Studies*. 25:4(1999):693-708.

late 1980s, which ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union were inextricably linked to the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, that “everything else flowed from that.”<sup>41</sup>

The epicenter of the rippling effects was the Red Army, seen as a legitimizing institution for the authority of the Communist Party, not just an instrument of force. The Soviet Union was an empire that encompassed vast cultural and identity differences, and the Red Army crossed those boundaries. The popular image of the Red Army was egalitarian, in keeping with the class free spiritualism of Lenin, but it was so more in ideal than in practice. As the war began to turn against the Soviet Union and the official media began reporting on public disenchantment, anti-militarism began to rise. Already addressed was the segregation of personnel into Russian and non-Russian units, but the Red Army was a draft based organization and this caused particular resentment.

Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Prakash, in their study of the integration of the Soviet Union emphasize fragile nature the totalitarian state that was built on a perception of dominance, reinforced by the relatively low cost strategy of supporting external conflicts. The war in Afghanistan would end up shattering the façade, with “the repeated failures in this war changed the Soviet leadership’s perception of the efficacy of using force to keep non-Soviet nationalities within the Union (perception effects), devastated the morale and legitimacy of the army (military effects), disrupted domestic cohesion (legitimacy effects), and accelerated glasnost (glasnost effects). These effects operated synergistically. War failures weakened the military and conservative anti-reform forces and accelerated glasnost and perestroika. Importantly, these failures demonstrated that the Soviet army was not invincible, thereby encouraging non-Russian republics to push for independence with little fear of a military backlash.”<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Dobbs, Michael. “The Afghan Archive: Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of War,” *The Washington Post*, November 16 (1992), p A16.

<sup>42</sup>Reuveny and Prakash. “The Afghanistan War,” :693-708.

In Lithuania and Georgia, many refused the 1989 draft, and mass protests erupted.<sup>43</sup> In Latvia, the first republic to declare independence, regular protests occurred outside Red Army bases, with protesters carrying slogans like ‘USSR armed forces are occupation forces’, and ‘Occupiers out of Latvia’.<sup>44</sup> In Uzbekistan in 1987, hundreds of Youth League members were




Figure 18. In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union supported the growth of Parcham, a communist party, which attempted to de-Islamize the country. The resulting reaction led to an insurgency suppressed with gunships and chemical weapons in a strategy of depopulation.

prosecuted for draft dodging.<sup>45</sup> In Tajikistan, this took on a racial quality when the local KGB blamed radical Muslims infiltrating from neighboring Afghanistan for encouraging locals to avoid

<sup>43</sup> Fane, Daria. ‘After Afghanistan: The Decline of Soviet Military Prestige’, *The Washington Quarterly*, 12:2(1990):5-16. Lithuanian protests are annotated in Reuveny, Rafael and Aseem Prakash. *The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union*. *Review of International Studies*. 25:4(1999):693-708.

<sup>44</sup> Reuveny and Prakash. “The Afghanistan War,” 693-708.

<sup>45</sup> Nahaylo, Bohdan. ‘When Ivan Comes Marching Home: The Domestic Impact of the War in Afghanistan’, *The American Spectator*, July 1987:15-17.

the draft.<sup>46</sup> Other protests occurred, with demonstrations in Armenia in 1982, and Tajikistan and the city of Astrakhan, on the Caspian Sea, in 1982.<sup>47</sup> The central party in Moscow responded to the growing divide between the internal Russia and the external satellite republics by engaging in wide scale political purges. Reuveny and Prakesh make the point that these occurred during perestroika and so the official media was able to cast the issue as one of new guard/old guard anti-corruption cleansing, but in reality Moscow didn't trust its non-Russian, local party leaders. This rebounded and intensified anti-Moscow, and ultimately, anti-Russian feelings when many of the new replacements were native Russians, especially in the Central Asian republics. In 1986, riots broke out in the capital of Kazakhstan when First Secretary Kunaev, a Kazakh, was replaced by Gennedy Kolbin, a Russian, who had never worked in Kazakhstan before.<sup>48</sup>

The deeper problem was the Soviet Union itself. However, the Soviet economy was moribund and in no position to support a surge or change in strategy less than withdrawal. Like the US in 1968, the war was a lens which magnified problems internal to the Soviet machine. Unlike the US where the market moves into new areas or groups agitate knowing they can manipulate the democratic process to achieve change in their favor, the political restrictions laid on the economy meant there would be little motivation to change and produce growth in new areas.

Over reliance on production and the prioritization of defense ahead of consumer goods contributed to inelasticity in the Soviet economy.<sup>49</sup> The Soviet economy was more brittle by the time the Soviet Union found itself decisively engaged in Afghanistan. As productivity declined

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<sup>46</sup> Rigby, T.H. "The Afghan Conflict and Soviet Domestic Politics," *International Crisis and Domestic Politics: Major Political Conflicts in the 1980s*. Lamare, James, ed. New York: Praeger, 1991. Pp. 137–149.

<sup>47</sup> Nahaylo, Bohdan. 'When Ivan Comes Marching Home: The Domestic Impact of the War in Afghanistan', *The American Spectator*, July 1987:15–17.

<sup>48</sup> Rigby, T.H. "The Afghan Conflict and Soviet Domestic Politics," Pp. 137–149.

<sup>49</sup> Davis, Christopher. "The changing priority status of the Soviet defense sector: 1985-90" in *The Defense Sector in the Soviet Economy*, C. Wolf, Jr., ed. Santa Monica: RAND, 1992. Pp. 139-168.

the burden of defense prioritization caused significant problems for the economy as a whole.<sup>50</sup> Workers employed in defense industries were paid more than other workers in other sectors and had better benefits, causing resentment. Military inspectors in would ensure goals were met and quality was maintained, but un-forecasted requirements would cause instability in the supply chain. The heavy industry sector of the economy, which had benefited from the extensive growth input model became saturated.<sup>51</sup> The over accumulation of iron and steel led to increased orders of products from heavy industry, particularly the highly prioritized defense industry. Systemic inefficiencies were increasingly burdening the system and the Soviet productivity declined from the 1960s.<sup>52</sup> The high growth following World War II had slowed to 2 percent by the mid-1980s.<sup>53</sup> The initial gains from increasing labor participation by a huge population and increasing, universal education and heavy investment stagnated. Still, the burden of the allocation of resources to support national defense in the Soviet Union remained high. Defense spending had risen from a low of 10 percent in the 1950s to 13 percent in 1970. Reductions in spending were lost as prices of defense goods were increased by the hyperinflation around the world in the late 1970s. The rising sophistication of technology for weapons systems needed to keep up with NATO led to ever greater problems as the Soviet central planners attempted to compensate.<sup>54</sup> By the mid-1980s, the CIA estimated that the share of GNP consumed by defense spending alone was between 15-17 percent.<sup>55</sup> The effect of the economic slowdown caused serious legitimacy issue across domestic audiences who began to perceive their sacrifices for the greater Soviet may have been in vain. Consumer

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<sup>50</sup> Davis, Christopher. "Defense Sector in the Economy of a Declining Superpower," Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Oxford University, No. 8, 2000.

<sup>51</sup> Dolinskaya, Irina. "Explaining Russia's Output Collapse," IMF Staff Papers, 49:2(2002):155-174. Pg. 156.

<sup>52</sup> Easter, William and Stanley Fischer, "The Soviet Economic Decline: Historical and Republican Data, Working Paper No. 4735, Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994. Pg 347.

<sup>53</sup> Ofer, Gur. Soviet Economic Growth: 1928-1985, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 25:4(1987):1767-1833.

<sup>54</sup> Becker, Abraham. The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Economic Dimension. Santa Monica, CA: RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, 1986.

<sup>55</sup> "The Soviet Economy Under a New Leader," CIA, 1986 found online at [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document\\_conversions/17/19860319.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/17/19860319.pdf)

goods became increasingly hard to obtain and Soviet citizens saw a shrinking of their purchasing power. The inability of the Soviet economy to switch gears from an input model to a consumption model may have led to a weakening of the central planning system, the increase in elitist interests', and declining worker morale.<sup>56</sup>

On an ideological level, the Soviet Union portrayed the war in Afghanistan partly as a war of liberation, and part solidarity with a communist country. The side opposing the Soviet Union and its clients were cast as pawns of imperialism. Although the ideology of international communism provided the Kremlin with the moral justification for war, it was too simple to explain the complex dynamics on the ground in Afghanistan. Since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union had not shied away supporting conflicts in the developing world, and had not hesitated to use the Red Army to suppress anti-Soviet movements in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In fact, between backing the anti-Franco coalition in Spain in the 1930s, and Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Soviet Union had a good track record in supporting these kinds of conflicts.

Soviet leaders had no qualms about using the military to hold together an extensive empire. Far from the perception that worker solidarity was the reason for successful export of communism, Yuri Andropov, Secretary General and former head of the KGB, would remark that "it took almost the entire Red Army fifteen years to subdue the rebellious khanates in the Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirgizstan."<sup>57</sup> The universal education espoused by the Soviet leadership had the unintended effect of increasing nationalist tendencies. To Moscow, it was inconceivable that people living under communist rule would revolt, so massive military

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<sup>56</sup> Schroeder, Gertrude. "The slowdown in Soviet Industry, 1976-1982," *Soviet Economy*. 1:1(1985)42-74.

<sup>57</sup> Dobbs, Michael. "The Afghan Archive: Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of War," *The Washington Post*, November 16 (1992), p A16.

responses to crush uprisings sponsored by the West were appropriate.<sup>58</sup> Too late, it occurred to the Moscow Politburo that the aging Soviet empire was risking the “possibility that incipient nationalist tendencies emerging in the Central Asian republics were being encouraged by the war in Afghanistan.”<sup>59</sup>

As the Soviet Union recovered from World War II, it began to see the struggle with the United States in global terms, with Brezhnev proclaiming at the twenty-third Soviet Congress that it was the policy of the Soviet Union to support “wars of national liberation.”<sup>60</sup> In Yemen, Nigeria, Angola and Ethiopia, Soviet equipment and advisors, and in some cases troops, were deployed to support proto-Leninist movements. The global arms trade also influenced where the Soviet Union would intervene, with the logic that states unable to obtain weapons from the West would turn to the Warsaw pact countries. Where national governments or resistance groups were under threat of defeat, the weapons trade made them dependent on the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the long string of successes influenced the Politburo’s decision to intervene in Afghanistan over the objections of its leading generals. Afghanistan marked the first time that a large field army was deployed to conduct combat operations.

The strength of the Mujahadeen’s identity in the face of the perceived threat against Islam was incredible, particularly in light of the internecine warfare which started 1992 and continues today. But one can’t underestimate the technical support given to the Muj by external supporters. By 1984, the U.S. had responded with over \$400 million in aid, which increased to

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<sup>58</sup> Medvedev, Zhores. “One More Year of Perestroika,” *International Affairs*. 36:8(1990):74-81. Also Fane, Daria. “After Afghanistan: The Decline of Soviet Military Prestige,” *The Washington Quarterly*. 13:2(1990):5-16. Pg. 9.

<sup>59</sup> Kuzio, Taras. “Opposition in the USSR to the Occupation of Afghanistan,” *Central Asian Survey*, 6:1 (1987):99-117.

<sup>60</sup> Porter, Bruce. *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Pg. 21.



\$470 million and \$630 million in 1986 and 1987 alone. The total spent on clandestine operations and humanitarian aid in the camps in Pakistan would reach \$2 billion dollars.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Coll, Steve. "Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's covert Afghan War," Washington Post, 19-20 July, 1992. Found online at <https://pgasb.pgarchiver.com/washingtonpost/results.html?st=advanced&uid=&MAC=50a23aa1f3f5c6104e90e36051420d61&QryTxt=&sortby=RELEVANCE&datetype=6&frommonth=07&fromday=17&fromyear=1992&tomonth=07&today=21&toyear=1992&By=Steve+Coll&Title=&Sect=ALL>

#### **8.4. Conclusion**

“Woe to the vanquished.”  
Livy

The exceptional regard of western states for their war machines is understandable: immense resources and commitment creates them. The failures of those machines, as part of the larger security dispositif can be seen in these case studies. This, and the increasingly special knowledge needed to understand the application of modern military power, meant that the military turned inward and focused on its past successes in an attempt to ensure that future risks could be minimized. In the 1980s and 1990s, as the world shifted from its bipolar axis, the Liberal public came to see stability operations and low-intensity conflicts as an appropriate use of military power. Michael Howard, in an essay for *War in History*, summarized this cultural dissonance when he wrote that “different cultures have different attitudes to war, and these, far more than any rational calculations, will shape their strategy and explain their successes and failures.”<sup>62</sup> Organizational bias and civil-military disintegration leads strong states to adopt the offensive military strategies which would become the dominant form of warfare.<sup>63</sup> The lesson of World War Two was that appeasement leads to aggression, thus decision makers since 1945 were inclined to translate ambiguous action as inviting hostile intent- a case where organizational bias greatly influenced the use of coercive military power during the Cold War. Understanding these institutional biases shed light on why a dominant military, already focused on those threats that could destroy the state, would identify *all* threats as similar in nature. This was because it was in the interest of the military to believe in the efficacy of the offensive, which is a demonstrable and decisive use of power. What is required is a similarly motivated enemy, with a similar military. Thus was born the idea of ‘force on force’ battles, *a la* the western Front

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<sup>62</sup> Howard, Michael. ‘Review of *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War*.’ Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein eds. *War in History*. 4:1(1997) pp 105-110.

<sup>63</sup> Snyder, Jack. *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.

in World War Two. Western militaries, and the US in particular, military has been susceptible to similar cognitive and psychological pitfalls. Popular culture has glorified WWII as the last good war, creating a desire that all future wars *should* be similar. This reinforces the idea that all future war *will* be similar despite *prima facie* evidence to the contrary.

These case studies demonstrate the evolution of strategy from preventative wars that targeted the connections of the Clausewitzian trinity to wars of preemption. In Algeria, people became legitimate targets of war based on their identity and identity became the motor of war. This is not so unlike the Clausewitzian trinity which harnesses the passion of the people, but in the trinity, it is funneled through the reason of government into exportable force of the military. Algeria was the first instance of the singularity, in which the hatred in the individual was born into a savage soldier. In order to win, either side had to destroy individuals.

In Vietnam, the overwhelming material superiority of the United States was limited to an application against South Vietnam. It does not over simplify to say that the political constraints against war in North Vietnam did not matter. North Vietnam did support the war in the south with organization and supplies. It was the promise of a redistribution of resources that motivated the South Vietnamese, but it was their allegiance to themselves over the externally oriented, non-Buddhist Saigon government which made the insurgency in the South so successful. The U.S. had no choice but to begin operations which made little effort to distinguish between supporters of the NLF and those who did not. Morgenthau picked up on this early, writing that Indochina wars erased the difference between legitimate military targets and civilian populations.”<sup>64</sup> Subtracting the political rhetoric which still rings today, the U.S. occupied South Vietnam and became a lumbering, easy target.

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<sup>64</sup> Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993. Pp. 199-233.

The Liberal outlier case of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan provides an even starker example of the problem of individual singularities. In Afghanistan, wholesale industrial war was waged in order to remove the pool of reserves from which the Mujahedeen could draw. Today, the images of highly advanced helicopter gunships strafing valleys of fields and villages draw the mind, but during the 1980s, it was the vast slums of refugee camps that indicated the strategy of preemption.

Without privileging the idea that military strategists thought any of this through, militaries were watching and drawing their own conclusions that there had to be a better way of war, one that could defeat the singularity.

## CHAPTER NINE: THE WEST GOES TO WAR

“Truth has arrived and falsehood has perished.”

Mohammed, *Surah Banee Isra'eel*

### **9.1. The Top of the World 1856**

The proceeding case studies laid out the foundations and history of preempting the individual as a response to the failure of Clausewitzian strategies. This study of the conflicts Iraq and Afghanistan will demonstrate how the unparalleled technological dominance of the West has matured into preemption as a strategy. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, separated by geography, need to be viewed as one conflict. Indeed, in many ways, it is a World conflict, contained in the Middle East only by ignorance of the fact, and exhaustion. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were clearly two operations in a broader campaign, one designed after the attacks of 9/11, but which built on a century of humanitarian interventions since Woodrow Wilson asked to go to war “in order that the world be made safe for democracy.” President George W. Bush, in 2002, would write in his first National Security Strategy that:

“We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent... the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe.”<sup>1</sup>

The war in Afghanistan started long before the first airstrike on 7 October, 2001. In many ways, the war had not stopped since the Soviets invaded. After the Soviet Army left, the Soviet-installed President Najibullah had a well-equipped 65,000 soldier army, 200 planes and

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<sup>1</sup> Bush, George. National Security Strategy of the United States. September 2002.  
<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>

helicopters and had made many alliances of local militias. The Mujahedeen attempted to seize the eastern city of Jalalabad in May 1989, but was defeated. It was not until 1992, when support collapsed with the Soviet Union, that Najibullah abdicated. The different major Mujahedeen groups then devolved into a civil war between the major Mujahedeen groups, and as the chaos spiraled out of control, Pakistan began supporting a cross-border group known as the Taliban.<sup>2</sup> Martin Ewans, a former British diplomat in Afghanistan, reported:

“The Taliban forces that proceeded to advance through Afghanistan in the winter of 1994–95 were equipped with tanks, APCs, artillery, and even aircraft, but however much equipment they may have acquired in Spin Boldak, Kandahar or elsewhere, they could not despite energetic denials, have operated without training, ammunition, fuel, and maintenance facilities provided by Pakistan... Within no more than six months, they had mobilized possibly as many as 20,000 fighting men . . . many [of whom] were Pakistanis.”<sup>3</sup>

The Taliban captured Kandahar, in the south, and other major cities fell quickly. Najibullah would hide in the UN compound in Kabul until the Taliban captured him in 1996.<sup>4</sup> The Taliban, raised in religious schools as refugees in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation, instituted a severe form of Sharia, in which all things modern were rejected, including most basic education, sanitation and health care. The condition of females under Taliban rule in particular declined, because the severe restrictions imposed cut them off from most of the remaining, limited, social infrastructure.

“The men who formed the original core of the Taliban had learned and imparted a version of Islam that differed significantly from other fundamentalists. Some scholars of the movement have emphasized that the madrassa education instilled in Pakistan focused on returning Afghan society to an imagined premodern period in which a purer form of Islam was practiced by a more righteous Muslim society. This made the Taliban approach to governance somewhat utopian in its attempt to battle the enemies of modernity and nonorthodoxy.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Collins, Joseph J. *Understanding War in Afghanistan*. Washington, D.C: National University Press, 2011. Pg. 36.

<sup>3</sup> Ewans, Martin. *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, New York: Harper Perennial, 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Ewans, Martin. *Afghanistan*: Pp. 238–260.

<sup>5</sup> Olivier Roy, as quoted in Girardet, Edward, Jonathan Walter, Charles Norchi and Mirwais Masood. *Afghanistan*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. London: Media Action International, 2004. Pg. 238.

Art was especially targeted for destruction, most notably, the destruction of Bamiyan Buddhas in March 2001. The Taliban, aided in this belief by the equally puritanical Al Qaida living among them, saw the 1500-year-old giant Buddha as idols of a pagan religion. Even Wahhabist Saudi Arabia, along with the governments of many Muslim majority countries condemned the action, and tried to stop it.

"The head and legs of the Buddha statues in Bamiyan were destroyed yesterday," Mawlawi Qudratullah Jamal, the Taliban's minister of information and culture, told reporters in Kabul, Afghanistan's capital. "Our soldiers are working hard to demolish the remaining parts. They will come down soon." He said he anticipated no difficulties: "It is easier to destroy than to build."<sup>6</sup>

The attacks of 9/11 changed basic U.S. strategy against Al Qaida, which inevitably included a war against the Taliban. Previous attacks against the United States had brought limited reactions (see chapter one). AQ actions, first in Afghanistan, then Iraq, has been seen as some as a strategic objective of Al Qaida, with Bruce Riedel writing that:

"They are focusing on a more immediate concern: how to defeat the United States just as they defeated the Soviet Union, how to overthrow U.S. allies in the Muslim world, and how to destroy Israel. As mentioned at the outset of this volume, theirs is a three-pronged strategy: first, wear down the United States and its Western allies in the "bleeding wars" in Iraq and Afghanistan just as the mujahedin wore down the Soviet invaders..."<sup>7</sup>

Air attacks began on 7 October, 2001, and by the end of the month, small teams of CIA ground action officers and special forces operators had linked up with anti-Taliban mujahedeen, some still with active fighters from the Soviet days. The first phase of the war, October to mid-March, 2002, could be understood as a traditional Clausewitzian war, although the tactics were largely asymmetric. The last battle of this phase was Operation Anaconda, in which three battalions of American infantry, supported by CIA and Special Forces' teams, along with about a thousand

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<sup>6</sup>Bearak, Barry. "Over World Protests, Taliban Are Destroying Ancient Buddhas," New York Times, 4 March, 2001. <https://web.archive.org/web/20140302192951/http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/04/world/04AFGH.html?ex=1218686400&en=f513bb4edae409e0&ei=5070>

<sup>7</sup> Riedel, Bruce. *The Search for Al Qaeda*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. Pg. 121.

Afghan mujahedeen, attacked the Shah-i-Kot valley.<sup>8</sup> The second phase of the war, ongoing, has largely seen the Pashtun heavy Taliban regain the initiative through a violent and widespread insurgency.<sup>9</sup>

The scale of the preparation for the war in Afghanistan can be seen in the use of the Ready Reserve, usually inactive, and composed of former members of the U.S. military, and called up on 14 September, 2001, just three days after the attacks.<sup>10</sup> A day later, President Bush characterized the response as a war.<sup>11</sup> Bush's political instincts were spot on: A New York Times/CBS News Poll taken in late September found that 92 percent of those surveyed supported military action, an amazing 72 percent supported military action even if it meant the deaths of thousands of military personnel, and 68 percent believed the war would last longer than a year.<sup>12</sup> By the first week of October, NATO, the mutual defense organization established to confront the Soviet threat in Europe, formally invoked Article V, which considered an attack against a member country as an attack against all.<sup>13</sup> The United Nations response was somewhat delayed, but its Secretary General Kofi Annan outlined general support when he said that "We are struggling, above all, to find adequate words of condemnation for those who planned and carried out these abominable attacks. In truth, no such words can be found. And

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<sup>8</sup> The most readable account is Naylor, Sean. *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda*. New York: Berkley Books, 2005. The Army's official assessment can be found in Wright, Donald et al., *A Different Kind of War: The U.S. Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001–2005*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010). Pp. 127–179.

<sup>9</sup> Stephen Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*. 82:2(2003):31-46.

<sup>10</sup> Bush, George W. "President Orders Ready Reserves of Armed Forces to Active Duty," Executive Order Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty and Delegating Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, 14 September 2001. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-5.html> (accessed 11 March 2009).

<sup>11</sup> Bush, George W. "President Urges Readiness and Patience," Remarks by the President, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcroft, Camp David, Thurmont, MD, 15 September 2001. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915-4.html> (accessed 18 September 2008).

<sup>12</sup> Berke, Richard L. and Janet Elder, "NY Times/CBS Poll," *New York Times*, 25 September 2001, A1.

<sup>13</sup> Robertson, Lord. NATO Secretary General, "Statement to the Press on the North Atlantic Council Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States," 4 October 2001. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm> (accessed 6 December 2006).



words, in any case, are not enough.”<sup>14</sup> The Organization of American States, headquartered in Washington, D.C., and made up of most Central American and South American countries, quickly invoked the Rio treaty which carried an injunction similar to the NATO article V, and Australia and New Zealand pledged their support under the ANZUS treaty.

After the fall of the Taliban, basic services were targeted for improvement, through the United Nations, and individual lead countries. For example, access to basic medical care expanded from 9 percent under the Taliban to 85 percent by 2010. Hunger has been reduced, mobile phone services, nonexistent under the Taliban, has penetrated over 60 percent of the population and internet use has increased to 10 percent. For females, life expectancy has increased from less than forty years, to sixty-two, and for males, it’s reached fifty-nine. Improved sanitation, to include drinking water access has improved. For females, 34 percent have access to secondary education, up from zero under the Taliban, and female literacy has increased to 46 percent.<sup>15</sup>

But security is an illusion in Afghanistan. The heavily Pashtun Taliban simply retreated to the tribal lands in Pakistan to regroup and rearm, with the permanent slums of refugee Afghans providing a bottomless pool of young, willing recruits. The central government in Kabul has steadily lost control of the country, as the massive coalition security force, comprised mostly of the U.S. Army, is withdrawn from a high of one-hundred-thousand in 2010, to less than ten thousand in 2016. In early 2016, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that another 19 of the country’s 400 organized governing districts were under the control of the Taliban. At this point, nearly a third of the country is

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<sup>14</sup> Annan, Kofi. United Nations, “Words Alone Inadequate as Response to Terrorist Attacks, Secretary General Tells Opening of Fifty-sixth General Assembly,” Press Release SG/SM7851, GA 9906, 12 September 2001.

<sup>15</sup> USAID statistics are from <https://idea.usaid.gov/cd/afghanistan?comparisonGroup=region>

subjected to brutal reprisals as the Taliban exact revenge on anyone who has supported the new Afghan government.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, another 88 districts are at risk.<sup>17</sup>

It gets worse. In September, 2014 a battle erupted in which the Afghan security forces reported the presence of Arab fighters pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in Syria, though



Figure 20. An ISIS fighter teaches young children how to fire an assault rifle in Afghanistan. From <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/11/islamic-state-isil-taliban-afghanistan-151101074041755.html>

locals denied this later in a New York Times report.<sup>18</sup> In October, some Taliban commanders pledged their support to ISIS and immediately, the Islamic State, from Raqqa in Syria, announced its presence in Afghanistan by appointing various leaders.<sup>19</sup> Since then, a mini-civil war within the larger civil war has erupted between traditional Taliban and the newcomer ISIS.

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<sup>16</sup> Ali, Idris. "Afghan Government Loses 5 Percent," Reuters. Friday, 29 July 2016. Found online at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-security-taliban-idUSKCN1090B1>

<sup>17</sup> SIGAR, Report to the United States Congress, 30 January, 2016, pg. 69.

<sup>18</sup> Hamdard, Hidayatullah. "ISIS Flexing muscles in Kunduz. Pajhwok Afghan News. 2 Feb 2015. Found online at <http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/03/10/isis-flexing-muscles-kunduz-governor-says>

<sup>19</sup> "Mapping the emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan," Long War Journal, 5 Mar 2015. Found online at <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/03/mapping-the-emergence-of-the-islamic-state-in-afghanistan.php>

The ISIS goal is to integrate what it has named the *Wilayat Khorasan* into the larger caliphate of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Doran, Jamie. "Making ISIL and the Taliban," Al Jazeera, 1 Nov 2015. Found online at <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/11/islamic-state-isil-taliban-afghanistan-151101074041755.html>

## **9.2. Asymmetric Insurgencies**

“Major combat operations in Iraq have ended.”  
Bush, President, 2003.

Iraq as a case study reveals both the power of the asymmetry of identity and the production of preemptive strategies. The war had two phases, the first, a high-tech war fought by conventional forces emphasizing mass and speed. The second phase, in some respects occurring almost simultaneously, was the conflict in which individuals coalesced around strategies of self/other and tactics that avoided the high-tech advantages of the Americans and their allies. The 2003 Iraq war had four fairly clearly demarcated phases. Phase one was the western state vs state war, phase two was a lull as the U.S. attempted to complete its pre-war plan and lasting until 2005, phase three was the full blown insurgency/civil war which lasted till 2009, and the final phase in which U.S. forces finally withdrew from the troubled country. To understand the insurgency, the purpose of this case study, one must examine the pre-war planning and the assumptions that drove U.S. strategy.

In many ways, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a continuation of the war which ended so quickly in 1991. In some ways, which must be obvious in retrospect, the 2003 war was very different. In 1991, the elder President Bush had stopped well short of Baghdad and removing the Iraqi government from power, citing the suffering of the Iraqi people and the limited UN mandate, which called only for the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In 2001, the younger President Bush would call for ‘regime change’ eventually including Iraq in the famous ‘axis of evil’. Intelligence was pointing to a connection between international terrorism and a limited number of states. The 2003 plan was based on aggressive conflict originating from Baghdad and threatening partner nations of the United States, much like 1990. Asked how many troops Secretary Rumsfeld thought might be needed, he replied that 125,000 was probably the right answer. Another round of planning used about 20,000 combat troops with support troops taking the total to somewhere between 75,000 and 100,000. If given the right orders and time to prepare, actual deployment from home bases to Kuwait would take thirty to forty-five days. Once the attack started, planners figured four days

secure the south of Iraq. Duly, the Pentagon asked for new plans. Another version of the plan was trotted out: A corps would secure northern Iraq, a heavy corps would occupy the center, and a Marine expeditionary force would occupy the south. Finally in late December 2001, a finished product was presented. An initial invasion force would deploy over ninety days with its 145,000 troops attacking for forty-five days. Additional troops would continue to flow into Kuwait, bringing the total to 275,000. Another ninety days would be spent “completing the destruction of Saddam’s



Figure 21. Iraq is a desert country inhabited by three Muslim sects, the Kurds in the north, the Shia in the south, and the Sunni in the center.

regime.”<sup>21</sup>

Simulations of the plan continued, but did not take into account the forces required to stabilize the country after the end of major combat operations. CENTCOM planners were told that the State Department would have the lead for rebuilding Iraq’s political institutions and

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<sup>21</sup> Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Vintage Books, 2007. Pg. 33.

infrastructure.<sup>22</sup> Planners knew they would have to leave security forces in place for up to twenty-four months as Iraq was rebuilt. Vague plans called for “maximum use of Iraqi resources” which included the Iraqi military and police who would take over as Americans withdrew.<sup>23</sup> There was disagreement between the political masters who determine the type of war to fight and the Generals who figure out who to fight is important.

General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff asked a post-war planner who stated no fewer than 350,000 coalitions would be needed to secure Iraq after Saddam was removed, and the number could be as high as 500,000. Shortly afterward, the service chiefs were testifying to the Senate Armed Services Committee. When General Shinseki was asked how many troops would be needed to control Iraq, he replied “several hundred thousand.”<sup>24</sup> Those numbers were similar to those in the current plan, which projected 250,000 troops in Iraq by the time Saddam was defeated. The political plan was still to off ramp forces and reduce the size of the occupying force as quickly as possible. What was clear that there was a large difference between the numbers of forces needed to defeat the state of Iraq and what a different set of planners thought was needed to maintain peace afterward. True to the maxims of Clausewitz, the tactical plan called for maximum speed and mass, subject to the direction policy makers had given. I

Instructions to V Corps, who would coordinate the land fight, was to converge on Baghdad quickly, avoiding as much as possible becoming entangled in fighting in the towns along the highways in the river valley. The most recent experience with urban combat was in 1993 in Mogadishu, where 18 American soldiers had been killed. Clearing buildings while

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<sup>22</sup> Weisman, Jonathan and Mike Allen (2003) “Officials Argue for Fast U.S. Exit from Iraq,” Washington Post, 21 April, 2003 found online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/04/21/officials-argue-for-fast-us-exit-from-iraq/7b290011-7333-4aba-8f4b-f9c8b2c826b2/>

<sup>23</sup> Dobbins, James, et al. After the War: Nation Building from FDR to George W. Bush. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008. Pg. 104.

<sup>24</sup> For a good account of the fallout and subsequent resignation of General Shinseki, go to <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/20/opinion/mills-truth-teller-iraq/> An extant report can be found at [http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-02-25-iraq-us\\_x.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-02-25-iraq-us_x.htm); to what the actual hearing, go to [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a\\_xchyleCQw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_xchyleCQw)

wearing heavy chemical protective garments was not a thought relished by the commanders. With Army forces arriving from the west, and the Marines converging from the East, a blocking cordon was established around the city. Forward operating bases were set up, with the first and largest at the Baghdad International Airport. Brigade combat teams would conduct fast raids into the city, aiming at significant power centers, and destroying them with tank, artillery and air power. The force would withdraw quickly. A series of fast offensives would decapitate the regime and the Iraqi army and resistance would collapse, and by avoiding most of the urban areas, the plan would spare casualties on both sides. The initial invasion was an overwhelming success. Within just three weeks, organized resistance by the state of Iraq collapsed under a punishing circus of firepower. By mid-April, the state of Iraq ceased to exist. The important takeaway is that the power generated at the top by the United States allowed it to destroy a state in the face of *overwhelming objections* to the *amount* of power, in the form of troop levels, which would be needed. However, the trajectory of power development that put the U.S. in that position i.e., Clausewitzian principles, blinded to the threat the production of asymmetries by identity posed. Iraq woke up.

As 2004 wore into 2005, the number of groups engaging in violent attacks within Iraq increased. Each group was different, some were more centralized like the *Fedayeen*, and others received support and training from international partners, like the Jays al Mahdi from Iran.<sup>25</sup> The complexity of the conflict stemmed from two primary motivations for conflict: First was confrontation with U.S. and allied forces who were considered intruding outsiders. Second, Baghdad was becoming become the central battlefield for a largely, regional, sectarian struggle for power in post-Saddam Iraq.

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<sup>25</sup> Shankur, Thom and Steven R. Weisman. "Iran is Helping Insurgents in Iraq, U.S. Officials say." New York Times. 20 Sep 2004. Found online at [http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/20/politics/iran-is-helping-insurgents-in-iraq-us-officials-say.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/20/politics/iran-is-helping-insurgents-in-iraq-us-officials-say.html?_r=0)

The existence of large, organized armed sections of political parties ensured the fragmentation of political power in Iraq along patrimonial and other sectarian lines.<sup>26</sup> There is evidence that Saddam Hussein, if not actively planning the insurgency to come, certainly laid the groundwork in terms of resources to fuel the insurgency. After the 1991 defeat, the Iraqi generals realized they would not be able to marshal their conventional army, and particularly the armored and mobile Republican Guard, in the face of U.S. airpower. Instead, they urged an unconventional defense in depth using the cities and villages as chokepoints to trap the Americans in urban fighting and slowing them down. The overall strategy dictated trading territory for time, protecting the Republican Guards' armor, and letting local militias slow the coalition advance. Hussein disagreed, alarmed at the prospect of arming potential enemies, preferring to believe, that like 1991, his forces could stop the United States from crossing the Euphrates. Saddam did develop and arm paramilitary forces for internal security, and these forces, under the leadership of Uday Hussein, were used to protect Baath party sites. In the event of an insurgency like the one by the Shia in 1991, the Fedayeen and militias would hold in the town centers long enough for the Army to arrive.<sup>27</sup> This plan was something akin to a revolution in military affairs for the Iraqi security forces. With few resources on the ground reporting, the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition was missed. In the event, the insurgency was relatively easy to ignite with Saddam's paramilitary Fedayeen having ready access to guns and ammunition.<sup>28</sup> Tariq Aziz, a Deputy Prime Minister in 2002 alluded to Iraq's ability to launch an insurgency. When asked, he said "people say to me, "you are not Vietnamese; you have no jungles and swamps to hide in." I reply "let our cities be our swamps and our buildings our jungles"<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> Herring, Eric and Rangwala, Glen. *Iraq in Fragments: The occupation and its legacy*. London: Hurst, 2006. Pg. 161

<sup>27</sup> Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Vintage Books, 2007. Pg. 71.

<sup>28</sup> Hashim Ahmed S. *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*. London: Hurst 2006.

<sup>29</sup> Herring, Eric and Rangwala, Glen. *Iraq in Fragments: The occupation and its legacy*. London: Hurst, 2006. Pp. 167



The U.S. planning for the war did not seem to recognize the possibility of an insurgency. Pre-war planning focused on a population that would be happy to replace Saddam. The failure of prewar intelligence to discover the Fedayeen meant that it wasn't until the fall of 2003 that the U.S. admitted it was involved in a guerrilla campaign. The pattern of attacks through the fall into 2004 against the Turkish and Jordanian embassies, and the United Nations headquarters showed that the new adversary in Iraq was "intelligent, adept, and adaptable."<sup>30</sup> Attacks surged in 2004, but military targets were only part of the whole. The insurgents, a broad coalition of anti-U.S., anti-Iraq, and religious sects were targeting personnel "working for the Coalition Provisional Authority, personnel from the police and security services, and simultaneous bombings of the political headquarters of the PUK and KPP as well as persistent mortar attacks on the Shia community."<sup>31</sup> This campaign of terror had two objectives: First to drive out the coalition forces, and destabilizing any pro-Iraq government from forming. Attacks had increased from forty per day in December 2003 to an average of one-hundred per day by 2005.

The bulk of violence was occurring in the so-called Sunni Triangle, running from Baghdad in the south, to Ramadi in the west, and north to Tikrit and the oil infrastructure in the area was quickly seized upon as legitimate targets by all main factions fighting the coalition. First, oil was the widely believed reason for the invasion and nationalist elements sought to prevent the U.S. from exploiting its sell. Second, the revenues from oil were meant to rebuild Iraq. U.S. policy makers anticipated that production would "increase within several months of the end of the hostilities" after the U.S.-led invasion."<sup>32</sup> Oil was also seen as integral to the long term ability to build political coalitions and the various factions sought to consolidate their own hold over the parts of the system as well as denying access to others.

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<sup>30</sup> Hammes X. Thomas. *The Sling and the Stone: On war in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. St Paul, MN: MBI Publishing 2006. Pp. 174

<sup>31</sup> Hammes X. Thomas. *The Sling and the Stone*. Pp. 174

<sup>32</sup> Pincus, Walter and DeYoung, Karen. "Analysts' Warnings of Iraq Chaos Detailed." Washington Post, Saturday, May 26, 2007; A01.

Oil pipelines were repeatedly attacked throughout 2005. Linked to the upcoming 2005 election, there were more than ten attacks on major pipelines in August and September 2005 including the pipelines linking Kirkuk to the Iraq's largest refinery in Baiji was disrupted more than a dozen times. Iraqi oil production fell by eight percent by the end of 2005, amid attacks on pipelines and tanker convoys. Insurgents were becoming adept at stealing and selling the oil, using the profits to purchase arms and access across Iraq. The Iraqi Finance minister declared the system to be "beyond Nigeria levels... the insurgents are involved at all levels."<sup>33</sup> By 2007, oil production dropped to 1.9 million barrels per day, just half of the already lowered Iraqi government projections. Exports dropped and oil through the Turkish port of Ceyhan ceased. The Iraqi government still forecast production of 3 million bpd by 2008.<sup>34</sup> It was becoming increasingly clear that insurgents were siphoning off and selling oil at all stages of refinement, and in the quarterly report in June 2007, the U.S. DOD implicated the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Oil being complicit in these thefts with the Baiji refinery, the largest in Iraq, reporting a loss of 70% of the fuel it processed, amounting to as much as \$2 billion a year.<sup>35</sup> Insurgent attacks also took place on the electricity grid, a vital component for stability and restarting the economy. The U.S. would spend seven billion dollars on the electricity and oil sectors, yet electricity output remained below the goals set. In 2006, it was below prewar levels.<sup>36</sup> By 2011, Iraq was only generating about half of the 14k megawatts it needs, importing another 1k megawatts from Iran.<sup>37</sup> White collar workers, desperately in short supply, were targeted also. Doctors and nurses, thought to be Shia because they worked in the Shia controlled Ministry of

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<sup>33</sup> Cordesman, Anthony H. *Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to the Civil Conflict*, Vol. 2. Westport, CT: Praeger Security, 2008. Pg. 648.

<sup>34</sup> Grier, Peter. "Iraq's Oil Production Falls Short of Goals," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 7, 2007.

<sup>35</sup> "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2007." Department of Defense, June 7, 2007; pg. 13.

<sup>36</sup> Glanz, James. "U.S. Agency Find New Waste and Fraud in Iraqi Rebuilding Projects." *New York Times*, 1 Feb 2007. Found online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/01/world/middleeast/01reconstruction.html>

<sup>37</sup> Kami, Aseel. "Militants Attack Iraq's Power Infrastructure." *Reuters*, 7 DEC 2011. Found online at <http://www.reuters.com/article/iraq-violence-electricity-idUSL5E7N738M20111207>

Health, were attacked by Sunni groups. Those that could leave, did, often fleeing westward to Jordan causing a “brain drain” that would cripple Iraq for a generation.<sup>38</sup>

Violence condensed around religious events such as Ramadan and al Shura, with attacks meaning to deepen religious sectarian divisions. Insurgents also targeted the election cycles, hoping to undermine the idea of a national Iraqi government, and the idea that the coalition forces could provide security. Abu Musab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian who pledged his group to Usama bin Laden in February 2004. In a letter to the AQ leader in hiding, he wrote that Shiite militias dominated the new Iraqi Army and police, causing his group to radically alter its offensive activities. He wanted to begin striking Shiite targets, and wanted bin Laden’s approval: “If you agree with us on [targeting Shiites] we will be your readied soldiers. If things appear otherwise to you, we are brothers, and the disagreement will not spoil our friendship.” On March 2, 2004, Shiites celebrating Al Shura, the annual festival commemorating the death of Ali Hussein were attacked in nearly simultaneous suicide bombings in Baghdad and Karbala.<sup>39</sup> At least 100 people were killed in Karbala with about 300 wounded.<sup>40</sup> Zarqawi’s group went on to carry out a campaign of targeted bombings, bombing Shia mosques and Shia neighborhood markets.<sup>41</sup> In December, an audio recording from bin Laden surfaced recognizing Zarqawi as the leader of Al Qaida in Iraq.<sup>42</sup> On September 14 Zarqawi released an audiotape declaring “*total war*” on Iraq’s Shiite population, announcing ex post facto a strategy he began to enact more than a year earlier.<sup>43</sup> The slippery

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<sup>38</sup> UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report, 1 January – 31 March 2007, released 24 April 2007, p.9, available at: [www.uniraq.org](http://www.uniraq.org)

<sup>39</sup> Arraf, Jane and Brent Sadler. “Deadly attacks rock Baghdad, Karbala” CNN.com, 2 March 2004. Found online at <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/03/02/sprj.nirq.main/>

<sup>40</sup> “Iraq Shias Massacred on Holy Day” BBC, 2 March 2004. Found online at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/3524589.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3524589.stm)

<sup>41</sup> “Reuters FACTBOX-Developments in Iraq on July 1” 1 July, 2006, <https://web.archive.org/web/20060719012102/http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/RAS118431.htm>

<sup>42</sup> Hunt, Emily. “Zarqawi’s Total War on Iraqi Shiites Exposes Divide Among Sunni Jihadists,” The Washington Institute, Policy Watch 1049, 15 Nov 2005. Found online at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/zarqawis-total-war-on-iraqi-shiites-exposes-a-divide-among-sunni-jihadists>

<sup>43</sup> Cordesman, Anthony. Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War, Working Draft. Washington, D.C: CSIS, 2006. Pg. 103.

slope of what is and what is not 'ethnic' conflict is demonstrated by Zarqawi's declaration. On the surface, it would be fairly obvious that his Sunni AQIZ was attacking Shia as apostates. On a much deeper level, his declaration followed one of the first successful offensives by the new Iraq Army, which was dominated by Shia. Those raids on Tal Afar must have confirmed his 2004 letter in which he pronounced the Shia to have the upper hand strategically. To counter this, his group would target all Shia in a "total" conflict, in an attempt to draw a Shia backlash and a Sunni uprising.<sup>44</sup> The attack on the Golden Mosque (al Askariya) would come just weeks after the prominent Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr called on his own Jaish al Mahdi to defend poor Sunni who were being killed by the indiscriminate killing by AQIZ.<sup>45</sup> From the summer of 2003 to the summer of 2005, there had been around 400 suicide bombings, with 90 in May 2005 alone. To put this in context, in that one month, there were "nearly as many [attacks] as the Israeli government has documented in the conflict with Palestinians since 1993."<sup>46</sup>

In a striking example of how the distribution of knowledge operates under a power disadvantage, the insurgents in Iraq began designing and building improvised explosive devices (IED) as early as 2003.<sup>47</sup> IEDs, along with suicide bombings, have been likened to "the poor man's cruise missile."<sup>48</sup> They were highly effective, with the Defense Department reporting that half to two-thirds of all casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan were caused by IEDs.<sup>49</sup> Because they were small and easy to construct, hide and transport, IEDs quickly became a favorite weapon against the

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<sup>44</sup> Hunt, Emily. "Zarqawi's Total War."

<sup>45</sup> Ridolfo, Kathleen. Iraq: Mosque Bombing A Test For Emerging Political Climate," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 13 Jun 2007. Found online at <http://www.rferl.org/a/1077105.html>

<sup>46</sup> Eggen, Dan and Scott Wilson. "Suicide Bombs Potent Tool for Terrorists," Washington Post, 17 Jul 2005. Found online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/16/AR2005071601363.html>

<sup>47</sup> Grove, Jairus. *An Insurgency of Things: Foray into the World of Improvised Explosive Devices*. International Political Sociology 10.4 (2016):332-351.

<sup>48</sup> Knickerbocker, Brad. "Relentless toll to US troops of roadside bombs," Christian Science Monitor, 2 Jan 2007. Found online at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0102/p01s03-usmi.html>

<sup>49</sup> Zoraya, Greg. "How the IED changed the U.S. Military." USA Today, 18 DEC 2018. Found online at <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/18/ied-10-years-blast-wounds-amputations/3803017/>

conventional armaments of the coalition.<sup>50</sup> Iranian expertise from the al Quds force brought to Iraq the deadly technology of Explosively Formed Penetrators, i.e., molten copper plugs powered by IEDs that could defeat even heavily armed vehicles.<sup>51</sup> Increasing efforts and resources were committed by the U.S. forces to defeating the IED threat.

Between 2005 and early 2007, a little noticed but significant change occurred in the expeditionary American army in Iraq. Its physical make up did not change. There were still tanks and armored vehicles, artillery, and the omnipresent attack helicopters circling every part of the city. As the threat became individualized, the understanding that individuals could plan, organize and execute deadly attacks with homemade weapons turned the Army into a police force. A police function of investigation and arrest was levied on a machine created for only one purpose: destruction. Massive patrols of heavily armored infantry still swept the neighborhoods looking for cache sites and bomb factories and *people*.

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<sup>50</sup> Lovelace Jr., James and Joseph Votel. The Asymmetric Warfare Group: Closing the Capability Gap. Army Magazine. 55:3(2005):29.

<sup>51</sup> Weisberber, Marcus. "How Many U.S. Troops Were Killed By Iranian IEDs in Iraq?" Defense One. 8 Sep 2015. Found online at <http://www.defenseone.com/news/2015/09/how-many-us-troops-were-killed-iranian-ieds-iraq/120524/>

### **9.3. Analysis and Conclusion**

“Words are uttered, but fail to enlighten.”

Aldous Huxley, *The Doors of Perception*

During the insurgency in Iraq, there were broadly three groups fighting the U.S. led coalition. The first was the nationalist groups were ranged from Hussein era hardliners such as the Fedayeen and leftover Republican Guard officers in the *al Awda* group. The second and third were divided along religious sectarian lines, with Al Qaida in Iraq the most prominent Sunni, and the Mahdi Army the most prominent Shia. In the beginning, all three loosely cooperated in their attacks against the coalition. The Baathist hold outs were quickly hunted down by the coalition and they never gained any tactical advantage, and soon drifted into their respective religious camps. By the time Zarqawi issued his declaration against the Shia, the aim of insurgent violence had shifted from the U.S. to each other. The profusion of resistance groups had two effects, as Ahmed Hashim points out:

“Although the numbers of insurgent groups constitute a political weakness [for creating a cohesive Iraqi government], it also has the unintended consequence been beneficial in so far as it creates significant difficulties for the coalition in attempting to unravel or understand the insurgency, since there is no singular movement, with one coherent ideology and overall goal.”<sup>52</sup>

The US military, long admired for its culture of offensive heroism, was becoming a slave to its own biases, to the detriment of the country. In the 1980s, this institutional bias towards ‘good wars’ and a Patton-esque obsession with offensive speed was expressed as the Wienberger and Powell doctrines. The idea of only using overwhelming force, and only when the nation had expressed its support was sublimely fashioned for maneuver warfare. Following Vietnam, military leaders did not want to be fed piecemeal into problems, and the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the subsequent Allied victory served to confirm this bias. Unfortunately,

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<sup>52</sup> Hashim Ahmed S. (2006) *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*, London: Hurst, 2006. Pg. 208

these ideas would become a constraining and deforming influence at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The military establishment bought and paid for by trillions of dollars was increasingly divorced from the policies it was being asked to implement in places as remote as Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army in Iraq and Afghanistan trained for maneuver warfare, and was woefully ill-prepared for the very personal nature of insurgencies.

The Iraq war arguably marked a culmination in military strategy that began with the defeat in Vietnam. In Vietnam, there was a technological gap between the adversaries, but the mode was similar. The loss there drove the U.S. to invest heavily in technology, so that in the future, they could rapidly establish violent dominance. In Iraq, the vast technology gap between adversaries was at least as great as if the Millennium Falcon had shown up at Gaugamela. Iraq, and Afghanistan in 2009-2011 forced the U.S. to grapple with a basic understanding that applying mass and force and greater military power would not guarantee success.

The war in Afghanistan is heavily predicated on the identity markers of religion and tribe and telluridity. The largely Pashtun Taliban have managed to transform the war from one against the Taliban to one against Islam in the minds of many residents of the war ravaged region. As communication technology comes down in price and spreads, and the effects of globalization become more pronounced, the ability to communicate via cell phones and social media have made resistance groups capable of dynamic mobility, structuring and action. Their ability to evolve into new variants presents a much more complex problem than in the past.<sup>53</sup>

In the case of Iraq, the resistance groups employed a broad strategy meant to increase the cost on all fronts of operating there. Direct insurgent attacks, i.e., firefights with small arms, on coalition units were relatively rare with the bulk of the violence directed against soft targets. By spreading out its attacks across Iraq, the insurgency put the coalition on the defensive. While the

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<sup>53</sup> Cohen, Eliot, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl. *"Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counter-Insurgency,"* Military Review, 2006:49-53.

actual attacks and loss of people and material could have been sustained by the coalition, the local advantages derived from the distribution of knowledge drove strategic effects that ended with the election of Barack Obama and the withdrawal of the coalition from Iraq in 2011.

In Afghanistan, the war is ongoing, with the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops delayed by President Obama in 2015 as security deteriorated. However, the level of troops is so low, essentially a combat brigade with added support troops that any real security must be provided by the Afghan's themselves. In the end analysis for both countries, the absence of foreign troops is prerequisite to any sustained action for peace, since the West, in the guise of ultra-violent militaries, simply enflames resistance groups.

The lessons for a modern army fighting a resistance group are several: No state can withstand the force of the modern blitzkrieg. If 1991 was the experiment, then 2003 was the proof. The other aspect is that in modern states, particularly low-growth states on the periphery, identity trumps the new nationalism. To murder a cliché, the enemy of your enemy is only your friend for a little while, something the U.S. political leaders forgot in the run up to the invasion. Be wary of the next big thing, the hyped answer to a new problem cloaked in familiar language. The military machine of Schumpeter, feeling neglected after its iconic victory in the first Gulf War, and searching for a great issue that would unify the country behind it, cast about and discovered preemption. Without understanding the wider purpose of Liberalism and force, or understanding its retroactive effect, no strategy can be crafted relying on military force that will achieve any victory. Resistance groups are able to harness greater moral forces than the state, something Clausewitz alluded to in the short essay in *On War* about people's war. What is surprising is that few military analysts, and even fewer generals, despite their allegiance to teaching Clausewitz, have realized that the superior moral impetus of the offensive that accrues to an Army, would also accrue to the partisan. The second lesson is one which occurs more frequently, is not mentioned in current doctrine, and only works by being prepared to use overwhelming force. The lesson is that, in irregular wars, when you attack, you are surrounded,



a lesson arguably lost on the French, and definitely on the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and again for the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. Knowledge is coercive- this is the confounding effect of back cast critical thought that Massumi teased out in his *Ontopower*.<sup>54</sup> The worse the defeat in the current wars, the better the last good war seems, with its emphasis on firepower, maneuver, and technology. In irregular wars, inability to decisively win gives way to wars of probabilities. Militaries, with their emphasis on concrete, quantifiable and delineated action, are particularly good at reconfiguring the past to fit the new information. Not doing this would create unbearable cognitive dissonance.

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<sup>54</sup> Massumi, *Ontopower*. Pg. 155.

## CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS

“So ends the bloody business of the day.”  
Homer, *Odyssey*

### **10.1. Three Tasks**

The serious work of exploring irregular war, began in the 1950s and 1960s by better-abled philosophers than I, was muted by the deterministic mechanics of the Cold War. After the attacks of 9/11, that is changing. In support of this trend, I have attempted three tasks in this dissertation: To illustrate that Liberalism has a global transformative mission which can be viewed as counterinsurgency; that irregular war is a product of regular war's emphasis on the distribution of power, and that the intrusion of the West into areas where knowledge trumps power generates identity conflict. A fourth task grew out of the analysis of the first three: Describing the origins, conditions and mechanisms of preemption as a new strategic artifice.

Conflicts in late liberalism are often studied, if not in a vacuum absent any context, then as stand-alone issues. The descriptions of why the conflict is occurring is almost perfunctory, and much of this stems from a focus on the methods of combat. I sought to change, or at least introduce the idea that the asymmetry of so many conflicts is rooted in how each side sees its war machine. Those war machines encourage the emphasis on tactics and techniques, which simplify conflict in such a way as to bolster the perception of ease and dominance. As demonstrated in Chapter three, the war machine finds it convenient to focus on method, ever refining the application of force through technology. Truly, when the protagonist are free to focus on the how of war, and not the why, the application of increasing levels of force can make any argument of liberty, norms and values moot. This preoccupation with method skews military planning to the asymmetric use of weapons. This reluctance to engage on the basis of war making philosophy is deeply rooted in the western *chauvinisme* associated with the long monopoly on state wars. Viewing conflict through a lens of asymmetric methodology provides

limited analytic power anyway, rooted as it is in first-world/third-world confrontations. While it is true that most asymmetric conflicts are between clearly delineated opponents, developing the conceptual tension between regular war and irregular war, while the terms themselves are sophomoric, has allowed the development of a more complete model of conflict, which has been a useful goal. Expunging the deeper obscurity over the fundamental analysis on the nature of conflict has revealed that both sides are driven to war by its basic philosophical underpinnings and attachment to identity. This is the change in the nature of conflict, away from state centered conflict, by large formations, attempting to break the Clausewitzian trinity. The rise of the strong central states is correlated with the rise of collectivized violence, i.e., state war. Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, states engaged in limited wars. The rise of Napoleon saw a strong state harness the unlimited enmity of the people, necessary for the existential wars needed to transform states and the international system. Through the remainder of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and much of the 20<sup>th</sup>, these wars of unconditional surrender were, if not desirable, then considered the *forme parfait* of war. In wars against other states operating under the same philosophies, this type of war has provided great support to the advancement of Liberal ideals. The two World Wars and the threat of war during the U.S./Soviet standoff are prime examples, but perhaps the American Civil War, fought to end a peculiarly barbarous slavery, shines as the exemplar. The goals in war changed without changing the way of war itself. The conflicts in Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan and most recently, Iraq and Afghanistan, weren't meant to break the state. These conflicts saw the West attempting to impose a western, Liberal image on societies still operating at an identity level which was antecedent to the nationalism that drove the earlier ascendancy of the West. The introduction of the force into these areas then generated resistance groups who engaged in violent conflict. These groups that take up arms in order to preserve their way of life operate at a distinct power disadvantage. As the telos has lengthened into late Liberalism, the very irregular strategy of preemption arose, powered by the *onto*-ability to define the threat after the fact.

The partisan is irregular, when the partisan is understood to be the come-upper, the revolutionary, the insurgent, and the terrorist, the underdog. His power status requires him to use is knowledge advantage, which in in the normative conflict the west would seek to have, is irregular. Thus, the irregularity of the partisan is no mystery. As Carl Schmitt rightly pointed out, the irregularity of partisan war comes from its relationship to regularity. Western war machines are nothing if not regular. Their product, regular war is defined by its structure; the irregular war of the partisan goes where the structure is not. There is a polarity in this dyad- the greater the regularity, the more surprise the irregular fighter achieves, and at ever lower costs. There is a Wittgensteinian crisis over the definition of irregular war can be easily solved by simple analysis.<sup>1</sup> The word itself implies something that is strange, or bizarre; not normal. This then generates a power relationship which reinforces the application of *regular war* as the *right* way.

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<sup>1</sup> In a drole essay, Colin S. Gray, the British-American strategist, addresses the confusion generated after 9/11. Gray, Colin S. Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters. Strategic Studies Quarterly. Winter, 2007:35 -57.

## **10.2. The War Machine**

As seen in chapter four, a state is sum of the power generated by its three parts: the people with their passion for life, the government, which maintains the framework of liberty that maximizes opportunity, and force, which not only protects, but in a significant way, creates and sustains that sum. The war machine is an apt description of his sum, allowing an opportunity to hypothesize that the most advanced war machines are a product of the most warlike societies. In a similar way, there is a symbiosis between the two protagonists. Illiberal regimes trigger Liberal interventions which in turn trigger illiberal reactions. As discussed in chapter two, the war machine transforms itself into an expeditionary focal point of power production, itself the end of the means of western politics. While domestically the latency of force is used to create the structure of society, it has transformed from disciplinary in nature to a securitization of events. Domestically, force has a quality of dark matter, structuring and holding the internal together. In its external manifestation, force becomes exportable as military force against the recalcitrant and *grossier*. In the West, the role of ethnic identity in creating tellurian political groups was replaced by a new identity that of nationalism with its common narrative of economic development and export into the new lands of the global south and east. The war machine, acting has the spearhead of the Liberal idea has as its propelling force generative capitalism, thus capitalizing and enshrining in the *modus vivendi* of the most successful, i.e., the largest states, the idea that nationalism, militarism and capitalism are synergistic and inseparable. Once this *mélange* occurred, each supported the other, both deriving life and providing it to the others, institutionalizing themselves. The thin crust of militarism, itself the product of the necessary requirement for self-defense, then inevitably spreads and grows along with the expanding economies, the perception that a militarized state is as important to life as the bread provided by jobs. The will to war is inbred into the nationalist character of the most successful expansionary states, and with the monolithic spread of Liberalism and neo-liberalism from its birth in the West, nationalism and militarism became conduits of aggression.

Neoliberalism benefited from them, and in turn provided the political and economic means to incubate and foster these characteristics. That military is best described today as Clausewitzian, after its manner of operation. The huge expense of the Clausewitzian war machine means that there can only be so much, more being done with less, and the delta being filled by technology. This in turn requires more force at the point of execution, a requirement that Clausewitzian states excel at fulfilling. The trend is undeniable- from half a million troops in Algeria and Afghanistan to a hundred thousand in Afghanistan and Iraq, to just a few thousand today in the fight against ISIS and Al Qaida with no lessening of *tactical* success.

There has been a risk throughout this dissertation of oversimplifying the idea of Liberalism and connoting it with 'the West'. This is perhaps another symptom of the comparative advantage Europe and her progeny have enjoyed, but it is not an oversimplification to do the same for the 'Army'. This is important because an army is a reflection of its society. The rationalist impulse of the first scientist led to a great race to define everything. In much the same way as the Enlightenment drove out the possibility of the *ancien regime*, its effect on the war machine ended the personal allegiance to the warlord and ushered in an era of prolific writers determined to solve the war riddle. What they ended up doing was simplifying it in such a way as to exponentially increase the ease of its use and export. The efficacy of those early professional soldiers caused a desire for more of the same and spread tactics and a distinctly western understanding of strategy. With the widespread adoption of gunpowder and the growing exploration for resources and markets, the European way of war was spread, becoming, along the way, *the* regular way of war. By using the lens of Clausewitz to re-examine the nature of war, his idea that war is a social act, the *bio-politic-ness* of it reveals the singularity. I am no worshipper of Clausewitz; he is not sacrosanct. But neither does anything written here disagree with his description of the nature of war- perhaps my work is an extension of his. I think he would be pleased with it. This doesn't excuse the fact that Clausewitzian

armies, built around his ideas of force and time, are an extraordinarily poor tool to use in identity wars as the case studies have shown. Liberalism sees itself as the 'right way' and its mechanism of force does not a good track record of self-correction. Information, as it were, is coercive and the very production of order and regularity make it difficult to change. The cognitive shortcuts provided by an active bureaucracy provide comfortable decision making routines that produce, over and over, the same policies.

Military specialists need to resist the siren song of simple state on state conflicts, which are inarguably on the wane. The bulk of history of the future, and the future, will be small, brutal conflicts driven by identity. Without resorting to moralizing over whether democracy or equality are goods worth distributing, what the case studies have shown is that it is very difficult for third parties to do so by the barrel of a gun. One of the shortcomings is the very nature of the force in the West. In three of the case studies, the initial reaction against intrusion transmogrified into something more than simply an alternative; the result was a terrible illiberal way of life. In Algeria, the FLN established a one party system of government which focuses on exporting oil and natural gas. The bill came due in the 1990s as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was ousted in a coup after a largely democratic election. Using the same religious semiotics, the second Algerian war pitted moderate Islamist groups against hardline groups in which as many as one-hundred-fifty thousand Algerians were killed. In Vietnam, the re-education camps were filled for a decade after the war as Hanoi eradicated the French and American influence in the south. Arguably, the seeds of support sown in the fifties and sixties throughout Laos and Cambodia would bear a bitter fruit. The idea that Liberalism willingly uses war to spread itself can be seen on the many levels of the Indochina conflicts. French colonialism, the cold war standoff, the 'hearts and minds' campaigns in South Vietnam are familiar. Less so was the North Vietnam war against the hill tribes like the Degar and the Hmong. These tribes were less inclined to resist the communism of the North, but fought mainly because they had been the

target of oppression by the majority Viets since they had been pushed out of the rich coastal lowlands into the Central Highlands. A living hell was reserved for Cambodia as the Khmer Rouge, armed and trained by the North Vietnamese to protect their sanctuaries, came boiling out of the eastern mountains and onto the plains. Instituting draconian Year One policies, as many as four million Cambodians were killed meant to usher in a just equality. Particularly targeted were any people with connections to western influence, such as English language ability, the wear of glasses, or simply living in towns. Eventually, Hanoi would invade, oust the Khmer Rouge, and occupy Cambodia for ten years.\* To this day, the Lao People's Democratic Republic is one of most underdeveloped states in the world, run by be-medaled and corrupt generals in a pseudo-socialist puppet state of Hanoi. In Afghanistan, the careful cultivation of radical Islamic groups by The Pakistani Intelligence Service, the ISI, backfired when these groups ended the Mujahedeen war as the strongest. The Taliban was the result. In Iraq, it was ISIS. War, it seems, refines violence in a survival-of-the-fittest competition. The West attempts to control life in an effort to provide the maximum liberty for all while resistance groups resort to the disciplinary practices that limit the physical body by intentionally targeting the individual.

States unprepared for wars against materially weak coalitions have paid the price. Arguably, the Soviet Union failed to defeat the largely Pashtun mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan and the United States has been unable to dominate the same people thirty years later. U.S. led western action has unleashed pent-up sectarianism throughout the Middle East through the removal of stable dictatorships. Even Beijing sits on uneasy populations in Xinjiang and Tibet while its attentions are pulled towards intimidating its (non-Han) neighbors in the South China Sea. Disintegration of national states can be observed today in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria and Mexico. The Philippines, having fought a long colonial war against the

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\* In 1979, China conducted a limited invasion of Vietnam in response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. China stopped short of Hanoi, withdrew, and both countries claimed victory.



United States in the first half of the twentieth century, now fights an even longer colonial war against the Muslims of Mindanao. The Congo is a region in which little state control has taken root in its remotest areas, spawning a conflict that has spread across the continent. In Chechnya and Dagestan, modern Russians continue to fight a war first made famous by Tolstoy's Hadji Murat after the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. Twice in the 1990s, the Red Army simply demolished Grozny and the surrounding, Muslim majority countryside. Today, an uneasy peace has settled over the land occupied by a compliant Russian backed authoritarian.

The vast majority of literature on future conflict revolves around technological innovations that are meant to overcome the age-old military tyranny of time and distance: Stealth fighters, autonomous, armed drones, Nano-robots that reside in the body and harnessing quantum mechanics to process information.<sup>2</sup> This emerging cyber world is an area where new forms of identity are created, stripped of language and religion, but even more personal as data giants map your past, and predict your future. Personal decisions become public property and the effect is an erasure of identity. These are methods, and however technologically advanced, are simply tools wielded by the drivers that construct conflict. Deeper analysis reveals deeply embedded biological processes, i.e., conflict is an inevitable condition of human possibility. Indeed, it seems that the most powerful states' often seem to rest on a singular concentration of one identity that is tied to the conception of that state. Roman and Persian empires, Charlemagne and William the Conqueror, German *lebensraum* to the modern Han Chinese migration into Tibetan and the Uighur lands, and the current epidemic of Islamist expansionism into non-Muslim lands testify to the power of identity. Indeed, a paradox of the new security dilemma is laid bare when one considered that the most homogenous societies

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<sup>2</sup> Breakthrough Technologies for National Security, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (2015) found online at [www.darpa.mil](http://www.darpa.mil)

have been the most violent, ironing their populations' differences out. Perhaps achieving the total mobilization required for the most destructive wars of the past two-hundred years required a relatively homogenous population turning economic output into military force. Riots in Paris and London, Ferguson and Baltimore and the rise of the ethnic political groups in Europe and the United States seem to herald a return to a darker time. A happy, cosmopolitan pluralism was the promised reward for accepting the architecture of state domination but it has become a myth located squarely in the failure of liberalism to erase ethnicity. That disbelief fuels a breakdown in civil society at the individual level, driving persons to rely on coalitions that are safe and familiar. It should be clear that ethnic identification is a powerful predictor of conflict, both *ex ante* in its evolution of tools to ensure survival and *ex post facto* in its distribution of resources. It is also clear that identity and culture reinforce each other in ways that cannot be easily observed. There is a strategic interaction between the two that creates an opaque floor below which the fusing of the two is hidden, perhaps making it impossible to predict when and where conflict may explode. It is unclear if identity will trump cosmopolitan Liberalism, putting it under pressure and revealing that the international system itself is a construct based on dominance and resource control.

### **10.3. The Singularity**

The ability of resistance groups to confound the war machines is the singularity. I built the idea of the singularity from Clausewitz trinity. This was necessary in order to complete Clausewitz theory of war and demonstrate the origins of identity conflicts. Defeating states is a rather simple matter of disconnecting any of the legs of the trinity. Defeating resistance groups is infinitely more complex because both sides is using power to force a redistribution of goods along identity lines. Resistance groups have rejected the monochromatic vision of the world that Liberalism promises. At the fore-edge of its creative destruction, humanitarian interventions often create despots who then rule with iron fists. Distribution of goods, generally seen as the *métier* of modern states becomes corrupted through oligarchic practices that restrict social mobility. People who define themselves through the any of the various lintels of identity fall back on that group for protection, for support, and ultimately, for mobilization in order to seek redress. When violence flares, and it does take a horrific form in the singularity, pressure is exerted by the system to intervene militarily. This goes much deeper than a simple tactic to end fighting. One must view Liberalism as *la vie dispositif*, with the purpose of applying force to teach the recalcitrant the proper social mores that support a blossoming and burgeoning center. From the famines of Foucault, states have grown sophisticated and fat. With no shortage of the *physical* resources needed for life, states have discovered that the threat of the *other* provides unlimited power to organize life.

The necessary condition of mobilization, identity, is a double edged sword. Dynamic leaders who can rally a given group based on historicized or even false grievances must provide the resource distribution promised as the panacea. If the goods fail to materialize, violence can result. If the threat of violence is significant, other groups can assume preemptive strategies, thus giving rise to the very violence they sought to forestall. Attacked groups then hew more closely together as a reaction to the violence, giving further impetus to action. It may seem

strange that physical destruction of the body matters less than the threat to the idea of self-connection. This seemingly irrational action is generated from the unlimited animus that mobilizes the partisan, who then act as a group even though the personal costs can be unlimited. The partisan's connection to his identity is so strong that the fear of loss of that identity would cause the partisan to lose a link to his or her immortality. This would make the individual hew more tightly to ethnic identification and support the actions needed to win the conflict. This is a key in the total mobilization that ethnicities often achieve in conflict. Conversely, states can rarely achieve full mobilization when combatting ethnic conflict; the citizenry is too diverse to consider threats from small ethnic groups as existential in nature. The strategic will and purpose of ethnic ideologies is tied up in the simple structural connections between early self-identity, ethnic identity and political ideology. Threatening situations drive conservatism, i.e., conflict draws ethnically self-identified individuals closer together. Threats put pressure on the group to adapt or disintegrate in order to erect protective processes than ensure the survival of privileges, privileges often earned through earlier violent conflict.

The identification of the self/individual is a powerful motivation to protect one's self through the preservation of the group, even while risking individual death. In the case studies this can be seen through positive and negative examples. In Algeria, the pied noir fell created the OAS in an attempt to preserve their position, of which individual personal status may have been built up over centuries. The Algerians themselves were quite clear that their vision of the future of the Algeria was a Muslim future, and relied on those sacred beliefs to fuel the solidarity so needed to take on a technically superior war machine in the guise of the French. The strength of knowledge puts paid to the idea that force can accomplish much. This emphasis on the individual makes every individual in the group an experiment in free will, taking upon themselves the reason and force, which in Western states, is reserved to the state and Army respectively. With no way to break the relationship between the three except through killing, the

application of force agitates the passion, igniting enduring grievances which are vented through violence. In some way, perhaps, this is evidence that the pain suffered for an identity makes those lives worth living.

#### **10.4. Preemption**

So what is the course of a future of preemption as mode? What happens to the state war machines? Whereas the power of the state represented an incursion into liberty, the introduction of the war machine, far from indicating the necessity of the state to resistance groups, actually generated enmity. In order to function properly, the *dispositif* must insist on delimiting the endless possibilities of boundless liberty in order to properly prepare for the management of different probabilities. It comes back to *ontopower*, the ability to redefine the past in ways that justify the threat. Modern western militaries are expensive, and costs will continue to climb. The single largest single costs is labor, the actual persons that wear the uniform or work to support the war machines. People will continue to be cut, but in order to ensure the ability to apply destructive force, technology will fill the difference. The state increases the use of tech in an effort to get around the 'norms and values' crisis of hysteria against killing, and groups increase the spectacle, the barbarity, which then tends to breed the worst of the worst survival game. The drawback is that the costs per unit of destruction is exponentially higher than the good wars of the past, and so the targeting must not fail, must be absolutely correct. This requires a failsafe, which becomes the vilification of the place and people from which the threat comes. This is not to say that there aren't monsters in the world, for which the only action can their destruction. Rather, it is simpler to justify the costs of the action if the target is part of a wider swath of politics that have been condemned. That is the *ouroboros* of Liberalism and preemption- by embedding preemption in the sider conflicts of good versus evil, it doesn't matter who is killed, because *they* are *all* bad. We observed this in the killings of civilians in Algeria, the relocation of entire villages in Vietnam, and the razing of valleys in Afghanistan. We can see it today in the fatwa of Bin laden, the travel ban of Trump, and the particularly vicious rhetoric emanating from the American political left and their information elites.

This makes the delivery of justice difficult. The killing of civilians, through the cultural preemptive actions of a protagonist, is a willful action meant to send a message. In the West, the careful manipulation of the operating environment creates *des sentiments forts* that the struggle- the very difficulty of the conflict- was meant to reinforce the idea that the core tenants of Liberalism had to be defended through offensive wars against a tough, barbaric enemy of ignorance. On the other side, particularly with the wide, pervasive conflict with Islam, the fascist adherents of the most extreme ideologies drink deeply from the idea that the very basis of western society is juridically disallowed, thus the persons of the west are do not enjoy juridical rights to existence. People without the right to exist, do not, and thus all action is allowed. The only justice allowed in this toxic miasma of beliefs becomes the destruction of the people, i.e., preemption on a grand scale.

## **10.5. The Ouroboros**

Liberalism's inability to provide largesse for all means that some groups have suffered from been a lack of production of opportunity that eases their integration into a larger whole. In the west, the power of the liberal state was justified because it moves people to build capacity for reason and deliberation, using its coercive power to produce morally better human beings. Governments were predicated on the legitimization of the security state that allowed their citizens to unlock their full potential. States strove to balance the most extensive liberty with the greatest economic opportunity possible.<sup>3</sup> The security state developed, not as a result, but in conjunction with liberalism. In Europe, the arguments for economic growth were meant to tame the wars of religion and the anarchy of the feudal dynasties. States used their coercive force to organize the economic output of their citizens and industrialized force to defend their interests from the influence of other states. By the mid seventeenth century, the European states were largely self-contained, centrally organized, and free from internal dissent. Suspicion of neighboring states and long memory convinced ruling elites that the greatest threats came from others and without a doubt, the most devastating wars in history have been fought by the mobilized power of states. Nationalism powered armies from the Napoleonic wars through the fall of the atomic bombs in 1945. Eurocentric histories have painted state on state war as the primary mover of history, but this picture is misleading. From roughly the sixteenth century to the cold war, there had been one interstate war for every two intra-state wars. That ratio actually rose to five intrastate wars to one interstate war from 1945 to 1992.<sup>4</sup> In identity wars, the killing is personal, rooted deeply in social settings where the killers are known to their victims. This was the shock of the Yugoslav civil war and the Rwanda massacres, following as they did an impersonal world divided by the Cold War, wherein the fighting was "people in rage

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<sup>3</sup> Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*, New York: Belknap Press, 1999. Mill, John Stuart (1859) *On Liberty*, Elizabeth Rapaport, ed. Cambridge MA: Hackett Publishing, 1978. Kant, Emmanuel. *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Mary Gregor, ed. and trans. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

<sup>4</sup> Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. *Causes of War*, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.



against each other and people fleeing from the rage."<sup>5</sup> That so much of the IR literature is bounded here is largely because the IR field itself is a product of places and time between the two World Wars. Those early researchers focused on states as the primary units of conflicts but following the Second World War, some theorists began to explore the fundamental changes in war that would occur in the latter half of the twentieth century.<sup>6</sup> Little headway was made in their study of *guerrilla warfare* before the cold war hardened IR into arguments about the various stabilities of unipolar, bipolar, and multi-polarity. Compounding the problem was the emphasis on realism and the importance of natural resources, economic strength and military forces, which squeezed out the influence of norms, values and identity on conflict.\* This weakness has grown as the European (and North American) states have aged, moving closer to techno-war and further away from blood of conflicts.

Force is a cheap *doppelganger* for power. In this final analysis, the West has made the mistake of seeing force as a solution to power. The pivot between power and violence appears to revolve on the idea of legitimacy. Violence- force in action- becomes empowering. Violence is the most obvious manifestation of power. It is through the war machine that the dispositif of Liberalism becomes manifest, moving from the latent power of the people, to an iron hammer of force. The dispositif of Foucault directly spawns the "rule of the nobody", which in turn, causes the rise of Arendt's *homo faber*, the idea of man as the Maker. This belief in self as the creator legitimizes violence, as creating gives the right to destroy.<sup>7</sup> People, chiefly concerned with their

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<sup>5</sup> Schorr, Daniel. *Come to Think Of It: Notes On the End of the Millenium*, New York: Viking, 2007. Pg. 30.

<sup>6</sup> Some of the earliest were Aron, Raymond. *Peace and War: A theory of International Relations*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966. Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*. New York: Knopf, 1967; Waltz, Kenneth (1967) "The Politics of Peace," *International Studies Quarterly* 11:3(1967):199-211.

\* Thus the importance of Alexander Wendt's contribution of social constructivism to the discussion. See Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

<sup>7</sup> Arendt, Hannah. *The Human Condition*, 2d Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. pp. 305-306.

private lives, give consent to power, and its latency comes from their numbers. People create power, and they then take upon themselves the juridical duty to destroy power, i.e., individuals.

That is why violence from a few can always provide victory over millions. The death of one person has a multiplicative effect on the decrease in power. Hannah Arendt wrote as much. Violence always outpunches its weight in numbers, through the shock of finding that consent to be governed, providing power, was not sufficient enough to be secure. This is why terrorism is so effective. It shatters the illusion that security can be provided. The shockwaves reverberate across institutions until people see oppression as an acceptable modality of survival. Herein lies the problem. Violence and force have a corrosive effect on power. Power and violence are at two ends of a spectrum. Where power rules, there is persuasion. Power, as persuasion, is democracy of a sort, in that it derives its legitimacy from the persuaded. As I've written earlier, violence can persuade, but it can never be legitimate. People don't willingly give their consent under violence. Hannah Arendt wrote that legitimacy bases itself on appeal to the past, while justifying its cost in relation to a glorious future.<sup>8</sup> Violence, is always justified by its promise of a new beginning, but can never be legitimate because it destroys what has been. This is the chief weakness of violence. Violence is destructive. Arendt makes the case that power and violence are antithetical, without going so far as to say power is peaceful. Power is persuasive, without violence. Violence can destroy power, which comes from people, by destroying the people. Violence and force can be synonyms, which can be seen in their Latin root: *violentia*, to violate, forcibly. Furthermore, violence may be necessary to bring liberty from oppression, but it is not sufficient to bring freedom of opportunity. This basic good must be provided by persuasion.

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<sup>8</sup> Arendt, Hannah. *On Violence*. Harvest Books: New York, 1970. Pg. 55.

Unfortunately, power and violence are not dichotomous. In the real world, power and violence are rarely separated. As real life extends itself towards the realization of either pure form, reactions are triggered. Hegemony, the ultimate expression of power, brings balancing, and it is in this aspect that Liberalism goes to war. Resistance groups challenge the notions of how things are and the way they ought to be. Lacking the fungibility of rich states, resistance groups target the individual. Finding that force doesn't solve the insurgency problem, states target the individual too. Terrorism, a peculiar word for preemption, is the complete absence of legitimate power, triggers like reactions from Liberal states. States and resistance groups operate somewhere in the middle, making decisions, i.e., practicing politics, about the tradeoffs between power and violence is an effort to maintain legitimacy.

As the West sinks into an oblivion of consumerism and self-criticism, the failure of its war machine becomes apparent and it has sought, and found, a new strategy. War has evolved from systemic shocks of prevention such as World War One and Korea, to preventive conflicts in Vietnam, to the preemptions of the drone. The drone strike represents a full closure of the circle of Clausewitzian force as surely as does the nuclear weapon. Resistance groups target civilians because they are easy to kill, and can be counted as propaganda losses against the state. The state responds with preemption. Both are actions meant to achieve reciprocity using force to the max. What is for sure is that the dead are dead. The relentless march of technology means that the drone is even now passing from the scene as the Liberal weapon of choice. Recent reports have surfaced of ISIS employing them in the battle for Mosul. No doubt there are new weapons being developed that will take preemption further towards the concept of the political in which there is no compromise.

Liberalism attempts to recreate itself in the periphery, reducing and eventually obliterating the illiberal other. This is its global, transformative mission. There have been others, the tribal structure of the Romans, the life-Gods of Egypt and Persia, the distinctly racial

hierarchy's of Japan and Germany- including versions of Liberalism, most notably, the communism as practiced by Stalin. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the victory of Liberalism and its neo-economic institutions seemed assured. No alternative system was seen as viable. China liberalized its economy and introduced limited private property rights. In Africa, totalitarian despots experimented with social nationalist policies and ran their countries into the ground. In South America, Venezuela and Bolivia are moribund; Cuba is taking tentative steps towards a market economy, albeit one dominated by the state. Only North Korea remains locked in a Stalinist vision of utopia. Liberalism is left standing, and it has taken many wars to achieve its current position. In its desire to provide human security and 'freedom from fear' Liberalism seeks consensus. That difficult goal of Liberalism, would seek to have all groups accept a certain way to live, imposed, as it were, by force. Anyone that chooses that believes a part of their identity should be valued above/beyond the common rights of the rest will cause problems.

This is the conundrum in which Liberalism finds itself. In order to justify the politics of power generation, it requires the presentation of an illiberal periphery as its adversary. Liberalism prefers hierarchical war, waged by a state authority, but it denies this to the irregular fighter and resistance group. As irregular war is about restructuring the local or global political order, this presents the existential threat that justifies conflict. Recurring military interventions are meant to validate the Schumpeterian war machine. But Liberalism requires a massive resource dislocation, exacerbating existing inequalities. In a closed system, which the world necessarily is, there is a finite amount of movement possible. As Liberalism has expanded, especially since the end of the Cold War, there is less left on the outside to be moved to the inside. Already marginalized groups are squeezed between the dubious benefits of state mandated resource distribution, and their identities. Inevitably, they are choosing identity. Feelings of mortality and the perception of oppression are realized in the military interventions

and occupations of their life modalities. Preemption allows targeted killing that maintains the threat. The application of violence is targeted towards the individual. Extending Foucault's biopolitical securitization, populations no longer accept the wide spread indiscriminate violence required in general wars. It is well documented that weak groups willingly target civilians, partly because they are simply easier targets, and partly because the killing of individuals not associated with the state organism generates much greater returns towards reciprocity. Partisan fighters achieve reciprocity by capitalizing on their *knowledge* advantage. Their intimate knowledge of the ties between self and the group, which powers an intrinsic belief in the superiority of the self and group, and consequently, the superiority of the individual narrative. Resort to violence is inevitable, thus fulfilling the prophecy and turning the global transformative mission of Liberalism into one of counterinsurgency, a never-ending war of maintenance that sees terrible deeds done in the name of a great good.

"Finally, from so little sleeping and so much reading, his brain dried up and he went completely out of his mind."

Miquel de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*

## APPENDIX ONE: INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED INTERNAL CONFLICTS

SideA	SideB	Type Of Conflict	Location
Government of India	Government of Pakistan	Interstate Conflict	India, Pakistan
Government of Algeria	AQIM	Internal Conflict	Algeria
Government of Burundi	Forebu, Military faction of General Godefroid Niyombare	Internal Conflict	Burundi
Government of Chad	IS	Internal Conflict	Chad
Government of Colombia	ELN, FARC	Internal Conflict	Colombia
Government of Egypt	IS	Internal Conflict	Egypt
Government of Ethiopia	OLF	Internal Conflict	Ethiopia
Government of Ethiopia	ONLF	Internal Conflict	Ethiopia
Government of India	CPI-Maoist	Internal Conflict	India
Government of India	Kashmir insurgents	Internal Conflict	India
Government of India	UNLFW	Internal Conflict	India
Government of Kenya	Al-Shabaab	Internal Conflict	Kenya
Government of Lebanon	IS	Internal Conflict	Lebanon
Government of Libya	Forces of the House of Representatives	Internal Conflict	Libya
Government of Libya	IS	Internal Conflict	Libya
Government of Mali	FLM	Internal Conflict	Mali
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	KIO	Internal Conflict	Myanmar (Burma)
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	SSPP	Internal Conflict	Myanmar (Burma)
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	MNDAA	Internal Conflict	Myanmar (Burma)
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	PSLF	Internal Conflict	Myanmar (Burma)
Government of Pakistan	BLA, BLF, BRA	Internal Conflict	Pakistan
Government of Philippines	CPP	Internal Conflict	Philippines
Government of Philippines	ASG, BIFM, MILF	Internal Conflict	Philippines
Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	Internal Conflict	Russia (Soviet Union)
Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	IS	Internal Conflict	Russia (Soviet Union)
Government of Sudan	Darfur Joint Resistance Forces, SRF	Internal Conflict	Sudan
Government of Syria	PYD	Internal Conflict	Syria
Government of Thailand	Patani insurgents	Internal Conflict	Thailand
Government of Turkey	PKK	Internal Conflict	Turkey

Government of Yemen (North Yemen)	IS	Internal Conflict	Yemen (North Yemen)
Government of Afghanistan	Taleban	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan	IS	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Afghanistan
Government of United States of America	al-Qaida	Internationalized Internal Conflict	United States of America
Government of Azerbaijan	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Azerbaijan
Government of Cameroon	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Cameroon
Government of Cameroon	IS	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Cameroon
Government of Iraq	IS	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Iraq
Government of Mali	CMA	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Mali
Government of Mali	AQIM	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Mali
Government of Niger	IS	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Niger
Government of Nigeria	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Nigeria
Government of Nigeria	IS	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Nigeria
Government of Pakistan	TTP	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Pakistan
Government of Somalia	Al-Shabaab	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Somalia
Government of South Sudan	SPLM/A In Opposition	Internationalized Internal Conflict	South Sudan
Government of Syria	Syrian insurgents	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Syria
Government of Syria	IS	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Syria
Government of Uganda	ADF	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Uganda
Government of Ukraine	United Armed Forces of Novorossiia	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Ukraine
Government of Yemen (North Yemen)	Ansarallah, AQAP, Forces of Hadi	Internationalized Internal Conflict	Yemen (North Yemen)

## APPENDIX TWO: NON STATE GROUPS

Side	Best Fatality Estimate	Low Fatality Estimate	High Fatality Estimate	Location
IS	292	285	420	Afghanistan
Taleban	134	134	135	Afghanistan
MEK	26	26	26	Iraq
Hezbollah	46	11	46	Lebanon
Birom	117	117	123	Nigeria
Dinka	100	100	100	South Sudan
Fulani	27	27	35	Nigeria
Habaniya	198	198	198	Sudan
Ma'aliyah	252	171	252	Sudan
Nuer	100	100	100	South Sudan
Supporters of PDP	39	39	45	Nigeria
Pokot	102	102	129	Kenya
Rizeigat Abbala	29	23	29	Sudan
Falata	245	245	245	Sudan
Turkana	102	102	129	Kenya
Rizeigat Baggara	198	198	198	Sudan
Sinaloa Cartel	130	130	292	Mexico
Gulf Cartel	221	221	606	Mexico
Juarez Cartel	38	38	946	Mexico
Tijuana Cartel	130	130	292	Mexico
AQAP	115	115	119	Yemen (North Yemen)
Samburu	50	50	50	Kenya
Touareg	75	75	77	Libya
Jukun	27	27	35	Nigeria
Salamat Baggara	245	245	245	Sudan
Ngok Dinka	47	46	47	Sudan
Luac Jang Dinka	92	92	94	South Sudan
Christians (Nigeria)	48	48	48	Nigeria
Muslims (Nigeria)	48	48	48	Nigeria
Misseriya	29	23	29	Sudan
Tiv	44	44	54	Nigeria
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad	39	39	39	Nigeria
Los Zetas	221	221	606	Mexico
Beltrán Leyva Cartel	32	32	247	Mexico
Thiyic Dinka	92	92	94	South Sudan
Jalisco Cartel New Generation	55	55	55	Mexico
Cartel Independiente de Acapulco	754	41	754	Mexico
La Barredora	754	41	754	Mexico




Ansar Dine	36	36	36	Mali
CMA	36	36	36	Mali
Deebam	29	29	29	Nigeria
Deewell	29	29	29	Nigeria
Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham	46	11	46	Lebanon
Black Axe	32	32	32	Nigeria
Kuteb	64	64	64	Nigeria
Eyie	38	38	38	Nigeria
Maphite	25	25	27	Nigeria
Guerreros Unidos	72	72	103	Mexico
Los Rojos	72	72	103	Mexico
Christians (CAR)	108	108	108	Central African Republic
Muslims (CAR)	108	108	108	Central African Republic
Al-Zayadia	127	127	127	Sudan
Berti	127	127	127	Sudan
al-Toubou	75	75	77	Libya
Yan Gora	39	39	39	Nigeria
Agatu	168	117	190	Nigeria
anti-Balaka	147	147	170	Central African Republic
Jaysh al-Mukhtar	26	26	26	Iraq
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council	428	418	430	Libya
Supporters of APC	39	39	45	Nigeria
Forces of the House of Representatives	348	343	368	Libya
UPC	147	147	170	Central African Republic
Los Ardillos	56	56	69	Mexico
Harkat Hazm	192	192	192	Syria
Forces of Mullah Abdol Rauf Ahmadi	50	50	50	Afghanistan
High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate	134	134	135	Afghanistan
Forces of Hadi	115	115	119	Yemen (North Yemen)
Shohadaa al-Yarmouk	226	225	230	Syria
SDF	89	89	89	Syria
Jaysh al-Jihad	78	78	78	Syria
IS, High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate	56	50	138	Afghanistan
Rup Dinka	78	78	78	South Sudan
Kuei Dinka, Pakam Dinka	78	78	78	South Sudan
FSA, PYD	226	226	226	Syria

Derna Mujahideen Shura Council	133	122	139	Libya
Aknaf Bait al-Maqdis, FSA, Jaysh al-Islam, PFLP-GC, PLO	134	120	202	Syria
Jaysh al Fatah Idlib	57	57	57	Syria
Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham	226	225	230	Syria
Eastern Qalamoun Operations Room	144	144	145	Syria
Ajdabiya Revolutionaries Shura Council	26	26	26	Libya
Euphrates Vulcano, Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham	78	78	78	Syria
Fatah Halab, Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham	89	89	89	Syria
Sinaloa Cartel - Los Memos faction	41	41	41	Mexico
Sinaloa Cartel - Los Salazar faction	41	41	41	Mexico
Sinaloa Cartel - Damaso faction	54	54	62	Mexico
Sinaloa Cartel - Los 28 faction	61	61	69	Mexico

## APPENDIX THREE: CIVILIAN DEATHS

In this first set of tables, the total deaths of civilians is rising even as the total conflicts decreases, indicating an increased lethality, if not targeting, for civilians.



**Figure 22.** The number of civilian deaths has been steadily, if slowly, increasing every year... Melander, Erik and Therése Pettersson & Lotta Themnér (2016) *Organized violence, 1989-2015. Journal of Peace Research* 53:5(2016):727-742.



**Figure 23.** While the number of conflicts has been decreasing. Melander, Erik and Therése Pettersson & Lotta Themnér (2016) *Organized violence, 1989-2015. Journal of Peace Research* 53:5(2016):727-742.

Be aggregating the conflicts, such as the U.S. global war on terror, as opposed to de-aggregation in the first set, the trend of lethality against civilians becomes even more pronounced.




Figure 24. Melander, Erik and Therése Pettersson & Lotta Themnér (2016) Organized violence, 1989-2015. Journal of Peace Research 53:5(2016):727-742.




Figure 25. If the various military conflicts in the U.S. war on terror are counted together, as would be the Russian wars in the Ukrain, then the decrease in the number of conflicts decreases even more precipitously. Melander, Erik and Therése Pettersson & Lotta Themnér (2016) Organized violence, 1989-2015. Journal of Peace Research 53:5(2016):727-742.

## APPENDIX FOUR: COLLECTED QUOTATIONS

### CHAPTER ONE: WAR WRIT LARGE

"The condition of man... is a condition of war of everyone against everyone."  
Thomas Hobbes

"The fortunes of war are always doubtful."  
Seneca

"Fortune favors the brave."  
Terence

"It is pleasant, when the sea is high and the winds are dashing the waves about, to watch from the shores the struggles of another."  
Lucretius

"The strong did what they could, and the weak suffered what they must."  
Thucydides, *The Melian Dialogue*

"The wise man speaks because he has something to say, the fool because he has to say something."  
Aristotle

### CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

"The sinews of war are endless money."  
Vegetius

"Let them hate us as long as they fear us."  
Caligula

"Liberalism is trust of the people tempered by prudence."  
William Gladstone

"Force always attracts men of low morality."  
Albert Einstein

"International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power."  
Hans Morgenthau

"War gives the right of the conquerors to impose any conditions they please upon the vanquished."  
Gaius Julius Caesar

"We make war that we may live in peace."  
Aristotle

"The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home."

James Madison

### CHAPTER THREE: REGULAR WAR

"Before all else, be armed."

Machiavelli

"Not creating delusions is enlightenment."

Bodhidharma

"What coast knows not our blood?"

Horace

"How could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?"

Plato, *The Allegory of the Cave*

"Men grow tired of sleep, love, singing and dancing sooner than war."

Homer

### CHAPTER FOUR: CLAUSEWITZIAN WAR

"War can be a matter of degree."

Clausewitz

"You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want, or wish to have at a later time."

Donald Rumsfeld, 2004.

"When you have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail."

Anonymous

"A soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon."

Napoleon

### CHAPTER FIVE: IRREGULAR WAR

"And how can man die better than facing fearful odds; for the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods."

Thomas Babington Macaulay, *Horatius at the Bridge*

Their frail deeds might have danced in a green bay.

Dylan Thomas, *Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night*

"It is the cause, not the death that makes the martyr."

Napoleon

"All warfare is based on deception."

Sun Tzu

"We are the hollow men; We are the stuffed men, leaning together."  
T.S. Eliot, *The Hollow Men*

## CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDIES

"We have reached an important point where the end begins to come into view."  
Westmoreland, General, U.S.A, 1967.

"For a colonized people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity."  
Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*

"One cannot waken the dead."  
Ho Chi Minh, President, North Vietnam

"A dead body revenges not injuries."  
William Blake, *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*

## CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS

"They make a solitude and call it peace."  
Tacitus

"All revolutions eat their own children."  
Earnest Rohm

"To those that flee comes neither power nor glory."  
Homer

"Woe to the vanquished."  
Livy

## CHAPTER EIGHT: THE WEST GOES TO WAR

"Truth has arrived and falsehood has perished."  
Mohammed, *Surah Banee Isra'eel*

"We took our eye off the ball when we invaded Iraq."  
Obama, President, 2009.

"Major combat operations in Iraq have ended."  
Bush, President, 2003.

"Words are uttered, but fail to enlighten."  
Aldous Huxley, *The Doors of Perception*

## CHAPTER NINE: PREEMPTION

"Man is a wolf to man"

Thomas Hobbes, *The Citizen*

"War, as the saying goes, is full of false alarms."

Aristotle

"War is cruelty; the crueler it is, the sooner it will be over."

Sherman, General, U.S.A., 1864

"So this is a just war - a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense."

Barack Obama, President, 2013

"So ends the bloody business of the day."

Homer, *Odyssey*

#### CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS

"The end of the fight is a tombstone white, With the name of the late deceased; And the epitaph drear; A fool lies here, who tried to hustle the East."

Rudyard Kipling, *The Naulahka*

"Finally, from so little sleeping and so much reading, his brain dried up and he went completely out of his mind."

Miquel de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*



## APPENDIX FIVE: TALIBAN RULES

The following list is compiled from Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reports collected from Radio Voice of Shari'ah and various documents from the General Department of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice and the Ministry of Justice in Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> When asked if it was permissible to beat a woman under Sharia, Mowlawi Mohammad Salim Haqqani, deputy minister for promotion of virtue and prevention of vice replied that "according to rules and regulations approved by the learned Ulema and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan we might get tough with the woman in order to protect her honour and dignity."<sup>2</sup> Well... we had to destroy the town in order to save it...

- //prohibition against female exposure [or being outside without burka and male relative];
- //prohibition against music;
- //prohibition against shaving;
- //mandatory prayer;
- //prohibition against the rearing of pigeons and bird fighting;
- //eradication of narcotics and the users thereof;
- //prohibition against kite flying;
- //prohibition against the reproduction of pictures;
- //prohibition against gambling;
- //prohibition against British and American hairstyles;
- //prohibition on interest on loans, exchange charges, and charges on transactions;
- //prohibition against [women] washing clothes by the river embankments;
- //prohibition against music and dancing at weddings;
- //prohibition against playing drums;
- //prohibition against [male] tailors sewing women's clothes or taking measurements of women;
- //prohibition against witchcraft.
- //female nurses and other female staff are not allowed to enter any male patient's room.
- //punishment for shaving or trimming beards is ten days in custody, which can be reduced if the offender passes an exam on the basics of religion;
- //prayers in congregation is an obligation;
- //taking photographs or paintings featuring people and animals is strictly prohibited;
- //private authorities are responsible for veiling women. Women who leave their houses must be escorted from their homes by very close relatives. Women may not leave their houses alone;
- //drivers and owners of private cars do not have the right to transport women unless their very close relatives are present;

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/community/opensource\\_gov\\_home/240](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/community/opensource_gov_home/240)

<sup>2</sup> Afghan Taleban Official on Virtue, Vice, FTS20000120001312 Kabul Hewad in Pashto 18 Dec 99 page 1-3, [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_203\\_121123\\_43/content/Display/FTS20000120001312#index=1&searchKey=25065236&rpp=10](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/FTS20000120001312#index=1&searchKey=25065236&rpp=10)

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